For a scientific concept of consciousness

[Speakpigeon]

I want to have a definition of consciousness that scientifically minded people could agree on.

To give an idea of the difficulty, here is the definition provided by my Oxford dictionary:

The totality of a person's thoughts and feelings.

This definition is reminiscent of Descartes explicitation of the "I" as he expounded on the Cogito "I think, therefore I am" but it may not be very useful for any scientific investigation of consciousness.

There are other interesting definitions that seem relevant:

6. the mental activity of which a person is aware, contrasted with unconscious thought.

7. (Philosophy) the mind or the mental faculties, characterized by thought, feelings, and volition.

Obviously people can report being aware of their thoughts for example but they won't be able to say whether they are aware of the activity of a part of their brain as shown on a brain scan.

So, how could we define consciousness in such a way that it would make sense to investigate this kind of consciousness scientifically?

I'm aware that there are scientists who already work on consciousness but I don't think they've bothered to provide a specific definition of the object of their investigations.


So, first, I'd like you to post what you think is the best definition of consciousness you know.

Thank also to comment on other people's definitions so we can get a sense of where we're going.

And then we'll see if it becomes practical to do a poll.

Thank you for your contributions.
EB

 

[DBT]

''Consciousness'' appears to represent the ability of a brain to construct a virtual model of the external world and self, our place within our environment during any given moment of conscious experience. The content of consciousness being composed of a collection of features and abilities, sensory awareness, recognition/ memory function, feelings relating to internal conditions, hunger, thirst, etc, thoughts relating to external conditions with the drive, the will or impulse to act, a set of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours developed over a lifetime of experience.

 

[Peez]

Speakpigeon:
I'm aware that there are scientists who already work on consciousness but I don't think they've bothered to provide a specific definition of the object of their investigations.

What definitions, or at least the closest things to definitions, have they provided?

Peez

 

[Speakpigeon]

Speakpigeon:
I'm aware that there are scientists who already work on consciousness but I don't think they've bothered to provide a specific definition of the object of their investigations.

What definitions, or at least the closest things to definitions, have they provided?

Peez

I expect there are many scientists working on this now, but here are two of the most well known, Christof Koch & Francis Crick, together with the relevant abstract of a paper published in 1990, which gives a broad indication of their perspective.

Visual awareness is a favorable form of consciousness to study neurobiologically. We propose that it takes two forms: a very fast form, linked to iconic memory, that may be difficult to study; and a somewhat slower one involving visual attention and short-term memory. In the slower form an attentional mechanism transiently binds together all those neurons whose activity relates to the relevant features of a single visual object. We suggest this is done by generating coherent semi-synchronous oscillations, probably in the 40-70 Hz range. These oscillations then activate a transient short-term (working) memory. We outfit several lines of experimental work that might advance the understanding of the neural mechanisms involved. The neural basis of very short-term memory especially needs more experimental study.

Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness.
Available at https://www.researchgate.net/public...L-aAoOgKwy3qI8bsArPjSZdjk3wZqYn-W18Fits4gKQD4.

And at https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/SCBCFD.pdf

Christof Koch is Chief Scientific Officer at the Allen Institute for Brain Science

Francis Crick (1916 – 2004) British molecular biologist, biophysicist, and neuroscientist, co-discoverer of the structure of the DNA molecule in 1953 with James Watson

Here, too, is a relevant quote from the same:

We did not attempt to define consciousness itself because of the dangers of premature definition.
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/theproblem.pdf

Obviously, that's just one example.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

I want to have a definition of consciousness that scientifically minded people could agree on.

To give an idea of the difficulty, here is the definition provided by my Oxford dictionary:


This definition is reminiscent of Descartes explicitation of the "I" as he expounded on the Cogito "I think, therefore I am" but it may not be very useful for any scientific investigation of consciousness.

There are other interesting definitions that seem relevant:

6. the mental activity of which a person is aware, contrasted with unconscious thought.

7. (Philosophy) the mind or the mental faculties, characterized by thought, feelings, and volition.

Obviously people can report being aware of their thoughts for example but they won't be able to say whether they are aware of the activity of a part of their brain as shown on a brain scan.

So, how could we define consciousness in such a way that it would make sense to investigate this kind of consciousness scientifically? ...

I'll ante-up -
First we need to define terms such as the I, and person (which I've bolded in the quote). We can easily come up with some objective definiton of these things, but that still doesn't necessarily explain the subjective experience in scientific terms. I still won't know what you mean when you say something appears to be "red". We may understand why one color appears to be distinct from another. But why is red "red"??

I think what we call the "I" is just a model of the self. That is, a concept that the brain creates in order to understand and adapt to its environment. But it's only a concept. In principle it can't have subjective experience. It can only have such things attributed to it. Perhaps this occurs as a way of explaining the behavior exhibited by other persons it encounters from earliest childhood on. And in learning to identify one's own personhood with these others we imbue the "I" with a kind of first-person awareness. Perhaps conscious experience is a sort of myth in that it's another concept formed from the various ways cultures have found to deal with individual responcibility and the necessity of some sort of soul for which to base accountability (another Platonic form?).

The term "person" is perhaps just a broader more inclusive way to characterize oneself and others and so includes more general attributes such as physical particulars and even one's associations, values, and possessions (when taken in a legal sense). Still, these also become incorporated into one's self image and have their particular influence over how the brain shapes the "I".

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'll ante-up -
First we need to define terms such as the I, and person (which I've bolded in the quote).

Not necessarily first. It will depend on your definition of consciousness.

We can easily come up with some objective definiton of these things, but that still doesn't necessarily explain the subjective experience in scientific terms.

The science will only have to explain what would have been defined so as to be explained. I'm not sure any scientist would want to go into subjective experience.

I still won't know what you mean when you say something appears to be "red". We may understand why one color appears to be distinct from another. But why is red "red"??

Absolutely.

I think we don't know whether our respective reds are really all the same as is ordinarily assumed.

Still, maybe you can agree this cannot be part of the scientific investigation. It's for you to choose whether to include this aspect or not.

I think what we call the "I" is just a model of the self. That is, a concept that the brain creates in order to understand and adapt to its environment. But it's only a concept. In principle it can't have subjective experience. It can only have such things attributed to it. Perhaps this occurs as a way of explaining the behavior exhibited by other persons it encounters from earliest childhood on. And in learning to identify one's own personhood with these others we imbue the "I" with a kind of first-person awareness. Perhaps conscious experience is a sort of myth in that it's another concept formed from the various ways cultures have found to deal with individual responcibility and the necessity of some sort of soul for which to base accountability (another Platonic form?).

I take this as someone thinking aloud before formulating a proper definition of consciousness. Some scientists are already investigating consciousness. The question is whether we can articulate what it is we think we are investigating in this case.

The term "person" is perhaps just a broader more inclusive way to characterize oneself and others and so includes more general attributes such as physical particulars and even one's associations, values, and possessions (when taken in a legal sense). Still, these also become incorporated into one's self image and have their particular influence over how the brain shapes the "I".

I haven't required you to include things like the "I", the "self" or the "person" in your definition.

Also, I leave it to those reasonably scientifically minded here to arrive at a consensus. Personally, I'm not qualified. Some scientists, perhaps even many scientists, are already working on consciousness. So, presumably, these people think it's a workable proposition although it may be too early right now. It's up to you all to decide.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

Not necessarily first. It will depend on your definition of consciousness. ...

What else can consciousness refer to than the subjective experience? And to say that "I think" or "I am conscious" it seems like a reasonable starting place to define what we mean by "I" or the "person", whether one is a scientist or a philosopher. I did that in my first reply. Then I went on to describe a unique perspective from which to approach the issue. It's a philosophical point, but it would require science to confirm. But that's what philosophy does. It suggests or clarifies issues in order that scientists might explore new approaches to a problem while avoiding classic missteps in logic.

 

[fromderinside]

I want to have a definition of consciousness that scientifically minded people could agree on.

EB

OK. Science approaches questions first by observation of qualities found operative during what observers call conscious then finds ways to parse these terms into experiment on structure and function manipulable with respect to these terms. Soon models are formed, opreable mechanisms are investigated testing these models, leading to formation of new models based upon research conducted. This goes on until global theories are constructed based on consistent findings into a model is testable on and predicting actual human experience.

The first definition provided here is

A clinically relevant definition of consciousness

Normal human consciousness is defined as the presence of a wakeful arousal state and the awareness and motivation to respond to self and/or environmental events. In the intact brain, arousal is the overall level of responsiveness to environmental stimuli. Arousal has a physiological range from stage 3 non-REM sleep, where strong stimuli are required to elicit a response, to states of high vigilance, where subtle stimuli can be detected and acted upon2. While arousal is the global state of responsiveness, awareness is the brain’s ability to perceive specific environmental stimuli in different domains, including visual, somatosensory, auditory, and interoceptive (e.g. visceral and body position). The focal loss of awareness, such as language awareness in aphasia or spatial awareness in left-sided neglect, does not significantly impair awareness in other modalities. Motivation is the drive to act upon internal or external stimuli that have entered conscious awareness. In the next section, we describe the brain regions that support these three aspects of consciousness and show that they are not independent, but rather heavily interact with each other.

This definition above gives a pretty global perspective joining information from many neurscientific threads.

 

[rousseau]

OK. Science approaches questions first by observation of qualities found operative during what observers call conscious then finds ways to parse these terms into experiment on structure and function manipulable with respect to these terms. Soon models are formed, opreable mechanisms are investigated testing these models, leading to formation of new models based upon research conducted. This goes on until global theories are constructed based on consistent findings into a model is testable on and predicting actual human experience.

The first definition provided here is

A clinically relevant definition of consciousness

[FONT=&]Normal human consciousness is defined as the presence of a wakeful [/FONT]arousal[FONT=&] state and the [/FONT]awareness[FONT=&] and [/FONT]motivation[FONT=&] to respond to self and/or environmental events. In the intact brain, [/FONT]arousal[FONT=&] is the overall level of responsiveness to environmental stimuli. Arousal has a physiological range from stage 3 non-REM sleep, where strong stimuli are required to elicit a response, to states of high vigilance, where subtle stimuli can be detected and acted upon[/FONT][FONT=&]2[/FONT][FONT=&]. While arousal is the global state of responsiveness, [/FONT]awareness[FONT=&] is the brain’s ability to perceive specific environmental stimuli in different domains, including visual, somatosensory, auditory, and interoceptive (e.g. visceral and body position). The focal loss of awareness, such as language awareness in aphasia or spatial awareness in left-sided neglect, does not significantly impair awareness in other modalities. [/FONT]Motivation[FONT=&] is the drive to act upon internal or external stimuli that have entered conscious awareness. In the next section, we describe the brain regions that support these three aspects of consciousness and show that they are not independent, but rather heavily interact with each other.[/FONT]

This definition above gives a pretty global perspective joining information from many neurscientific threads.

This is pretty good.

Lots of people seem to want to 'mystify' consciousness (find a God in there), but it's not that complicated. The brain is oriented to perceive the immediate environment toward the end of survival. The senses funnel events to one's awareness in order for the subject to react. It need not be any more complicated than that.

 

[fromderinside]

The full article.

Consciousness: Its Neurobiology and the Major Classes of Impairment https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3222861/

 

[untermensche]

Normal human consciousness requires brainstem, basal forebrain, and diencephalic areas to support generalized arousal, as well as functioning thalamocortical networks to become aware of, and respond to environmental and internal stimuli...

The scientists can only tell you what a consciousness can do, based on their subjective experience and the subjective reports of others, and what parts of the brain seem to be involved.

They know the brain somehow creates the experience of vision because they and others can see.

That is the state of scientific understanding.

 

[DBT]

Quote;

1) What is the neural substrate of conscious experience? While William James (1842-1910) concluded that it was the entire brain (1), recent approaches have attempted to narrow the focus: are there neurons endowed with a special location or intrinsic property that are necessary and sufficient for conscious experience? Does primary visual cortex contribute to conscious experience? Are brain areas that project directly to prefrontal cortex more relevant than those that do not (2)? Although heuristically useful, these approaches leave a fundamental problem unresolved: How could the possession of some particular anatomical location or biochemical feature render some neurons so privileged that their activity gives rise to subjective experience? Conferring this property on neurons seems to constitute a category error, in the sense of ascribing to things properties they cannot have (3).

2) The authors pursue a different approach. Instead of arguing whether a particular brain area or group of neurons contributes to consciousness or not, their strategy is to characterize the kinds of neural processes that might account for key properties of conscious experience. The authors emphasize two properties: conscious experience is integrated (each conscious scene is unified) and at the same time it is highly differentiated (within a short time, one can experience any of a huge number of different conscious states). Neurobiological data indicates that neural processes associated with conscious experience are highly integrated and highly differentiated.

3) Consciousness, as William James pointed out, is not a thing, but a process or stream that is changing on a time scale of fractions of seconds (1). As he emphasized, a fundamental aspect of the stream of consciousness is that it is highly unified or integrated. Integration is a property shared by every conscious experience irrespective of its specific content: Each conscious state comprises a single "scene" that cannot be decomposed into independent components (5). Integration is best appreciated by considering the impossibility of conceiving of a conscious scene that is not integrated, that is, one which is not experienced from a single point of view. A striking demonstration is given by split-brain patients performing a spatial memory task in which two independent sequences of visuospatial positions were presented, one to the left and one to the right hemisphere. In these patients, each hemisphere perceived a separate, simple visual problem and the subjects were able to solve the double task well. Normal subjects could not treat the two independent visual sequences as independent, parallel tasks. Instead, they combined the visual information into a single conscious scene and into a single, large problem that was much more difficult to solve.

4) In summary: Conventional approaches to understanding consciousness are generally concerned with the contribution of specific brain areas or groups of neurons. By contrast, the authors consider what kinds of neural processes can account for key properties of conscious experience. Applying measures of neural integration and complexity, together with an analysis of extensive neurological data, leads to a testable proposal -- the dynamic core hypothesis -- about the properties of the neural substrate of consciousness.(4)

 

[Speakpigeon]

Not necessarily first. It will depend on your definition of consciousness. ...

What else can consciousness refer to than the subjective experience?

Where have you been all those years? There's a long-standing conventional distinction between 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'access consciousness'. No? Subjective experience is probably what people mean by phenomenal consciousness. I also call that 'subjective consciousness' to distinguish it from 'objective consciousness', which seems like access consciousness, I think, and which is what most scientists are usually prepared to talk about.

So, yeah, lots of people think of consciousness as something else than subjective experience.

Personally, it baffles me but that's the situation. And you only have to look up a dictionary to see that 'consciousness' is polysemous.

And to say that "I think" or "I am conscious" it seems like a reasonable starting place to define what we mean by "I" or the "person", whether one is a scientist or a philosopher. I did that in my first reply.

And that may not be the only one conceivable but it's still a perfectly legitimate approach. Now it's up to you to try and articulate a definition that would be scientifically operational while taking into account the notion of subjective experience. Isn't that the real difficulty?

Then I went on to describe a unique perspective from which to approach the issue. It's a philosophical point, but it would require science to confirm. But that's what philosophy does. It suggests or clarifies issues in order that scientists might explore new approaches to a problem while avoiding classic missteps in logic.

The misstep I want to preclude is to start with a definition that would not be scientifically operational.

There's also no shortage of philosophy on consciousness. What is missing is a coherent definition that science could use.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

OK. Science approaches questions first by observation of qualities found operative during what observers call conscious then finds ways to parse these terms into experiment on structure and function manipulable with respect to these terms. Soon models are formed, opreable mechanisms are investigated testing these models, leading to formation of new models based upon research conducted. This goes on until global theories are constructed based on consistent findings into a model is testable on and predicting actual human experience.

The first definition provided here is

A clinically relevant definition of consciousness

[FONT=&]Normal human consciousness is defined as the presence of a wakeful [/FONT]arousal[FONT=&] state and the [/FONT]awareness[FONT=&] and [/FONT]motivation[FONT=&] to respond to self and/or environmental events. In the intact brain, [/FONT]arousal[FONT=&] is the overall level of responsiveness to environmental stimuli. Arousal has a physiological range from stage 3 non-REM sleep, where strong stimuli are required to elicit a response, to states of high vigilance, where subtle stimuli can be detected and acted upon[/FONT][FONT=&]2[/FONT][FONT=&]. While arousal is the global state of responsiveness, [/FONT]awareness[FONT=&] is the brain’s ability to perceive specific environmental stimuli in different domains, including visual, somatosensory, auditory, and interoceptive (e.g. visceral and body position). The focal loss of awareness, such as language awareness in aphasia or spatial awareness in left-sided neglect, does not significantly impair awareness in other modalities. [/FONT]Motivation[FONT=&] is the drive to act upon internal or external stimuli that have entered conscious awareness. In the next section, we describe the brain regions that support these three aspects of consciousness and show that they are not independent, but rather heavily interact with each other.[/FONT]

This definition above gives a pretty global perspective joining information from many neurscientific threads.

That's interesting but why is awareness defined here as "the brain’s ability to perceive" (specific environmental stimuli) rather than as perception itself. Why do we need the word ability in there? Me, I think that having the ability to perceive X is not at all being aware of X. Could you elaborate?

Also, I don't see here the case where we just think about something without attending to what's going on around us... Say, I am imagining meeting with a friend next Friday. This, I believe, qualifies as a conscious process but the case doesn't seem to appear in the extract you provided here. What do you think?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Quote;

All I get from your link is "find a tutor"! Right...

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Is it just me?
EB

 

[fromderinside]

That's interesting but why is awareness defined here as "the brain’s ability to perceive" (specific environmental stimuli) rather than as perception itself. Why do we need the word ability in there? Me, I think that having the ability to perceive X is not at all being aware of X. Could you elaborate?

Also, I don't see here the case where we just think about something without attending to what's going on around us... Say, I am imagining meeting with a friend next Friday. This, I believe, qualifies as a conscious process but the case doesn't seem to appear in the extract you provided here. What do you think?
EB

What does it tell you when one says the brain perceives. To me that means the brain is seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, interocepting, etc. The brain doesn't do that. There are no perception organs. The brain processes information. Within sense modality, the brain processes that flavor of information. The form of processing is both specific and integrative. There are descending process from cortex to ear as there are ascending processes from ear to cortex, interacting at every level and between sense and action.

When we were searching for the seat of learning we looked within each modality. We found that input was being modified by outgoing signals at every ascending sense level of processing. Learning was ongoing throughout each sense, every sense was treating information to and from every other sense as well. So pointing to, say the superior olive we found modified responses there to new signals being sent from traces of previous and other sense information. That organ is not the seat of learning. It is an area where certain aspects of auditory and visual information are treated for association with other parts of whatever one is sensing.

So when we find 19 areas in cortex that are processing visual spatial information, providing representations of what is input as virtual representation, maps, of what the eye is taking in in a coherent mapping. We know some of these areas exchange information with position and language centers coordinating virtual scenes.

The brain doesn't work as a computer nor does it have essences of reality. It is an organ processing input, history, similarity, size, etc. for which it is equipped with processes that selects and presents to what the human attends all the while processing other information to which the observer may not be able to report because is isn't that to which one is aware. Fortunately we've found rules for what is raised up to awareness and how information is represented there. Some call this consciousness.

 

[untermensche]

What else can consciousness refer to than the subjective experience?

Where have you been all those years? There's a long-standing conventional distinction between 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'access consciousness'. No? Subjective experience is probably what people mean by phenomenal consciousness. I also call that 'subjective consciousness' to distinguish it from 'objective consciousness', which seems like access consciousness, I think, and which is what most scientists are usually prepared to talk about.

I see no distinction, besides different words used.

How is objective consciousness different from the consciousness you experience (your subjective experience of consciousness)?

What is the distinction between the two?

A scientific explanation of consciousness MUST explain how and why you experience what you experience.

Anything less is playing around.

 

[Peez]

What definitions, or at least the closest things to definitions, have they provided?

Peez

I expect there are many scientists working on this now, but here are two of the most well known, Christof Koch & Francis Crick, together with the relevant abstract of a paper published in 1990, which gives a broad indication of their perspective.

Visual awareness is a favorable form of consciousness to study neurobiologically. We propose that it takes two forms: a very fast form, linked to iconic memory, that may be difficult to study; and a somewhat slower one involving visual attention and short-term memory. In the slower form an attentional mechanism transiently binds together all those neurons whose activity relates to the relevant features of a single visual object. We suggest this is done by generating coherent semi-synchronous oscillations, probably in the 40-70 Hz range. These oscillations then activate a transient short-term (working) memory. We outfit several lines of experimental work that might advance the understanding of the neural mechanisms involved. The neural basis of very short-term memory especially needs more experimental study.

Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness.
Available at https://www.researchgate.net/public...L-aAoOgKwy3qI8bsArPjSZdjk3wZqYn-W18Fits4gKQD4.

And at https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/SCBCFD.pdf

Christof Koch is Chief Scientific Officer at the Allen Institute for Brain Science

Francis Crick (1916 – 2004) British molecular biologist, biophysicist, and neuroscientist, co-discoverer of the structure of the DNA molecule in 1953 with James Watson

Here, too, is a relevant quote from the same:

We did not attempt to define consciousness itself because of the dangers of premature definition.
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/theproblem.pdf

Obviously, that's just one example.
EB

Thank you. It is a little out of date, but Dr. Koch still thought in 2009 at least that a good definition of consciousness remained elusive: "But how can consciousness—the notorious ineffable and ethereal stuff that can’t even be rigorously defined—be measured?" and "Instead of arguing with people about whether or not they are conscious of grammatical rules or when these rules are violated, wagering means that we can study consciousness without having an agreed-on formal definition of consciousness." <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/understanding-consciousness-measure-more-argue-less/>

Peez

 

[Peez]

All I get from your link is "find a tutor"! Right...

And Google seems to agree...

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Is it just me?
EB

Nope, me too.

Peez

 

[Speakpigeon]

That's interesting but why is awareness defined here as "the brain’s ability to perceive" (specific environmental stimuli) rather than as perception itself. Why do we need the word ability in there? Me, I think that having the ability to perceive X is not at all being aware of X. Could you elaborate?

Also, I don't see here the case where we just think about something without attending to what's going on around us... Say, I am imagining meeting with a friend next Friday. This, I believe, qualifies as a conscious process but the case doesn't seem to appear in the extract you provided here. What do you think?
EB

What does it tell you when one says the brain perceives. To me that means the brain is seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, interocepting, etc. The brain doesn't do that. There are no perception organs. The brain processes information. Within sense modality, the brain processes that flavor of information. The form of processing is both specific and integrative. There are descending process from cortex to ear as there are ascending processes from ear to cortex, interacting at every level and between sense and action.

When we were searching for the seat of learning we looked within each modality. We found that input was being modified by outgoing signals at every ascending sense level of processing. Learning was ongoing throughout each sense, every sense was treating information to and from every other sense as well. So pointing to, say the superior olive we found modified responses there to new signals being sent from traces of previous and other sense information. That organ is not the seat of learning. It is an area where certain aspects of auditory and visual information are treated for association with other parts of whatever one is sensing.

So when we find 19 areas in cortex that are processing visual spatial information, providing representations of what is input as virtual representation, maps, of what the eye is taking in in a coherent mapping. We know some of these areas exchange information with position and language centers coordinating virtual scenes.

The brain doesn't work as a computer nor does it have essences of reality. It is an organ processing input, history, similarity, size, etc. for which it is equipped with processes that selects and presents to what the human attends all the while processing other information to which the observer may not be able to report because is isn't that to which one is aware. Fortunately we've found rules for what is raised up to awareness and how information is represented there. Some call this consciousness.

This looks like seriously pent up expertise. You must be terribly frustrated no one seems interested!

And indeed, it wasn't what I was asking for. Could you please pay attention to what people are actually saying?


Still, you seem here to question the validity of very proposition you yourself initially submitted. I'm confused.

Anyway, I guess the definition you really want to submit is this logorrhea of your expertise where, as far as I can tell, the notion of consciousness is reductively reduced to strings of zeroes and ones processed by a human computer.

Well, if this can motivate a consensus here, why not.

We'll see what other people are motivated to say on this.
EB