For a scientific concept of consciousness

[bilby]

phenomenal (or subjective) consciousness

In other words, consciousness.

access (or objective) consciousness

In other words, how consciousness happens.

Scientists decided early on to investigate access consciousness, for the obvious reason that it looked the only reasonable proposition. That's at least my understanding of the story.

Yes they started with the idea they would explain how conscious experience occurs, how consciousness happens.

But they found that to be harder than originally thought.

But they are still working, but have no understanding of how cells can generate conscious experience and something that experiences.

So, who are the scientists doing what you say and where is the evidence of that?
EB

That is not how it works.

YOU have to respond.

If you can.

All you do is dodge and avoid and pretend to know something.

What I wrote needs no support. It is self evident because I really, truly believe it with all my heart.

FTFY.

 

[untermensche]

What I wrote needs no support. It is self evident because I really, truly believe it with all my heart.

FTFY.

Yeah, sure you did.

Here is what I wrote:

Yes they started with the idea they would explain how conscious experience occurs, how consciousness happens.

But they found that to be harder than originally thought.

But they are still working, but have no understanding of how cells can generate conscious experience and something that experiences.

What about that is not self evident?

Actual arguments, not emojis are necessary.

 

[bilby]

FTFY.

Yeah, sure you did.

Here is what I wrote:

Yes they started with the idea they would explain how conscious experience occurs, how consciousness happens.

But they found that to be harder than originally thought.

But they are still working, but have no understanding of how cells can generate conscious experience and something that experiences.

What about that is not self evident?

Actual arguments, not emojis are necessary.

It is far from evident that you have a clue what others do or do not understand.



Your arguments of the form "I don't understand it, therefore nobody understands it, therefore I can call anyone who claims to understand it a liar" are fucking pathetic, and incredibly tiresome.

learn a new tune; We have all head this one before.

 

[untermensche]

You have worthless opinions only.

With nothing to back them up.

If you think you understand how the activity of cells results in conscious experience go ahead and write it up and win your Nobel Prize.

 

[fromderinside]

Does anyone else sense a troll on this thread?

 

[DBT]

All I get from your link is "find a tutor"! Right...

And Google seems to agree...

Find A Tutor
www.scienceweek.com/
Find a tutor online for free in minutes. Search by location, price, subject, student rating, and more!
‎Login · ‎Tutoring Jobs · ‎About Us - UniversityTutor.com · ‎Melbourne Tutoring

Is it just me?
EB

Sorry about that, I have had the article on file for some time for reference. It must have expired by now

 

[Speakpigeon]

Ok, if you're back to wakefulness status, we can try again to get relevant answers...

So, again, it's interesting what you say but, why is awareness defined here as "the brain’s ability to perceive" (specific environmental stimuli) rather than as perception itself, or something like that. Why do we need the word ability in there? Sure, consciousness presumably is an ability of the brain, but that's not the point. I think that having the ability to perceive X is not at all perceiving X. Any idea?

Also, I don't see here the case where we just think about something without attending to what's going on around us... Say, I am imagining meeting with a friend next Friday. This, I believe, qualifies as a conscious process but the case doesn't seem to appear in the extract you provided here. What do you think?
EB

Perceiving is what a human does. The ability to perceive is a capability that at least humans have.

Yeah, I'm sure I knew that already. But 'ability', or 'capability', does not imply doing what you can do. I've always been capable of jumping off from the twelfth floor and yet I never did (go figure). Consciousness is not an ability. It's something you actually do, call it perception or anything you like.

As for your last criticism I tried to point out that the definition presented encapsulated memory, dreaming, and self reflection when I spoke of midbrain involvement in awareness.

Ok, so I guess it's covered in your original proposition as "motivation to respond to self <snip> events".

Good enough for me.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Just a few examples of the current production that seem to be very large.

Phenomenal Awareness and Consciousness from a Neurobiological Perspective
https://www.researchgate.net/public...sciousness_from_a_Neurobiological_Perspective

ABSTRACT: It is proposed that phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and reapplying on themselves the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world. Search for the neuronal substrate of awareness therefore converges with the search for the cognitive mechanisms through which brains represent their environment. The hypothesis is put forward that the mammalian brain uses two complementary representational strategies. One consists of the generation of neurons responding selectively to particular constellations of features and is based on selective recombination of inputs in hierarchically structured feed-forward architectures. The other relies on the dynamic association of feature specific cells into functionally coherent cell assemblies which as a whole represent the constellation of features defining a particular perceptual object. Arguments are presented which favour the notion that the meta-representations supporting awareness are established according to the second strategy. Reviewing experimental data the question is then investigated whether evolved brains utilize assembly codes and if so how assemblies are defined. The hypothesis is forwarded that assemblies self-organize through transient synchronization of the discharges of the respective neurons and evidence is presented that the prerequisites for the occurrence of these synchronization phenomena on the one hand and for awareness on the other are similar. Furthermore, it is argued that self-consciousness cannot be explained in the same way as phenomenal awareness, because it requires for its emergence not only the generation of metarepresentations of the brain’s own cognitive operations but the dialogue between different brains through which these can become aware of their autonomy.

On why the unconscious prerequisites and consequences of consciousness might derail us from unraveling the neural correlates of consciousness
https://www.researchgate.net/public...veling_the_neural_correlates_of_consciousness

ABSTRACT: It has been proposed that one key step for solving the mystery of consciousness is to locate the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The experimental paradigms for revealing the NCC have commonly applied the contrast between conditions with and without conscious perception. However, such contrast does not exclusively reveal the neural processes directly related to conscious experience of the target but also the prerequisites for and the consequences of conscious perception. Therefore, understanding the neural bases of conscious experience requires the NCC to be experimentally disentangled from these confounding processes. Here we review some recent experimental developments and suggest some new empirical approaches for distilling the neural basis of conscious perception.

Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness
https://www.researchgate.net/public...fEd-qOEcVpiULYZ4xhKakfn7tlOx4CkySb_hfhJprSugg

Abstract: There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.

How Is Our Self Related to Its Brain? Neurophilosophical Concepts
https://www.researchgate.net/public...gSV5UfARsxtFrvZvreNWghFtfswed5BF2s-YPjW5T4qC4

Abstract: The present chapter aims to target yet another central feature of the mind: the self as the subject of all our experience and hence of consciousness. More specifically, the focus is on different concepts of the self and how they are related to recent findings about neural mechanisms related to the self-reference of stimuli. I first introduce different basic concepts of the self as they are currently discussed in philosophy. The first concept of self is the self as mental substance, which was introduced originally by Descartes. This is rejected by current and more empirically oriented concepts of the self where the idea of a mental substance is replaced by assuming specific self-representational capacities. These self-representational capacities represent the body’s and brain’s physical, neuronal states in a summarized, coordinated, and integrated way. As such, the self-representational concept of the self must be distinguished from the phenomenological concept of self that is supposed to be an integral part of the experience and thus of consciousness. This phenomenal self resurfaces in the current debate as the “minimal self”—a basic sense of self in our experience that is supposed to be closely related to both the brain and body. Current neuroscience investigates the spatial and temporal neural mechanisms underlying those stimuli that are closely related to the self when compared to the stimuli that show no relation or reference to the self. This is described as the self-reference effect. When comparing self- versus non-self-specific stimuli, neural activity in the middle regions of the brain, the so-called cortical midline structures, is increased. Moreover, increased neuronal synchronization in the gamma frequency domain can be observed. The question is how specific these findings are for the concept of self as discussed in philosophy. Neuronal specificity describes the specific and exclusive association of the midline regions with the self. This is not the case since the same regions are also associated with a variety of other functions. This goes along with the quest for the psychological and experimental specificity of psychological functions and experimental paradigms and measures used to test for the self. One may also raise the issue of phenomenal specificity: the concept of phenomenal specificity refers to whether the phenomenal features of the self, that is, minessness and belongingness, are distinguished from other phenomenal features like intentionality or qualia. Finally, one may discuss the question of conceptual specificity that targets the distinction between the concepts of self-reference and self.

 

[fromderinside]

Nice set of summaries Speakpigeon,

The last quote needlessly wraps itself around a self axle. That is not necessary since it is obvious that among the capabilities are both representation of self and, consequently with the aid of memory, an awareness of self. No one ever disputed the ability to be of two minds. For instance there is lots of evidence that one can speak to oneself, must actually, since subvocalization is at the base of "hearing" one's speech.

 

[untermensche]

Does anyone else sense a troll on this thread?

Yeah any idiot that thinks they know how cellular activity results in conscious experience is a stupid troll.

What you call a troll is anybody who questions your patent nonsense.

You have NO EXPERTISE in human consciousness.

You do not have a clue what it is beyond your subjective experience.

 

[untermensche]

Just a few examples of the current production that seem to be very large.

Yes the pile of bullshit is large.

Here is the first sentence from the first "study" you posted. You are posting this stuff so it is reasonable to assume you can explain it.

It is proposed that phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and reapplying on themselves the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world.....

Tell me what that means, since you present it as some explanation of something.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes the pile of bullshit is large.

Maybe it is bullshit, but you'd have to explain why it is bullshit.

Your posts are long in vituperations and the occasional abuse. They're also short on justification.

You'd have to do much better than that if you want to convince anyone.

But maybe it's not even what you're after.

Here is the first sentence from the first "study" you posted. You are posting this stuff so it is reasonable to assume you can explain it.

There's no reason to assume this. I didn't even initialled it.

I provided these abstracts to provide a sample of the perspectives of scientists on the subject.

It is proposed that phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and reapplying on themselves the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world.....

Tell me what that means, since you present it as some explanation of something.

No, I didn't. You would need to improve you reading and interpretative skills.

Still, it seems quite straightforward as to what is meant: The brain can observe itself thinking and then, think about that. Which is at least an interesting idea.

I would dispute the suggestion that "phenomenal awareness" is properly defined as "the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings", so I would also expect the paper is probably coming short on phenomenal awareness.

Now, with this thread, I didn't mean to lecture people on what to think about consciousness. Instead, I'm asking them about their views and to try and come up with a consensus on a scientific perspective on consciousness.

I'm perfectly aware of the gap between what we experience as conscious beings and any scientific explanation of consciousness but that's not the point of this thread. So, please calm down and wait for people to express their views as they please. We'll see what come out of that.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

All I get from your link is "find a tutor"! Right...

And Google seems to agree...


Is it just me?
EB

Sorry about that, I have had the article on file for some time for reference. It must have expired by now

Ok, I found it, somehow...

And here is an interesting bit. It's just a note on qualia. What's interesting is that qualia should be understood as key word for "phenomenal consciousness" (what I call 'subjective consciousness'), or, alternatively, as the basic content of all subjective experience. So, it's telling that scientists are including consideration of qualia into their published papers.

Consciousness and Complexity
Giulio Tononi and Gerald M. Edelman
Science 282, 1846 (1998)
Qualia--the seemingly inexplicable phenomenological manifestations of conscious experience--are conceived within this framework as rapid, highly informative discriminations within a repertoire of billions of neural states available to a united neural process of great complexity. They correspond to the generation of a large amount of information in a short period of time. In this view, each quale--even a seemingly simple quale like a feeling of "redness"--corresponds to a discriminable state of the dynamic core in its entirety, and not merely to the state of a specific group of neurons in a certain brain area. The subjective meaning or quale of "redness," for example, would be defined by the (increased) activity of red-selective neurons as much as by the (reduced or unmodified) activity of neuronal groups selective for green or blue, for visual motion or shape, for auditory or somatosensory events, and for proprioceptive inputs, body schemas, emotions, intentions, and so forth, that jointly constitute the dynamic core. This view is antithetical to modular or atomistic approaches to consciousness

For UM: please note these people don't claim that a discriminable state of the dynamic core (i.e. "a large cluster of neuronal groups that together constitute, on a time scale of hundreds of milliseconds, a unified neural process of high complexity") in its entirety is a quale. The word they use here is "correspond": "each quale corresponds to a discriminable state of the dynamic core in its entirety". Other scientists may use words other than "correspond" but most seem to understand that there will be an explanatory gap left even after they have finished the job they are doing now.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Nice set of summaries Speakpigeon,

The last quote needlessly wraps itself around a self axle. That is not necessary since it is obvious that among the capabilities are both representation of self and, consequently with the aid of memory, an awareness of self. No one ever disputed the ability to be of two minds. For instance there is lots of evidence that one can speak to oneself, must actually, since subvocalization is at the base of "hearing" one's speech.

I'd be more cautious if I were you. My understanding is that they are considering variations on the concept of self and, presumably, this would impact on what you will be able to claim about the self depending on the concept you selected.

I guess you would need to read the whole paper D) to arrive at a more considerate judgement.
EB

 

[Underseer]

Pigeon, if you want to claim that a magical, non-physical substance or being is what makes consciousness possible, them you have to provide evidence for the magical, non-physical signature or being. It is not our job to show how consciousness can be explained without your truth claim.

Neuroscientists can, but that is entirely beside the point.

You are committing a shifting the burden of proof fallacy and an argument from ignorance fallacy here.

- - - Updated - - -

What is your evidence for the non-physical substance or being in question?

- - - Updated - - -

This is the science forum. We have a separate forum for pseudoscience discussions.

 

[fromderinside]

Nice set of summaries Speakpigeon,

The last quote needlessly wraps itself around a self axle. That is not necessary since it is obvious that among the capabilities are both representation of self and, consequently with the aid of memory, an awareness of self. No one ever disputed the ability to be of two minds. For instance there is lots of evidence that one can speak to oneself, must actually, since subvocalization is at the base of "hearing" one's speech.

I'd be more cautious if I were you. My understanding is that they are considering variations on the concept of self and, presumably, this would impact on what you will be able to claim about the self depending on the concept you selected.

I guess you would need to read the whole paper D) to arrive at a more considerate judgement.
EB

Actually I'm pretty confident as you say. That partly because I held back some neural indications supporting the neuroscience model of being conscious. Consciousness of self is probably readily explained in the existence of diverse loci of mirror or empathy neurons and neuron clusters throughout the cortex and parts of the midbrain implicated in consciousness mechanization.

I do have an article from 2006 by northoff on the same topic. It's a meta-study, a review of articles on the topic catalogues those results using statistical methods, many post hoc,into representations in the brain. https://static1.squarespace.com/sta.../Self-referential+processing+in+our+brain.pdf

Also I've scanned other articles by Northoff. While I hold psychiatrists suspect, many of them are fricking geniuses with access to tool other neuroscientists don't have like clinical and human medical examples. so a critical evaluation of the quality, much less the validity, of these studies remains open. However he is getting very high exposure in very reputable publications and other sources.

I have request the article from researchgate.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Maybe it's time for a reminder of what we're trying to do here.

I want to have a definition of consciousness that scientifically minded people could agree on.

So, how could we define consciousness in such a way that it would make sense to investigate this kind of consciousness scientifically?

I'm aware that there are scientists who already work on consciousness but I don't think they've bothered to provide a specific definition of the object of their investigations.

<snip>

So, first, I'd like you to post what you think is the best definition of consciousness you know.

Thanks also to comment on other people's definitions so we can get a sense of where we're going.

And then we'll see if it becomes practical to do a poll.

Thank you for your contributions.

Now, I'd like to try something very different as to form.

I would like you to try and articulate a definition of consciousness that you could accept as true to your own view of consciousness, or at least reasonably accurate, and that would be no more than 144 characters long--I'm trying to make it easy for the President of the United States of America to get involved if he's got nothing more urgent to do.

Bear in mind that I will expect you to provide a longer version later.

But, for the moment, you need to squeeze your conception of consciousness within that small box of 144 characters. The shorter, the better.

I give here my own as exemplar: Consciousness is knowledge of the state of specific neuronal structures in the human brain.

Don't get stuck on it, it's just an example. What I'm interested in is your definition.

Still, mine shows it's possible to express a reasonably accurate expression of someone's view of consciousness in only 90 characters, including spaces. So, 144 should be good enough for your own definition.

There's no requirement as to the philosophical a priori of your definition, but bear in mind that, if the definitions offered are good enough, we'll try to vote on which is the best. And I think it's fair to say that most people around here have a scientific bias. Still, you make up your own definition as you please.

Thanks for your efforts.
EB

 

[untermensche]

Here is the first sentence from the first "study" you posted. You are posting this stuff so it is reasonable to assume you can explain it.

There's no reason to assume this. I didn't even initialled it.

So you just post a bunch of shit you don't even understand?

And then claim what?

It is proposed that phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and reapplying on themselves the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world.....

Tell me what that means, since you present it as some explanation of something.

Still, it seems quite straightforward as to what is meant: The brain can observe itself thinking and then, think about that. Which is at least an interesting idea.

What does that mean???? You haven't explained anything.

The brain "observes itself"?

What does that mean?

Please use physiological terms.

This is all a bunch of emperor's new clothes nonsense.

 

[fromderinside]

Maybe this will work. Speakpigeon asks each of us to come up with our own definition or understanding consciousness. He elaborates by referring those who only criticize to put their own understanding or definition into the pot.

As yet untermenche all you have done is carp. You have no skin inthe game. Ante up.

 

[bilby]

As yet untermenche all you have done is carp.

Is that a typo?