FORGIVENESS

[ruby sparks]

Why do you think the wrongdoer might deserve forgiveness?

Ok so all of these are to be prefixed with the phrase, "it's a wrong, but....."

1. To err is human (that's possibly the biggie).

2. I like forgiving, and I also think it's the morally good thing to do in this situation.

3. Forgiving them might be better for me.

4. Being forgiven might be better for them (might bring about positive change in them).

5. If 5, being forgiven might be better for people they subsequently interact with.

6. The mitigating antecedent circumstances allow/explain/excuse it.

I could go on, I think. An act of forgiveness might involve one or more of those, or other reasons.

The bases are essentially of the same or similar type as for retribution. A certain, alternative response to a wrong (or a deemed wrong) is deemed to be a permissible option, in the judgement of the victim.

1. is true in the sense that humans are fallible. But how does being fallible make a human deserve a reward, in particular forgiveness?
2. What you like is irrelevant as to what the wrongdoer deserves. As to whether it is 'the morally good' thing to do, suggests a moral obligation, albeit with an odd wording. If that is what you meant, why is it obligatory? If it is not what you meant, then why is it good in some sense, and how is that related to what the wrongdoer deserves?
3. True, but irrelevant as to whether the wrongdoer deserves. What the wrongdoer deserves is a property of the wrongdoer, not of you.
4. That might be true, but why would they deserve what is better for them, given that they behaved wrongfully?
5. You mean if 4? Sure, it might, and that would be a reason to forgive them. However, that would not be a reason to think they deserve forgiveness.
6. If they allow/excuse it, they did not act immorally, so there seems to be nothing to forgive. If they explain it but do not excuse it/allow it, then they behaved wrongfully, and that the behavior is explained does not provide a good reason to think they deserve forgiveness (every behavior is explained, even that of serial killers, e.g., the explanation is they like it).

I would be happy to answer all those, and I may do if you still want me to, but I think there's a fundamental issue here that needs to be addressed first, otherwise I'll just be wasting our time answering those questions and they won't make sense (to you). The fundamental issue is that you make a claim that I don't yet accept, which is not only (a) that it is a moral fact that a wrongdoer deserves to be punished (and as far as you are concerned that does not go away even if there is forgiveness instead) and crucially, and more controversially imo, (b) that this is a moral fact that is external to and independent of the person(s) deeming to either forgive or punish.

If someone (eg you) believes both those things, (a) & (b), then no answer from me can suffice for you, because an answer from me would only ever be about what the wronged person or wronged persons, or the humans observing (who may largely agree one way or the other) deem to be what is deserved, however they do that (and essentially it could be instinctive in the end, which might be the ultimate answer to your initial question) and that may not in some cases be punishment, it may be forgiveness instead.

An act of forgiveness might involve many things. My objection is to the claim that they deserve it.

Indeed. And my objection is to the claim that they necessarily deserve punishment. And essentially, I could be asking you pretty much the same questions you are asking me. And if your bottom-line answer is 'it feels instinctively right' I'll say that about forgiveness. And if your answer boils down to saying 'it's an independent moral fact' then I would be very sceptical about that. I think that nearly everything we are and have been discussing may now revolve around this issue that has come up regarding your claim of independence.

If you accepted that both deserving punishment and deserving forgiveness were independent moral facts, depending on circumstances, it would be helpful for you, and be one way to get the fly of forgiveness out of the ointment of your claims, but that would still involve the claim that there are independent moral facts, which at this point I am very sceptical about. Further, even if there were, there would have to be either a vast number of specific versions of them, given that moral judgements are obviously relative to so many, many things, and combinations of them, and fluctuations in them over time (at which point it would surely be a better descriptor to say they are relative) or so vague and general that they are more or less useless for determining the right answer in any given situation. One way to not be wrong is to merely be sufficiently vague.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I would be happy to answer all those, and I may do if you still want me to, but I think there's a fundamental issue here that needs to be addressed first, otherwise I'll just be wasting our time answering those questions and they won't make sense (to you). The fundamental issue is that you make a claim that I don't yet accept, which is not only (a) that it is a moral fact that a wrongdoer deserves to be punished (and as far as you are concerned that does not go away even if there is forgiveness instead) and crucially, and more controversially imo, (b) that this is a moral fact that is external to and independent of the person(s) deeming to either forgive or punish.

The proper way of making moral assessments is using our moral sense, so I am doing just that. But the claim is meant to be seen as correct by other human moral senses as well. Now, you do not accept it. But you also reject (when you are discussing these matters; I do not know you do that when you are not thinking about it) most of the ordinary human moral assessments, so the fact that you reject these ones does not seem to say much.

But just to be clear, and in particular regarding your point (a), I would say this:

1. When I say wrongdoers deserve punisment, as I said before, I do not mean they deserve a lot of punishment. That depends on the wrongdoing. The punishment might consist in being called on it, be told that he was being immoral, and so on.

2. While I hold that forgiveness does not make the fact that a wrongdoer deserves punishment, I do not believe that nothing other than punishment can make it go away. For example, if the wrongdoer was not punished for something that happened 2 decades ago, and the person has made considerable changes ever since and would not engage in the same sort of behavior, then I do not think they still deserve punishment for that deed. Of course, there is the issue of how much they changed. A cold-blooded murderer probably still deserves punishment because he hasn't actually changed that much. But the point is that it depends on the current brain/mind of the former perpetrator. In fact, for lesser offenses, even a short period in which the person shows remorse, apologizes, etc., might be enough.

With respect to your point (b), then yes I hold it is independent of the person deciding whether to forgive or to punish. But this is generally the case for moral properties in general. For example, whether a behavior is immoral does not depend on whether someone deems it so. To see that, consider the example from this post.

...suppose Ahmed and Ahmad want to blow up a train full of people. They learn how to do it in the same manner. They independently acquire materials from the same places. They do all of the same stuff (not connected to each other). They plant the bombs. At that point, their participation ends. What happens later cannot retroactively make them any more or less guilty. And what happens later is that Ahmed's bomb goes of killing 200 people, whereas Ahmad's bomb fails to go off due to a defect in a circuit which was exactly the same model as that used by Ahmed, and even bought in the same place, with the same degree of care, etc.

To be more precise, I should have pointed out they incur further guilt after they plant the bombs, because they fail to go and disarm the bombs they immorally planted. The example, however, works for its purpose. But now let us consider the punishment they deserve. They did the same, are equally guilty, and deserve the same punishment. Now suppose that Ahmad is never blamed for his actions. In fact, he manages to retrieve the faulty bomb before the authorities find it, so his actions remain undetected. He is not forgiven, but he is not blamed, either. That fact also cannot change what he deseves already. Now Ahmed gets blamed. Would that make him more deserving of punishment? I say clearly not. Whether he deserves punishment is a property of Ahmed, not a property of those blaming him. Why would it be otherwise?

But now let us say that another terrorist, Sajid, does the same as Ahmed and Ahmad, and the bomb goes off, as in the case of Ahmed. But as it happens, some (or all) of the families of the victims come to believe in a forgiving ideology and decide to forgive him, whereas no one forgives Ahmed. Does that mean that Sajid deserves less punishment than Ahmed (perhaps even no punishment at all). Again, clearly not. The punishment they deserve depends on their minds (i.e., those of the perpetrators), not on the minds of other people. Do you assess otherwise?

If someone (eg you) believes both those things, (a) & (b), then no answer from me can suffice for you, because an answer from me would only ever be about what the wronged person or wronged persons, or the humans observing (who may largely agree one way or the other) deem to be what is deserved, however they do that (and essentially it could be instinctive in the end, which might be the ultimate answer to your initial question) and that may not in some cases be punishment, it may be forgiveness instead.

But let me ask you: is that really what you intuitively, instinctively if you like, say?
Imagine immoral actions with no witnesses. For example:

S10: Jack is a serial killer goes around murdering homeless people for pleasure. He is careful to pick homeless people who are alone and have no one who would look for them, in his assessment - which turns out to be correct. Other people either do not notice they're gone or just think they've move to live on the streets somewhere else. At any rate, there are no witnesses. No one ever figures out that Jack ever killed anyone.​

In S10, no humans observe any wrongdoing, so no one deems that Jack deserves any punishment. Would you say that in that case, Jack deserves no punishment whatsoever for murdering homeless people for pleasure? I'm asking not only what your theory says, but more importantly, what your moral sense instinctively says.

Indeed. And my objection is to the claim that they necessarily deserve punishment. And essentially, I could be asking you pretty much the same questions you are asking me. And if your bottom-line answer is 'it feels instinctively right' I'll say that about forgiveness.

But does it? Does it really feel instinctively right to you that they deserve forgiveness? That would be like a reward, something positive. But why would someone who behaved wrongfully would deserve something positive?

I think that nearly everything we are and have been discussing may now revolve around this issue that has come up regarding your claim of independence.

I already explained that it is independent in some senses but not others. You do not seem to be very clear about what you mean by it.

 

[ruby sparks]

Of course, there is the issue of how much they changed. A cold-blooded murderer probably still deserves punishment because he hasn't actually changed that much. But the point is that it depends on the current brain/mind of the former perpetrator.

I disagree. You can forgive someone without them ever knowing you are doing it. I could forgive, say, my daughter, or my mother for something, even if I never see them again and have no idea at all whether they either have remorse or have changed, or ultimately even if they are still alive.

In S10, no humans observe any wrongdoing, so no one deems that Jack deserves any punishment. Would you say that in that case, Jack deserves no punishment whatsoever for murdering homeless people for pleasure? I'm asking not only what your theory says, but more importantly, what your moral sense instinctively says.

Yes, when considering that particular hypothetical situation, my instinctive moral sense says that it's wrong and deserves punishment, but in the end, what has my instinctive response to a particular hypothetical deed by particular hypothetical people in particular hypothetical circumstances got to do with it? What if you picked a different situation involving lesser wrong that we nevertheless both agreed was a wrong and in that case I felt otherwise? Doing killing for fun is just limiting yourself to an 'easy' example over which there would be a great deal of agreement. Go down even half a notch and a few people have forgiven terrorists. More to the point, go further and further down the scale of severity of wrong, to very minor transgressions, and bring in a host of other variables (eg all those I listed in my thread on moral relativism) and more people would probably feel forgiveness is deserved instead, in certain situations.

Does it really feel instinctively right to you that they deserve forgiveness?

Yes, in some cases it does, depending on the particularities, and I am far from being the only one who would say that.

I already explained that it is independent in some senses but not others.

I don't understand what you mean by independence.

 

[The AntiChris]

I don't understand what you mean by independence.

The 'independence' that I find controversial is stated explicitly in this quote from the Grand Contradiction thread:

Permissibility or impermissibility (immorality, moral wrongness, or whatever word one likes better) is a property of McConnell's behavior.

In other words, according to Angra Mainyu, an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions. It follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.

It makes no sense to me.

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't understand what you mean by independence.

The 'independence' that I find controversial is stated explicitly in this quote from the Grand Contradiction thread:

Permissibility or impermissibility (immorality, moral wrongness, or whatever word one likes better) is a property of McConnell's behavior.

In other words, according to Angra Mainyu, an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions. It follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.

It makes no sense to me.

Nor me. Well, it makes a certain sense (is not incoherent) and maybe it's hypothetically possible, if, say, there was some moral standard or fact that was externally independent of living things (and sometimes instantiated or manifested in them) but if I say instead that right and wrong are only what they are deemed to be by those doing the deeming, and that there's nothing externally independent of that, that seems to be an adequate explanation which covers absolutely everything. Anything else, while possible, seems to be undemonstrateable, unfalsifiable, superfluous and redundant to the explanation.

 

[ruby sparks]

That said, here's a possibility. And I'm surprised it hasn't come up yet.

A moral realist could claim (some do, apparently) that morality is like mathematics.

So, in principle, and without having thought it through, it seems to me possible that there are laws of morality as there are laws of mathematics (or physics), which are, of course, fully independent not just of brains, or of living things, but are true literally universally (of the universe) and are only sometimes instantiated in living things, and in brains configured to manifest them, and not always necessarily understood or accessed by those brains.

Personally, I would not rule this out.

Now, the image below, plucked from the internet, might illustrate in principle, at least the general sort of thing:

Show

Where, say, the L_gws at the start (left hand side of the equation) represents a 'moral fact' in some case or situation, and the other symbols are variables.

For example,

'A' could be 'degree of genetic (or other) relatedness between the two actors' (on some scale) although we might need different symbols for genetic and other.

'g' could be 'degree of psychological disposition towards favouring retribution by one of the actors' (on some scale).

'i' could be 'degree of severity of outcome' (on some scale).

'z' could be 'degree to which the relevant species is a sentient, socially-interacting species' (on some scale) although we might need separate symbols for sentience and socially-interacting.

And so on.

And all those variables might interact and might themselves be subject to (because of) other variables. 'g' for example, could be the case for a wide number of reasons.


I could push this even further, and say that given full determinism, and if the laws of mathematics and/or physics were therefore fully contained in and prescribed by the state of the universe at the time of the big bang, what happened would be as inevitable for morality as for everything else that manifested in the universe, and so would arguably have been a latent fact, even beforehand. The Fibonacci Number Sequence, for example, is exhibited by plants (eg sunflowers) and under the above scenario, was always going to be.

And as Treedbear said in the Retributivism thread, perhaps when 'life' emerges (and in the above scenario, it has to, and indeed in a certain way, to be a certain thing) there is a basis for morality that is essentially, 'continued existence (life) is good and right' or 'has merit', a bit like the Fibonacci Sequence, and which arguably holds true even if an organism has no sense of what 'good' or 'right' or 'merit' or 'Fibonacci Sequence' mean. A propositional attitude about morality would then be an optional add-on feature that only some organisms had the capacity to experience. Which might be an idea that fromderinside might warm to.

I'm not sure what randomness, if it exists, would do to that, but I bet it would be very complicated.

But maybe we could still say that things were 'as latently true' for maths and physics as for morality (unless random effects differed between those things).


Mind you, in the end, I think even saying all that would still be saying that morality is effectively relative. But perhaps being 'relative' (even to a multitude of variables and permutations of them, which might themselves change over time) and being 'independent' are not mutually exclusive.

 

[Tigers!]

In other words, even full/complete forgiveness is conditional (unless one has a very poor memory or is a doormat).

If forgiveness has conditions it is not really forgiveness. It just becomes a transaction.
Forgiveness must start with the wronged party. It is not necessary for the other party to accept the offered forgiveness.

In Sydney, Australia a couple of weeks ago a drunk driver mowed down 4 children on their bikes, killing 3 of them and seriously injuring the other. The parents of the 3 dead children ( brothers & sisters) gave forgiveness to the driver.
The driver does not have to accept the forgiveness. It is offered by the parents without conditions.
Note that this does not mean the driver will face no consequences. He broke the law and will face a trial. But the parents have refused to take vengeance or retribution for, or by, themselves.

 

[ruby sparks]

In other words, even full/complete forgiveness is conditional (unless one has a very poor memory or is a doormat).

If forgiveness has conditions it is not really forgiveness. It just becomes a transaction.
Forgiveness must start with the wronged party. It is not necessary for the other party to accept the offered forgiveness.

In Sydney, Australia a couple of weeks ago a drunk driver mowed down 4 children on their bikes, killing 3 of them and seriously injuring the other. The parents of the 3 dead children ( brothers & sisters) gave forgiveness to the driver.
The driver does not have to accept the forgiveness. It is offered by the parents without conditions.
Note that this does not mean the driver will face no consequences. He broke the law and will face a trial. But the parents have refused to take vengeance or retribution for, or by, themselves.

Yeah.

Interpersonal forgiveness is often a dyadic interaction, but it doesn't have to be.

It's the same with retribution. The other person does not have to agree or even know about it, know that someone thinks it is deserved I mean.

I would say that retribution and forgiveness are in some ways two sides of the same coin, were it not for the fact that it seems more complicated than that (because both are permitted in a single case).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

In other words, according to Angra Mainyu, an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions. It follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.

It makes no sense to me.

Nor me.

When you say it makes no sense to you, do you mean that you do not understand what it means (i.e., you find it incoherent), or that you disagree? (that is a question for both of you).

Of course in reality, it is not only coherent, but easy to understand, in line with human moral intuitions, and true. Purely for example, consider the following scenario:

S11: Jack is an evil genius, and a serial killer. He goes around murdering homeless people for fun. But he wants more. He wants to inflict more pain and death and general carnage. He also gets off deceiving people, so that no one knows he is the one doing the evil deeds. When he sees how mistaken his victims are, he experience great pleasure. So, he thinks of a devious plan, and carries it out. First, he makes a superintelligent AI with the purpose of enslaving the rest of humanity, pretending to be an alien invassion. Of course, Jack will be in charge, and will engage in all sorts of horrific torture of humans to death under the guise of alien experimentation. But no other human will know that. Well, it turns out he succeeds: he makes the AI, which in a few days makes billions for him (without telling anyone). Then it makes a ship, goes to the asteroid belt, makes a much bigger ship, and then attacks. Hacking everything and with the firepower of its ship, the AI wins easily. All armed forces are defeated. Armies of robots are made, and the Earth is taken over. Jack rules almighty, and tortures many humans to death, leaves millions to starve, uses bioweapons to cause horrific illnesses, and so on. So, monstruous fun.
Now, Jack is a psychopath, and does not have any negative attitudes against wrongful actions. Of course, he would get angry if anyone did something against him, but that would be so regardless of whether the deed is immoral. In short, he just does not react in any negative way to immorality per se - and, indeed, he enjoys some of the most atrocious immoral acts anyone can think of. Moreover, he is a moral error theorist who believe that no behavior is immoral. The AI, on the other hand, does not have a moral sense, and does not find it useful to bother studying human morality, so he makes no moral judgments whatsoever.​

In S11, Jack engaged in many immoral actions. He does not deem them immoral. In the vast majority of cases, no other human knew that Jack engaged in them. So, in particular, they did not deem the actions immoral. Purely for example, Jack's creation of an AI designed to take over the world and subjugate humanity so that he can torture everyone he wants for fun is a morally despicable set of actions. But no one knows he did that, except for himself, and the AI he created. However, as specified, neither Jack nor the AI make a moral judgment about his behavior.

I hope at least you understand that it is coherent to say that Jack's behavior in creating the AI, etc., is morally despicable, and that humans generally would realize that. But in the scenario, nobody thought it was immoral. Now if when you say it makes no sense to you, you merely say that you disagree but you understand that the claim is coherent, okay, so this is a disagreement.

 

[ruby sparks]

I hope at least you understand that it is coherent to say that Jack's behavior in creating the AI, etc., is morally despicable, and that humans generally would realize that.

It seems that humans generally, including me, would deem it to be that, yes.

But in the scenario, nobody thought it was immoral.

Really? No one deemed that what the robots were doing was wrong? Cool scenario. Very, very implausible indeed however. Have you seen the film, 'War of the Worlds'? The aliens were deemed to be breaching moral standards, Big Time. And humans surely would also deem it that way, if it ever actually happened.

And even if Jack had (in another scenario), seemingly randomly, unleashed small, fiery asteroids from outer space, and not torturing robots, the victims would only not deem it immoral because (as in your scenario) they did not know the facts, particularly about intentions. It's very odd indeed that you are willing to set that factor aside now when it suits you after having banged on for so long about it being important to making accurate moral judgements.

If someone is harmed or killed and it is deemed to be some sort of accident or natural phenomenon (absent any beliefs about the agency of a god for instance) of course no one will deem it immoral. Duh.

And if it was (probably incorrectly) deemed to be a god, they might not deem it immoral. They might think it just retribution. Which would weaken your case even further, and also possibly illustrate why your analogy with cat faeces in the other thread was not necessarily a good one when it comes to supposed gods giving moral permissions.

And in any case, all the deeming in all those scenarios, of whatever sort, is still taking place in human brains. No independence so far.

A number of big fails on your part there. Large asteroid-sized fails.

And also, this thread is about forgiveness, not about whether something is or isn't a wrong. That there's at least an an agreed deemed wrong is already assumed. I've been willing to also discuss here the other issue of what is or isn't 'actually' a wrong and whether it's independently true or not, but since we're not getting anywhere on that, perhaps we should leave it out here. You could still bring it up in the thread it came up in, or start a new one, since it was arguably a detour in that other thread ('The Great Contradiction').

What's odd is that Treedbear's suggested independent right and wrong, and my subsequent reply to AntiChris in post 46, both offered your claims about independence a leg up, and yet you've not picked up on either of them. In case you hadn't noticed, I was willing to agree in principle that you could be right. Perhaps you, like a non-minuscule proportion of humans, prefer disagreements about morality a non-minuscule proportion of the time.

 

[The AntiChris]

In other words, according to Angra Mainyu, an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions. It follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.

It makes no sense to me.

When you say it makes no sense to you, do you mean that you do not understand what it means...

I understand. It's just utterly unintuitive.

But in the scenario, nobody thought it was immoral.

Sure, when people are unaware of an activity they have no opinion whatsoever. When they become aware they form an opinion. I'm not sure what you think you've shown. Nothing you've said requires that "permissibility or impermissibility (immorality, moral wrongness, or whatever word one likes better) is a property of....behaviour".

_____________________________

You've taken one particular interpretation of what I said which avoids the uncomfortable logical conclusion of your view. I'll be explicit.


Given Angra Mainyu's view that an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions, it follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).

Is this a problem for you, or does it conform with your intuitions?

 

[ruby sparks]

Given Angra Mainyu's view that an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions, it follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).

Is this a problem for you, or does it conform with your intuitions?

If I could answer for myself....

Yes. Everyone who has ever existed so far could be mistaken about a particular moral 'fact'.

This does not mean there are no independent moral facts, of course. I think I'm now happy to agree that's possible.

It just begs the question of how humans today would know it about a particular example today. Which would surely be a problem for any current judiciary system claiming to dispense actual, independent justice.

It goes back to what you were saying about reliable access.

Homosexual acts might be a good example.

And perhaps worryingly for homosexual anal intercourse (and indeed heterosexual anal intercourse), if we were to go back to the idea that it's an independent fact (which informs morality, as it seems to, and I would say at a stretch is morality, albeit sometimes devoid of the attitudinal add-ons and consciously-felt desires that only some organisms have the capacity for) that continued existence is good (or right, or merited, or warranted, or efficient, or a basis for action, or a compelling life force, or whatever) including by reproduction, we might trace intuitive human objections to certain human sex acts all the way back to that one, anal intercourse being a complete waste of sperm and a missed opportunity for an egg (to be fertilised), and therefore a waste of an egg too, and those who have a preference for it would be considered 'defective' in some way in relation to the independent fact that continued existence via reproduction is the right thing, because it just is.

If everyone, of any sexual orientation, began to prefer anal sex, it would not, in the long run, be good for the perpetuation of a species that reproduced via sexual intercourse. It might solve an overpopulation problem in the short term, but that's all. In the end the species would likely die out (unless the members began to reproduce in some other way).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Really? No one deemed that what the robots were doing was wrong? Cool scenario. Very, very implausible indeed however. Have you seen the film, 'War of the Worlds'? The aliens were deemed to be breaching moral standards, Big Time. And humans surely would also deem it that way, if it ever actually happened.

Some humans would deem that the aliens - who do not exist - were behaving immorally. No human would believe that Jack behaved immorally in creating the AI, programmed to pretend to be aliens, etc., simply because no one except for Jack and the AI ever knows that he did that, as explained in the scenario.

And even if Jack had (in another scenario), seemingly randomly, unleashed small, fiery asteroids from outer space, and not torturing robots, the victims would only not deem it immoral because (as in your scenario) they did not know the facts, particularly about intentions. It's very odd indeed that you are willing to set that factor aside now when it suits you after having banged on for so long about it being important to making accurate moral judgements.

No, you do not understand at all. It is not very odd at all that I construct a case in which the victims do not know it happens, because The AntiChris said that it did not make sense to him that a behavior "could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.", and you added that it would not make sense to you, either. Obviously, these are examples in which the behavior is immoral even though no one in the universe think it is. All of the people who actually know about the behavior, do not judge it immoral. And yet it is immoral. It is a counterexample.

If someone is harmed or killed and it is deemed to be some sort of accident or natural phenomenon (absent any beliefs about the agency of a god for instance) of course no one will deem it immoral. Duh.

Not "Duh" but counterexample. However, if for some reason you do not like that scenario, we can change it so that there are no victims, as no one is actually be harmed or killed.

S12: Abdullah is a terrorist who plants a bomb in order to blow up a school bus full of children. Due to a malfunction in its timer, the bomb does not go off. No one is harmed. To avoid detection so that he can commit further terrorist acts in the future, he proceeds to remove the bomb the next day - no one else ever finds it. Now Abdullah is a religious fanatic who deems his own actions morally praiseworthy. No one else knows about them. So, he behaves immorally, but no one judges his actions immoral.

S13: Moe is a psychopath who plants a bomb in order to blow up a school bus full of children, for fun. Due to a malfunction in its timer, the bomb does not go off. No one is harmed. To avoid detection so that he can commit further terrorist acts in the future, he proceeds to remove the bomb the next day - no one else ever finds it. Now Moe does not deem anything morally wrong or right or anything. No one else knows about his actions. So, he behaves immorally, but no one judges his actions immoral.

S14: Magdalene plans to murder her old husband Bob for the inheritance money. She already married him for that purpose. She plans to kill him slowly, with poison. She buys the poison, and is planning to being the next day, at dinner. However, before that happens Bob has a heart attack, and dies, without her involvement. She does not need to kill him to inherit the money. She harms no one. She does not reckon her actions are immoral. No one else does, because no one else knows about them. No victims.
​

It is easy to construct as many scenarios as you like. No one needs to be harmed or killed. It remains the case that even if no one in the universe deem a behavior immoral, it may well still be immoral. In fact, plenty of cases of immoral behavior with no victims and which no one deemed immoral surely did happen in the real world.

A number of big fails on your part there. Large asteroid-sized fails.

No, my scenarios are successful counterexamples. You do not seem to be following.

 

[ruby sparks]

Some humans would deem that the aliens - who do not exist - were behaving immorally. No human would believe that Jack behaved immorally in creating the AI, programmed to pretend to be aliens, etc., simply because no one except for Jack and the AI ever knows that he did that, as explained in the scenario.



No, you do not understand at all. It is not very odd at all that I construct a case in which the victims do not know it happens, because The AntiChris said that it did not make sense to him that a behavior "could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.", and you added that it would not make sense to you, either. Obviously, these are examples in which the behavior is immoral even though no one in the universe think it is. All of the people who actually know about the behavior, do not judge it immoral. And yet it is immoral. It is a counterexample.

Only because of an absence of a crucial fact. I do not think AntiChris was talking about cases in which it was not even known that there had been an act by someone in the first place, and neither was I. Your scenario missed the point.

If you were to apply that situation to ANY scenario we have been talking about, it would change matters entirely. Duh. You showed nothing of any relevance, nothing that can be applied elsewhere to any of the claims.

 

[ruby sparks]

Not "Duh" but counterexample. However, if for some reason you do not like that scenario, we can change it so that there are no victims, as no one is actually be harmed or killed.

S12: Abdullah is a terrorist who plants a bomb in order to blow up a school bus full of children. Due to a malfunction in its timer, the bomb does not go off. No one is harmed. To avoid detection so that he can commit further terrorist acts in the future, he proceeds to remove the bomb the next day - no one else ever finds it. Now Abdullah is a religious fanatic who deems his own actions morally praiseworthy. No one else knows about them. So, he behaves immorally, but no one judges his actions immoral.

S13: Moe is a psychopath who plants a bomb in order to blow up a school bus full of children, for fun. Due to a malfunction in its timer, the bomb does not go off. No one is harmed. To avoid detection so that he can commit further terrorist acts in the future, he proceeds to remove the bomb the next day - no one else ever finds it. Now Moe does not deem anything morally wrong or right or anything. No one else knows about his actions. So, he behaves immorally, but no one judges his actions immoral.

S14: Magdalene plans to murder her old husband Bob for the inheritance money. She already married him for that purpose. She plans to kill him slowly, with poison. She buys the poison, and is planning to being the next day, at dinner. However, before that happens Bob has a heart attack, and dies, without her involvement. She does not need to kill him to inherit the money. She harms no one. She does not reckon her actions are immoral. No one else does, because no one else knows about them. No victims.
​

It is easy to construct as many scenarios as you like. No one needs to be harmed or killed.

We are already broadly in agreement that actual ensuing consequences are more or less irrelevant in a particular instance, or should be, so that was a waste of time on your part.

Again, it is the not even knowing an act was done that matters. Obviously, there will be no moral judgement at all in such cases.

It remains the case that even if no one in the universe deem a behavior immoral, it may well still be immoral.

It may be. That is what we are discussing. Albeit we arguably should be discussing forgiveness.

In fact, plenty of cases of immoral behavior with no victims and which no one deemed immoral surely did happen in the real world.

Sure, but possibly only because in all such cases they would be deemed immoral if they were known about. You have not actually got away from deeming to an independent moral fact yet at all.

In short, you need to establish that there are independent moral facts, and you haven't yet. Merely showing that no one does any deeming because they don't know about something is not that.

All of this, everything, so far, in various threads, seems to boil down to your own assumptions or axioms, or mine, or of those that would agree with us. Deemings in other words.

With the possible exceptions that Treedbear brought up, and which informed my subsequent reply to AntiChris in post 46, which I think it would be more fruitful for you to explore, since it seems to support your claims.

I'm willing to agree with you in principle, on that basis, about the possibility of independent moral facts, Angra. You're wasting your philosophical sperm by trying to ram them up my metaphorical anus. Shove them up my metaphorical vagina instead, there's a much better chance of fertilisation!

We can agree on this.

And then, maybe, we can move on to the actual OP topic.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Sure, when people are unaware of an activity they have no opinion whatsoever. When they become aware they form an opinion. I'm not sure what you think you've shown

Let me explained what I showed. You said before

I don't understand what you mean by independence.

The 'independence' that I find controversial is stated explicitly in this quote from the Grand Contradiction thread:

Permissibility or impermissibility (immorality, moral wrongness, or whatever word one likes better) is a property of McConnell's behavior.

In other words, according to Angra Mainyu, an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions. It follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.

It makes no sense to me.

I showed that it is in principle possible that a behavior can be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was. I showed what you said made no sense, actually made sense. More recently, I pointed out that plenty of cases of immoral behavior with no victims and which no one deemed immoral surely did happen in the real world. So, not only is in principle possible that a behavior is immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was. In fact, it has happened many times.

Nothing you've said requires that "permissibility or impermissibility (immorality, moral wrongness, or whatever word one likes better) is a property of....behaviour".

That is true, I was instead focusing on providing a counterexample to what you said.

As to my claim that "Permissibility or impermissibility (immorality, moral wrongness, or whatever word one likes better) is a property of McConnell's behavior.", it is not only not utterly counterintuitive, but rather, intuitively obvious to a human moral sense. Take a look at how humans behave in the wild (i.e., when they instinctively engage in moral judgments, not when they are in the grip of a RIP). They all treat it as it is a property of the behavior. Of course, McConnell's behavior is something McConnell's does, so in that sense, if you go further is a property of McConnell's mind. But it is not a property of the minds of other people (or any other part of other people).

You've taken one particular interpretation of what I said which avoids the uncomfortable logical conclusion of your view. I'll be explicit.

No, I was just debunking one of your claims by means of a counterexample. But no problem, I will address your new scenario.

Given Angra Mainyu's view that an action is moral/immoral independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions, it follows that in principle it is possible that a behaviour could be immoral even if everyone in the universe thought it was fine (not immoral).

Is this a problem for you, or does it conform with your intuitions?

Not a problem at all. Yes, it is intuitively obviously true. Consider the following scenario:

S12: A few centuries into the future, Ahmed is one of the colonists going to a nearby planetary system. He is terrorist, and is planning to kill as many colonists as he can, because they are infidels he reckons. He goes into criosleep with everyone else, but reprograms his pod to wake up a day earlier than scheduled. He also plants a virus so that no one is warned when he wakes up. So, he does wake up. And he proceeds to murder 3 members of the 4-people crew, one by one, and before they knew what hit them. The fourth one, Sally, he takes by surprise, beats up, and then tortures slowly, to get the codes to access the main functions of the ship. Then, he murders her too. After that, he kills everyone else, by jettisoning the criopods into space. Even though he is planning to crash the ship, he wants to make sure he kills many colonists even if, for some reason, the rest of his plan were to fail. So, he kills them, and keeps going to planet #294, his destination. Since the colony is new and still pretty small, a direct hit to the inhabited area will kill everyone, he reckons. He sets the ship on a collision course, and abandons ship on a small pod, landing in an area that is specific for landing and launching ships. He plans to launch again later in a different ship, in course to Earth, to kill more infidels.
However, while Ahmed was in criosleep, a massive war broke out on Earth, and it got to the colony. Tens of thousands of nukes were used, as well as smart killer robots, and bioweapons. Humans were all killed. As for the colony, a bunch of killer robots got there faster (better propulsion system, no need for life support) and killed everone. All of the other colony ships were also blown up. Result? After he killed everyone else on board, the only human being left in the universe is Ahmed. He deemed his own actions morally praiseworthy. So, all of the actions he carried out after he murdered all of the other colonists, where considered fine by everyone in the universe ("everyone"="Ahmed").
​

Of course, it was immoral on his part to crash the ship in order to kill colonists just because Jack reckoned they were infidels who did not follow his religion. But the only person left in the universe was Ahmed, who thought it was fine - well, more than fine, praiseworthy, but in particular, fine.

ETA: Just in case, we may assume that in the scenario, there are no alien civilizations that have morality (just alien analogues, perhaps), or if you prefer, that humans are the only civilization in the universe, and there are no aliens smarter than a frog anywhere in the universe.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

We are already broadly in agreement that actual ensuing consequences are more or less irrelevant in a particular instance, or should be, so that was a waste of time on your part. More duh.

Not a waste of time, as I am debunking your claims. Even though you do not realize it, if any person is interested and reads the thread with care (now or in the future), this might be useful to them. And there are other reasons too. So, useful.

In short, you need to establish that there are independent moral facts, and you haven't yet. Merely showing that no one does any deeming because they don't know about something is not that.

No, I do not need to. Your use of "independent" appears to be just a confusion, but as for my claims regarding moral facts being independent in some sense, they are like the claim that humans normally can move small objects in their vicinity, or that the flu is an illness, or things like that. It's part of ordinary human experience. If you want to debunk them, the burden is on you.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Some humans would deem that the aliens - who do not exist - were behaving immorally. No human would believe that Jack behaved immorally in creating the AI, programmed to pretend to be aliens, etc., simply because no one except for Jack and the AI ever knows that he did that, as explained in the scenario.



No, you do not understand at all. It is not very odd at all that I construct a case in which the victims do not know it happens, because The AntiChris said that it did not make sense to him that a behavior "could be immoral even though no one in the universe thought it was.", and you added that it would not make sense to you, either. Obviously, these are examples in which the behavior is immoral even though no one in the universe think it is. All of the people who actually know about the behavior, do not judge it immoral. And yet it is immoral. It is a counterexample.

Only because of an absence of a crucial fact. I do not think AntiChris was talking about cases in which it was not even known that there had been an act by someone in the first place, and neither was I. Your scenario missed the point.

If you were to apply that situation to ANY scenario we have been talking about, it would change matters entirely. Duh. You showed nothing of any relevance, nothing that can be applied elsewhere to any of the claims.

I took The AntiChris claim as it was written. If he misspoke, whatever, now I have considered his new claim as well.

 

[ruby sparks]

Not a waste of time, as I am debunking your claims. Even though you do not realize it...

Questionable hubris.

Given that you haven't yet demonstrated that there are independent moral facts.

About which the really odd thing is that I might agree with you on a certain basis that has arisen recently.

... if any person is interested and reads the thread with care (now or in the future), this might be useful to them.

I guess you can at least hope that whoever reads it arbitrarily limits their enquiries to colloquial everyday language, mere intuitions, folk-psychology, 'how things subjectively seem', incomplete analyses and inadequate definitions and so on. Try a theology forum maybe. Stay away from science and proper, thorough philosophy. Neither are your strong suit.

What you have, so far, subject to us exploring Treedbear's point, are arguments that are inside the little artificial bubble of 'Angra's limited considerations', that's all. Go you. Maybe with that caveat your arguments are not bad. In order not to be shown wrong, it is only necessary to be sufficiently vague, and I might now add sufficiently lacking in thoroughness.

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course, it was immoral on his part....

This assumes as true the very thing that's in question.

The only thing we can say with certainty is that both you and I (external to Ahmed's universe) consider Ahmed's actions immoral (and probably insane) and that the entire population of Ahmed's universe think he did no wrong.

Nothing in your scenario can be taken as logically entailing that Ahmed's behaviour was impermissible independent of anyone's beliefs, feelings, attitudes or opinions.

Anyway, congratulations on coming up with a totally unrealistic and convoluted scenario which challenged my intuitions!