James Madison
Senior Member
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
“The State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public- sector employees violates the First Amendment. Abood erred in con- cluding otherwise, and stare decisis cannot support it. Abood is therefore overruled.”
“Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First Amendment concerns. E.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633. That in- cludes compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers. E.g., Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 309. In Knox and Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S. ___, the Court applied an “exact- ing” scrutiny standard in judging the constitutionality of agency fees rather than the more traditional strict scrutiny. Even under the more permissive standard, Illinois’ scheme cannot survive. Pp. 7–11.
(2)
Neither of Abood’s two justifications for agency fees passes mus- ter under this standard. First, agency fees cannot be upheld on the ground that they promote an interest in “labor peace.” The Abood Court’s fears of conflict and disruption if employees were represented by more than one union have proved to be unfounded: Exclusive rep- resentation of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are not inextricably linked. To the contrary, in the Federal Gov- ernment and the 28 States with laws prohibiting agency fees, mil- lions of public employees are represented by unions that effectively serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the case 41 years ago when Abood was decided, it is thus now undeniable that “labor peace” can readily be achieved through less restrictive means than the assessment of agency fees.
Second, avoiding “the risk of ‘free riders,’ ” Abood, supra, at 224, is not a compelling state interest. Free-rider “arguments . . . are gener- ally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections,” Knox, su- pra, at 311, and the statutory requirement that unions represent members and nonmembers alike does not justify different treatment. As is evident in non-agency-fee jurisdictions, unions are quite willing to represent nonmembers in the absence of agency fees. And their duty of fair representation is a necessary concomitant of the authori- ty that a union seeks when it chooses to be the exclusive representa- tive. In any event, States can avoid free riders through less restric- tive means than the imposition of agency fees.”
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“The State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public- sector employees violates the First Amendment. Abood erred in con- cluding otherwise, and stare decisis cannot support it. Abood is therefore overruled.”
“Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First Amendment concerns. E.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633. That in- cludes compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers. E.g., Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 309. In Knox and Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S. ___, the Court applied an “exact- ing” scrutiny standard in judging the constitutionality of agency fees rather than the more traditional strict scrutiny. Even under the more permissive standard, Illinois’ scheme cannot survive. Pp. 7–11.
(2)
Neither of Abood’s two justifications for agency fees passes mus- ter under this standard. First, agency fees cannot be upheld on the ground that they promote an interest in “labor peace.” The Abood Court’s fears of conflict and disruption if employees were represented by more than one union have proved to be unfounded: Exclusive rep- resentation of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are not inextricably linked. To the contrary, in the Federal Gov- ernment and the 28 States with laws prohibiting agency fees, mil- lions of public employees are represented by unions that effectively serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the case 41 years ago when Abood was decided, it is thus now undeniable that “labor peace” can readily be achieved through less restrictive means than the assessment of agency fees.
Second, avoiding “the risk of ‘free riders,’ ” Abood, supra, at 224, is not a compelling state interest. Free-rider “arguments . . . are gener- ally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections,” Knox, su- pra, at 311, and the statutory requirement that unions represent members and nonmembers alike does not justify different treatment. As is evident in non-agency-fee jurisdictions, unions are quite willing to represent nonmembers in the absence of agency fees. And their duty of fair representation is a necessary concomitant of the authori- ty that a union seeks when it chooses to be the exclusive representa- tive. In any event, States can avoid free riders through less restric- tive means than the imposition of agency fees.”
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