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God Paradox: Infinite Sets and Omniscience

lpetrich

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I had earlier posted here on God Paradoxes, and I have come across another one: omniscience and infinite sets.


The world of infinite sets deserves some explaining, to give some background information for this paradox. It was first worked out in detail in the late 19th cy. by mathematician George Cantor, and though it provoked a lot of controversy, it is now generally accepted. That is because of all the paradoxes it has.

Galileo discovered one of these, that a proper subset of an infinite set can have the same cardinality or number of elements or members as that set itself. In particular, he noted that there is the same number of squares of positive integers as of positive integers themselves. For finite sets,
card(proper subset of set S) < card(S)

But for infinite sets,
card(proper subset of set S) <= card(S)

Georg Cantor discovered that there is an infinite hierarchy of infinities, and he called the infinite cardinalities aleph-0, aleph-1, aleph-2, etc. But of these, he could only identify aleph-0, the cardinality of the natural numbers (either nonnegative or positive integers). It is also the cardinality of the integers, the rational numbers, the algebraic numbers, the computable numbers, and the definable numbers. Even though:

(positive integers) < (nonnegative integers) < (integers) < (rational numbers) < (real algebraic numbers) < (real computable numbers) < (real definable numbers)

But GC showed that any attempt to match real numbers with integers would always leave some left over. That is his famous diagonal argument. Thus, there are more real numbers than integers, or

C = card(real numbers) > aleph-0

He thought that C = aleph-1, the "continuum hypothesis", but he could not prove it. Later mathematicians discovered that the usual axioms of set theory, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC), are consistent with that hypothesis and its negation, with both C = aleph-1 and C != aleph-1.


When checking over GC's work, Bertrand Russell discovered another paradox of infinite sets. The set of "normal" sets N, those that are not members of themselves. Is N a member of itself? If it is, then it isn't, and if it isn't, then it is. This paradox thus related to the liar paradox and to Goedel's paradox.


An infinite sequence of infinite sets can be constructing by taking "power sets" of sets. A power set of a set is the set of all subsets of that set, including that set itself. For finite sets,

card(power set of A) = 2^(card(A))

GC himself proved that a power set has a cardinality greater that that of that set itself. He did it by considering the set of all elements that are matched to subsets that do not contain them. By considering whether or not some element is matched to it, he discovered a liar-paradox sort of contradiction. This result is not only valid for finite sets, but also for infinite sets. Repeating the power-set operation thus gives an infinite series of sets, each one larger than all those before it. Power sets starting with the natural numbers have cardinalities sometimes called the beth numbers:
  • Beth-0 = aleph-0
  • Beth-1 = cardinality of the real numbers C.
  • Beth-2 = cardinality of all the functions from real numbers to real numbers. The functions need not be continuous, and the continuous ones have cardinality beth-1.
Nobody has come up with a good identification of beth-3 or higher, even though there is an infinite number of such numbers.


Now for the omniscience paradox.

Since there is no largest set, there can be no such thing as complete omniscience. That is because if one takes the set of everything that one knows about, then one can construct a larger set from it by taking its power set.
 
Theologians sometimes say: "A finite mind cannot comprehend the infinite." Whatever that is supposed to mean.

But mathematicians have had no trouble doing so despite having finite minds.


Can God count to infinity? Can God know all the digits of Pi? Can God know omega numbers?

https://plus.maths.org/content/omega-and-why-maths-has-no-toes
Omega =  Chaitin's constant. This is not a single number but an infinite family of numbers. Each member of this family is between 0 and 1, and each binary-representation digit after the decimal point (binary point?) represents whether or not a Turing machine can halt. There are countably many possible Turing machines, so that is always possible. But since a Turing machine's halting cannot be determined with a Turing machine, Chaitin's constant is thus uncomputable.

With a binary-digit representation, one can show that the real numbers have the same cardinality as the power set of the positive integers. Each digit after the decimal/binary point represents whether or not some positive integer is in some subset of the positive integers.
 
Nice post, Ipetrich.

Bertrand Russell gets too much credit for rocking the foundations of set theory. His paradox was not directed to Cantor, but to Frege, who had a very explicit formal system of logic for working with higher-order predicates. It's pretty inconceivable that Cantor would have done more than shrug his shoulders at Russell's paradox: Cantor ate those sorts of diagonal arguments for breakfast, and a supremely beautiful one is the basis for Cantor's Theorem, the theorem from which you obtain your Beth numbers.

Cantor was aware of the Burali-Forti paradox, which goes as follows: for any set of ordinals, there is a larger ordinal. Thus, given the set of all ordinals, there must be an ordinal not in the set. A contradiction. Cantor's response to this was basically the modern one. He concluded that some totalities were too big to be considered sets at all. Nowadays, we call these totalities "proper classes." Cantor called them "actual infinities", and attributed to them divine significance.

And therein lies the counterargument. God's omniscience is not thwarted by these paradoxes, because the totality of God's knowledge forms a proper class.

Note also that, if your argument did work, I suggest it'd be pretty disastrous. I mean, consider the totality of all truths. This cannot be a set, but does this mean that the totality of truths doesn't exist?
 
God knows a trick... a way to equate an infinite set to a constant.

take the infinite set {1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8.... + 1/n}

one can express this as the principle of halves.. which goes like this:

I can walk across the room in 1 unit of time. But, before I make it across the room, I first have to make it halfway across the room (in half the total time).
Then, once I make it halfway across the room, I can go the rest of the way... but first, I will need to make it halfway across the remaining distance to the other side of the room (in a quarter of the total time)... Each subsequent traversal can be divided in half.

Regardless, I am going to make it across the room... nothing is stopping me. and we already know it is going to take a total of 1 unit of time to travel the total distance. therefore:

{1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8.... + 1/n} = 1

an infinite set has a finite value.

Omniscience solved.
 
That's limits of infinite sequences of numbers. Your example has the sum of terms 1 to n of 1 - 2-n for n = 1, 2, 3, ... . Though all its members are less than 1, its limit is 1. A limit of an infinite sequence need not be a member of some set that the sequence members are members of. Thus, all the 1 - 2-n are less than 1, while its limit is 1.

More generally, a sequence a(n) for n = 1, 2, 3, ... converges to some limit A if for every e > 0, there is some N such that |a(n) - A| < e for all n > N.

This only works if A is defined in some set that the a(n)'s are. But one can get around that difficulty with "Cauchy sequences". One changes the definition of convergence to: if for every e > 0, there is some N such that |a(n) - a(m)| < e for all n and m > N.

However, that sort of definition does not work with sequences of ever-larger infinities. But some limits can nevertheless be stated. The countable cardinality aleph-0 is the limit of finite cardinalities 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ...

Likewise, one might imagine some limit of the beth numbers or some other sequence of cardinalities of an infinite sequence of power sets. This would be a sort of super infinity that's bigger than any of the sequence's infinities.
 
According to his book, God had trouble computing pi.
What, because the guy didn't want his book to be infinitely long it means he must not know infinitely much? If the basin was 30 cubits in circumference, was God supposed to write that it was 9.5492965855... cubits across? So he rounded off, so sue him.
:goodevil:
 
Now for the omniscience paradox.

Since there is no largest set, there can be no such thing as complete omniscience. That is because if one takes the set of everything that one knows about, then one can construct a larger set from it by taking its power set.
Nature is smooth, not discrete. It's doing stuff that math and logic can't do all the time (like making the qualia of pink, the flavor of chocolate, and living bunnies). Consider the possibly perfectly smooth geodesics in spacetime that exist in nature that cannot be perfectly replicated by humanity's mathematical simulations or logical systems.

Not sure how someone would back up the claim that natural intelligence couldn't surpass logical abilities as well as mathematical abilities. My intelligence obviously does. Well, does something.
 
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According to his book, God had trouble computing pi.
What, because the guy didn't want his book to be infinitely long it means he must not know infinitely much? If the basin was 30 cubits in circumference, was God supposed to write that it was 9.5492965855... cubits across? So he rounded off, so sue him.
:goodevil:
So he rounded off to a value that gives 3% error? That's a rather unusable value...
 
What, because the guy didn't want his book to be infinitely long it means he must not know infinitely much? If the basin was 30 cubits in circumference, was God supposed to write that it was 9.5492965855... cubits across? So he rounded off, so sue him.
:goodevil:
So he rounded off to a value that gives 3% error? That's a rather unusable value...
You're one to complain. :cheeky:
 
And didn't God also believe that the sky held back the heavenly sea...that bats are birds...that snakes can talk...that jackasses can talk (leaving the prophets out of it)...that the earth has four corners...that the moon makes its own light...that the sun revolves around the earth...that every virginal bride has an intact hymen...that epilepsy needs an exorcism to be cured...that if your mom's on the rag, she should probably camp out in the back yard and avoid contact with the family...that rainbows are to be explained as bona fides on "his" deal with man...that the end times would arrive in the lifetimes of first century Hebrews...that if you work on whichever day your group identifies as the Sabbath, you deserve execution...and so many more fun ideas in the Encyclopedia of Delusions.
 
And didn't God also believe that the sky held back the heavenly sea... ...and so many more fun ideas in the Encyclopedia of Delusions.
(lots of other Biblical errancy snipped for brevity) What I say applies to putatively omnimax deities of other creeds.

Can God count to infinity? Can God know all the digits of Pi? Can God know omega numbers?

https://plus.maths.org/content/omega-and-why-maths-has-no-toes

If one can count to infinity, that means that one can do a countable number of operations.

If one can know all the digits of pi, then one's memory must have a size of at least aleph-0, because that's how many digits pi has.

If one can know a version of Chaitin's constant, then one's memory must have size aleph-0 for that reason. But if one can know every version of that constant, then one's memory must have size beth-1 or C, the cardinality of the real numbers.

-

There is a serious problem with infinite memory size and that's what possible size of infinity it is. Here is the problem. George Cantor proposed an infinite hierarchy of infinite cardinalities or set sizes: aleph-0, aleph-1, aleph-2, ...

He also considered the question of what aleph-1 might be. He proposed beth-1, the "continuum hypothesis". However, he was not able to prove it. Some later mathematicians proved that the continuum hypothesis is independent of the usual axiomatic formulation of set theory, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. It is also independent of an additional axiom, the axiom of choice. However, I've never seen the construction of a set whose cardinality is in between aleph-0 (beth-0) and beth-1.

So that leaves us with the beth numbers as constructible ones. So if one has an infinite memory, is its size beth-0, beth-1, beth-2, or some larger beth number?
 
If one can know a version of Chaitin's constant, then one's memory must have size aleph-0 for that reason. But if one can know every version of that constant, then one's memory must have size beth-1 or C, the cardinality of the real numbers.
That's counterintuitive. Why isn't aleph-0 enough to hold every version of Chaitin's constant?
 
If one can know a version of Chaitin's constant, then one's memory must have size aleph-0 for that reason. But if one can know every version of that constant, then one's memory must have size beth-1 or C, the cardinality of the real numbers.
That's counterintuitive. Why isn't aleph-0 enough to hold every version of Chaitin's constant?

That's because one has to find all the permutations of Turing-machine results, though that is a subset of permutations of the Turing machines themselves. The latter has the continuum cardinality, or beth-1, as far as I've been able to find out.

In set-theoretic terms, a permutation is a bijection of a set onto itself, so counting all permutations reduces to counting every self-bijection of a set.

set theory - Cardinality of the permutations of an infinite set - MathOverflow
set theory - An easy proof of the uncountability of bijections on natural numbers? - MathOverflow
elementary set theory - Cardinality of the set of bijective functions on $\mathbb{N}$? - Mathematics Stack Exchange
elementary set theory - The set of all bijections from N to N is infinite, but not countable - Mathematics Stack Exchange

One can count how many Turing machines will halt and how many will not halt by considering some subsets of them. Here they are, by memory type:
  • Turing machine: state register, infinite tape
  • Pushdown automaton: state register, pushdown stack
  • Finite-state machine/automaton: state register
  • Combinational logic: none
A combinational-logic machine will always halt, since it gets its results in one step. It may be interpreted as a one-step finite-state automaton (FSA). There is a countably-infinite number of them, thus a countable number of Turing machines will halt.

Going to finite-state automata, one can imagine a FSA that steps through N states and then halts, or else gets into an infinite loop at the last state. Since N is an arbitrary positive integer, there is thus a countable number of both halting and non-halting ones. This means that a countable number of Turing machines will not halt.

I'll now estimate the cardinality of the set of Chaitin's constants.

A subset of them can be described by lengths of alternating runs of finite numbers of 0's and 1's. Thus, one has an infinite sequence of positive integers. The cardinality of all such sequences is thus the continuum cardinality or beth-1. Thus, the Chaitin-constant set has cardinality beth-1.
 
I'll now estimate the cardinality of the set of Chaitin's constants.

A subset of them can be described by lengths of alternating runs of finite numbers of 0's and 1's. Thus, one has an infinite sequence of positive integers. The cardinality of all such sequences is thus the continuum cardinality or beth-1. Thus, the Chaitin-constant set has cardinality beth-1.

Not sure I follow that, it seems like your inequalities are going the wrong way. This is outside of my expertise, but I think there are countably many. We get at most one Chaitin constant per Turing Machine and since there are countably many Turing machines, there should be countably many Chaitin's constants.
 
That's counterintuitive. Why isn't aleph-0 enough to hold every version of Chaitin's constant?

That's because one has to find all the permutations of Turing-machine results, though that is a subset of permutations of the Turing machines themselves. The latter has the continuum cardinality, or beth-1, as far as I've been able to find out.

In set-theoretic terms, a permutation is a bijection of a set onto itself, so counting all permutations reduces to counting every self-bijection of a set.
...
I see, you're including noncomputable permutations. I'm not sure they should count for this problem.
 
Check on  Chaitin's constant. Each digit is whether a Turing machine can halt (1) or not (0). So it's for every Turing machine, not one of them.

I don't think that's true. If we take the wiki definition, each Chaitin's constant is defined for a prefix-free universal computable function F. There are only countably many computable functions.
 
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