Human Instinct and Free Will

[DBT]

Ryan - 10/10 for sheer effort and perseverance. Accuracy...meh!

 

[ryan]

You constantly refer to "QC" in your posts, which I take to mean "quantum cognition", not "quantum computation".

When Fisher refers to quantum cognition, he is referring to what Wang et al describes as "material quantum systems"; Wang et al explicitly states that their "quantum cognition" research is distinct from "material quantum systems", because they have repurposed quantum probability theory to describe systems that are unrelated to quantum mechanics.

Fisher even states plainly that his definition of "quantum cognition" does involve material quantum systems and does involves quantum mechanics.

Therefore, Fisher's research is unrelated to Wang et al.


You clearly equivocate the two different meaning of "quantum cognition" when you make statements such as the following:

It seems glaringly obvious to me that Fisher is using actual QM to explain the "quantum-like" behavior in QC.

The "quantum-like" behavior in Wang et al's quantum cognition model is not explained by Fisher's research, because they are unrelated.

There's QC (quantum cognition) which is a mathematical model of cognitive processes such as the decision-making process. Then there is what Fisher calls a "working definition" of QC. That's just a possible explanation that fits the mathematical model.

There you go again.

Fisher's definition of "quantum cognition" is unrelated to the model in Wang et al.

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory? I mean, that is how I see them as related. Wang does not propose a working definition, only a mathematical quantum theoretic account, and Fisher advances quantum cognition by finding possible mechanisms that explain the math.

 

[bigfield]

You constantly refer to "QC" in your posts, which I take to mean "quantum cognition", not "quantum computation".

When Fisher refers to quantum cognition, he is referring to what Wang et al describes as "material quantum systems"; Wang et al explicitly states that their "quantum cognition" research is distinct from "material quantum systems", because they have repurposed quantum probability theory to describe systems that are unrelated to quantum mechanics.

Fisher even states plainly that his definition of "quantum cognition" does involve material quantum systems and does involves quantum mechanics.

Therefore, Fisher's research is unrelated to Wang et al.


You clearly equivocate the two different meaning of "quantum cognition" when you make statements such as the following:

It seems glaringly obvious to me that Fisher is using actual QM to explain the "quantum-like" behavior in QC.

The "quantum-like" behavior in Wang et al's quantum cognition model is not explained by Fisher's research, because they are unrelated.

There's QC (quantum cognition) which is a mathematical model of cognitive processes such as the decision-making process. Then there is what Fisher calls a "working definition" of QC. That's just a possible explanation that fits the mathematical model.

There you go again.

Fisher's definition of "quantum cognition" is unrelated to the model in Wang et al.

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory? I mean, that is how I see them as related. Wang does not propose a working definition, only a mathematical quantum theoretic account, and Fisher advances quantum cognition by finding possible mechanisms that explain the math.

You are imputing the words "working definition" with some kind of meaning that isn't there. "Working definition" just means that it is a stipulative definition; stipulative definitions are used when readers might accidentally confuse the meaning of an ambiguous term.

Fisher stipulates that "quantum cognition" refers--in the context of his article alone--to neural activity that employs quantum entangled pairs or molecules and the ability to store "qubits". The very fact that he states that it is a working definition should tell you that it doesn't necessarily have the same meaning as "quantum cognition" does in other articles.

I would have pointed this out earlier had I realised that you didn't understand something as elementary as a stipulative definition.

Wang et al could also be said to be using a "working definition"--albeit a much different one than Fisher--as they specify that their "quantum cognition research...applies abstract, mathematical principles of quantum theory to inquiries in cognitive science...researchers in this area are not doing quantum mechanics".

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory?

Both areas of research use mathematics from quantum theory, but they use it for dramatically-different applications that are unrelated to each other.

 

[DBT]

The problem with quantum mind theory:

''Combining data about the brain's temperature, the sizes of various proposed quantum objects, and disturbances caused by such things as nearby ions, Tegmark calculated how long microtubules and other possible quantum computers within the brain might remain in superposition before they decohere. His answer: The superpositions disappear in 10**-13 to 10**-20 seconds. Because the fastest neurons tend to operate on a time scale of 10**-3 seconds or so, Tegmark concludes that whatever the brain's quantum nature is, it decoheres far too rapidly for the neurons to take advantage of it.

"If our neurons have anything at all to do with our thinking, if all these electrical firings correspond in any way to our thought patterns, we are not quantum computers," says Tegmark. The problem is that the matter inside our skulls is warm and ever-changing on an atomic scale, an environment that dooms any nascent quantum computation before it can affect our thought patterns. For quantum effects to become important, the brain would have to be a tiny fraction of a degree above absolute zero.''

 

[DBT]

For the sake of argument, let's say that ''ideas start out in superposition in the preconscious and then wind up in the conscious mind as the superposition ends and the waveform collapses. "The collapse is where consciousness comes in," says Hameroff'' - that this occurs through the mechanism of microtubule superposition effecting neighbouring microtubules - ''which can take at least two different shapes--extended and contracted--so, in theory, they might be able t which in turn affect their neighbors'--and so forth, throughout the brain'' - how would this even relate to freedom in the sense of able to do otherwise within exactly the same state?

Quantum events unfold as they do without input by conscious will and the so called wave collapse brings about a decision, which emerges in conscious form.

Quantum free will? It is not.

 

[ryan]

You constantly refer to "QC" in your posts, which I take to mean "quantum cognition", not "quantum computation".

When Fisher refers to quantum cognition, he is referring to what Wang et al describes as "material quantum systems"; Wang et al explicitly states that their "quantum cognition" research is distinct from "material quantum systems", because they have repurposed quantum probability theory to describe systems that are unrelated to quantum mechanics.

Fisher even states plainly that his definition of "quantum cognition" does involve material quantum systems and does involves quantum mechanics.

Therefore, Fisher's research is unrelated to Wang et al.


You clearly equivocate the two different meaning of "quantum cognition" when you make statements such as the following:

It seems glaringly obvious to me that Fisher is using actual QM to explain the "quantum-like" behavior in QC.

The "quantum-like" behavior in Wang et al's quantum cognition model is not explained by Fisher's research, because they are unrelated.

There's QC (quantum cognition) which is a mathematical model of cognitive processes such as the decision-making process. Then there is what Fisher calls a "working definition" of QC. That's just a possible explanation that fits the mathematical model.

There you go again.

Fisher's definition of "quantum cognition" is unrelated to the model in Wang et al.

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory? I mean, that is how I see them as related. Wang does not propose a working definition, only a mathematical quantum theoretic account, and Fisher advances quantum cognition by finding possible mechanisms that explain the math.

You are imputing the words "working definition" with some kind of meaning that isn't there. "Working definition" just means that it is a stipulative definition; stipulative definitions are used when readers might accidentally confuse the meaning of an ambiguous term.

Fisher stipulates that "quantum cognition" refers--in the context of his article alone--to neural activity that employs quantum entangled pairs or molecules and the ability to store "qubits". The very fact that he states that it is a working definition should tell you that it doesn't necessarily have the same meaning as "quantum cognition" does in other articles.

I would have pointed this out earlier had I realised that you didn't understand something as elementary as a stipulative definition.

Wang et al could also be said to be using a "working definition"--albeit a much different one than Fisher--as they specify that their "quantum cognition research...applies abstract, mathematical principles of quantum theory to inquiries in cognitive science...researchers in this area are not doing quantum mechanics".

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory?

Both areas of research use mathematics from quantum theory, but they use it for dramatically-different applications that are unrelated to each other.

Don't you think he is trying to give a neurological explanation for why the results of QC follow quantum theory?

 

[ryan]

For the sake of argument, let's say that ''ideas start out in superposition in the preconscious and then wind up in the conscious mind as the superposition ends and the waveform collapses. "The collapse is where consciousness comes in," says Hameroff'' - that this occurs through the mechanism of microtubule superposition effecting neighbouring microtubules - ''which can take at least two different shapes--extended and contracted--so, in theory, they might be able t which in turn affect their neighbors'--and so forth, throughout the brain'' - how would this even relate to freedom in the sense of able to do otherwise within exactly the same state?

I don't know what you are saying here, and I don't know what is quoted and what isn't. The collapse could have been different.

 

[bigfield]

You constantly refer to "QC" in your posts, which I take to mean "quantum cognition", not "quantum computation".

When Fisher refers to quantum cognition, he is referring to what Wang et al describes as "material quantum systems"; Wang et al explicitly states that their "quantum cognition" research is distinct from "material quantum systems", because they have repurposed quantum probability theory to describe systems that are unrelated to quantum mechanics.

Fisher even states plainly that his definition of "quantum cognition" does involve material quantum systems and does involves quantum mechanics.

Therefore, Fisher's research is unrelated to Wang et al.


You clearly equivocate the two different meaning of "quantum cognition" when you make statements such as the following:

It seems glaringly obvious to me that Fisher is using actual QM to explain the "quantum-like" behavior in QC.

The "quantum-like" behavior in Wang et al's quantum cognition model is not explained by Fisher's research, because they are unrelated.

There's QC (quantum cognition) which is a mathematical model of cognitive processes such as the decision-making process. Then there is what Fisher calls a "working definition" of QC. That's just a possible explanation that fits the mathematical model.

There you go again.

Fisher's definition of "quantum cognition" is unrelated to the model in Wang et al.

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory? I mean, that is how I see them as related. Wang does not propose a working definition, only a mathematical quantum theoretic account, and Fisher advances quantum cognition by finding possible mechanisms that explain the math.

You are imputing the words "working definition" with some kind of meaning that isn't there. "Working definition" just means that it is a stipulative definition; stipulative definitions are used when readers might accidentally confuse the meaning of an ambiguous term.

Fisher stipulates that "quantum cognition" refers--in the context of his article alone--to neural activity that employs quantum entangled pairs or molecules and the ability to store "qubits". The very fact that he states that it is a working definition should tell you that it doesn't necessarily have the same meaning as "quantum cognition" does in other articles.

I would have pointed this out earlier had I realised that you didn't understand something as elementary as a stipulative definition.

Wang et al could also be said to be using a "working definition"--albeit a much different one than Fisher--as they specify that their "quantum cognition research...applies abstract, mathematical principles of quantum theory to inquiries in cognitive science...researchers in this area are not doing quantum mechanics".

Are you saying that they both would not use quantum probability and other mathematics of quantum theory?

Both areas of research use mathematics from quantum theory, but they use it for dramatically-different applications that are unrelated to each other.

Don't you think he is trying to give a neurological explanation for why the results of QC follow quantum theory?

Obviously, he is not.

 

[ryan]

Don't you think he is trying to give a neurological explanation for why the results of QC follow quantum theory?

Obviously, he is not.

Is there any reason why you think this?

 

[bigfield]

Obviously, he is not.

Is there any reason why you think this?

Are you taking the piss?

 

[ryan]

Nevermind my last post.

Oh come on. Are you really going to say that Fisher is not expecting his "working definition of QC" to produce the results that are expected by QC?

QC is about models of cognition using math from quantum theory. Fisher is talking about the brain functioning as a quantum computer. So I think is safe to assume a quantum computing brain would lead to QC which, again, is about math models using the math of quantum theory.

 

[Juma]

I think is safe to assume a quantum computing brain would lead to QC.

And in this you are utterly alone...

 

[bigfield]

Nevermind my last post.

I minded it.

Oh come on. Are you really going to say that Fisher is not expecting his "working definition of QC" to produce the results that are expected by QC?

False equivocation, again.

ETA: You're still imputing some special meaning to the phrase "working definition".

QC is about models of cognition using math from quantum theory. Fisher is talking about the brain functioning as a quantum computer. So I think is safe to assume a quantum computing brain would lead to QC which, again, is about math models using the math of quantum theory.

Your reasoning is not valid; you are depending on ambiguity, again.

[1] "QC is about models of cognition using math from quantum theory.
[2] "Fisher is talking about the brain functioning as a quantum computer.
"So
[3] "I think is safe to assume a quantum computing brain would lead to QC..."

[3] does not follow from [1] and [2].

Firstly, Wang et al quantum cognition research does not model the brain as a quantum computer, therefore it does not follow that Fisher's mechanism would (or even could) produce a system that is represented by Wang et al's model.

Secondly, Fisher does not provide a mechanism that allows the brain to function as a quantum computer; he only provides a mechanism by which the brain might be able to function partly as a quantum computer. On the slim chance that Fisher's mechanism actually exists in the brain, this would not mean that the brain, or even small parts of it, would function like a quantum computer.

 

[DBT]

For the sake of argument, let's say that ''ideas start out in superposition in the preconscious and then wind up in the conscious mind as the superposition ends and the waveform collapses. "The collapse is where consciousness comes in," says Hameroff'' - that this occurs through the mechanism of microtubule superposition effecting neighbouring microtubules - ''which can take at least two different shapes--extended and contracted--so, in theory, they might be able t which in turn affect their neighbors'--and so forth, throughout the brain'' - how would this even relate to freedom in the sense of able to do otherwise within exactly the same state?

I don't know what you are saying here, and I don't know what is quoted and what isn't. The collapse could have been different.

The quotes are in quotation marks, my questions and remarks are not in quotation marks.

The point of my post was to say that your foundation for free will - ''the collapse could have been different'' - has nothing to do with free will, or will in general.

Certainly not conscious will, which is a product of superposition collapse (assuming quantum consciousness for the sake of argument), therefore not a freely willed decision.

Ryan, you may as well call a random number generator a free will generator.

 

[ryan]

I minded it.

Oh come on. Are you really going to say that Fisher is not expecting his "working definition of QC" to produce the results that are expected by QC?

False equivocation, again.

ETA: You're still imputing some special meaning to the phrase "working definition".

QC is about models of cognition using math from quantum theory. Fisher is talking about the brain functioning as a quantum computer. So I think is safe to assume a quantum computing brain would lead to QC which, again, is about math models using the math of quantum theory.

Your reasoning is not valid; you are depending on ambiguity, again.

[1] "QC is about models of cognition using math from quantum theory.
[2] "Fisher is talking about the brain functioning as a quantum computer.
"So
[3] "I think is safe to assume a quantum computing brain would lead to QC..."

[3] does not follow from [1] and [2].

Firstly, Wang et al quantum cognition research does not model the brain as a quantum computer, therefore it does not follow that Fisher's mechanism would (or even could) produce a system that is represented by Wang et al's model.

That's not what Wang et al are interested in; that's not what their kind of research specializes in (see https://www.kitp.ucsb.edu/sites/default/files/users/mpaf/174.pdf ). Wang/Busemeyer are studying the behavior of people by observation and trying to find a mathematical model that explains how the brain processes inputs. They are not concerned with how the internal processes that perform QC, "This research is not concerned with whether the brain is a quantum computer."

QC was a well established term by the time Fisher put out his paper "Quantum cognition: The possibility of processing with nuclear spins in the brain" in 2015. And I take "working definition of QC" to mean possible definition of QC.

Secondly, Fisher does not provide a mechanism that allows the brain to function as a quantum computer; he only provides a mechanism by which the brain might be able to function partly as a quantum computer. On the slim chance that Fisher's mechanism actually exists in the brain, this would not mean that the brain, or even small parts of it, would function like a quantum computer.

Your first sentence seems to contradict your second sentence.

 

[ryan]

I don't know what you are saying here, and I don't know what is quoted and what isn't. The collapse could have been different.

The quotes are in quotation marks, my questions and remarks are not in quotation marks.

The point of my post was to say that your foundation for free will - ''the collapse could have been different'' - has nothing to do with free will, or will in general.

But's it's how our will/choices work, freely.

Certainly not conscious will, which is a product of superposition collapse (assuming quantum consciousness for the sake of argument), therefore not a freely willed decision.

I think you are still thinking in terms of particle for particle processes where objectively whole entities do not exist except for how people subjectively categorize objects, processes, functions, etc.

 

[DBT]

The quotes are in quotation marks, my questions and remarks are not in quotation marks.

The point of my post was to say that your foundation for free will - ''the collapse could have been different'' - has nothing to do with free will, or will in general.

But's it's how our will/choices work, freely.

This makes no sense in relation to what I pointed out.

As will is shaped and formed without awareness, as are decisions (readiness potential, conscious representation), will itself has no choice or freedom to 'do otherwise'

Your claim is akin to saying a random number generator has free will because its 'choice' of number 'could have been different'

I think you are still thinking in terms of particle for particle processes where objectively whole entities do not exist except for how people subjectively categorize objects, processes, functions, etc.

No.

You appear to be conflating actual objects and events with mental representation of these objects and events.

The former exist independently of the latter.

How the former is perceived and represented mentally is determined by the state of the system of perception and representation.

 

[ryan]

But's it's how our will/choices work, freely.

This makes no sense in relation to what I pointed out.

As will is shaped and formed without awareness, as are decisions (readiness potential, conscious representation), will itself has no choice or freedom to 'do otherwise'

But that would mean that the will/consciousness is fixed, no quantum consciousness.

Your claim is akin to saying a random number generator has free will because its 'choice' of number 'could have been different'

Yes, except the will/consciousness is the generator and the number is a choice.

I think you are still thinking in terms of particle for particle processes where objectively whole entities do not exist except for how people subjectively categorize objects, processes, functions, etc.

No.

You appear to be conflating actual objects and events with mental representation of these objects and events.

The former exist independently of the latter.

How the former is perceived and represented mentally is determined by the state of the system of perception and representation.

You misunderstood what I was saying. I will try again.

Particle for particle, nothing but the knowledge of a particle would exist. We would be conscious one particle at a time and would never know other particles exist. Entanglement would give us a more complex consciousness because we would be more than one particle. Entanglement allows us to acknowledge whole groups of particles by being them. There should have to be many particles acting as their parts but also acting as a single object, the consciousness.

An entangled group of particles inside and extending outside the consciousness seems to be the only way science can make sense of how we can know about (aboutness) other things that aren't us.

 

[Juma]

Particle for particle, nothing but the knowledge of a particle would exist.

Knowledge requires perception and memory and those requires a brain.

 

[DBT]

We would be conscious one particle at a time and would never know other particles exist.

How are you conscious of one particle? Or even conscious of what the quantum states at synaptic clefts happen to be at any given moment in time?

Entanglement would give us a more complex consciousness because we would be more than one particle.

We are more than one particle. We are a part of a whole brain with its trillions of neurons working to produce our experience of the world and self. But we as conscious entities are only aware of the latter.

We have no awareness of the former.

That is where your proposition fails.