Humans don't long for the eternal, but the indefinite

[DBT]

You get to wear a brand spanking new incorruptible body, so I'm told.

 

[ideologyhunter]

But you know there'd be fleas. They'd get in. Some unwashed ascetic would be shooed in so quickly, he wouldn't be properly vetted. He be flea-ridden, naturally. The fleas would become immortal once they got in -- the way fruit flies mutate in a generation -- and there's no Orkin mentioned in descriptions of heaven. Everyone up there would be bitching about the fleas. To newcomers: 'Yes, yes, we're in a golden paradise, and the weather's okay -- but just wait til you've been here for five minutes. The fleas!!! We've tried talking to God about it, but he doesn't get bitten, so he doesn't think it's a problem.'

 

[PyramidHead]

I think we see this same "innate longing for the timeless, eternal" in the (atheist) doctrine of;

* A past-eternal, perpetual motion uni/multi/mega/omni-verse
* The supposed metaphysical impossibility of an ontological state of nothingness/non-existence

Why then would the idea of a past-eternal, perpetually existent Being pose a problem?

I think it's a matter of which level of description we're talking about. The claim you're referring to suggests that what exists, reality, what is, whatever you want to call the set of everything that is something, did not have a beginning. The second claim you ask about refers to a specific "Being" within the set of things that exist. So, it's much more particular about the commitment it makes, metaphysically and epistemologically. I would break it down like this:

Atheist claim (if the atheist believes in a past-eternal universe): there was never a time when nothing existed, or: never a moment with no preceding moment.
Theist claim (if the theist believes in a past-eternal God): there was never a time when this specific entity with these particular properties did not exist.

There is a big difference in scope and justification between the two. For the first to be the case, it doesn't matter what things are real. There could be gods, no gods, matter, mind, whatever, as long as every X coordinate in time (or meta-time, at some nested level of reality) has an X-1 coordinate, the claim is true. The latter claim requires that a specific thing is real, though. It's like saying "all pigs that fly are remarkable", which could be true or not, but is less of a stretch than saying "this flying pig is remarkable". There needs to be a flying pig for that one to work.

Either way, I don't see how an infinitely old uni/multiverse would do someone any good if they longed for the eternal, especially not if eternal life was part of their longing.

 

[bilby]

I think we see this same "innate longing for the timeless, eternal" in the (atheist) doctrine of;

* A past-eternal, perpetual motion uni/multi/mega/omni-verse
* The supposed metaphysical impossibility of an ontological state of nothingness/non-existence

Why then would the idea of a past-eternal, perpetually existent Being pose a problem?

I think it's a matter of which level of description we're talking about. The claim you're referring to suggests that what exists, reality, what is, whatever you want to call the set of everything that is something, did not have a beginning. The second claim you ask about refers to a specific "Being" within the set of things that exist. So, it's much more particular about the commitment it makes, metaphysically and epistemologically. I would break it down like this:

Atheist claim (if the atheist believes in a past-eternal universe): there was never a time when nothing existed, or: never a moment with no preceding moment.
Theist claim (if the theist believes in a past-eternal God): there was never a time when this specific entity with these particular properties did not exist.

There is a big difference in scope and justification between the two. For the first to be the case, it doesn't matter what things are real. There could be gods, no gods, matter, mind, whatever, as long as every X coordinate in time (or meta-time, at some nested level of reality) has an X-1 coordinate, the claim is true. The latter claim requires that a specific thing is real, though. It's like saying "all pigs that fly are remarkable", which could be true or not, but is less of a stretch than saying "this flying pig is remarkable". There needs to be a flying pig for that one to work.

Either way, I don't see how an infinitely old uni/multiverse would do someone any good if they longed for the eternal, especially not if eternal life was part of their longing.

You are overthinking this.

Lion's position isn't a failed attempt at reasoning; It's just a long-winded version of the schoolyard retort "I know you are, but what am I?". It doesn't need to make sense, it just needs to make him feel like he retaliated against atheists for daring to present a position that highlights the inanity of his beliefs.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't know that I even presented something that "highlights the inanity" of Christian faith, I just think it's not what most Christians claim it is. Or to put it differently, I think that most Christians (and most people) have what the author I mentioned calls "secular faith"--concern for temporal, mortal affairs as ends in themselves, motivated by the knowledge that they are finite and irreplaceable, only valuable to the extent that they are at risk of being permanently lost. What they call faith in the everlasting kingdom of God is actually this mundane, secular idea extrapolated indefinitely. If they actually believed that a state of timeless eternal radiance in union with the divine was capable of restoring everything that we lose in death, they wouldn't grieve, wouldn't dedicate themselves to terrestrial causes that help others. I agree with you that Lion is probably not arguing in good faith here, pardon the pun, but I try to be charitable because I'd like to hear some Christian perspectives on this.

 

[Lion IRC]

Saying that "Lion is probably not arguing in good faith" isn't being charitable.
It just puts you on par with bilby.
/thread

 

[bilby]

Saying that "Lion is probably not arguing in good faith" isn't being charitable.
It just puts you on par with bilby.
/thread

Most people prefer honesty over charity in a debate.

There's really not much benefit to anyone in being kind to people who have zero interest in the truth value of their claims.

 

[PyramidHead]

Saying that "Lion is probably not arguing in good faith" isn't being charitable.
It just puts you on par with bilby.
/thread

Nothing personal, I just know your work. We sometimes agree, but I can't sugarcoat my honest opinion here. If you want to shake off the reputation of having questionable motives in debate, maybe don't flee the scene like a deer startled by the snap of a twig when someone challenges your integrity.

 

[Brian63]

Most people prefer honesty over charity in a debate.

Source? I would be interested in reading that study further.

It depends on the circumstances and the context of the debate. If I am with a family member at Christmas who thinks my religious and political views are stupid, I would prefer they kept that rhetoric to themselves than express it, even if we were debating those issues. In online debates with strangers, charity still goes a long way.

Outside of debates, we are politely dishonest to people all the time, in attempts to make them feel more comfortable and establish mutual goodwill. Telling a person they look beautiful even if they don’t really. “It is so nice to meet you” even if you do not really care about meeting them. Etc., etc.

There's really not much benefit to anyone in being kind to people who have zero interest in the truth value of their claims.

There is significant benefit. They may *currently* have zero interest in the truth value of their claims. However, they may be willing to take the first step in evaluating the truth value, if they did not think that their new-found critical thinking and willingness to question themselves would be used as a weapon against themselves later on. If a person thought that it was okay and completely acceptable to doubt their beliefs, they would be more willing to do so. If they felt guilt and shame for doing so, or even fear that others would laugh at them and say “Ha! You changed your view! That means you are weak!” then they will go into self-preservation mode and not doubt themselves.