Idealist epistemological argument leads to solipsism

[lpetrich]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

I once knew someone who responded that it is more reasonable to infer the existence of other minds than of nonmental entities, even though our physical environment is more accessible by perception than other minds. I didn't find that argument the least bit convincing, and it seems to me like this would be a Universe full of disembodied minds floating in a void like jellyfish in the ocean.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

You really wouldn't need a universe would you?

 

[ontological_realist]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

I once knew someone who responded that it is more reasonable to infer the existence of other minds than of nonmental entities, even though our physical environment is more accessible by perception than other minds. I didn't find that argument the least bit convincing, and it seems to me like this would be a Universe full of disembodied minds floating in a void like jellyfish in the ocean.

How about Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Idealism ? Can you show exactly how it leads to solipsism?

 

[lpetrich]

How about Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Idealism ? Can you show exactly how it leads to solipsism?

I'm not familiar with that.

 

[Underseer]

I think it's more accurate that idealist epistemology fails to escape solipsism than to say that it causes solipsism.

 

[Bomb#20]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

How does that follow? There's also only one body that one is directly acquainted with, one's own. One knows of other bodies only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. If that doesn't lead to solipsism, why would the same being true of mind lead to solipsism?

I once knew someone who responded that it is more reasonable to infer the existence of other minds than of nonmental entities, even though our physical environment is more accessible by perception than other minds. I didn't find that argument the least bit convincing, and it seems to me like this would be a Universe full of disembodied minds floating in a void like jellyfish in the ocean.

I knew someone who said that too; I likewise found it an unconvincing argument against matter. But it doesn't imply non-interacting minds. One would of course have to hypothesize some sort of mind-reading; but that's not much of a hurdle when one has already hypothesized the nonexistence of one's own body. Every concept in the only mind you're directly acquainted with that you have no experience of creating yourself is evidence of other minds. Sing a familiar song to yourself. Do you remember writing it? With or without nonmental entities, it's always reasonable to infer the existence of other minds.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

How does that follow? There's also only one body that one is directly acquainted with, one's own. One knows of other bodies only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. If that doesn't lead to solipsism, why would the same being true of mind lead to solipsism?


I knew someone who said that too; I likewise found it an unconvincing argument against matter. But it doesn't imply non-interacting minds. One would of course have to hypothesize some sort of mind-reading; but that's not much of a hurdle when one has already hypothesized the nonexistence of one's own body. Every concept in the only mind you're directly acquainted with that you have no experience of creating yourself is evidence of other minds. Sing a familiar song to yourself. Do you remember writing it? With or without nonmental entities, it's always reasonable to infer the existence of other minds.

How do we know that our mind is not part of a larger mind? We're also assuming our individual minds are aware of everything that is "mind." I would not be so quick to jump to that conclusion. The question is possibly how much my mind know about itself.

 

[Bomb#20]

How do we know that our mind is not part of a larger mind? We're also assuming our individual minds are aware of everything that is "mind." I would not be so quick to jump to that conclusion. The question is possibly how much my mind know about itself.

Sure, if a clod be washed away by the sea Europe is the less and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls. But just because one chooses to view mankind as a continent rather than a bunch of islands, that doesn't mean the other parts of the hypothesized larger mind don't count as other minds. If I call you "me", because I'm involved in mankind so your death diminishes me, does that mean if I kill you I should be considered a suicide and not a murderer? When there are thoughts you have no access to unless another part of the larger mind chooses to give you access to them, what is the substantive content of calling those thoughts "another part of you" instead of calling them "somebody else"? How is that a falsifiable hypothesis rather than just an idiolectal relabeling?

 

[ontological_realist]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

I once knew someone who responded that it is more reasonable to infer the existence of other minds than of nonmental entities, even though our physical environment is more accessible by perception than other minds. I didn't find that argument the least bit convincing, and it seems to me like this would be a Universe full of disembodied minds floating in a void like jellyfish in the ocean.

Why do you object to solipsism? I am not saying that one should or should not object to solipsism. I am merely trying to know that why do you object to solipsism.

 

[Underseer]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

I once knew someone who responded that it is more reasonable to infer the existence of other minds than of nonmental entities, even though our physical environment is more accessible by perception than other minds. I didn't find that argument the least bit convincing, and it seems to me like this would be a Universe full of disembodied minds floating in a void like jellyfish in the ocean.

Why do you object to solipsism? I am not saying that one should or should not object to solipsism. I am merely trying to know that why do you object to solipsism.

I can't speak for Lpetrich, but I suspect he's pointing out that theists have a problem with solipsism, not that he himself has a problem with it.

Solipsism is absurd, but because we can't rule it out, there are certain conclusions we have to accept.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

Non sequitur.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Solipsism is absurd, but because we can't rule it out, there are certain conclusions we have to accept.

If we can't rule out solipsism then solipsism isn't absurd.
EB

 

[Juma]

Solipsism is absurd, but because we can't rule it out, there are certain conclusions we have to accept.

If we can't rule out solipsism then solipsism isn't absurd.
EB

Duh. What useful/good/meaningful comes from a solipsistic view?

 

[Speakpigeon]

You're talking about absurdity as synonym of uselessness, if solipsism for example is conducive to living a useless life. Maybe that's what Underseer meant but he didn't make that clear.

From the point of view of the solipsist of course there is no such a thing as a useless life.
EB

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

How does that follow? There's also only one body that one is directly acquainted with, one's own. One knows of other bodies only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. If that doesn't lead to solipsism, why would the same being true of mind lead to solipsism?


I knew someone who said that too; I likewise found it an unconvincing argument against matter. But it doesn't imply non-interacting minds. One would of course have to hypothesize some sort of mind-reading; but that's not much of a hurdle when one has already hypothesized the nonexistence of one's own body. Every concept in the only mind you're directly acquainted with that you have no experience of creating yourself is evidence of other minds. Sing a familiar song to yourself. Do you remember writing it? With or without nonmental entities, it's always reasonable to infer the existence of other minds.

How do we know that our mind is not part of a larger mind? We're also assuming our individual minds are aware of everything that is "mind." I would not be so quick to jump to that conclusion. The question is possibly how much my mind know about itself.

Exactly. All is maya, illusion. All exists only in the mind of Atman. Your mind is an illusion, a dream of Atman. You have no mind or existence than this. Not a new idea by any means. If Arman decides to stop dreaming his dream, this Universe and us and our minds would cease to exist. Plus all the religions of this world.

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

If we can't rule out solipsism then solipsism isn't absurd.
EB

Duh. What useful/good/meaningful comes from a solipsistic view?

About the same as having a God that decided who would exist, who be elect or reprobate from the beginning of time. Only God's mind matters. Our sense of free will is illusionary, our mind is illusionary.

 

[ryan]

There's a common epistemological argument for metaphysical idealism. It is that we are most directly acquainted with mind instead of with matter. The big problem with that argument is that there is only one mind that one is directly acquainted with. One's own. One knows of other minds only indirectly, by inference from perceptions. Even mind reading, if it was possible, would be inference from perceptions.

So one gets solipsism.

I once knew someone who responded that it is more reasonable to infer the existence of other minds than of nonmental entities, even though our physical environment is more accessible by perception than other minds. I didn't find that argument the least bit convincing, and it seems to me like this would be a Universe full of disembodied minds floating in a void like jellyfish in the ocean.

For "mind" to have any relation to its usual definitions, there must be something that isn't the mind. But, if your going to assume that everything is your mind, then "mind" means "everything". So if "mind" = "everything", then you are just saying that everything exists - not controversial.

 

[Juma]

You're talking about absurdity as synonym of uselessness, if solipsism for example is conducive to living a useless life. Maybe that's what Underseer meant but he didn't make that clear.

From the point of view of the solipsist of course there is no such a thing as a useless life.
EB

No. I mean that solipsism is useless in itself.

 

[Speakpigeon]

All is maya, illusion.

So this too is an illusion?

If the answer is "yes" then it's not true that all is illusion; if the answer is "no" then it's not true that all is illusion. Ergo, all is not illusion.

Another way to put it is that you cannot claim without contradicting yourself that you know we know nothing.

So you probably don't understand the saying properly. It's likely that it only applied originally to our beliefs about the material world. It is certainly illusory that there should be human beings, cows, earthly goods etc. are we think of them. If there is something material, i.e. not of the mind, then we don't know what it is. On the other hand, impressions cannot be illusions. Any impression that there are human beings, cows, or earthly goods etc., as I think of them, cannot possibly be an illusion when I have this impression. And if we call "mind" whatever impressions we have at the moment we have them, then the mind cannot possibly be an illusion.
EB

 

[Underseer]

If we can't rule out solipsism then solipsism isn't absurd.
EB

Duh. What useful/good/meaningful comes from a solipsistic view?

Well, the possibility is part of the reason nothing we know is 100% certain, which in turn pushes us towards certain epistemologies and away from others.