If the Germans had conquered Britain would he have ethnic cleansed?

[dystopian]

Hitler admired the British and considered the Empire an important factor in world civilization.

There are some who feel he allowed to the BEF to escape from Dunkirk. German panzer forces were only a few miles away, stopped by orders, days before the British reached the sea. Without access to a port, the BEF would've had to surrender or face annihilation. The argument is that Hitler thought the British would be more amenable to a deal if the repeat were not too severe.

Based on that, I would guess that Hitler would've more generous than he was with the French.

Don't count on it. The Germans considered the Dutch to be their little Aryan brothers. When the Dutch shattered that delusion by engaging in mass protests against the occupation and Jewish deportations, Hitler reputedly planned to deport the entire Dutch population to Eastern Europe. Of course, he had to be told that was logistically impossible at the time. Afterwards the Germans were considerably harsher against the Dutch. It demonstrates that their initial opinion isn't particularly relevant. I very much doubt Hitler and his ilk would be particularly kind to the British population, especially given that like us, they wouldn't just lower their heads and play nice with the occupiers.

I think that if the UK were to have fallen, then Germany would've eventually won the war. At the very least it would've resulted in a cold war between the third reich and the remnants of the allies. This would enable the post war reich to try and implement the means for mass migration plans for the uncooperative occupied populations in ways similar to the original Madagascar plan for the Jews.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Hitler admired the British and considered the Empire an important factor in world civilization.

There are some who feel he allowed to the BEF to escape from Dunkirk. German panzer forces were only a few miles away, stopped by orders, days before the British reached the sea. Without access to a port, the BEF would've had to surrender or face annihilation. The argument is that Hitler thought the British would be more amenable to a deal if the repeat were not too severe.

Based on that, I would guess that Hitler would've more generous than he was with the French.

Don't count on it. The Germans considered the Dutch to be their little Aryan brothers. When the Dutch shattered that delusion by engaging in mass protests against the occupation and Jewish deportations, Hitler reputedly planned to deport the entire Dutch population to Eastern Europe. Of course, he had to be told that was logistically impossible at the time. Afterwards the Germans were considerably harsher against the Dutch. It demonstrates that their initial opinion isn't particularly relevant. I very much doubt Hitler and his ilk would be particularly kind to the British population, especially given that like us, they wouldn't just lower their heads and play nice with the occupiers.

I think that if the UK were to have fallen, then Germany would've eventually won the war. At the very least it would've resulted in a cold war between the third reich and the remnants of the allies. This would enable the post war reich to try and implement the means for mass migration plans for the uncooperative occupied populations in ways similar to the original Madagascar plan for the Jews.

OTOH, the Germans were relatively benevolent to the Danes. So it could've gone either way.

If Hitler had closed the Mediterranean after his victory in France, the British would've lost. But he wouldn't attempt Gibralter without Franco's blessing. And after the heavy losses taking Crete, he abandoned the idea of large scale airborne operations. Grand strategy wasn't Hitlers forte. His view was political. He hated and distrusted the Soviets and thought that the British would persuade them to enter the war on their side.

Anyway, such a loss wouldn't have meant occupation of Britain. I think the only way the Germans would've occupied Britain was if they had gotten a force across the Channel immediately after or even during Dunkirk when the British were too disorganized to resist. But consider - they still had to complete the defeat of France. Most of the French army was still intact, demoralized to be sure, but not a negligible threat. Not the best time to mount a major seaborn invasion, of which the Germans had no experience. The invasion of Norway was a deception, using neutral merchant ships, hardly a model for an invasion of Britain.

Sarpedon made a good point that the Germans were on the verge of establishing air superiority over southern England before changing their air strategy, but also by this time the British were better organized on the ground. The only way for the Germans to prevail in an invasion was by speed.

 

[Sarpedon]

And that's the story of the Axis in WW2: Nothing that was needed was ready at the time it was needed. No landing craft because invasion of britain wasn't anticipated. Insufficient surface ships because war wasn't expected so soon. Submariners wondered why advanced submarines weren't available sooner, and in greater quantities: Britain wasn't expected to hold out against Luftwaffe. Tanks didn't have guns big enough for Soviet armor that they didn't know existed in 1941. Italy wasn't ready at all. Mussolini said it wouldn't be until 1948. Advanced Italian fighters as good as allied fighters introduced just before the italian surrender. German Jet fighters postponed and misused when they could have stopped the strategic bombing had they arrived sooner.

They enjoyed what success they had because the allies were even less prepared.

 

[dystopian]

OTOH, the Germans were relatively benevolent to the Danes. So it could've gone either way.

That's for a few reasons. To start with the Danes were in a similar position of being seen as "Aryan brothers", but in contrast to the Dutch there were no strong ideological movements in the country to form an early resistance; and the Germans had no particular strategic interests in Denmark and so the Danes were largely left to their own devices unlike was the case elsewhere. It wasn't until late '43 that significant resistance and protest formed, and unsurprisingly the Germans were decidedly less benevolent from then on. So really, I don't think it could've 'gone' either way: German policy towards occupied territories inevitably turned sour when the people and the puppets they installed didn't act subservient enough. If the war was effectively over, and they'd occupied Brittain, I could totally see them dispersing the British population the way they planned with many other countries. They seemed to understand the long-term strategic value in forced migration quite well and with the backing of their ideology I don't doubt they'd have pushed it through.

None of this of course is at all relevant to the question of if Germany was ever close to occupying Brittain. I was just addressing the naive notion that because Hitler supposedly admired the British that he'd be nice to them. He claimed to admire lots of people and nations, and that didn't really help the people there much.

 

[Horatio Parker]

And that's the story of the Axis in WW2: Nothing that was needed was ready at the time it was needed. No landing craft because invasion of britain wasn't anticipated. Insufficient surface ships because war wasn't expected so soon. Submariners wondered why advanced submarines weren't available sooner, and in greater quantities: Britain wasn't expected to hold out against Luftwaffe. Tanks didn't have guns big enough for Soviet armor that they didn't know existed in 1941. Italy wasn't ready at all. Mussolini said it wouldn't be until 1948. Advanced Italian fighters as good as allied fighters introduced just before the italian surrender. German Jet fighters postponed and misused when they could have stopped the strategic bombing had they arrived sooner.

They enjoyed what success they had because the allies were even less prepared.

I think they did well because their armored and combined arms tactics were far superior to what anyone else was doing. In the invasion of France, the Germans were weaker in everything but airplanes. But they massed their tanks.

Hitler didn't want war with the British. After he swallowed Czechoslavkia, Chamberlain offered a guarantee to Poland, who accepted. The British didn't include Russia, the only country whereby the Brits actually could do anything for the Poles, in their plans. So Hitler neutralized Russia with his deal. In his mind, the British would never bind themselves to a such a futile guarantee (the Czechs also received a guarantee but Chamberlain weasled). Oops....

 

[Horatio Parker]

None of this of course is at all relevant to the question of if Germany was ever close to occupying Brittain.

I was just addressing the naive notion that because Hitler supposedly admired the British that he'd be nice to them.

1948, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 'The German Generals Talk', pp. 134-135: "But certain members of Rundstedt's staff regarded the excuses as thin, and believed that Hitler had a deeper motive for his halt order [at Dunkirk]. They connected it with the surprising way he had talked when visiting their headquarters at Charleville on May 24th, the day after the armoured forces had been halted in their stride. Hitler was accompanied by only one of his staff, and talked in private to Rundstedt and the two key men of his staff-Sodenstern and Blumentritt.

Here is what the latter told me--"Hitler was in a very good humor, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been 'a decided miracle,' and gave us his opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain. He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but where there is planing [of wood], shavings will fall.

He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church, saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the Continent. The return of Germany's colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in difficulties anywhere. He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics. He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honor to accept. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, who was always for agreement with France and Britain, expressed his satisfaction, and later, after Hitler's departure, remarked with a sigh of relief-'Well if he wants nothing else, then we shall have peace at last.'"

When Hitler continued to keep on the break, Blumentritt's thoughts ran back to this conversation. He felt that the "halt" had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the British Army had been captured at Dunkirk, the British people might have felt that their honour had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape, Hitler hoped to conciliate them. This conviction of Hitler's deeper motive was confirmed by his strangely dilatory attitude over the subsequent plans for the invasion of England. "He showed little interest in the plans," Blumentritt said, "and made no effort to speed up the preparations. That was utterly different to his usual behaviour." Before the invasion of Poland, of france, and later of Russia, he repeatedly spurred them on. But on this occasion he sat back."

Supposedly.

 

[Bronzeage]

1948, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 'The German Generals Talk', pp. 134-135: "But certain members of Rundstedt's staff regarded the excuses as thin, and believed that Hitler had a deeper motive for his halt order [at Dunkirk]. They connected it with the surprising way he had talked when visiting their headquarters at Charleville on May 24th, the day after the armoured forces had been halted in their stride. Hitler was accompanied by only one of his staff, and talked in private to Rundstedt and the two key men of his staff-Sodenstern and Blumentritt.

Here is what the latter told me--"Hitler was in a very good humor, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been 'a decided miracle,' and gave us his opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain. He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but where there is planing [of wood], shavings will fall.

He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church, saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the Continent. The return of Germany's colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in difficulties anywhere. He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics. He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honor to accept. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, who was always for agreement with France and Britain, expressed his satisfaction, and later, after Hitler's departure, remarked with a sigh of relief-'Well if he wants nothing else, then we shall have peace at last.'"

When Hitler continued to keep on the break, Blumentritt's thoughts ran back to this conversation. He felt that the "halt" had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the British Army had been captured at Dunkirk, the British people might have felt that their honour had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape, Hitler hoped to conciliate them. This conviction of Hitler's deeper motive was confirmed by his strangely dilatory attitude over the subsequent plans for the invasion of England. "He showed little interest in the plans," Blumentritt said, "and made no effort to speed up the preparations. That was utterly different to his usual behaviour." Before the invasion of Poland, of france, and later of Russia, he repeatedly spurred them on. But on this occasion he sat back."

Supposedly.

Yeah, I suppose it could have happened that way. On the other hand, Luftwaffe bombers continued to pound the evacuation zone up till the last Tommy left the beach. If the BEF were being allowed to escape for political reasons, no one told the German Air Command.

If this conversation with Hitler actually occurred, I think it is just Hitler did not want anything to spoil his good mood.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Supposedly.

Yeah, I suppose it could have happened that way. On the other hand, Luftwaffe bombers continued to pound the evacuation zone up till the last Tommy left the beach. If the BEF were being allowed to escape for political reasons, no one told the German Air Command.

If this conversation with Hitler actually occurred, I think it is just Hitler did not want anything to spoil his good mood.

Sure. Maybe the battle was a hoax...

Why on earth would Hitler tell his commanders he was intentionally allowing the British to escape?

Wikipedia says the halt was ordered by Rundstedt and confirmed by Hitler:

After the war, several commanders, including Rundstedt and OKH Chief of Staff General Franz Halder, tried to put the blame for this decision exclusively on Hitler. However, according to Rundstedt's official war diary, Rundstedt ordered the halt, concerned about the vulnerability of his flanks and the question of supply to his forward troops.[40][41][42] He was also concerned that the marshy ground around Dunkirk would prove unsuitable for the use of tanks, and he wished to save some of the armour for the upcoming advance on Paris. Both these concerns were shared by Hitler,[43] who merely validated the order several hours after the fact.

and

The Halt Order has been the subject of much discussion by historians.[48][49] Guderian considered the failure to order a timely assault on Dunkirk to be one of the major mistakes the Germans made on the Western Front.[50] Rundstedt called it "one of the great turning points of the war",[39] and Manstein described it as "one of Hitler's most critical mistakes".[51]

 

[Bronzeage]

Yeah, I suppose it could have happened that way. On the other hand, Luftwaffe bombers continued to pound the evacuation zone up till the last Tommy left the beach. If the BEF were being allowed to escape for political reasons, no one told the German Air Command.

If this conversation with Hitler actually occurred, I think it is just Hitler did not want anything to spoil his good mood.

Sure. Maybe the battle was a hoax...

Why on earth would Hitler tell his commanders he was intentionally allowing the British to escape?

Wikipedia says the halt was ordered by Rundstedt and confirmed by Hitler:

After the war, several commanders, including Rundstedt and OKH Chief of Staff General Franz Halder, tried to put the blame for this decision exclusively on Hitler. However, according to Rundstedt's official war diary, Rundstedt ordered the halt, concerned about the vulnerability of his flanks and the question of supply to his forward troops.[40][41][42] He was also concerned that the marshy ground around Dunkirk would prove unsuitable for the use of tanks, and he wished to save some of the armour for the upcoming advance on Paris. Both these concerns were shared by Hitler,[43] who merely validated the order several hours after the fact.

and

The Halt Order has been the subject of much discussion by historians.[48][49] Guderian considered the failure to order a timely assault on Dunkirk to be one of the major mistakes the Germans made on the Western Front.[50] Rundstedt called it "one of the great turning points of the war",[39] and Manstein described it as "one of Hitler's most critical mistakes".[51]

As I posted earlier, the decision to delay a final assault was sound military judgment. The BEF could not resupply and the Germans could. The longer they delayed, the weaker the BEF became, and the more likely it became the British would ask for terms. It looks bad in hindsight, but the German High Command could not have anticipated the scale of the evacuation. It was possible only because of a confluence of advantageous circumstances, not the least of which was the weather.

 

[Horatio Parker]

As I posted earlier, the decision to delay a final assault was sound military judgment. The BEF could not resupply and the Germans could. The longer they delayed, the weaker the BEF became, and the more likely it became the British would ask for terms. It looks bad in hindsight, but the German High Command could not have anticipated the scale of the evacuation. It was possible only because of a confluence of advantageous circumstances, not the least of which was the weather.

You're conflating two issues. Taking Dunkirk when there was only one British battalion on the scene, as was the case for several days, is a completely different scenario from assaulting a fortress.

 

[Bronzeage]

As I posted earlier, the decision to delay a final assault was sound military judgment. The BEF could not resupply and the Germans could. The longer they delayed, the weaker the BEF became, and the more likely it became the British would ask for terms. It looks bad in hindsight, but the German High Command could not have anticipated the scale of the evacuation. It was possible only because of a confluence of advantageous circumstances, not the least of which was the weather.

You're conflating two issues. Taking Dunkirk when there was only one British battalion on the scene, as was the case for several days, is a completely different scenario from assaulting a fortress.

I never considered Dunkirk to be a fortress. That's not the issue. The BEF was no longer an offensive threat. They weren't going to break out and launch a counter offensive. It was over. Why would a General expend men and resources to fight a pitched battle for an objective that will be his, just for waiting a week or two.

 

[Horatio Parker]

You're conflating two issues. Taking Dunkirk when there was only one British battalion on the scene, as was the case for several days, is a completely different scenario from assaulting a fortress.

I never considered Dunkirk to be a fortress. That's not the issue. The BEF was no longer an offensive threat. They weren't going to break out and launch a counter offensive. It was over. Why would a General expend men and resources to fight a pitched battle for an objective that will be his, just for waiting a week or two.

What pitched battle? There was a single British battalion between the Germans and Dunkirk.

 

[Bronzeage]

I never considered Dunkirk to be a fortress. That's not the issue. The BEF was no longer an offensive threat. They weren't going to break out and launch a counter offensive. It was over. Why would a General expend men and resources to fight a pitched battle for an objective that will be his, just for waiting a week or two.

What pitched battle? There was a single British battalion between the Germans and Dunkirk.

Okay, no fortress or pitched battle. What is your speculation about the end of the Dunkirk position, if there had been no evacuation and no capitulation?

 

[bilby]

Describing the position held by a surrounded and defeated army as a 'fortress' might, just possibly, make their supporters back home feel better about the situation, but it doesn't mean they are in any less precarious a position, as the Germans were later to find out repeatedly on the Eastern Front.

 

[Horatio Parker]

What pitched battle? There was a single British battalion between the Germans and Dunkirk.

Okay, no fortress or pitched battle. What is your speculation about the end of the Dunkirk position, if there had been no evacuation and no capitulation?

Assuming that Dunkirk was taken as Guderian wanted, annihilation. But it wouldn't have come to that. There would've been a capitulation.

But I think I get your point; the Germans were saving their resources. The problem is that with a very small expenditure at virtually no risk they could have destroyed the BEF.