In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[ryan]

Like I asked DBT, is there a difference between ryan in pain and being ryan in pain? The difference cannot be physical. You eluded to this point a few days ago.

Please answer my post instead of indulge in a new problem.

You asked what the difference is, and I am trying to tell you. Being Juma is different than Juma - even though they are physically the same thing. Do you remember eluding to this a few days ago?

 

[The AntiChris]

The bolded part is begging the question.

If you subscribe to a bodily criterion of personal identity then A is "you" and B is not.

If you subscribe to a psychological criterion of personal identity then then both A and B qualify equally as different continuations of the "you" that was cloned.

In any case both A and B will believe themselves to be the 'original' and any perceived difference (in continuation of personal identity) lies solely in the subjective view of the observer.

But there is a truth "out there". B would be wrong about living before he was cloned, but A would be correct. The difference is their histories.

It's clear you subscribe to the bodily criterion of personal identity (for you, personal identity is immutably attached to the actual atoms and molecules which comprise one's body).

There are a couple of problems with this view.

First, the majority of atoms and molecules of which we're composed are replaced many times over during our lifetime which would suggests our personal identity is in constant flux (while we experience personal identity as pretty constant).

Second, your view proposes an apparent ability of atoms and molecules to record detailed personal history - a property which is not currently recognised within science.

 

[Juma]

Please answer my post instead of indulge in a new problem.

You asked what the difference is, and I am trying to tell you. Being Juma is different than Juma - even though they are physically the same thing. Do you remember eluding to this a few days ago?

No. You asked for the difference between an originial and its copy. This is something completely different. How can I trust that you dont change subject again?

 

[ryan]

But there is a truth "out there". B would be wrong about living before he was cloned, but A would be correct. The difference is their histories.

It's clear you subscribe to the bodily criterion of personal identity (for you, personal identity is immutably attached to the actual atoms and molecules which comprise one's body).

There are a couple of problems with this view.

First, the majority of atoms and molecules of which we're composed are replaced many times over during our lifetime which would suggests our personal identity is in constant flux (while we experience personal identity as pretty constant).

Our memories and the illusion of identity is preserved in a slowly evolving "blueprint" in the brain. The illusion stays constant.

Second, your view proposes an apparent ability of atoms and molecules to record detailed personal history - a property which is not currently recognised within science.

First of all, this debate is not about scientific knowledge. Second, there absolutely is a record of every particle's personal history; it's called information entropy . Everything that happens leaves a trail of information. Recent discoveries have even caused Stephen Hawking to concede to his prior belief that information can't even be lost in a black hole.

Actually, the universe, as we know it, only has x amount of information that it can process. Some say that the universe will eventually process all of its information leaving only information entropy to exist. The universe will eventually be in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium.

Added in edit: Actually I should say that it is called information entropy before the information has been processed or known. Once its processed, then it is just information revealed and entropy gained.

 

[ryan]

You asked what the difference is, and I am trying to tell you. Being Juma is different than Juma - even though they are physically the same thing. Do you remember eluding to this a few days ago?

No. You asked for the difference between an originial and its copy. This is something completely different. How can I trust that you dont change subject again?

You asked, "Please clearly state what difference between the two bodies that needs to be explained!". I did not know that you meant that I had to use the same argument/scenario. In that same post, you said that separation is an intrinsic property, which I was shocked to read.

 

[fromderinside]

He, he, he. Sorry I'm so late in responding Juma.

Yet you seem to understand most of the time. I'll settle for an arrangement where choice is tied to whatever keeps the river flowing. For instance presume A's percept generated from selected attending is usable in the current social situation then others might presume from this percept A appeared to chose without coercion then for that instance one can say A demonstrated free will.

Of course we know that none of this is possible since we have a causality problem, a reality problem, and a reactive problem. Cause cannot be established without perdetermining the order of events, one cannot establish the relation of the percept to the state of the world at time t, and one is attempting to say one is choosing when one is reacting. Other than that the topic is perfectly reasonable.

So, as you say it's bullshit or ....

Are you talking about freedom to control attention? If so, then what is the mechanism that makes me select A over B?

One doesn't control attending. One selects from available attendings after the fact to tell a story, er, make a choice. The selecting may be fully conscious or something else, but that designation is meaningless because it is part of the script already in place.

 

[ryan]

Are you talking about freedom to control attention? If so, then what is the mechanism that makes me select A over B?

One doesn't control attending. One selects from available attendings after the fact to tell a story, er, make a choice. The selecting may be fully conscious or something else, but that designation is meaningless because it is part of the script already in place.

So then what were you saying is random?

 

[Juma]

No. You asked for the difference between an originial and its copy. This is something completely different. How can I trust that you dont change subject again?

You asked, "Please clearly state what difference between the two bodies that needs to be explained!". I did not know that you meant that I had to use the same argument/scenario.

Of course you didnt. Keeping to the same subject for more than one post is simply not your thing...

 

[The AntiChris]

It's clear you subscribe to the bodily criterion of personal identity (for you, personal identity is immutably attached to the actual atoms and molecules which comprise one's body).

There are a couple of problems with this view.

First, the majority of atoms and molecules of which we're composed are replaced many times over during our lifetime which would suggests our personal identity is in constant flux (while we experience personal identity as pretty constant).

Our memories and the illusion of identity is preserved in a slowly evolving "blueprint" in the brain. The illusion stays constant.

This would suggest that a an identical (cloned) brain would preserve identity.

Second, your view proposes an apparent ability of atoms and molecules to record detailed personal history - a property which is not currently recognised within science.

First of all, this debate is not about scientific knowledge.

It's becoming apparent.

Second, there absolutely is a record of every particle's personal history; it's called information entropy . Everything that happens leaves a trail of information. Recent discoveries have even caused Stephen Hawking to concede to his prior belief that information can't even be lost in a black hole.

I think you've confused yourself. This has nothing whatsoever to do with personal identity attaching itself to individual atoms and molecules.

The bodily criterion of personal identity is just a way of preserving the strong (and often unshakable) intuition that we are unique entities (it's just the soul hypothesis dressed up as pseudo-science).

 

[ryan]

Our memories and the illusion of identity is preserved in a slowly evolving "blueprint" in the brain. The illusion stays constant.

This would suggest that a an identical (cloned) brain would preserve identity.

The illusion of identity is preserved.

But this is not only about identity. It is about being and experiencing something versus not being and experiencing something else.

The bodily criterion of personal identity is just a way of preserving the strong (and often unshakable) intuition that we are unique entities (it's just the soul hypothesis dressed up as pseudo-science).

Call it whatever you want. Don't worry, you can still be an atheist with this "soul" that I am talking about.

 

[HellFire]

This stuff is over my head but never the less I love reading it.A quick question,if our selves are replacing atoms and molecules thru out our lives does that mean we are clones of ourselves over and over?

Also if someone cloned a human how would that be different than the above?

Thanks Tim.

 

[ryan]

This stuff is over my head but never the less I love reading it.A quick question,if our selves are replacing atoms and molecules thru out our lives does that mean we are clones of ourselves over and over?

Also if someone cloned a human how would that be different than the above?

Thanks Tim.

That's at the heart of the argument.

If you wanted to, say, travel to Alpha Centauri but didn't want to wait 20 years to get there on a solar sail, would you allow them to make a clone of you there if it mean killing your original body? Do you think that you would be in the Centauri star system? Why or why not?

 

[DBT]

But 'you' are inseparable from 'your' body, 'you' are a body of information encoded within the cells and connections of the brain of that body and brought to life by conscious activity as self awareness and self identity by that brain, and that brain alone.

Okay, so do you believe that there is a difference between ryan in pain and being ryan in pain? This is not a physical difference. This is a different kind of knowledge that resides with each individual. For example, I can't scientifically prove what my mom told me 20 years ago, yet it still might be true.

The perception of pain is specific to the organism (a human being in this instance) that is feeling pain. If someone sticks a needle into the arm your perfectly identical copy, the feeling of pain is related to that condition by that organism. It is not something you experience, and what set you apart from your perfectly identical copy, who is no longer perfectly identical. Location and information state of the body/brain/mind....

 

[ryan]

Okay, so do you believe that there is a difference between ryan in pain and being ryan in pain? This is not a physical difference. This is a different kind of knowledge that resides with each individual. For example, I can't scientifically prove what my mom told me 20 years ago, yet it still might be true.

The perception of pain is specific to the organism (a human being in this instance) that is feeling pain. If someone sticks a needle into the arm your perfectly identical copy, the feeling of pain is related to that condition by that organism. It is not something you experience, and what set you apart from your perfectly identical copy, who is no longer perfectly identical. Location and information state of the body/brain/mind....

Okay, so let's say that I slam my finger with a door and the pain is process A from t = 0 seconds to t =5 seconds. What exactly is experiencing this process?

 

[Juma]

The perception of pain is specific to the organism (a human being in this instance) that is feeling pain. If someone sticks a needle into the arm your perfectly identical copy, the feeling of pain is related to that condition by that organism. It is not something you experience, and what set you apart from your perfectly identical copy, who is no longer perfectly identical. Location and information state of the body/brain/mind....

Okay, so let's say that I slam my finger with a door and the pain is process A from t = 0 seconds to t =5 seconds. What exactly is experiencing this process?

You have already answered it: the pain is the process.

 

[Juma]

This stuff is over my head but never the less I love reading it.A quick question,if our selves are replacing atoms and molecules thru out our lives does that mean we are clones of ourselves over and over?

Also if someone cloned a human how would that be different than the above?

Thanks Tim.

That's at the heart of the argument.

If you wanted to, say, travel to Alpha Centauri but didn't want to wait 20 years to get there on a solar sail, would you allow them to make a clone of you there if it mean killing your original body? Do you think that you would be in the Centauri star system? Why or why not?

This is not an argument. This is an incongruent rambling of a ryan that cant formulate a standpoint to discuss.

 

[DBT]

The perception of pain is specific to the organism (a human being in this instance) that is feeling pain. If someone sticks a needle into the arm your perfectly identical copy, the feeling of pain is related to that condition by that organism. It is not something you experience, and what set you apart from your perfectly identical copy, who is no longer perfectly identical. Location and information state of the body/brain/mind....

Okay, so let's say that I slam my finger with a door and the pain is process A from t = 0 seconds to t =5 seconds. What exactly is experiencing this process?

The bundle of information that is the organism - body/brain/mind - who calls itself/himself 'ryan.' An experience formed specifically by the brain in response to a given stimuli, in this instance 'slamming your finger with the door' being experienced in conscious form by neural activity.

 

[The AntiChris]

This would suggest that a an identical (cloned) brain would preserve identity.

The illusion of identity is preserved.

But this is not only about identity. It is about being and experiencing something versus not being and experiencing something else.

Ok, given your thought experiment, what test could we apply to verify/falsify your theory that although A and B are physically identical, there is (according to you) a "nonphysical difference".

 

[ryan]

Okay, so let's say that I slam my finger with a door and the pain is process A from t = 0 seconds to t =5 seconds. What exactly is experiencing this process?

The bundle of information that is the organism - body/brain/mind - who calls itself/himself 'ryan.' An experience formed specifically by the brain in response to a given stimuli, in this instance 'slamming your finger with the door' being experienced in conscious form by neural activity.

I just want to nail down what is experiencing and what is the experience, or are they the same thing?

 

[ryan]

The illusion of identity is preserved.

But this is not only about identity. It is about being and experiencing something versus not being and experiencing something else.

Ok, given your thought experiment, what test could we apply to verify/falsify your theory that although A and B are physically identical, there is (according to you) a "nonphysical difference".

This claim is outside of the scope of science; it is philosophical. It relies on individual knowledge and also has to do with whether or not we trust it. It might be science one day, but I couldn't even conceive what the experiment would be.