DBT
Contributor
As for the definition - "the ability to consciously select from a set of realizable alternatives" - I don't think the issue is as simple as some posters think.
This definition may be interpreted in several different ways.
From the compatibilist position, where adequate determinism enables decision making, the decision being deterministic (cannot choose otherwise), but the associated action, if not coerced, is an instance of free will.
From the Libertarian perspective, the selection/decision allows the possibility to have chosen a different option given the same circumstances and conditions, therefore the conscious selection/choice is an instance of free will.
Or the incompatibilist position; the selection/decision that is made is determined by antecedent events, as is the associated action and neither decision or action is an instance of free will.
From the perspective of evidence from neuroscience, it is not consciousness that is the decision maker, the conscious experience of making decision being a report or representation of prior unconscious processing (readiness potential) therefore not consciously chosen (the illusion of conscious will), and the subject cannot have chosen otherwise under the exact same circumstances (both external and neuronal).
This definition may be interpreted in several different ways.
From the compatibilist position, where adequate determinism enables decision making, the decision being deterministic (cannot choose otherwise), but the associated action, if not coerced, is an instance of free will.
From the Libertarian perspective, the selection/decision allows the possibility to have chosen a different option given the same circumstances and conditions, therefore the conscious selection/choice is an instance of free will.
Or the incompatibilist position; the selection/decision that is made is determined by antecedent events, as is the associated action and neither decision or action is an instance of free will.
From the perspective of evidence from neuroscience, it is not consciousness that is the decision maker, the conscious experience of making decision being a report or representation of prior unconscious processing (readiness potential) therefore not consciously chosen (the illusion of conscious will), and the subject cannot have chosen otherwise under the exact same circumstances (both external and neuronal).