In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[The AntiChris]

If you're going to continually repeat a claim, as you do, then you should really be prepared to repeat your supporting argument.

Why should I repeat something that should have been addressed the first time, or the second or the third and the fourth and on and on....for ten fucking years!!!! And ten years later I'm asked to repeat it again?

Doesn't matter how frequently or how long you've been making a claim - a commonly accepted principle of rational discourse is that claims should be supported.

To what result? Feigned incomprehension, and yet more feigned incomprehension.....only to be asked to repeat the argument? Really? Are you serious?

Yes, I'm serious.

Of course it's really frustrating when one's rock solid/unassailable arguments are misunderstood or not accepted by one's interlocutors, but that's the nature of debate. You can never assume that your arguments have been understood or accepted.

How many times before enough is enough? A hundred repetitions? A thousand? Several thousand?

You're not having a private conversation (this is a publicly accessible forum), others may well be reading your exchanges. You owe it to the lurkers, who may not have seen your previous arguments, to provide support for your claims.

Tell me, what do you think would happen if I posted the argument for the irrelevancy of the term 'free will' as a description or representation of human cognition, decision making and behaviour again? Something different to the last time, or the time before that, something different to the response I got from Togo ten years ago? Do you think?

If you don't want to rehash the same old disagreements then stop repeating the same old claims.

 

[fromderinside]

circling, circling, circling .... Is it any different in the southern hemisphere where the circling goes other way around?

For my part I'm happy with the idea of the existence a folk free will as either a categorical statement or a notion which is probably not reality.

 

[DBT]

So, why on earth would I want to interact with Togo in any way, shape or form?

You don't have to. Ignore him.

Difficult to ignore being poked. And then you join in, not understanding the situation, and poke some more. I am given no choice but to explain the situation.

 

[DBT]

If you don't want to rehash the same old disagreements then stop repeating the same old claims.

I know that you don't agree with any of the arguments against free will being presented (which are not my arguments, but just standard arguments), but your position or your belief or your objections do not make them any less valid.

There are two sides in this issue and obviously each side takes the position that their side is valid.

The simple fact of the matter is (supported by experiments and case studies), that it is the unchosen state and condition of a brain that shapes, forms and generates sets of both conscious and unconscious behaviours, including what we call 'will' - which makes 'will' - not a regulative agent, a 'free' agent' not 'free will' - but a product of an unchosen process, an aspect of the cognitive process.

That is the fact of the matter.

 

[The AntiChris]

If you don't want to rehash the same old disagreements then stop repeating the same old claims.

I know that you don't agree with any of the arguments against free will being presented

That's simply not true.

I agree with your arguments against libertarian free will and have said so on many occasions.

In any event, this is not relevant to the post to which you're responding.

You complained that posting a supporting argument would only lead to a repetition of old disagreements and I suspect you're right. However, if you want to avoid repetitious arguments, the answer isn't to post claims without a supporting argument (which would violate the fundamental principle of rational debate) but just to stop repeating the same old claims.

 

[DBT]

I know that you don't agree with any of the arguments against free will being presented

That's simply not true.

I agree with your arguments against libertarian free will and have said so on many occasions.

In any event, this is not relevant to the post to which you're responding.

You complained that posting a supporting argument would only lead to a repetition of old disagreements and I suspect you're right. However, if you want to avoid repetitious arguments, the answer isn't to post claims without a supporting argument (which would violate the fundamental principle of rational debate) but just to stop repeating the same old claims.

OK, my mistake. I don't consider Libertarianism to be in any way, shape or form a credible argument for free will. I can't remember that anyone has actually argued for Libertarianism at any time during the course of debates on IIDB, FRDB or Talk Freethought.

The arguments being usually related to compatibalism or some version of the common perception of free will, such as one poster defined; ''the ability to make conscious decisions based on a set of realizable alternatives'' or words to that effect (I haven't got time to do a search)

You complained that posting a supporting argument would only lead to a repetition of old disagreements and I suspect you're right. However, if you want to avoid repetitious arguments, the answer isn't to post claims without a supporting argument (which would violate the fundamental principle of rational debate) but just to stop repeating the same old claims.

For a start, my remark wasn't directed at you. It was a reference to the ten year long interaction between Togo and myself. To which you piped up and added your two bobs worth without any apparent comprehension of that history.

It's not that I can't provide evidence for claims that are made, I can and I have, it's simply that that the key points are never addressed, just skirted around, ignored or misrepresented. That is the frustrating part.

 

[Juma]

. I can't remember that anyone has actually argued for Libertarianism at any time during the course of debates on IIDB, FRDB or Talk Freethought.

At least Togo, ryan and apeman does.

 

[DBT]

. I can't remember that anyone has actually argued for Libertarianism at any time during the course of debates on IIDB, FRDB or Talk Freethought.

At least Togo, ryan and apeman does.

Specifically for Libertarianism? Ryan and apeman appear to be arguing for free will from Quantum wavefunction/uncertainty principle and or the observer relationship....which I suppose could be loosely connected to the concept of Libertarianism. Hard to say.

 

[The AntiChris]

I can't remember that anyone has actually argued for Libertarianism at any time during the course of debates on IIDB, FRDB or Talk Freethought.

This confirms my suspicion that you don't fully understand what distinguishes the different notions of free will.

You complained that posting a supporting argument would only lead to a repetition of old disagreements and I suspect you're right. However, if you want to avoid repetitious arguments, the answer isn't to post claims without a supporting argument (which would violate the fundamental principle of rational debate) but just to stop repeating the same old claims.

For a start, my remark wasn't directed at you. It was a reference to the ten year long interaction between Togo and myself. To which you piped up and added your two bobs worth without any apparent comprehension of that history.

I was well aware of the history, I just objected to your continued refusal to provide a supporting argument (or even a link to a supporting argument) on the basis that you'd provided supporting arguments elsewhere.

It's not that I can't provide evidence for claims that are made, I can and I have, it's simply that that the key points are never addressed, just skirted around, ignored or misrepresented. That is the frustrating part.

Welcome to the internet.

 

[The AntiChris]

. I can't remember that anyone has actually argued for Libertarianism at any time during the course of debates on IIDB, FRDB or Talk Freethought.

At least Togo, ryan and apeman does.

User Ughaibu was a particularly outspoken (and belligerent) defender of libertarian free will on FRDB.

 

[Juma]

At least Togo, ryan and apeman does.

Specifically for Libertarianism? Ryan and apeman appear to be arguing for free will from Quantum wavefunction/uncertainty principle and or the observer relationship....which I suppose could be loosely connected to the concept of Libertarianism. Hard to say.

This another sign that you doesnt understand the difference in nature between the definitions if lfw an compatibilism. Anyone argumenting for a explanation how free will actually (physically and biläologically) works are argumenting for lfw.

 

[DBT]

Specifically for Libertarianism? Ryan and apeman appear to be arguing for free will from Quantum wavefunction/uncertainty principle and or the observer relationship....which I suppose could be loosely connected to the concept of Libertarianism. Hard to say.

This another sign that you doesnt understand the difference in nature between the definitions if lfw an compatibilism. Anyone argumenting for a explanation how free will actually (physically and biläologically) works are argumenting for lfw.

This confirms my suspicion that you don't fully understand what distinguishes the different notions of free will.

I don't think it's always so clear cut and simple, I tend to think that semantic drift, etc, different versions of LFW, such as Dennett's 'modest' version have been described as a form of compatibalism; Dennetts compatibalism.

''A more conservative or "modest" libertarianism has been proposed by Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele. They and many other philosophers and scientists have proposed two-stage models of free will that keep indeterminism in the early stages of deliberation, limiting it to creating alternative possibilities for action.''

''Other compatibilists, Daniel Dennett, for example, simply insist that such genuine irreducible randomness is not needed for evolution or for human freedom. Others point out that even if strict determinism were true (which it isn't), compatibilist freedom of action, in David Hume's sense, would still exist.''

So depending on the versions, some describe Dennetts position as either compatibalism or Libertarianism (soft).


I think the whole the whole pack and caboodle associated with free will is a Dogs breakfast, a tangled mess. Irrelevant.

The situation with ryan, apeman et al, is that they have not reconciled the classical quantum divide but simply focus on QM indeterminism...which appears to be a form of amalgamation of libertarianism and compatibalism, reconciliation between classical and quantum physics through consciousness. Or maybe that's just getting too complicated.

Who, for example, would call themselves a 'Libertarian' when the position is described like this:

''The only conception of free will that I find interesting is the libertarian one. According to this view, humans (but not other animals) can freely decide what to do regardless of the past or present state of the universe. The human will is seen as the only force that can set in motion a new causal chain, with itself being uncaused. This type of free will is radical and godlike; it creates something out of nothing; it does not have to answer to prior causes. Alas, this conception of free will is certainly false, impossible, and logically incoherent. No one (correct me if I’m wrong) has demonstrated that or how this type of will can triumph over the old soldiers of necessity and chance. Radically free will does not exist because it cannot exist.''

This is why I tend to assume drift, conceptual, semantic, between various versions of 'free will' and why I said 'it's hard to say'

 

[DBT]

I was well aware of the history, I just objected to your continued refusal to provide a supporting argument (or even a link to a supporting argument) on the basis that you'd provided supporting arguments elsewhere.

You were wrong. The thing is, I even outlined why the term is irrelevant in the post when the question was first asked, the outline was ignored but the question asked as if the outline was not there. The rational thing to do would be to question the outline of irrelevancy (the physical state and condition of the brain determining will) and not ask ''irrelevant to what?'' as if I had not already outlined 'to brain state and condition' (or words to that effect).

That's why I ignored it. It's just too absurd to deal with at times.

 

[The AntiChris]

This another sign that you doesnt understand the difference in nature between the definitions if lfw an compatibilism. Anyone argumenting for a explanation how free will actually (physically and biläologically) works are argumenting for lfw.

This confirms my suspicion that you don't fully understand what distinguishes the different notions of free will.

I don't think it's always so clear cut and simple,

Sure there are subtle differences in approach from both libertarians and compatibilists but the essential difference between the two is quite distinct.

The problem is that you consistently fail to acknowledge these differences in your arguments. As I've tried to explain to you in the past, to no avail, arguments against libertarian free will are not relevant when discussing compatibilist free will.

 

[DBT]

Another reason why I think definitions are not always clear cut in terms of Catagory. For example the definition that Ughaibu used for his version; "the ability to consciously select from a set of realizable alternatives" is not necessarily non deterministic, therefore Libertarian.

We do experience the ability to consciously select options from realizable alternatives, but this doesn't necessarily mean that the selection we do make (brain makes) is not determined by antecedent conditions, which does not allow an alternative in the instant that the decision was made...as implied by the definition. Free will being an illusion of consciousness in that instance. Two different interpretations of the same definition.

 

[DBT]

This confirms my suspicion that you don't fully understand what distinguishes the different notions of free will.

I don't think it's always so clear cut and simple,

Sure there are subtle differences in approach from both libertarians and compatibilists but the essential difference between the two is quite distinct.

The problem is that you consistently fail to acknowledge these differences in your arguments. As I've tried to explain to you in the past, to no avail, arguments against libertarian free will are not relevant when discussing compatibilist free will.

You must be aware that there are different versions of compatibalism, which muddies the water even more. If I remember correctly, some compatibalists have even proposed the ability to have chosen otherwise, I'll try and find more detailed references later (time contraints), but for now:

Compatibilists' Ameliorating Efforts

''In assessing compatibilist theories and arguments, it is useful to consider what sort of model of control they rely upon—Garden of Forking Paths or Source—and how they stack up against both the Classical Incompatibilist Argument and the Source Incompatibilist Argument. As for the Classical Incompatibilist Argument, some compatibilists have responded to this argument by denying the truth of the second premise: If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. By doing so, these compatibilists embrace a Garden of Forking Paths model of control. They maintain that determinism is not a threat to it. (For example, see sections 3.3, 5.1, and 5.4.) Others have instead resisted the first premise: If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise. These compatibilists proceed by rejecting the Garden of Forking Paths model altogether. (See sections 4.2, 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5.) They instead attempt to make do with a Source model of control. What, then, of the Source Incompatibilist Argument? No compatibilist, it seems, can deny the truth of the second premise of the Source Incompatibilist Argument: If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions. Given the definition of ultimacy (as given in section 2.2 above), the second premise appears to be an analytic truth. Thus, all compatibilists must respond to the argument by arguing against the truth of the first premise: A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source. [Perhaps there is some room for compatibilists to resist the second premise instead of the first by offering a positive account of being an ultimate source of one's action (e.g., McKenna, 2008). Naturally, such an account would have to be shown to be consistent with determinism, and so it would not rely upon the definition of ultimacy offered above (in section 2.2). But few compatibilists have pursued this option, and so it will not be explored further in this entry.''

 

[The AntiChris]

This confirms my suspicion that you don't fully understand what distinguishes the different notions of free will.

I don't think it's always so clear cut and simple,

Sure there are subtle differences in approach from both libertarians and compatibilists but the essential difference between the two is quite distinct.

The problem is that you consistently fail to acknowledge these differences in your arguments. As I've tried to explain to you in the past, to no avail, arguments against libertarian free will are not relevant when discussing compatibilist free will.

You must be aware that there are different versions of compatibalism, which muddies the water even more.

In reality it's really not that muddy.

The varieties of incompatibilist and compatibilist free will you're likely to encounter on these boards (i.e. outside philosophical academia) will disagree about what counts as [moral] control.

The incompatibilist will insist that x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a. Ultimate source is clearly incompatible with determinism.

The compatibilist denies that ultimate source is necessary for appropriate control (i.e. moral responsibility) and that how we commonly apportion responsibility does not require that we have ultimate control.

 

[DBT]

This confirms my suspicion that you don't fully understand what distinguishes the different notions of free will.

I don't think it's always so clear cut and simple,

Sure there are subtle differences in approach from both libertarians and compatibilists but the essential difference between the two is quite distinct.

The problem is that you consistently fail to acknowledge these differences in your arguments. As I've tried to explain to you in the past, to no avail, arguments against libertarian free will are not relevant when discussing compatibilist free will.

You must be aware that there are different versions of compatibalism, which muddies the water even more.

In reality it's really not that muddy.
The incompatibilist will insist that x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a. Ultimate source is clearly incompatible with determinism.

The compatibilist denies that ultimate source is necessary for appropriate control (i.e. moral responsibility) and that how we commonly apportion responsibility does not require that we have ultimate control.

Apparently it is that muddy:

''Compatibilist views of free will hold that free will is compatible with causal determinism. Classical compatibilists argued that determinism does not entail that agents lack alternative possibilities. They often advanced conditional accounts of alternatives (eg, the agent can do otherwise if, were she to want to do otherwise, she would). In more recent times, compatibilists have often denied that we need a power to do otherwise for freedom. Most contemporary compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with but does not require determinism. So-called Hobartian compatibilists hold that determinism is required for free will.''

I've mentioned Hume in other posts:

''For Hume and other compatibilists, liberty means being free to act as we will, but this does not mean that our actions come from nowhere: our passions, motives and desires provide us with the impulse which our reason (prudence) tries to satisfy. To be at liberty cannot mean acting without a motive, because that’s the definition of madness.''

Some compatibilists are libertarians (which they probably deny)while making the noises of a compatibalism

The varieties of incompatibilist and compatibilist free will you're likely to encounter on these boards (i.e. outside philosophical academia) will disagree about what counts as [moral] control.

Frankly, I'm happy to take the simple straightforward approach. From this point on, if there is even a hint of the ability to do otherwise within a given argument, as far as I am concerned I am dealing with a Libertarian. That's fine with me.

 

[Togo]

Another reason why I think definitions are not always clear cut in terms of Catagory. For example the definition that Ughaibu used for his version; "the ability to consciously select from a set of realizable alternatives" is not necessarily non deterministic, therefore Libertarian.

We do experience the ability to consciously select options from realizable alternatives, but this doesn't necessarily mean that the selection we do make (brain makes) is not determined by antecedent conditions, which does not allow an alternative in the instant that the decision was made...as implied by the definition.

Yes, it necessarily means that. Because if the decision is determined such that no alternative is possible, then there are not realisable alternatives.

 

[Togo]

Time for more definitions! (see post#957 for the previous set.)

Dualism is the idea that there are fundamentally two kinds of things/events in the world. Mental, and Physical. Originally proposed by Descartes, David Chalmers is probably the best known modern proponent.

Monism is the idea that there is fundamentally one kind of thing/event in the world. It is divided into Idealism and Physicalism/Materialism

Idealism is a form on monism that states that fundamentally the world is made up only of mental things/events, and that physical events as we understand them are specialised conceptions of mental processes. Mental experience being our only experience, physical things may well happen, but we only know of them via mental events. Bishop Berkley is the famous proponent here.

Physicalism/Materialism is the idea that fundamentally the world is made up only of physical/material things/events. It is futher split into reductive materialism and eliminative materialism.

Eliminative Materialism is the idea that because of materialism, mental things/events should be eliminated entirely from our considerations of the universe, except as placeholders for physical events/things. Paul Churchland is a famous proponent here.

Reductive Materialism is the idea that because of materialism, mental things/events should be reducible to physical components, but that such reduction does not invalidate the use of mental things/events. This is either because they are effectively interchangeable, or because they convey different information, because of a one-to-many relationship between a mental event, and the physical events that it might reduce to(i.e. a painting is made up of paint, but analysis of the paint is not equivalent to analysis of the painting.)

Even within these categories a range of views exist. The issue is not that the subject is not somehow muddy or murky, but merely that it is quite complicated, and there is quite a bit of material to go through. Hence the importance of defining clearly what it is you are talking about