In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[PyramidHead]

There are no choices in relation to neural architecture, sensory information and memory function and content...the determining elements of the decision making process. We are whatever the brain is doing in response to its information inputs and neural architecture. Consciousness being one means by which a brain interacts with the external world and the state of the body as a whole. The term 'free will' is meaningless.

Do you extend this reasoning to ordinary matters of fairness and legal disputes?

 

[Togo]

OK. I think the effect is that benefits (even if only perceived) exceed the costs. At the least, the person reasons that no harm results from the decision.

You've not grasped the point.

The definitions in the OP are all about reaching a mental state known as a decision. When people talk abotu free will, they don't just talk about mental states, they talk about effective intentions. In other words, they talk about deciding to do something and then carrying out that decision. If your definition doesn't include the connnection between decision and action, then you can't distinguish between some positions on free will. For example, both DBT and I agree that neural events known as decisions in fact occur. What we don't agree on is whether those neural events have any effect whatsoever on behaviour. You definition doesn't include that difference.

I still do not understand what people mean by compatibilist free will beyond the idea that decisions are not coerced.
...
That leads me to conclude that everyone talks about free will but no one knows what it really means beyond saying that it involves contra-causal choice - the ability to choose otherwise (whatever that means).

Ok, a brief overview.

There are (very broadly) two types of free will that people argue about. They differ on how they treat concept of determinism - the idea that everything is entirely determined by prior events.

Incompatibalist (or Libertarian) free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from external determination. That is, if your decision is entirely caused by prior external events, then you can't have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is incompatible with free will.

Compatibalist free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from coercion. That is that so long as someone is not being threatened, physically forced, or similar, then they have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is entirely compatible with free will.

The vital point here is that it is the definition of free will that is different in each case.

The most common positions are that:
Determinism is false, libertarian free will is true, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is false

 

[fromderinside]

You've not grasped the point.

The definitions in the OP are all about reaching a mental state known as a decision. When people talk abotu free will, they don't just talk about mental states, they talk about effective intentions. In other words, they talk about deciding to do something and then carrying out that decision. If your definition doesn't include the connnection between decision and action, then you can't distinguish between some positions on free will. For example, both DBT and I agree that neural events known as decisions in fact occur. What we don't agree on is whether those neural events have any effect whatsoever on behaviour. You definition doesn't include that difference.

I still do not understand what people mean by compatibilist free will beyond the idea that decisions are not coerced.
...
That leads me to conclude that everyone talks about free will but no one knows what it really means beyond saying that it involves contra-causal choice - the ability to choose otherwise (whatever that means).

Ok, a brief overview.

There are (very broadly) two types of free will that people argue about. They differ on how they treat concept of determinism - the idea that everything is entirely determined by prior events.

Incompatibalist (or Libertarian) free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from external determination. That is, if your decision is entirely caused by prior external events, then you can't have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is incompatible with free will.

Compatibalist free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from coercion. That is that so long as someone is not being threatened, physically forced, or similar, then they have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is entirely compatible with free will.

The vital point here is that it is the definition of free will that is different in each case.

The most common positions are that:
Determinism is false, libertarian free will is true, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is false

Another way one could put it is by excluding genetically derived imperatives as part of coersion since they are presumed there demanding certain types of actions in defense of being alive. Now coersion becomes temporally and spatially local and one can find many examples where one acts in ways that appear free from demands given a reference for choice.

 

[rhutchin]

The definitions in the OP are all about reaching a mental state known as a decision. When people talk about free will, they don't just talk about mental states, they talk about effective intentions. In other words, they talk about deciding to do something and then carrying out that decision. If your definition doesn't include the connnection between decision and action, then you can't distinguish between some positions on free will. For example, both DBT and I agree that neural events known as decisions in fact occur. What we don't agree on is whether those neural events have any effect whatsoever on behaviour. You definition doesn't include that difference.

I don't see that decisions are made outside the context of something to gain (benefits exceed the costs). Something compels that a choice be made; that something is the gain perceived from the choice made. The choice made is active in that future events proceed from that choice. So, the decision to choose between options sets in motion future events based on the choice made. You say we need to spell that out; I don't see it. But I'll work on it; think about it.

I still do not understand what people mean by compatibilist free will beyond the idea that decisions are not coerced.
...
That leads me to conclude that everyone talks about free will but no one knows what it really means beyond saying that it involves contra-causal choice - the ability to choose otherwise (whatever that means).

Ok, a brief overview.

There are (very broadly) two types of free will that people argue about. They differ on how they treat concept of determinism - the idea that everything is entirely determined by prior events.

Incompatibalist (or Libertarian) free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from external determination. That is, if your decision is entirely caused by prior external events, then you can't have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is incompatible with free will.

Compatibalist free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from coercion. That is that so long as someone is not being threatened, physically forced, or similar, then they have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is entirely compatible with free will.

The vital point here is that it is the definition of free will that is different in each case.

The most common positions are that:
Determinism is false, libertarian free will is true, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is false

Libertarian Free Will seeks to avoid deterministic outcomes. Sounds nice, but how does one develop a process that does that? Apparently, we then have contra-causal choice. Here, a person can choose between/among options and the choice made can take into account information about those choices but supposedly, that information does not determine the choice made. That is wishful thinking to me. Information (costs and benefits) will drive one's thinking so that the goal is to get the greatest benefit at the least cost - but that is deterministic. I tend to think that Libertarian Free Will is an illusion. However, if we define "free will" in some manner - e.g., as compatibilist free will - then we can ask what it takes to move from that position to Libertarian Free Will. That's what I am trying to do - move away from compatibilist free will but the compatibilist seems to claim everything not Libertarian and no one can explain how Libertarian could work - outside some random process which is not really making decisions.

I think my effort basically defines one process for free will (if we include your need for a "connection" between the decision and a following action). I doubt that anyone can take that and modify it to describe Libertarian Free Will. In the end, every appeal to Libertarian Free Will is an appeal to something that does not really exist except (except on a wish list) and what people mean by free will starts from free from coercion and moves from there and "there" never escapes the shadow of determinism. Any way, I think the burden is on those who appeal to Libertarian Free Will to explain how it avoids determinism in whatever situation they envision.

 

[rhutchin]

Another way one could put it is by excluding genetically derived imperatives as part of coersion since they are presumed there demanding certain types of actions in defense of being alive. Now coersion becomes temporally and spatially local and one can find many examples where one acts in ways that appear free from demands given a reference for choice.

I'd like to see an example that actually achieves choices that are not deterministic. Coercion avoids choices that a person is forced to make when they would have made a different choice. However, one may be compelled to make a choice that they want to make simply because it is the desired choice. But a "desired" choice is determined by whatever factors make it desirable - perhaps desires are genetically derived imperatives.

 

[DBT]

There are no choices in relation to neural architecture, sensory information and memory function and content...the determining elements of the decision making process. We are whatever the brain is doing in response to its information inputs and neural architecture. Consciousness being one means by which a brain interacts with the external world and the state of the body as a whole. The term 'free will' is meaningless.

Do you extend this reasoning to ordinary matters of fairness and legal disputes?

It gets complicated, but basically no. That the term 'free will' is not representative of the brain's neural architecture and electrochemical information processing activity does not mean that the brain cannot make rational decisions.

Making rational decisions and acting upon them is its evolutionary function, after all. If a brain is healthy and functional, the person/brain/mind should understand the rules of society and abide by them with an understanding of the consequences for transgressions. Reason and rational decision making is not a matter of free will, just a functional brain that is able to adapt to social conditions.

Quote;
''... Our contention is not that neuroscience does (or will) disprove free will; rather, we contend that free will is an antiquated concept that impairs our understanding of human behavior and thereby clouds our thinking about ethics. ...

''We ought to think about decision making in terms of neurological control, not because this is some sort of eternal absolute truth, but because among the options on the table currently, it shows the most promise of coherently unifying the scientific, ethical, judicial, and personal realms of our experience, and because it has the best chance of improving our understanding of ourselves and one another. Research in neuroscience is already well underway, and we can manipulate control across species using conditioning, drugs, and lesions. 4
Just as we have learned to consider our decisions as “free choices,” we can shift our introspection toward our varying levels of control. A man forced to choose between a hamburger and heroin might be acutely aware that his control is being compromised by an addiction. Insisting that he has (or lacks) free will ads nothing to our understanding of his behavior. Nor does it provide any useful suggestions of what we as a society ought do with him legally. An understanding of the problems that opiate addiction creates for one's self-control and how best to treat these difficulties, along with a knowledge of the user's history, would help a judge or jury make informed decisions based on the likely outcomes of various incarceration and rehabilitation programs.''


On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''

''Man does at all times only what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily. But this is because he already is what he wills.'' -Arthur Schopenhauer

 

[DBT]

Another way one could put it is by excluding genetically derived imperatives as part of coersion since they are presumed there demanding certain types of actions in defense of being alive. Now coersion becomes temporally and spatially local and one can find many examples where one acts in ways that appear free from demands given a reference for choice.

I'd like to see an example that actually achieves choices that are not deterministic. Coercion avoids choices that a person is forced to make when they would have made a different choice. However, one may be compelled to make a choice that they want to make simply because it is the desired choice. But a "desired" choice is determined by whatever factors make it desirable - perhaps desires are genetically derived imperatives.

All decisions are determined by neural architecture and condition;

Quote;
''Cognitive neuroscientists persistently talk about neural representations. For example, a recent paper stated that ‘the role of the prefrontal cortex in visual attention is to provide neural representations of to-be-attended information’13. We prefer to use more neutral terms, such as ‘patterns of neural activity',for neurophysiological states. However, we suggest that it might be convenient to refer to the contents of consciousness (that is, phenomenal consciousness) as mental representations; mental entities that can stand for things in the outside world, and can usually be reported. When I remember something I have a mental representation of a past event. When I imagine something I have a mental representation of something that could occur in the outside world. When I perceive something I have a mental representation of something currently in the outside world. To say that we are conscious of something (or aware of something) is equivalent to saying that we have a mental representation of something.''

''Given that all mental activity derives from brain activity, it follows that all mental representations have corresponding neural activities. However, not all neural activities have corresponding mental representations. This is the crucial lesson taught us by phenomena such as blindsight14; behaviour can be guided by neural responses to visual stimuli in the absence of any awareness. In some cases, highly processed information can be used unconsciously, as evidenced in masked priming experiments15.''

 

[rhutchin]

All decisions are determined by neural architecture and condition;

Quote;
''...To say that we are conscious of something (or aware of something) is equivalent to saying that we have a mental representation of something.''

''...In some cases, highly processed information can be used unconsciously, as evidenced in masked priming experiments15.''

This just seems to be saying that our minds use the information available to it to make decisions. This information may be considered consciously or unconsciously. That would make decision-making dependent on information and that need for information to make decisions causes it to be deterministic.

 

[rhutchin]

Making rational decisions and acting upon them is its evolutionary function, after all. If a brain is healthy and functional, the person/brain/mind should understand the rules of society and abide by them with an understanding of the consequences for transgressions. Reason and rational decision making is not a matter of free will, just a functional brain that is able to adapt to social conditions.

I think there is more than adapting to social conditions involved here. For example, suppose a person prefers to steal what he needs rather than get a job, earn money, and purchase what he needs. Yet, if someone steals from him, he calls the police and has the thief prosecuted. The person reasons that he wants to be treated a certain way, but he does not want to treat others that way. He is a slave to his desires but choose not to be a slave to the desires of others. So, his adapting to social conditions ends up being rational decisions about what he can get away with. He is free to violate his personal ethical system in his treatment of others. We see animals behaving this way. The lion hunts and eats that which he catches. If that which he catches wants to eat him, he fights against it. If it is just a matter of an evolutionary function and adapting to social conditions, why shouldn't people who steal be comfortable with having people steal from them?

 

[DBT]

All decisions are determined by neural architecture and condition;

Quote;
''...To say that we are conscious of something (or aware of something) is equivalent to saying that we have a mental representation of something.''

''...In some cases, highly processed information can be used unconsciously, as evidenced in masked priming experiments15.''

This just seems to be saying that our minds use the information available to it to make decisions. This information may be considered consciously or unconsciously. That would make decision-making dependent on information and that need for information to make decisions causes it to be deterministic.

No, that's not what I'm saying. You are implying a mind brain separation, as if it is the mind that 'uses' information. On the contrary, it is the mind that is being generated by the activity of the brain, and it is the information state of the brain - neural architecture, inputs and memory - that shapes and forms the mind...basically the reason why the term 'free will' is considered to be antiquated.

 

[DBT]

Making rational decisions and acting upon them is its evolutionary function, after all. If a brain is healthy and functional, the person/brain/mind should understand the rules of society and abide by them with an understanding of the consequences for transgressions. Reason and rational decision making is not a matter of free will, just a functional brain that is able to adapt to social conditions.

I think there is more than adapting to social conditions involved here. For example, suppose a person prefers to steal what he needs rather than get a job, earn money, and purchase what he needs. Yet, if someone steals from him, he calls the police and has the thief prosecuted. The person reasons that he wants to be treated a certain way, but he does not want to treat others that way. He is a slave to his desires but choose not to be a slave to the desires of others. So, his adapting to social conditions ends up being rational decisions about what he can get away with. He is free to violate his personal ethical system in his treatment of others. We see animals behaving this way. The lion hunts and eats that which he catches. If that which he catches wants to eat him, he fights against it. If it is just a matter of an evolutionary function and adapting to social conditions, why shouldn't people who steal be comfortable with having people steal from them?

There are both adaptive and maladaptive behaviours. It's not one or the other, but a complex interweaving of both.

 

[rhutchin]

This just seems to be saying that our minds use the information available to it to make decisions. This information may be considered consciously or unconsciously. That would make decision-making dependent on information and that need for information to make decisions causes it to be deterministic.

No, that's not what I'm saying. You are implying a mind brain separation, as if it is the mind that 'uses' information. On the contrary, it is the mind that is being generated by the activity of the brain, and it is the information state of the brain - neural architecture, inputs and memory - that shapes and forms the mind...basically the reason why the term 'free will' is considered to be antiquated.

The key term you use is "inputs." That's information and new information changes the "information state" of the mind/brain. Without "inputs" to the mind/brain, there would be nothing on which to decide. It is not a matter of "shaping and forming the mind;" information gives the mind/brain something to work with without which, the mind/brain might as well sleep.

 

[DBT]

No, that's not what I'm saying. You are implying a mind brain separation, as if it is the mind that 'uses' information. On the contrary, it is the mind that is being generated by the activity of the brain, and it is the information state of the brain - neural architecture, inputs and memory - that shapes and forms the mind...basically the reason why the term 'free will' is considered to be antiquated.

The key term you use is "inputs." That's information and new information changes the "information state" of the mind/brain. Without "inputs" to the mind/brain, there would be nothing on which to decide. It is not a matter of "shaping and forming the mind;" information gives the mind/brain something to work with without which, the mind/brain might as well sleep.

The point being, inputs change the state of the brain, consequently, the state of the mind...and this is not a matter of 'free will' - ''will'' whether conscious or unconscious, being a part and parcel of mind formation by the brain, the state of its neural architecture, inputs and memory content (past experience).

 

[Togo]

I don't see that decisions are made outside the context of something to gain (benefits exceed the costs). Something compels that a choice be made; that something is the gain perceived from the choice made. The choice made is active in that future events proceed from that choice. So, the decision to choose between options sets in motion future events based on the choice made. You say we need to spell that out; I don't see it....

The only reason I'm saying that we need to spell it out is because you're going to run into many people, some of them on this thread, that do not believe that the choice is active at all. They believe that decision-making is an illusion and that decision-making has no direct causal link with actions taken. Given that this is one of the standard positions to take on this issue, it would be better if your definition spelled out where you stand on this.

I still do not understand what people mean by compatibilist free will beyond the idea that decisions are not coerced.
...
That leads me to conclude that everyone talks about free will but no one knows what it really means beyond saying that it involves contra-causal choice - the ability to choose otherwise (whatever that means).

Ok, a brief overview.

There are (very broadly) two types of free will that people argue about. They differ on how they treat concept of determinism - the idea that everything is entirely determined by prior events.

Incompatibalist (or Libertarian) free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from external determination. That is, if your decision is entirely caused by prior external events, then you can't have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is incompatible with free will.

Compatibalist free will is the idea that, in order to be free, actions must be free from coercion. That is that so long as someone is not being threatened, physically forced, or similar, then they have free will. It uses a definition of free will such that determinism is entirely compatible with free will.

The vital point here is that it is the definition of free will that is different in each case.

The most common positions are that:
Determinism is false, libertarian free will is true, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is true
Determinism is true, libertarian free will is false, compatibalist free will is false

Libertarian Free Will seeks to avoid deterministic outcomes. Sounds nice, but how does one develop a process that does that?

Fairly easily, you just take the position that determinism is false. There is no trick, workaround or special mechanism here - the definition of a libertarian position on free will is that determinism and free will are incomptible, and that determinism is false, and free will is not.

Apparently, we then have contra-causal choice. Here, a person can choose between/among options and the choice made can take into account information about those choices but supposedly, that information does not determine the choice made. That is wishful thinking to me.

That's most likely because you're a determinist. If you're assuming a priori that determinism is true, then of course incompatibalist free will is false - because incompatibalist free will is the kind that is incompatible with determinism.

If you're not a determinist, then you need a reason to think that human decision making is determined. Do you have one?

Information (costs and benefits) will drive one's thinking so that the goal is to get the greatest benefit at the least cost

I don't agree.

The problem here is what constitutes a 'benefit', and a 'cost'. I can go out jogging. That costs effort, time, energy, etc, but has a physiological benefit. Or I can stay at home on the sofa. That saves effort, time, energy etc. but has a physiological cost. You're claiming that the decision as to whether to go out jogging or stay in is 'driven' by the costs and benefits, but we know that some people jog and others do not. It's not the costs that are changing in each case, but the people. Ok, so the people must rate these costs and benefits differently, in a way that is not driven by the costs and the benefits themselves, but by internal states. But how do we know what those internal states are? By what decisions people make. Great! Except that, can you see what's happened here? We've abadoned any notion that the actual cost-benefit comparison is driven by the situation, and instead stated that we have internal states that assign costs and benefits to these, as measured by... what decisions people make. Or to put it another way, we've declared that human decision making is driven by human decision making. It's an entirely empty statement.

I tend to think that Libertarian Free Will is an illusion.

If you're wedded to determinism, then you really have to.

However, if we define "free will" in some manner - e.g., as compatibilist free will - then we can ask what it takes to move from that position to Libertarian Free Will. That's what I am trying to do - move away from compatibilist free will but the compatibilist seems to claim everything not Libertarian

That's because of how the terms are defined. Either free will is compatible with determinism, or it isn't. I don't see how you can move from one position to the other, since they're discussing two entirely separate concepts that happen to share a name.

and no one can explain how Libertarian could work.

It sounds like you've not really thought it through. What is it about Incompatibalist Free Will, that is free will that is incompatible with determinism, that you feel has trouble working? Because if you're assuming a deterministic universe, then it's never going to work, by definition. And if you're not assuming a deterministic universe then you need some other principle that Libertarian Free Will is falling afoul of, or else there isn't really anything for people to explain.

Any way, I think the burden is on those who appeal to Libertarian Free Will to explain how it avoids determinism in whatever situation they envision.

If someone believes that determinism is false, why would need to explain how free will avoids determinism? It's like asking an atheist how they explain god.

 

[fromderinside]

The only reason I'm saying that we need to spell it out is because you're going to run into many people, some of them on this thread, that do not believe that the choice is active at all. They believe that decision-making is an illusion and that decision-making has no direct causal link with actions taken. Given that this is one of the standard positions to take on this issue, it would be better if your definition spelled out where you stand on this.

I only wish I represented that remark. Actually those of us who pile on 'choice' is because what the observer processes and what the observer acts upon are often different things suggesting that choice is a false term. No doubt people act. But that they have things called consciousness, unconsciousness, will, which can be scientifically used to interpret acting will be contested by me and my ilk until the cows come home. Nor am I all wrapped up in brain processes (see yourself here DBT) which are just another can't touch dodge used to 'explain' behavior.

At present I'm holding to a "we don't know anything more than what we can directly measure" position which is quite appropriate for both physiologists and sensory physiologists. Black boxes are nice. I use them often when setting up detection, discrimination, recognition, and capacity experiments ie "How does an observer come into a trial and what time need elapse between trials for them to be considered independent (a statistical analysis requirement - that damn empirical isolation constraint - for generating usable data for interpretation".

For those who want to use stuff already in the container, so to speak, what I demand wouldn't let them even do experiments. So go ahead, I say, but remember it all comes back to actually demonstrating that a thing probably exists rather than some interpretation of some model. Its one thing to suggest how many angstroms a membrane must move to generate sufficient response to detect what interacted with the membrane, but, quite another to use a consciousness and unconsciousness or a brain to demonstrate the unconscious processes underlying masked priming or some notion of cost benefits underlies anything decisive. We have the time. Develop instruments and methods that permit direct test (fMRI seems to be a nice candidate if properly applied; after all we have a pretty good handle on metabolism that can be traced back to nerve function (activity), chemistry, and physics).

 

[rhutchin]

The point being, inputs change the state of the brain,...

And different inputs (information) result in people behaving in different ways.

 

[untermensche]

A decision is a physiological event.

Only when we discover exactly what this event is can we ever begin to try to understand how a concept like "free" could apply to it.

Is there any other physiological event that is "free"?

In the gut? In the spleen? The kidney?

Are these so-called "free" physiological events only taking place in brains?

How peculiar.

 

[DBT]

The point being, inputs change the state of the brain,...

And different inputs (information) result in people behaving in different ways.

Yes. But not only inputs, a combination of neural architecture and experience laid down as memory function (past experience) - Genetics and environment. None of this being a matter of choice. The decision making ability (neuronal information processing) being a function of the system. Intelligent, interactive, but not 'free will'

 

[DBT]

I only wish I represented that remark. Actually those of us who pile on 'choice' is because what the observer processes and what the observer acts upon are often different things suggesting that choice is a false term. No doubt people act. But that they have things called consciousness, unconsciousness, will, which can be scientifically used to interpret acting will be contested by me and my ilk until the cows come home. Nor am I all wrapped up in brain processes (see yourself here DBT) which are just another can't touch dodge used to 'explain' behavior.

At present I'm holding to a "we don't know anything more than what we can directly measure" position which is quite appropriate for both physiologists and sensory physiologists. Black boxes are nice. I use them often when setting up detection, discrimination, recognition, and capacity experiments ie "How does an observer come into a trial and what time need elapse between trials for them to be considered independent (a statistical analysis requirement - that damn empirical isolation constraint - for generating usable data for interpretation".

Not sure why the reference to me.

 

[rhutchin]

And different inputs (information) result in people behaving in different ways.

Yes. But not only inputs, a combination of neural architecture and experience laid down as memory function (past experience) - Genetics and environment. None of this being a matter of choice. The decision making ability (neuronal information processing) being a function of the system. Intelligent, interactive, but not 'free will'

"...experience laid down as memory function (past experience)" is also information. So, basically, your point is that genetics determines "what" people decide and not just "how." However, different decisions can reflect the different information that people have with genetics affecting "how" a person is able to process that information. People make choices; regardless how one explains how those choices come about.

The issue is not what leads to choices but whether those choices are "free" and this requires that the term, "free," be defined. That seems to be the difficulty in free will issues. Your contention works only you can show that it is the cause behind decision-making. So far, you cannot, can you?