Information is bogus.

[Val]

[YOUTUBE]xGJL8aQ9hoM[/YOUTUBE]

 

[Hermit]

You're not smart enough for this thread, Herr Mitt. Take your leave while you're still able.

Make me.

 

[Val]

Nah, you've proven time and again that the Chermans are resilient motherfuckers (or, perhaps, simply gluttons for punishment) and always hang around even after getting the crap kicked out of them. Sieg heil.

 

[Speakpigeon]

[...] we know nothing about the world

I believe many (very many) things about the world. I have justification for some of those which are true beliefs. At least a few of my beliefs are probably incorrect. As such, I would be mistaken when I say I know since it wouldn't be so that I did; however, I'd have to be wrong about every darn last one of my beliefs for it to be false that I didn't know anything about the world.

You're entitled to your beliefs. I would grant that some of your belief might be true. Yet, which ones? Do you know? Even our belief that there's a world out there may conceivably not be true. But, sure, it's also possible some of our beliefs are true, for example that there are other minds or some such. Who know? I don't!

Still, I'm open to the demonstration of the contrary. It's seems fair that I should let whatever sits outside of me to make sure I know it's out there!
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'm playing a bit of a game here by connecting two unrelated dots between information and its identity. Unrelated in the sense that identity is information in of itself, which then suffers from infinite regress.

Identity? Of information?!

Sorry, you just lost me there.

Let's rather not muddy the waters by talking about beliefs.

Fair enough but I can only grant that information on its own is vacuous, a view that other posters have rightly derided as trivial.

And this view may be still open to the challenge that our impressions, which seem to give some substance to a finite interpretation of information, may be itself information, at least in the sense of Shannon.

Transcriptase, ferinstance, does not need to believe in start and stop codons.

Possibly, but you yourself certainly need to believe the information you have about transcriptase and codons.
EB

 

[Val]

I think the subtlety you're missing is that I don't need to be around for transcriptase to do its thing. Nobody needs to be around - nobody or nothing needs to have any knowledge of transcriptase for it to do its thing. It does what it does whether someone is watching or not.

More to the point - transcriptase does not need to have any view on start and stop codons for it to do its thing - but the fact remains that a start or a stop codon are canonical bits of "information".

ETA - let me phrase it another way. Does a start or a stop codon contain information, or does it only contain information because it has a consumer for that information?

 

[fast]

Idiots. Does anybody have a fucking clue what I'm on about?

If someone claims that something is bogus, it's highly suggested that there is a something to in fact be bogus. Take calling counterfeit money bogus for instance. There is the sense in which it's not real (fake) and the sense it's real (exists).

Yet, you say "there's no such thing." That's contradictory. If there's something bogus, there's something, so this notion of there is no such thing implies nonexistence, but surely if something is indeed (as you say) bogus, then false you are to say there's no such thing.

Later, you speak of information. Why you single that out is any extremists guess, and notwithstanding the blindingly obvious falsity of "you cannot SAY that," you seem to think knowledge is a necessary condition for truth. The proposition expressed by the sentence the cat is on the mat is true if there's a real world match up between the worldly facts and purported facts.

You're on the completely wrong track. Anyway, the truth or falsehood of "information" is a red herring - you need different information to make that determination to begin with, and that is the point.

I might need additional information (Y) to make the determination that I have current information (X), but I do not need to make the determination with information (Y) to in fact have information (X). What you are saying seems equivalent to saying that I must know that I know in order to know.

 

[Val]

How would you know you have X if you had nothing to compare it to? So you igore that problem and just compare it to y. Simple enough, but how do you know you're looking at Y?

Can you see what I'm getting at?

 

[fast]

[...] we know nothing about the world

I believe many (very many) things about the world. I have justification for some of those which are true beliefs. At least a few of my beliefs are probably incorrect. As such, I would be mistaken when I say I know since it wouldn't be so that I did; however, I'd have to be wrong about every darn last one of my beliefs for it to be false that I didn't know anything about the world.

You're entitled to your beliefs. I would grant that some of your belief might be true. Yet, which ones? Do you know? Even our belief that there's a world out there may conceivably not be true. But, sure, it's also possible some of our beliefs are true, for example that there are other minds or some such. Who know? I don't!

Still, I'm open to the demonstration of the contrary. It's seems fair that I should let whatever sits outside of me to make sure I know it's out there!
EB

I have beliefs that are not merely beliefs, as some are also both justified and true. Because I cannot be so certain that it's impossible to be mistaken, you want to deny that I in fact know anything, but you predicate that denial on the notion that knowledge is insufficient for knowledge; you think that I must know that I know for it to be so that I know. It boils down to you thinking you're using the word "knowledge" as commonly used. In one sense you're right. Among philosophers, it is common.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I think the subtlety you're missing is that I don't need to be around for transcriptase to do its thing. Nobody needs to be around - nobody or nothing needs to have any knowledge of transcriptase for it to do its thing. It does what it does whether someone is watching or not.

Sorry to have to insist, but it's still a fact that you don't know whether there is anything like transcriptase to begin with.

Although I'm prepared to grant you that this may be irrelevant to the point you're trying to make.

More to the point - transcriptase does not need to have any view on start and stop codons for it to do its thing - but the fact remains that a start or a stop codon are canonical bits of "information".

Ok, so now you're back to Shannon. So, yes, DNA works fine and this has nothing to do whatsoever with information as we conceive of it in our ordinary lives, but it may be seen as having everything to do with information as how Shannon thought of it.

Perhaps the information paradigm in this context is saying that some clever engineer should conceivably be able to build a contraption working 'essentially' like DNA, perhaps something made out of chunky electronic and/or mechanical bits. Information would be what's common to DNA and this chunky contraption. In other words, the physical specifics of DNA are not essential (even if the chunky contraption could not possibly support life itself).

So, yes, transcriptase and codons do their bit unaware of what they are doing and why, but information is understood here as a property of these things. If that's true then information is physically operational because properties are physically operational.

ETA - let me phrase it another way. Does a start or a stop codon contain information, or does it only contain information because it has a consumer for that information?

Properties are always only effective on something else playing the role of "consumer". Does the Earth's gravity only exist because there is the Moon to "consume" it by being subjected to it?


I think the potency of the information paradigm is that information is conceived as an abstract property. As we think of it, the same information can be present in very different objects and systems. And yet, it's still understood as being a property, i.e. something physically effective.

I would say that's just mind-blowing if you ask me.

I think nobody on this planet could properly characterise information in physical terms. In a way, the concept of information defeats our imagination. We've been able to conceive of it but we can't imagine it at all.

Which seems like saying the very opposite of what your OP seems to be about.

Information may well be the only game in town.

But, of course, we lack information on that bit just yet.
EB

 

[fast]

How would you know you have X if you had nothing to compare it to? So you igore that problem and just compare it to y. Simple enough, but how do you know you're looking at Y?

Can you see what I'm getting at?

Infinite regress, but that isn't the problem but rather what you may think is the problem.

The issue can be dissolved by focusing on unraveling the set up. We must keep our eye on the ball.

If I know X and how I know X if I do are separate issues, much like truth and knowledge are separate issues.

Ever watch a video of a vehicle (like a dune buggy) going up a steep hill? The driver may not know what's in store for him up ahead as he nears the top of the hill that's obstructing his view. But, the truth of what's there isn't a function of knowledge.

If I'm on the wrong track, then maybe a down to Earth example of what you mean is in order. Now, I might very well be on the wrong track and need additional information to make the determination that I'm on the wrong track, but getting that information will not alter the truth or falsity of whether or not I'm on the wrong track one iota.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You're entitled to your beliefs. I would grant that some of your belief might be true. Yet, which ones? Do you know? Even our belief that there's a world out there may conceivably not be true. But, sure, it's also possible some of our beliefs are true, for example that there are other minds or some such. Who know? I don't!

Still, I'm open to the demonstration of the contrary. It's seems fair that I should let whatever sits outside of me to make sure I know it's out there!
EB

I have beliefs that are not merely beliefs, as some are also both justified and true. Because I cannot be so certain that it's impossible to be mistaken, you want to deny that I in fact know anything, but you predicate that denial on the notion that knowledge is insufficient for knowledge; you think that I must know that I know for it to be so that I know. It boils down to you thinking you're using the word "knowledge" as commonly used. In one sense you're right. Among philosophers, it is common.

No, it's not just among philosophers. Everybody understand it this way.

Clearly, we don't use it always in this way. Sometimes, we cut corners. We may on occasions say we know when in fact we're not even convinced ourselves that we do, and some people will do that pretty routinely.

Still, overall, the idea of knowledge is that knowledge comes with absolute certainty, i.e. knowledge is undefeasible.


There's an alternative possibility. When we say that we know that the Moon orbits the Earth, maybe what we mean is that we know the scientific claim that The Moon orbits the Earth, but that we can only believe that this claim is true. That wouldn't rescue knowledge of the world out there. All we would know would be claims, not whether these would be true of the world.
EB

 

[Val]

I was referring to what you wrote regarding my choice of the word "bogus". Anyway, bygones; lemme see how I can rephrase this.

Right.

So there's a bit of a dichotomy here regarding how we view information. Is it an intrinsic or an assigned property? Or both?

A consumer of information (and even if by consumption we simply mean to identify a bit of information as being itself and not another- invoking the law of identity on a bit of information, whether it be a word document or a particle's spin means that we consume information). Two particles interacting with each other depend on being NOT the other in order to interact.

Is identity intrinsic? I'll tentatively argue that it is. That would then imply that information is intrinsic. HOWEVER, it does not solve my paradox of requiring two or more entitities for purposes of making a comparison possible - because it is only once you can make the comparison that information becomes available, and it needs to be available to begin with in order to determine that I have two entities in the first place.

Where did Mercer's word doccies come from? Mercer's word doccies do not emerge from quantum spin &c - that is, quantum spin and whatnot do not encode Mercer's word doccies. They do not contain templating information for the layout of the Word doccies, the fonts used, etc, and it was not encoded for at T = 0.


A clusterfucked collection of quantum spin has emergence in the form of Mercer word doccies? It doesn't sit well with me - the information state of Mercer's word doccies came from, essentially, nothing.

 

[fromderinside]

Switches. They're the harbinger of the future. They are what make you believe you make choices. They are to which information can be reduced. Forget about belief.

 

[Speakpigeon]

truth and knowledge are separate issues.

Not so. Knowledge implies truth, i.e. if someone knows that X then it is true that X.

And, of course, if it is not true that X, then nobody can possibly know that X.
EB

 

[Val]

Your Cartesianism is a bit annoying.

 

[fast]

truth and knowledge are separate issues.

Not so. Knowledge implies truth, i.e. if someone knows that X then it is true that X.

And, of course, if it is not true that X, then nobody can possibly know that X.
EB

Knowledge implies truth but not inversely.

You and I have been through this, but for Val's sake, I'll explain a common misunderstanding so my position is shed in a more accurate light. Beyond the obvious, the obvious being that the conditions in the JTB analysis of knowledge are merely necessary, not sufficient, conditions, the following distinction is not so obvious:

A true justified belief need not be necessary for condition of satisfaction. To explain, a justified belief that is true versus a justified belief that must be true. The distinction between is and must is substantively important. To illustrate, suppose a girl believes that her name is Ann. Suppose she is 16 years old and has never thought otherwise. She is called Ann. She's went by that name all her life. Her drivers license and social security card is in accordinance with what she's believed her whole life to be. The point thus far is merely to point out that there is overwhelming evidence and no countervailing evidence to think she is not mistaken. That should satisfy the justification condition.

So, moving forward, let's consider that her belief is not just a belief but instead a justified belief. I don't think you have any feisty qualms with this so far. The next part gets tricky. She might be mistaken. I won't say she may be mistaken. Might be. Not may be. I can go into great detail in these regards, but I can bypass the argument. Let's just agree that there is the possibility of mistake. If she is mistaken, then obviously she doesn't know her name since the truth condition wouldn't be satisfied.

The key to grasping my upcoming point is to comprehend that there is a compatibility between actuality and possibility. Yes, she might be mistaken. There is the possibility of mistake. Thing is, the JTB truth condition don't give a rats ass about possibilities, nor does it give a hoot about whether we can determine what others might think we need to.

If her justified belief is (is, I say) true, then that's what matters. If it's met and we don't know it's met, then it's still met, just unknowingly. That's not to say a justified belief that is false is knowledge; on the contrary, we would deny knowledge in that case. It's important that the justified belief is true, but we need not rule out the possibility of mistake, for recall, possibility of mistake is irrelevant. Whether it's actually true is what's actually relevant to the truth condition in the JTB analysis.

 

[fast]

I was referring to what you wrote regarding my choice of the word "bogus". Anyway, bygones; lemme see how I can rephrase this.

Right.

So there's a bit of a dichotomy here regarding how we view information. Is it an intrinsic or an assigned property? Or both?

A consumer of information (and even if by consumption we simply mean to identify a bit of information as being itself and not another- invoking the law of identity on a bit of information, whether it be a word document or a particle's spin means that we consume information). Two particles interacting with each other depend on being NOT the other in order to interact.

Is identity intrinsic? I'll tentatively argue that it is. That would then imply that information is intrinsic. HOWEVER, it does not solve my paradox of requiring two or more entitities for purposes of making a comparison possible - because it is only once you can make the comparison that information becomes available, and it needs to be available to begin with in order to determine that I have two entities in the first place.

Where did Mercer's word doccies come from? Mercer's word doccies do not emerge from quantum spin &c - that is, quantum spin and whatnot do not encode Mercer's word doccies. They do not contain templating information for the layout of the Word doccies, the fonts used, etc, and it was not encoded for at T = 0.


A clusterfucked collection of quantum spin has emergence in the form of Mercer word doccies? It doesn't sit well with me - the information state of Mercer's word doccies came from, essentially, nothing.

I'm not so sure I understand the identity information connection. If I had to speculate, at the heart of the presumed connection is a highly broadened sense of "information." I'd prefer a more subdued nonextremist use of "information." For instance, if I wanted to conduct an experiment, I would rather not articulate data as information. The point of using distinctions is to fine tune our communication. If we simply regard anything and everything in physical existence as information and clamor to that notion like a dog in heat (not speaking of you or anyone in particular), the insight gained from that grip on terminology is less than optimal.

When you speak of comparison, I'm inclined to agree with you, as to compare something to something else without a something else strikes me as conflicting.

 

[fromderinside]

Communication usually refers to a bidirectional process for sharing or conveying certain information.

 

[Speakpigeon]

suppose a girl believes that her name is Ann. Suppose she is 16 years old and has never thought otherwise. She is called Ann. She's went by that name all her life. Her drivers license and social security card is in accordinance with what she's believed her whole life to be. The point thus far is merely to point out that there is overwhelming evidence and no countervailing evidence to think she is not mistaken. That should satisfy the justification condition.

So, moving forward, let's consider that her belief is not just a belief but instead a justified belief. I don't think you have any feisty qualms with this so far.

That's where I disagree. That kind of justification doesn't do the heavy-lifting job necessary to achieve knowledge.

You may think you're justified. So what? You believe X is true; X is in fact true; and you have some very convincing justification accepted as very good by all the right people. And yet, your justification is wrong or irrelevant. It's crap. Then what? You and the JTB crowd all claim you have knowledge. Well, no, definitely not.

That's also exactly why previously accepted "knowledge" can get degraded to junk status as soon as enough of the right people decide that the previously accepted justification is wrong, something that happens once in a while in science in particular, but also in justice, but also in any scholarly domain. And we may in fact all do it once in a while. You've done it. I've done it. The best among equal also do it.

What would be needed would be a metaphysically superior kind of justification, something "undefeasible", but then you'd have a new problem. You'd need to know it to begin with. And, obviously, you'd have the problem that you'd need a second-level justification to guaranty your knowledge of your first-level justification. And that's where you'd get an infinite regress. QED.

Well, no quite. There's a way out of this conundrum. I'll let everybody make suggestions in that direction.
EB