56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443
UCLA Law Review
June, 2009
Symposium
The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller
IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND A RESEARCH AGENDA
Eugene Volokha1
Copyright (c) 2009 Regents of the University of California; Eugene Volokh
How should state and federal constitutional rights to keep and bear arms be turned into workable constitutional doctrine? I argue that unitary tests such as “strict scrutiny,” “intermediate scrutiny,” “undue burden,” and the like don't make sense here, just as they don't fully describe the rules applied to most other constitutional rights.
Rather, courts should separately consider four different categories of justifications for restricting rights: (1) Scope justifications, which derive from constitutional text, original meaning, tradition, or background principles; (2) burden justifications, which rest on the claim that a particular law doesn't impose a substantial burden on the right, and thus doesn't unconstitutionally infringe it; (3) danger reduction justifications, which rest on the claim that some particular exercise of the right is so unusually dangerous that it might justify restricting the right; and (4) government as proprietor justifications, which rest on the government's special role as property owner, employer, or subsidizer.
I suggest where the constitutional thresholds for determining the adequacy of these justifications might be set, and I use this framework to analyze a wide range of restrictions: “what” restrictions (such as bans on machine guns, so-called “assault weapons,” or unpersonalized handguns), “who” restrictions (such as bans on possession by felons, misdemeanants, noncitizens, or 18-to-20-year-olds), “where” restrictions (such as bans on carrying in public, in places that serve alcohol, or in parks, or bans on possessing in public housing projects), “how” restrictions (such as storage regulations), “when” restrictions (such as waiting periods), “who knows” regulations (such as licensing or registration requirements), and taxes and other expenses.
Introduction 1445
I. A Framework for Thinking About Constitutional Rights Doctrine 1448
A. Scope 1449
1. Text 1449
2. Original Meaning 1450
3. Tradition 1450
4. Background Legal Principles 1451
5. Why It's Helpful to Distinguish Scope-Based Restrictions From Burden-Based Restrictions or Reducing-Danger-Based Restrictions 1453
B. Burden 1454
1. Generally 1454
2. In Right-to-Bear-Arms Cases 1456
3. Risks and Benefits of a Burden Threshold 1459
C. Danger Reduction 1461
1. Per Se Invalidation, at Least for Especially Serious Burdens 1462
2. The Two Versions of Strict Scrutiny 1464
a. The Shape of the Underlying Factual Debate 1465
b. The Consequences for Strict Scrutiny 1467
c. Intermediate Scrutiny 1470
d. Different Levels of Danger-Reduction Showings for Different Levels of Burden 1471
D. Government Proprietary Role 1473
II. Applying the Framework to Various Gun-Control Laws 1475
A. “What” Bans: Bans on Weapon Categories 1475
1. Scope 1475
a. The “Usually Employed in Civilized Warfare” Test 1476
b. The “Descended From Historically Personal-Defense Weapons” Test 1477
c. The “of the Kind in Common Use” “by Law-Abiding Citizens for Lawful Purposes” Test 1478
d. An Unusual Dangerousness Test 1481
2. Burden 1483
3. Danger Reduction 1487
4. A Quick Review of Weapons Bans 1488
5. A Special Case: “Personalized Gun” Mandates 1491
B. “Who” Bans: Bans on Possession by Certain Classes of People 1493
1. The Bans 1493
2. Burden 1496
3. Scope and Danger Reduction 1497
4. Bans Justified by Individualized Finding of Likely Past Criminal Behavior or Future Danger 1498
5. Bans Without Individualized Findings of Likely Past Violence or Future Danger 1503
a. Side Effects of Attempts to Disarm the Dangerous: Bans on Gun Possession by People Subject to Restraining Orders Without Findings of Misconduct or Dangerousness 1503
b. Proxies for Likely Inadequate Judgment: Bans on Gun Possession by Under-18-Year-Olds, the Mentally Ill, Mentally Retarded, the Drug-Or-Alcohol-Addicted, and 18-to-20-Year-Olds 1508
c. Bans on Gun Possession by Noncitizens 1513
C. “Where” Bans: Prohibition on Possession in Certain Places 1515
1. Bans on All Gun Carrying 1516
2. Bans on Concealed Carry, Revisited 1521
3. Bans on Carry Into Places Where Alcohol Is Served or Sold 1524
4. Bans on Carry Into Places With Effective Security Screening and Internal Security, Such as Airports and Courthouses 1526
5. Bans on Carrying in Other Privately Owned Places 1527
6. Bans on Carrying Within One Thousand Feet of a School 1528
7. Bans on All Gun Possession on Government Property (Setting Aside Streets and Sidewalks) 1529
D. “How” Restrictions: Rules on How Guns Are to Be Stored 1534
1. Requirements That Guns Be Stored Locked or Unloaded 1534
E. “When” Restrictions: Rules on Temporarily Barring People From Possessing Guns 1535
1. Restrictions on Possession While Intoxicated 1535
2. Restrictions on, or Sentence Enhancements for, Possessing Firearms While Possessing Drugs or Committing Another Crime 1536
3. Waiting Periods 1538
F. Taxes, Fees, and Other Expenses 1542
G. Restrictions on Sellers 1545
H. “Who Knows” Restrictions: Government Tracking Regulations, Including Nondiscretionary Licensing, Background Checks, Registration, and Ballistics Tracking Databases 1545
Conclusion 1549