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Is Human Nature Determined by Our Material Conditions?

If I claim to have free will it is like saying I am super wealthy, but I don't know how I got all that money or where it is.
 
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Even if that was true, how does it help the case for free will? Does a quantum information processor necessarily have free will?

You are wasting your time. Ryan will always argue for the existence of free will. He couldn't do otherwise.

True, but he (or someone else) may have been working on a new argument or angle during the break between free will debates that could be interesting, you never know. :cool:

I am not arguing for the existence of free will. I am only arguing for the possibility of free will.

Even if that was true, how does it help the case for free will? Does a quantum information processor necessarily have free will?

From what I understand QM processors in the brain may allow the agent to make indeterminable choices that are sufficient for the definition of free will.
 
True, but he (or someone else) may have been working on a new argument or angle during the break between free will debates that could be interesting, you never know. :cool:

I am not arguing for the existence of free will. I am only arguing for the possibility of free will.
Indeed. And you couldn't do otherwise.
Even if that was true, how does it help the case for free will? Does a quantum information processor necessarily have free will?

From what I understand QM processors in the brain may allow the agent to make indeterminable choices that are sufficient for the definition of free will.

You are mistaken. But it's become crystal clear that you will never accept that fact, so argument is futile.
 
Ever wonder why quantum uncertainty doesn't impact deterministic behavior in the macro world, it's only operative at the quantum level of material activity. You might have your answer in that simple set of observations. Matter of scale probably, yano, intervening unobservables.
 
From what I understand QM processors in the brain may allow the agent to make indeterminable choices that are sufficient for the definition of free will.

How exactly do you relate 'indeterminable choices' to 'free will?' That needs to be explained.

Plus, how does an ''indeterminable choice'' work if there is no actual decision making process, just quantum activity that flips between options?
 
You are mistaken. But it's become crystal clear that you will never accept that fact, so argument is futile.

You thought you knew things in this area when you didn't. Do you have anything to back your claim up, or do you want me to just trust you.
 
From what I understand QM processors in the brain may allow the agent to make indeterminable choices that are sufficient for the definition of free will.

How exactly do you relate 'indeterminable choices' to 'free will?' That needs to be explained.

One should expect a choice to be made with free will would not be determined. Given the definition I am using for FW, it would seem to allow the choice to be a different one.

Plus, how does an ''indeterminable choice'' work if there is no actual decision making process, just quantum activity that flips between options?

Read the "Entangled Neurons" part of https://www.news.ucsb.edu/2018/018840/are-we-quantum-computers
 
One should expect a choice to be made with free will would not be determined. Given the definition I am using for FW, it would seem to allow the choice to be a different one.

Plus, how does an ''indeterminable choice'' work if there is no actual decision making process, just quantum activity that flips between options?

Read the "Entangled Neurons" part of https://www.news.ucsb.edu/2018/018840/are-we-quantum-computers

Several problems with that assumption - even if it effects changes to the brain, the quantum state in the instance of an option taken is not a matter of choice.

As you are not aware of what is happening on that scale you cannot have altered what was happening, nor have chosen to have done differently.

In other words, you still have no regulative control.

As for the article, you need to quote whatever part of it you feel supports your claim.
 
One should expect a choice to be made with free will would not be determined. Given the definition I am using for FW, it would seem to allow the choice to be a different one.

Plus, how does an ''indeterminable choice'' work if there is no actual decision making process, just quantum activity that flips between options?

Read the "Entangled Neurons" part of https://www.news.ucsb.edu/2018/018840/are-we-quantum-computers

Several problems with that assumption - even if it effects changes to the brain, the quantum state in the instance of an option taken is not a matter of choice.

As you are not aware of what is happening on that scale you cannot have altered what was happening, nor have chosen to have done differently.

In other words, you still have no regulative control.

As for the article, you need to quote whatever part of it you feel supports your claim.

It talks about entire neurons being entangled with other neurons.
 
Several problems with that assumption - even if it effects changes to the brain, the quantum state in the instance of an option taken is not a matter of choice.

As you are not aware of what is happening on that scale you cannot have altered what was happening, nor have chosen to have done differently.

In other words, you still have no regulative control.

As for the article, you need to quote whatever part of it you feel supports your claim.

It talks about entire neurons being entangled with other neurons.

There is an awful lot of atoms that make up a single neuron yet alone neurons themselves being entangled....even granting that, you are still left with a lack of regulative control: the ability to have chosen otherwise.

As it is, you are still left with, brain information condition equals decisions made, options taken.
 
You are mistaken. But it's become crystal clear that you will never accept that fact, so argument is futile.

You thought you knew things in this area when you didn't. Do you have anything to back your claim up, or do you want me to just trust you.

I don't want anyone to trust anyone - including themselves.

As I said, there's no point in discussing this with you; You cannot do otherwise than believe in free will. So it is futile.
 
One should expect a choice to be made with free will would not be determined.

What you mention here is a necessary condition for free will. What we have been telling you (for years!) is that it is not a sufficient condition for free will. You can have random events in the brain that don't have anything to do with agency, intention, preference, or any of the things that are important about free will.

As an analogy: one should expect all bears to shit in the woods, but not everything that shits in the woods is a bear.
 
As I understand it, though, this thread isn't about classical determinism versus libertarian free will in the abstract, but the colloquial assessment of how people in society can be expected to behave. I agree that there is a such thing as human nature, but I disagree that it can be identified by observing human behavior without taking material conditions into account. Just as there is no blank slate for human nature, there is no socially blank slate upon which human acts unfold and reveal their true motivations. Anthropology rules that out.
 
Several problems with that assumption - even if it effects changes to the brain, the quantum state in the instance of an option taken is not a matter of choice.

As you are not aware of what is happening on that scale you cannot have altered what was happening, nor have chosen to have done differently.

In other words, you still have no regulative control.

As for the article, you need to quote whatever part of it you feel supports your claim.

It talks about entire neurons being entangled with other neurons.

There is an awful lot of atoms that make up a single neuron yet alone neurons themselves being entangled....even granting that, you are still left with a lack of regulative control: the ability to have chosen otherwise.

As it is, you are still left with, brain information condition equals decisions made, options taken.
I am not sure what you are getting at. If my consciousness is a bunch of neurons and the firing of these neurons are not fully determined by the environmental causes, then how is this not a human having the ability to have chosen otherwise, in at least some instances?
 
There is an awful lot of atoms that make up a single neuron yet alone neurons themselves being entangled....even granting that, you are still left with a lack of regulative control: the ability to have chosen otherwise.

As it is, you are still left with, brain information condition equals decisions made, options taken.
I am not sure what you are getting at. If my consciousness is a bunch of neurons and the firing of these neurons are not fully determined by the environmental causes, then how is this not a human having the ability to have chosen otherwise, in at least some instances?

Necessary but not sufficient! Necessary but not sufficient! Argh!
 
One should expect a choice to be made with free will would not be determined.

What you mention here is a necessary condition for free will. What we have been telling you (for years!) is that it is not a sufficient condition for free will. You can have random events in the brain that don't have anything to do with agency, intention, preference, or any of the things that are important about free will.

As an analogy: one should expect all bears to shit in the woods, but not everything that shits in the woods is a bear.

And what I have been saying for years and years is that I am only arguing for the possibility for free will.

As people come with objections I try to overcome them to only allow the possibility of FW to exist, not to prove that it does.
 
One should expect a choice to be made with free will would not be determined.

What you mention here is a necessary condition for free will. What we have been telling you (for years!) is that it is not a sufficient condition for free will. You can have random events in the brain that don't have anything to do with agency, intention, preference, or any of the things that are important about free will.

As an analogy: one should expect all bears to shit in the woods, but not everything that shits in the woods is a bear.

And what I have been saying for years and years is that I am only arguing for the possibility for free will.

As people come with objections I try to overcome them to only allow the possibility of FW to exist, not to prove that it does.

That doesn't change anything. You need to start with the necessary and sufficient conditions for free will TOGETHER, and then show how something that satisfies BOTH might be possible.

Again, an analogy. You can't argue for the possibility of faster-than-light travel by appealing to the existence of spacecraft. Sure, spacecraft are required for any kind of travel at that speed, but the other part of the definition can't just be left out of the equation. You have to actually show that traveling in a spacecraft AND going faster than the speed of light is possible.
 
And what I have been saying for years and years is that I am only arguing for the possibility for free will.

As people come with objections I try to overcome them to only allow the possibility of FW to exist, not to prove that it does.

That doesn't change anything. You need to start with the necessary and sufficient conditions for free will TOGETHER, and then show how something that satisfies BOTH might be possible.

Again, an analogy. You can't argue for the possibility of faster-than-light travel by appealing to the existence of spacecraft. Sure, spacecraft are required for any kind of travel at that speed, but the other part of the definition can't just be left out of the equation. You have to actually show that traveling in a spacecraft AND going faster than the speed of light is possible.

If there is nobody to explain why the ship can't travel faster than light, then it's possible for those that don't know.
 
And what I have been saying for years and years is that I am only arguing for the possibility for free will.

As people come with objections I try to overcome them to only allow the possibility of FW to exist, not to prove that it does.

That doesn't change anything. You need to start with the necessary and sufficient conditions for free will TOGETHER, and then show how something that satisfies BOTH might be possible.

Again, an analogy. You can't argue for the possibility of faster-than-light travel by appealing to the existence of spacecraft. Sure, spacecraft are required for any kind of travel at that speed, but the other part of the definition can't just be left out of the equation. You have to actually show that traveling in a spacecraft AND going faster than the speed of light is possible.

If there is nobody to explain why the ship can't travel faster than light, then it's possible for those that don't know.

Could you say that again but without not making any sense?
 
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