Is it racist for a prostitute to reject black men?

[Tom Sawyer]

Ya, but if you let the asian prostitutes discriminate against blacks, then you need to let the black prostitutes discriminate against Indians and then the Indian prostitutes will get to discriminate against hispanics and the hispanic prostitutes will get to discriminate against asians and so on and so on. Not only is that difficult to keep track of and leads to unecessary confusion when you have a multiracial prostitute, but all the white prostitutes will just annoyed at the reverse racism and that will compromise their attitude at work and affect the quality of the blow jobs.

I'm against your idea.

Since there is a supposed freedom against discrimination, can a prostitute who finds out a potential client won't pay for their services because of their race turn around and sue the client?

No, she'd be able to sue because he didn't pay for the services. There's no law against customers discriminating.

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Since there is a supposed freedom against discrimination, can a prostitute who finds out a potential client won't pay for their services because of their race turn around and sue the client?

In Nevada the answer is yes.

1) The usual procedure here to refuse a client is to quote them an outrageous price. The girls set their own prices (subject to a brothel-imposed minimum) and are free to charge what they like.

2) A prostitute that doesn't want black clients will simply not show up for the lineup.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

By "isn't the same usage", do you mean two different definitions of the word "threat" are being applied? If that's what you mean, what do you think the two definitions are? If that's not what you mean, what do you mean?

Conflating the two and calling the enforcement of the provisions of a business licence the same thing as sexual harassment or coersion into sex is invalid.

Nobody's calling them "the same thing". Coercion and sexual harassment are categories, not individual entities; a proper subset relation is not an equivalence relation. Which parts of the definitions of "coercion" and "quid pro quo sexual harassment" do enforcement of the disputed provisions of the business license not satisfy?

Ya, but just because two things are in the same category doesn't mean that they should be considered similar. If you're driving 101 kph or 180 kph on the highway, you're in the category of speeding in both cases, but it's silly to use the arguments against why it's bad to drive 180 kph as rationales against going 101 kph. The term applies in both cases but if you use the term in the same way when discussing them both, your arguments just become nonsensical.

It's the same thing with coercion by law and illegal coercion. The government has a right and responsibility to enforce the law and enforce penalties on those who break the law. The term coercion applies to that. To conflate that with the use of the word coercion as in "fuck this guy or I'll make you regret it, bitch" type of coercion is just silly. They're in the same category, but at different ends of the category which don't relate to each other.

 

[Jason Harvestdancer]

Since there is a supposed freedom against discrimination, can a prostitute who finds out a potential client won't pay for their services because of their race turn around and sue the client?

No, she'd be able to sue because he didn't pay for the services. There's no law against customers discriminating.

Then he should lose his right to be a customer, if you're to be consistent.

 

[angelo]

Too right. If a client can discriminate against a prostitute for whatever reason then so should a prostitute be able to discriminate against certain clients.

 

[Canard DuJour]

It seems to me that we humans tend to value a number of mutually inconsistent freedoms

Certainly. Which is no bad thing. We generally assign rights and freedoms by heuristic application of empathy, case by case. Some inconsistency is inevitable. Rigid consistentcy with some abstract principle, like property rights or social rank, typically begets institutionalised cruelty.

, including:

1. The freedom to do business, or to refuse doing business, with anyone we want.

2. The freedom not to be discriminated against based on race.

3. The freedom to decide for ourselves whom we are willing to have sex with, and whom we are not, for any reason whatsoever, without being penalized by the state (except, perhaps, in the case of state-run brothels, who may decide not to employ prostitutes who aren't sufficiently indiscriminate).
​

That list is in increasing order of importance. So when they conflict, #1 often gives way to #2, and #2 gives way to #3. That's why prostitutes, but not accountants, should be able to discriminate based on race.

If we disagree, I suspect it's because you value #2 more than #3; and if so, I suspect you are in the minority (which does not by itself make you wrong). Is that a fair summary?

I don't disgree, but that misrepresents the argument by omission. The prioritised list in this context would be :

1. The freedom to be a licensed prostitute.

2. The freedom to do business, or to refuse doing business, with anyone we want.

3. The freedom not to be discriminated against based on race.

4. The freedom to decide for ourselves whom we are willing to have sex with, and whom we are not, for any reason whatsoever, without being penalized by the state (except, perhaps, in the case of state-run brothels, who may decide not to employ prostitutes who aren't sufficiently indiscriminate).​

Since the licensing authority would revoke licenses rather than pin anyone down and force their legs apart, the conflict here is between (1) and (2 & 3), with the fourth irrelvant. Most people value (1) far less than the others, with many (not me) denying that it should be a right at all.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.


(I haven't read the entire thread, so apologies to others who're doubtless already blue in the face from pointing this out)

 

[Tom Sawyer]

Too right. If a client can discriminate against a prostitute for whatever reason then so should a prostitute be able to discriminate against certain clients.

That's been discussed to death

 

[coloradoatheist]

Too right. If a client can discriminate against a prostitute for whatever reason then so should a prostitute be able to discriminate against certain clients.

That's been discussed to death

It's been a long thread, but I don't remember it. You are being inconsistent. If a John wants to engage in buying prostitution services, he can decide whether or not to buy that service but he needs to not discriminate based on race or not buy those services.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

That's been discussed to death

It's been a long thread, but I don't remember it. You are being inconsistent. If a John wants to engage in buying prostitution services, he can decide whether or not to buy that service but he needs to not discriminate based on race or not buy those services.

Well, you can look it up if you'd like. I don't feel like retyping something that's been rehashed a dozen times.

 

[coloradoatheist]

It's been a long thread, but I don't remember it. You are being inconsistent. If a John wants to engage in buying prostitution services, he can decide whether or not to buy that service but he needs to not discriminate based on race or not buy those services.

Well, you can look it up if you'd like. I don't feel like retyping something that's been rehashed a dozen times.

I'll try and find it, but it's a hypocritical position. If a John has a right not to be discriminated against, then a prostitute has a right not to be discriminated against.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

Well, you can look it up if you'd like. I don't feel like retyping something that's been rehashed a dozen times.

I'll try and find it, but it's a hypocritical position. If a John has a right not to be discriminated against, then a prostitute has a right not to be discriminated against.

No, they're entirely separate issues for all the reasons mentioned.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Certainly. Which is no bad thing. We generally assign rights and freedoms by heuristic application of empathy, case by case. Some inconsistency is inevitable. Rigid consistentcy with some abstract principle, like property rights or social rank, typically begets institutionalised cruelty.

, including:

1. The freedom to do business, or to refuse doing business, with anyone we want.

2. The freedom not to be discriminated against based on race.

3. The freedom to decide for ourselves whom we are willing to have sex with, and whom we are not, for any reason whatsoever, without being penalized by the state (except, perhaps, in the case of state-run brothels, who may decide not to employ prostitutes who aren't sufficiently indiscriminate).
​

That list is in increasing order of importance. So when they conflict, #1 often gives way to #2, and #2 gives way to #3. That's why prostitutes, but not accountants, should be able to discriminate based on race.

If we disagree, I suspect it's because you value #2 more than #3; and if so, I suspect you are in the minority (which does not by itself make you wrong). Is that a fair summary?

I don't disgree, but that misrepresents the argument by omission. The prioritised list in this context would be :

1. The freedom to be a licensed prostitute.

2. The freedom to do business, or to refuse doing business, with anyone we want.

3. The freedom not to be discriminated against based on race.

4. The freedom to decide for ourselves whom we are willing to have sex with, and whom we are not, for any reason whatsoever, without being penalized by the state (except, perhaps, in the case of state-run brothels, who may decide not to employ prostitutes who aren't sufficiently indiscriminate).​

Since the licensing authority would revoke licenses rather than pin anyone down and force their legs apart, the conflict here is between (1) and (2 & 3), with the fourth irrelvant. Most people value (1) far less than the others, with many (not me) denying that it should be a right at all.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.


(I haven't read the entire thread, so apologies to others who're doubtless already blue in the face from pointing this out)

Even if we went with that scheme:

a. The government will actually enforce the ban on working as a prostitute without a license. Or at least, in the scenarios being proposed, it seems they favor enforcing the law. So, we're talking about the right to be a prostitute, not the right to be a licensed prostitute.

c. That most people doesn't value (a) is beside the point (well, except for other reasons; e.g, a government might be justified to pass an unjust law in order to appease them if many would otherwise rebel and do worse things that can't be stopped by force, and then not enforce the law or minimize enforcement. But that and other cases with other reasons are not what we're talking about).

For that matter, there are social contexts (maybe most) in which most people believe there is no right to be a prostitute at all. But the moral “should” does not follow from that.
In addition to that, there are many social contexts (very common historically; still more or less common today) in which most people do not put much value (or any value) on (3); many have never thought about race or ever seen a person of another race; others are happy discriminating against the very few people of other races they meet.

d. Even if the government doesn't enforce the law, the law is siding with the villain, as I mentioned earlier. It's a very unjust law.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.

With the theory collides with reality, the theory needs to be adjusted. The law should not ban racial discrimination in prostitution.

Take, for example, the case of a man of race X who insists on having sex with a prostitute who doesn't want to have sex with any person of race X, and who would suffer if she did – she would only do it not to lose her job.
What he is doing is much worse than what she is doing, even assuming that she is doing something wrong – which might not be the case; after all, discrimination based on physical appearance in general is not immoral, when it comes to sexual partners, and that applies to prostitutes too. But even granting she's doing something wrong, he's much worse.
A law that sides with him and tells her to either lose her job or have sex with him is unjust. What if he, say, threatens to sue her if she does not have sex with him? (say she has already advertised she does not provide sexual services to clients of race X, so he has evidence to make his case).

This is vastly different from a person of race X who sues a bus company because they refuse to take her to her destination, or tell her that she has to go to the back of the bus, or that people of race Y have priority getting seats, etc., or generally other cases of racial discrimination.
In those cases, the law sides with a victim of an unjust action who is doing nothing wrong in that context, whereas the proposed law in the case of prostitutes sides with a villain who insists on having sex with a person knowing she will experience the sex as an ordeal she has to go through to keep her job.
Yes, granted, the bus driver or the owners of the company may also suffer if they're forced not to discriminate racially. But it's not wrong to force them anyway. On the other hand, it's very wrong to force her in the case of sex (or him, if he's a male prostitute, but let's pick the most common case to simplify, since the others are relevantly similar); in fact, it's a lot more wrong than whatever she's doing by saying “no clients of race X”.
A law that sides with the would-be client is, again, very unjust.

 

[Bomb#20]

By "isn't the same usage", do you mean two different definitions of the word "threat" are being applied? If that's what you mean, what do you think the two definitions are? If that's not what you mean, what do you mean?

Conflating the two and calling the enforcement of the provisions of a business licence the same thing as sexual harassment or coersion into sex is invalid.

Nobody's calling them "the same thing". Coercion and sexual harassment are categories, not individual entities; a proper subset relation is not an equivalence relation. Which parts of the definitions of "coercion" and "quid pro quo sexual harassment" do enforcement of the disputed provisions of the business license not satisfy?

Ya, but just because two things are in the same category doesn't mean that they should be considered similar. If you're driving 101 kph or 180 kph on the highway, you're in the category of speeding in both cases, but it's silly to use the arguments against why it's bad to drive 180 kph as rationales against going 101 kph. The term applies in both cases but if you use the term in the same way when discussing them both, your arguments just become nonsensical.
...
They're in the same category, but at different ends of the category which don't relate to each other.

That proposal amounts to a complete abdication from the use of reasoning in moral dispute. You might as well just say "Governments should ban the practice of screwing some races and not others for money, because that feels right to me.", and have done with it. In substance, that's the entirety of your case.

That does raise an interesting question about the legalization and regulation of prostitution, though. If an accountant can't advertise that he doesn't want black clients or turn them away due to their race when they show up, would a prostitute be able to legally discriminate in that manner?

What the prostitute is doing is in the category of "discrimination", yes, but it's silly to use the arguments against why it's bad to let accountants discriminate as rationales against prostitutes getting to do it. The term applies in both cases but if you use the term in the same way when discussing them both, your arguments just become nonsensical. Refusing to do someone's taxes and refusing to let him stick his penis into you are in the same category, but at different ends of the category which don't relate to each other.

Explain exactly what the difference is between that and a specialized restaurant where the patrons, as part of the dining experience, don't have to eat with the darkies...

Refusing to serve someone a meal and refusing to let him stick his penis into you are in the same category, but at different ends of the category which don't relate to each other.

Once something becomes a business transaction, different rules apply. ... I can't assert my right to do what I want with my private property when I'm using that property as a business in the same way that I can when it's just my house. ... I can put up a sign saying "NO BLACK MEN ALLOWED" if I feel like it, but there are legal consequences to doing so which will impact my ability to run my business in such an overtly racist manner.

It's the same with prostitutes. If they're using their body as a business transaction, then different rules apply than if they pick up some guy in a bar. ...

If you don't want black people coming into your home, you don't operate a home-based business which involves customers coming into your home. Full stop. Your racist attitude is at odds with your ability to operate your business.

If you don't want black people sticking their penis into you, you don't operate (or work for) a business which involves customers sticking their penis into you. Full stop. Your racist attitude is at odds with your ability to run your business.

Calling entry into a house used for tax preparation and entry into a vagina "business transactions" aren't the same usage. Conflating the two and calling them the same thing is invalid. Just because two things are in the same category doesn't mean that they should be considered similar. The term applies in both cases but if you use the term in the same way when discussing them both, your arguments just become nonsensical.

Sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

That proposal amounts to a complete abdication from the use of reasoning in moral dispute. You might as well just say "Governments should ban the practice of screwing some races and not others for money, because that feels right to me.", and have done with it. In substance, that's the entirety of your case.

No, that's unrelated to what I'm saying. We seem to just be talking past each other at this point.

 

[Canard DuJour]

Certainly. Which is no bad thing. We generally assign rights and freedoms by heuristic application of empathy, case by case. Some inconsistency is inevitable. Rigid consistentcy with some abstract principle, like property rights or social rank, typically begets institutionalised cruelty.

I don't disgree, but that misrepresents the argument by omission. The prioritised list in this context would be :

1. The freedom to be a licensed prostitute.

2. The freedom to do business, or to refuse doing business, with anyone we want.

3. The freedom not to be discriminated against based on race.

4. The freedom to decide for ourselves whom we are willing to have sex with, and whom we are not, for any reason whatsoever, without being penalized by the state (except, perhaps, in the case of state-run brothels, who may decide not to employ prostitutes who aren't sufficiently indiscriminate).​

Since the licensing authority would revoke licenses rather than pin anyone down and force their legs apart, the conflict here is between (1) and (2 & 3), with the fourth irrelvant. Most people value (1) far less than the others, with many (not me) denying that it should be a right at all.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.


(I haven't read the entire thread, so apologies to others who're doubtless already blue in the face from pointing this out)

Even if we went with that scheme:

a. The government will actually enforce the ban on working as a prostitute without a license. Or at least, in the scenarios being proposed, it seems they favor enforcing the law. So, we're talking about the right to be a prostitute, not the right to be a licensed prostitute.

Freedom to be a prostitute is no further up the list of popular priority (which is what I was addressing) than freedom to be a licensed prostitute. Or my list, so long as not being one means nothing worse than a different job or welfare. And that's assuming being unlicensed means being banned rather than forgoing state protections.

c. That most people doesn't value (a) is beside the point (well, except for other reasons; e.g, a government might be justified to pass an unjust law in order to appease them if many would otherwise rebel and do worse things that can't be stopped by force, and then not enforce the law or minimize enforcement. But that and other cases with other reasons are not what we're talking about).

Beside what point? Not the one I was addressing.

(What happened to b.? - don't answer!)

For that matter, there are social contexts (maybe most) in which most people believe there is no right to be a prostitute at all. But the moral “should” does not follow from that.

So I said. I'm not sure why you're repeating it.

In addition to that, there are many social contexts (very common historically; still more or less common today) in which most people do not put much value (or any value) on (3); many have never thought about race or ever seen a person of another race; others are happy discriminating against the very few people of other races they meet.

d. Even if the government doesn't enforce the law, the law is siding with the villain, as I mentioned earlier. It's a very unjust law.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.

With the theory collides with reality, the theory needs to be adjusted. The law should not ban racial discrimination in prostitution.

Take, for example, the case of a man of race X who insists on having sex with a prostitute who doesn't want to have sex with any person of race X, and who would suffer if she did – she would only do it not to lose her job.
What he is doing is much worse than what she is doing, even assuming that she is doing something wrong – which might not be the case; after all, discrimination based on physical appearance in general is not immoral, when it comes to sexual partners, and that applies to prostitutes too. But even granting she's doing something wrong, he's much worse.
A law that sides with him and tells her to either lose her job or have sex with him is unjust. What if he, say, threatens to sue her if she does not have sex with him? (say she has already advertised she does not provide sexual services to clients of race X, so he has evidence to make his case).

This is vastly different from a person of race X who sues a bus company because they refuse to take her to her destination, or tell her that she has to go to the back of the bus, or that people of race Y have priority getting seats, etc., or generally other cases of racial discrimination.
In those cases, the law sides with a victim of an unjust action who is doing nothing wrong in that context, whereas the proposed law in the case of prostitutes sides with a villain who insists on having sex with a person knowing she will experience the sex as an ordeal she has to go through to keep her job.
Yes, granted, the bus driver or the owners of the company may also suffer if they're forced not to discriminate racially. But it's not wrong to force them anyway. On the other hand, it's very wrong to force her in the case of sex (or him, if he's a male prostitute, but let's pick the most common case to simplify, since the others are relevantly similar); in fact, it's a lot more wrong than whatever she's doing by saying “no clients of race X”.
A law that sides with the would-be client is, again, very unjust.

While I'm not 100% convinced there should be such a law (or licensing condition), that doesn't sway me 1%. Your "villain" is improbable or rare. Assuming the law, that prostitute would be even more so. Absent or outside the law, s/he'd just as likely be threatened with the sack - or worse - by a pimp or madame.


Angra Mainyu, any long rambling posts will be ignored and I'm not interested in discussing a load of daft hypotheticals.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Freedom to be a prostitute is no further up the list of popular priority (which is what I was addressing) than freedom to be a licensed prostitute. Or my list, so long as not being one means nothing worse than a different job or welfare. And that's assuming being unlicensed means being banned rather than forgoing state protections.

Popular priority is not the point. If one goes with that list (not that I see any good reason to) the issue here is not what's popular. What's popular depends on many factors, and it may well be that the majority does not care at all about racial discrimination, or even are happy engaging in it.

My point in that part of my post was that the proposed laws would be such that people wouldn't be allowed to be prostitutes if they don't accept clients of all races.

Beside what point? Not the one I was addressing.

Yes, actually. You said that “So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.”. Those are moral “should”, and so the question is one of justice, not one of majorities.

(What happened to b.? - don't answer!)

Why not?
It seems as I missed that one.

For that matter, there are social contexts (maybe most) in which most people believe there is no right to be a prostitute at all. But the moral “should” does not follow from that.

So I said. I'm not sure why you're repeating it.

No, you did not say what I said in that paragraph. On the contrary, you offered majorities as a basis for your “should” judgment.

The only part you said is that “most people” value the right to be a “licensed” prostitute far less than the others. But my reply was that even if one considers prostitutes in general, it seems most people do that, and in any case, that does not support the “should” judgment; that is the key point, which you didn't say and you actually didn't take into account, given the bad rationale that you gave in support of your moral judgment.

In order also to show by means of another example why your proposed rationale did not work (though it should be sufficient to point it out), I said that there are many social contexts (very common historically; still more or less common today) in which most people do not put much value (or any value) on (3); many have never thought about race or ever seen a person of another race; others are happy discriminating against the very few people of other races they meet.

You did not address that. The point is that if you go by majorities as the basis for the “should” judgments, then the right not to be discriminated against based on race, or the right not to be enslaved, etc., should go, in all of those social contexts in which the majorities say that, which is not the case, either.

Take, for example, the case of a man of race X who insists on having sex with a prostitute who doesn't want to have sex with any person of race X, and who would suffer if she did – she would only do it not to lose her job.
What he is doing is much worse than what she is doing, even assuming that she is doing something wrong – which might not be the case; after all, discrimination based on physical appearance in general is not immoral, when it comes to sexual partners, and that applies to prostitutes too. But even granting she's doing something wrong, he's much worse.
A law that sides with him and tells her to either lose her job or have sex with him is unjust. What if he, say, threatens to sue her if she does not have sex with him? (say she has already advertised she does not provide sexual services to clients of race X, so he has evidence to make his case).

This is vastly different from a person of race X who sues a bus company because they refuse to take her to her destination, or tell her that she has to go to the back of the bus, or that people of race Y have priority getting seats, etc., or generally other cases of racial discrimination.
In those cases, the law sides with a victim of an unjust action who is doing nothing wrong in that context, whereas the proposed law in the case of prostitutes sides with a villain who insists on having sex with a person knowing she will experience the sex as an ordeal she has to go through to keep her job.
Yes, granted, the bus driver or the owners of the company may also suffer if they're forced not to discriminate racially. But it's not wrong to force them anyway. On the other hand, it's very wrong to force her in the case of sex (or him, if he's a male prostitute, but let's pick the most common case to simplify, since the others are relevantly similar); in fact, it's a lot more wrong than whatever she's doing by saying “no clients of race X”.
A law that sides with the would-be client is, again, very unjust.

While I'm not 100% convinced there should be such a law (or licensing condition), that doesn't sway me 1%. Your "villain" is improbable or rare. Assuming the law, that prostitute would be even more so. Absent or outside the law, s/he'd just as likely be threatened with the sack - or worse - by a pimp or madame.

a. Actually, there are plenty of prostitutes, and some do discriminate based on race. They would not cease to exist if such a law is passed and then licensing is enforced. Rather, they would have to choose between losing their jobs, or having sex and endure it. In other words, the law threatens them with the sack.

As for what will happen to her absent the law, that's simply not the case for all of the prostitutes who do discriminate based on race.

b. If they keep working and try not to endure that, those villains become more likely. They don't have to be common, that's not the point.
Granted, the result of the law would be worse if there were many such villains, and less bad if there are few. But it still sides with them.

c. Moreover, the degree of likelihood is not the point, when it comes to the justice of the law.
If someone passed a law allowing slavery in a society in which it's unlikely that anyone would engage in slavery, that law would still be unjust, even if the result would be less bad if no one engaged in slavery than if a few people did, and less bad if a few people did than if a lot of people did (assuming a similar number of slaves per slave owner).

Angra Mainyu, any long rambling posts will be ignored and I'm not interested in discussing a load of daft hypotheticals.

Your choice, of course, but just as you may choose to ignore my post, I may choose to show why the law you're promoting is unjust, why the rationale you offer in support of it is untenable, etc., if you choose to insist.

 

[Canard DuJour]

Popular priority is not the point.

I'm not saying it is.

If one goes with that list (not that I see any good reason to) the issue here is not what's popular. What's popular depends on many factors, and it may well be that the majority does not care at all about racial discrimination, or even are happy engaging in it.

My point in that part of my post was that the proposed laws would be such that people wouldn't be allowed to be prostitutes if they don't accept clients of all races.

Yeah, and..?

Beside what point? Not the one I was addressing.

Yes, actually. You said that “So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.”. Those are moral “should”, and so the question is one of justice, not one of majorities.

Eh? What moral "should" ?

(What happened to b.? - don't answer!)

Why not?
It seems as I missed that one.

For that matter, there are social contexts (maybe most) in which most people believe there is no right to be a prostitute at all. But the moral “should” does not follow from that.

So I said. I'm not sure why you're repeating it.

No, you did not say what I said in that paragraph. On the contrary, you offered majorities as a basis for your “should” judgment.

The only part you said is that “most people” value the right to be a “licensed” prostitute far less than the others. But my reply was that even if one considers prostitutes in general, it seems most people do that, and in any case, that does not support the “should” judgment; that is the key point, which you didn't say and you actually didn't take into account, given the bad rationale that you gave in support of your moral judgment.

In order also to show by means of another example why your proposed rationale did not work (though it should be sufficient to point it out), I said that there are many social contexts (very common historically; still more or less common today) in which most people do not put much value (or any value) on (3); many have never thought about race or ever seen a person of another race; others are happy discriminating against the very few people of other races they meet.

You did not address that. The point is that if you go by majorities as the basis for the “should” judgments, then the right not to be discriminated against based on race, or the right not to be enslaved, etc., should go, in all of those social contexts in which the majorities say that, which is not the case, either.

Take, for example, the case of a man of race X who insists on having sex with a prostitute who doesn't want to have sex with any person of race X, and who would suffer if she did – she would only do it not to lose her job.
What he is doing is much worse than what she is doing, even assuming that she is doing something wrong – which might not be the case; after all, discrimination based on physical appearance in general is not immoral, when it comes to sexual partners, and that applies to prostitutes too. But even granting she's doing something wrong, he's much worse.
A law that sides with him and tells her to either lose her job or have sex with him is unjust. What if he, say, threatens to sue her if she does not have sex with him? (say she has already advertised she does not provide sexual services to clients of race X, so he has evidence to make his case).

This is vastly different from a person of race X who sues a bus company because they refuse to take her to her destination, or tell her that she has to go to the back of the bus, or that people of race Y have priority getting seats, etc., or generally other cases of racial discrimination.
In those cases, the law sides with a victim of an unjust action who is doing nothing wrong in that context, whereas the proposed law in the case of prostitutes sides with a villain who insists on having sex with a person knowing she will experience the sex as an ordeal she has to go through to keep her job.
Yes, granted, the bus driver or the owners of the company may also suffer if they're forced not to discriminate racially. But it's not wrong to force them anyway. On the other hand, it's very wrong to force her in the case of sex (or him, if he's a male prostitute, but let's pick the most common case to simplify, since the others are relevantly similar); in fact, it's a lot more wrong than whatever she's doing by saying “no clients of race X”.
A law that sides with the would-be client is, again, very unjust.

While I'm not 100% convinced there should be such a law (or licensing condition), that doesn't sway me 1%. Your "villain" is improbable or rare. Assuming the law, that prostitute would be even more so. Absent or outside the law, s/he'd just as likely be threatened with the sack - or worse - by a pimp or madame.

a. Actually, there are plenty of prostitutes, and some do discriminate based on race. They would not cease to exist if such a law is passed and then licensing is enforced. Rather, they would have to choose between losing their jobs, or having sex and endure it. In other words, the law threatens them with the sack.

As for what will happen to her absent the law, that's simply not the case for all of the prostitutes who do discriminate based on race.

b. If they keep working and try not to endure that, those villains become more likely. They don't have to be common, that's not the point.
Granted, the result of the law would be worse if there were many such villains, and less bad if there are few. But it still sides with them.

c. Moreover, the degree of likelihood is not the point, when it comes to the justice of the law.
If someone passed a law allowing slavery in a society in which it's unlikely that anyone would engage in slavery, that law would still be unjust, even if the result would be less bad if no one engaged in slavery than if a few people did, and less bad if a few people did than if a lot of people did (assuming a similar number of slaves per slave owner).

Angra Mainyu, any long rambling posts will be ignored and I'm not interested in discussing a load of daft hypotheticals.

Your choice, of course, but just as you may choose to ignore my post, I may choose to show why the law you're promoting is unjust, why the rationale you offer in support of it is untenable, etc., if you choose to insist.

OK, almost none of this seems related to what I posted. Sorry, not interested.

 

[Bomb#20]

That proposal amounts to a complete abdication from the use of reasoning in moral dispute. You might as well just say "Governments should ban the practice of screwing some races and not others for money, because that feels right to me.", and have done with it. In substance, that's the entirety of your case.

No, that's unrelated to what I'm saying. We seem to just be talking past each other at this point.

It sure sounds like what you're saying. If using a term in the same way when discussing two actions makes an argument become nonsensical, even though the term correctly applies to both because they both satisfy the criteria in the term's definition, merely because one of the actions isn't the same thing as a stereotypical example of the specified category, then what the bejesus arguments have you made in this thread that aren't nonsensical? Your own inference procedure disallows your own arguments. What reasons have you offered for putting a prostitute out of business, that aren't based on categorizing her activities as a business, categorizing her leg-spreading behavior as discrimination, categorizing toleration of her as a standard business license, categorizing shutting her down as law enforcement, and categorizing the enforced policy as a just law?

Can you explain from first principles why society should not tolerate anyone selling entry to his or her body to people from some races but not others, without reference to rules that were derived from considering stereotypical examples of other things people sell?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

If one goes with that list (not that I see any good reason to) the issue here is not what's popular. What's popular depends on many factors, and it may well be that the majority does not care at all about racial discrimination, or even are happy engaging in it.

My point in that part of my post was that the proposed laws would be such that people wouldn't be allowed to be prostitutes if they don't accept clients of all races.

I'm not saying it is.

You were using it as the rationale backing your moral assessment.

Yeah, and..?

Asking “Yeah, and...?” precisely when the rest of the post explains that – some of the parts you're not quoting in the part of the post before your “Yeah, and...?” is not a proper way of discussing.

So, yeah, and and you had offered pupularity as the rationale to back the claim about what right should go; with that criterion, then the right not to be discriminated against based on race, or the right not to be enslaved, etc., should go, in all of those social contexts in which the majorities say that, which is not the case, either. .

I already made this abundantly clear, repeating the points even. Your argument is a bad one; you should realize that the rationale you were offering is a bad one, and withdraw the argument.

Eh? What moral "should" ?

You said earlier:

Since the licensing authority would revoke licenses rather than pin anyone down and force their legs apart, the conflict here is between (1) and (2 & 3), with the fourth irrelvant. Most people value (1) far less than the others, with many (not me) denying that it should be a right at all.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.

You said "it is (1) which should be compromised", after "So if sex is so special..."

That is a moral "should" (in "should be compromised"), based on the majority rationale.

OK, almost none of this seems related to what I posted.

Actually, it is all related. If it does not seem related to you, you are mistaken. But it should be obvious that it's related, since I'm refuting your argumentation, and defending mine.
I would recommend that any interested readers take a look at the exchange between us and see for themselves.

 

[Canard DuJour]

I'm not saying it is.

You were using it as the rationale backing your moral assessment.

Yeah, and..?

Asking “Yeah, and...?” precisely when the rest of the post explains that – some of the parts you're not quoting in the part of the post before your “Yeah, and...?” is not a proper way of discussing.

So, yeah, and and you had offered pupularity as the rationale to back the claim about what right should go;

So you keep saying. I didn't.

with that criterion, then the right not to be discriminated against based on race, or the right not to be enslaved, etc., should go, in all of those social contexts in which the majorities say that, which is not the case, either. .

I already made this abundantly clear, repeating the points even. Your argument is a bad one; you should realize that the rationale you were offering is a bad one, and withdraw the argument.

Eh? What moral "should" ?

You said earlier:

Since the licensing authority would revoke licenses rather than pin anyone down and force their legs apart, the conflict here is between (1) and (2 & 3), with the fourth irrelvant. Most people value (1) far less than the others, with many (not me) denying that it should be a right at all.

So if sex is so special that exceptions should be made to rights and freedoms (about which there seems to be a range of opinion), it is (1) which should be compromised.

You said "it is (1) which should be compromised", after "So if sex is so special..."

That is a moral "should" (in "should be compromised"), based on the majority rationale.

No, that was in context of my disputing someone else's assertion about what "we humans tend to value (...) in increasing order of importance" Saying 'if A then B' isn't necessarily asserting A. Now that does happen to be my order of priority but not just because I think it'd be most peoples'.

OK, almost none of this seems related to what I posted.

Actually, it is all related. If it does not seem related to you, you are mistaken. But it should be obvious that it's related, since I'm refuting your argumentation, and defending mine.
I would recommend that any interested readers take a look at the exchange between us and see for themselves.

Well I'm afraid that was as politely as I could put it. I wasn't making the imputed majoritarian argument, and your "villains" argument seemed too silly to deserve all text and formatting it'd take to address in detail. Sorry.