Is the mind material or non-material?

[DBT]

maybe an orange.

Maybe we are talking about nothing? If such things exist, what properties or attributes do non material things have? How are we to know?

I am pretty sure something was being talked about more so than nothing.

The question still stands: if the mind is claimed to be non physical, what is the nature of this ''non physical'' stuff. But it can't be called 'stuff' because it is not supposed to be composed of material...such as the physical makeup of a brain. So the obvious question, what is the nature of this so called 'non material' mind?

 

[StarryNight]

For philosophy of science copnsciousness it probably just another letter in the pluralistic alphabet of all those physical properties like magnetism, temperature, luminosity etc. For philosophers of ethics and morality on the other hand its the point of emergence for a whole new board game: moral relevance itself. So I dont like the idea of a a fundamental dualism appled to physical stuff, unless ethics is part of the equation.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Because there is no physical substance to instantiate it. Our understanding of what it means to say of something that it is or isn't material matter makes it obviously clear that those things (broad sense of the term) are not material.

Then you should have no problem designing an experiment demonstrating the existence of this non-physical material, and perhaps even determine the properties of this non-material substance. I look forward to telling everyone that I knew you before you were famous!

I certainly experience my mind, which is as good an experiment as you will ever get. I also believe others do their own, although I may be mistaken here. So my mind at least exists. Is it material or not? Well, you would have to specify how I should be able to recognise the materiality of things. You see, all I know is my mind. I sure believe there is something like a world somehow external to my mind and I don't mind calling that "material" but that's not to say I could identify materiality without fail or even tell how I should do that. In other words, any notion about things that would be material come through my mind, somehow. So, I don't know if my mind is material or if it is non-material, not because I don't know my mind, I do, but because I don't know what you mean by material beyond my subjective experience of what might be subjective evidence of a material world. In other word, I know the evidence as mental evidence (or evidence in the mind) but I don't know the thing that this evidence might be the evidence of.

The properties of the mind that I know of are the qualities I experience subjectively. For instance, pain would be a property of my mind whenever I am in pain. The impression of seeing a tree would be another property whenever I have this impression. Etc. you get the picture.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties.

Funny. But not true. Santa has properties but doesnt exist.

To say that something exist means that that information is about something in the real world. That it must be taken in consideration for its own reason.

Saying that unicorn exist means that you actually can expect to see a real unicorn etc.

Not some lame shit about properties.

a. A characteristic trait or peculiarity, esp. serving to define or describe its possessor.
b. A characteristic attribute possessed by all members of a class.

I think that the idea that a property is somehow possessed by a thing makes it of a similar nature of this thing. So a material thing would possess only material properties and an imaginary thing would only possess imaginary properties. Possession of a material property would entail material existence, while possession of an imaginary property would entail imaginary existence. So, if something weighs a ton it exists materially. Something like Santa Claus does not possess material properties that I know of, only the imaginary one of distributing toys to children the world over on Noël night while singing Ho-Ho-Ho, so we can say that it is an imaginary being, i.e. one that does not exist. I think it's fair to add that presumably my very real idea of Santa Claus as different from this imaginary Santa Claus may be said to only have mental properties and therefore to exist only in my mind.
Why not?
EB

 

[Juma]

To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties.

Funny. But not true. Santa has properties but doesnt exist.

To say that something exist means that that information is about something in the real world. That it must be taken in consideration for its own reason.

Saying that unicorn exist means that you actually can expect to see a real unicorn etc.

Not some lame shit about properties.

a. A characteristic trait or peculiarity, esp. serving to define or describe its possessor.
b. A characteristic attribute possessed by all members of a class.

I think that the idea that a property is somehow possessed by a thing makes it of a similar nature of this thing. So a material thing would possess only material properties and an imaginary thing would only possess imaginary properties. Possession of a material property would entail material existence, while possession of an imaginary property would entail imaginary existence. So, if something weighs a ton it exists materially. Something like Santa Claus does not possess material properties that I know of, only the imaginary one of distributing toys to children the world over on Noël night while singing Ho-Ho-Ho, so we can say that it is an imaginary being, i.e. one that does not exist. I think it's fair to add that presumably my very real idea of Santa Claus as different from this imaginary Santa Claus may be said to only have mental properties and therefore to exist only in my mind.
Why not?
EB

Gibberish. The santa is a imaginative person. Thus imagined to have physical as well as superphysical properties.

 

[fast]

To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties.

Funny. But not true. Santa has properties but doesnt exist.

To say that something exist means that that information is about something in the real world. That it must be taken in consideration for its own reason.

Saying that unicorn exist means that you actually can expect to see a real unicorn etc.

Not some lame shit about properties.

a. A characteristic trait or peculiarity, esp. serving to define or describe its possessor.
b. A characteristic attribute possessed by all members of a class.

I think that the idea that a property is somehow possessed by a thing makes it of a similar nature of this thing. So a material thing would possess only material properties and an imaginary thing would only possess imaginary properties. Possession of a material property would entail material existence, while possession of an imaginary property would entail imaginary existence. So, if something weighs a ton it exists materially. Something like Santa Claus does not possess material properties that I know of, only the imaginary one of distributing toys to children the world over on Noël night while singing Ho-Ho-Ho, so we can say that it is an imaginary being, i.e. one that does not exist. I think it's fair to add that presumably my very real idea of Santa Claus as different from this imaginary Santa Claus may be said to only have mental properties and therefore to exist only in my mind.
Why not?
EB

Gibberish. The santa is a imaginative person. Thus imagined to have physical as well as superphysical properties.

But an imaginative person is not a kind of person.

 

[Juma]

Gibberish. The santa is a imaginative person. Thus imagined to have physical as well as superphysical properties.

But an imaginative person is not a kind of person.

Yes it is. If you doesnt implicitly exclude them by defining "person" as "non-fictive person"

 

[fast]

Gibberish. The santa is a imaginative person. Thus imagined to have physical as well as superphysical properties.

But an imaginative person is not a kind of person.

Yes it is. If you doesnt implicitly exclude them by defining "person" as "non-fictive person"

No, it's not. Don't let the wording misdirect you. Take for instance a toy car. A toy car is not a kind of car. It's a kind of toy. An imaginary person isn't a real person. In fact, it's not a person at all and so can't be a kind of person.

 

[Juma]

Take for instance a toy car. A toy car is not a kind of car. It's a kind of toy.

And real cars can be seen as toys.

An imaginary person isn't a real person. In fact, it's not a person at all and so can't be a kind of person.

This is silly. You are moving goalposts.

 

[fast]

And real cars can be seen as toys.

An imaginary person isn't a real person. In fact, it's not a person at all and so can't be a kind of person.

This is silly. You are moving goalposts.

I'm trying to illustrate how language has deceived you. By the way, real cars are 'toys', but they are not toys; hence, when a term is used in either an alternative or unusual manner (signified by the use of single quotes), such a usage is a stipulative usage and not necessarily a lexical usage. Your observation of how cars can be seen doesn't refute what I said; moreover, you should be careful not to think that a fictional character refers to characters of fiction, especially when used in contexts contrasting them to characters of fiction for the point of making the much needed distinction between entities that purportedly exist outside works of fiction and those that do exist within works of fiction. Notice I didn't say fictional works. Anyhow, it's all good.

 

[none]

And real cars can be seen as toys.

An imaginary person isn't a real person. In fact, it's not a person at all and so can't be a kind of person.

This is silly. You are moving goalposts.

I'm trying to illustrate how language has deceived you. By the way, real cars are 'toys', but they are not toys; hence, when a term is used in either an alternative or unusual manner (signified by the use of single quotes), such a usage is a stipulative usage and not necessarily a lexical usage. Your observation of how cars can be seen doesn't refute what I said; moreover, you should be careful not to think that a fictional character refers to characters of fiction, especially when used in contexts contrasting them to characters of fiction for the point of making the much needed distinction between entities that purportedly exist outside works of fiction and those that do exist within works of fiction. Notice I didn't say fictional works. Anyhow, it's all good.

real cars are raced at a local race track here, the people there call them toys... are they toys or cars?
Harry Potter, character of fiction or fictional character? and definitions of both fictional character and character of fiction...

 

[fast]

And real cars can be seen as toys.

An imaginary person isn't a real person. In fact, it's not a person at all and so can't be a kind of person.

This is silly. You are moving goalposts.

I'm trying to illustrate how language has deceived you. By the way, real cars are 'toys', but they are not toys; hence, when a term is used in either an alternative or unusual manner (signified by the use of single quotes), such a usage is a stipulative usage and not necessarily a lexical usage. Your observation of how cars can be seen doesn't refute what I said; moreover, you should be careful not to think that a fictional character refers to characters of fiction, especially when used in contexts contrasting them to characters of fiction for the point of making the much needed distinction between entities that purportedly exist outside works of fiction and those that do exist within works of fiction. Notice I didn't say fictional works. Anyhow, it's all good.

real cars are raced at a local race track here, the people there call them toys... are they toys or cars?
Harry Potter, character of fiction or fictional character? and definitions of both fictional character and character of fiction...

We ought not argue over the example I was using to make the point that language might have been responsible for his belief that a fictional character is a kind of person, but since you ask, there is a term called "big boy toys" (or toys, for short) that would refer to such things as a race car, but clearly, that is an equivocation on the word, "toy" probably evolved from an extreme scope broadening usage of the word that caught on in our lexicon. Surely you're not going to find such cars driven at your local track in your local toy store.

We used to have a member that believed that if you told him "nothing was in the drawer" that there was something in the drawer to which the word, "nothing" referred to, but to say "nothing is in the drawer" is to deny that something is in the drawer. Same with "imaginary person". When we say little Sally has an imaginary friend, we aren't saying that Sally has a friend and that the friend is imaginary. That's preposterous! We are denying that such a friend exists in the real world. She may pretend to have a friend and ascribe characteristics to what she might call her friend, but if there is no friend, then there are no properties of her pretend friend, and again, just like an imaginary person, a pretend friend is no real friend at all--they don't have properties (despite ascribed characteristics) and don't exist.

We say fictional characters don't exist just as we say imaginary people don't exist. They don't exist in the real world. In fact, they don't exist at all, not even in the mind. If they did exist in the mind, why deny their existence? But, that's not to say there are no characters of fiction, nor is it to say little children don't have an imagination. When we say that characters of fiction exist, we aren't saying they possess real world properties, but they they do have properties, but because they are works of fiction created by others, they do exist, and the very characteristics we ascribe to them are the properties they have, but never are the characteristics we ascribe to fictional characters regarded as properties.

If the character of fiction known as Harry Potter were to suddenly appear before us and begin talking to us and shaking our hand, then the character wouldn't be a fictional character at all, since it would have the property of having hands and feet, for example. The character of fiction found in the work of fiction is characterized as having hands and feet, but they aren't really hands and feet and so doesn't have the properties of hands and feet, but the character of fiction is depicted as having hands and feet, and since the characteristic is actually present, the character of fiction does have properties, for instance as being a character of fiction ascribed as having hands and feet.

Tricky stuff...gotta keep your eye on the ball.

 

[Juma]

We ought not argue over the example I was using to make the point that language might have been responsible for his belief that a fictional character is a kind of person,

Nobody is arguing that a fictive person is a real person.

The forget the very important fact that when you state the question "is an imaginative person a person" you are using language, and thus the answer follow what are deducted from how the question is stated.

But you may be excused by how context driven meaning is that you didnt realize that there are contexts where "fictive person" is the obvious meaning of the word "person.

That is why this "existence" because of "real properties" is baloney,

 

[none]

...
We say fictional characters don't exist just as we say imaginary people don't exist. They don't exist in the real world. In fact, they don't exist at all, not even in the mind. If they did exist in the mind, why deny their existence? But, that's not to say there are no characters of fiction, nor is it to say little children don't have an imagination. When we say that characters of fiction exist, we aren't saying they possess real world properties, but they they do have properties, but because they are works of fiction created by others, they do exist, and the very characteristics we ascribe to them are the properties they have, but never are the characteristics we ascribe to fictional characters regarded as properties.
...

I can't make heads nor tails out of this^
you say fictional characters don't exist, then why is it possible to have a conversation about something that doesn't exist?

 

[Juma]

...
We say fictional characters don't exist just as we say imaginary people don't exist. They don't exist in the real world. In fact, they don't exist at all, not even in the mind. If they did exist in the mind, why deny their existence? But, that's not to say there are no characters of fiction, nor is it to say little children don't have an imagination. When we say that characters of fiction exist, we aren't saying they possess real world properties, but they they do have properties, but because they are works of fiction created by others, they do exist, and the very characteristics we ascribe to them are the properties they have, but never are the characteristics we ascribe to fictional characters regarded as properties.
...

I can't make heads nor tails out of this^
you say fictional characters don't exist, then why is it possible to have a conversation about something that doesn't exist?

Because the brain uses symbols. The symbols are used as representatives, labels, of the real thing. But since it awkward to explicitly dereference the symbol (fex say "what the sun represents") we implicitly dereferences the symbol and assumes that when somebody says "the sun" she means the star 8 light minutes from earth, not the symbol in her brain.

Fictional characters though are interesting since they seem to exist. But what exist in that case is a really elaborated symbol, nothing else.

But the funny thing us that the symbol "Green Latern" refers to something that exist: a globally known fantasy figure.

 

[none]

...
We say fictional characters don't exist just as we say imaginary people don't exist. They don't exist in the real world. In fact, they don't exist at all, not even in the mind. If they did exist in the mind, why deny their existence? But, that's not to say there are no characters of fiction, nor is it to say little children don't have an imagination. When we say that characters of fiction exist, we aren't saying they possess real world properties, but they they do have properties, but because they are works of fiction created by others, they do exist, and the very characteristics we ascribe to them are the properties they have, but never are the characteristics we ascribe to fictional characters regarded as properties.
...

I can't make heads nor tails out of this^
you say fictional characters don't exist, then why is it possible to have a conversation about something that doesn't exist?

Because the brain uses symbols. The symbols are used as representatives, labels, of the real thing. But since it awkward to explicitly dereference the symbol (fex say "what the sun represents") we implicitly dereferences the symbol and assumes that when somebody says "the sun" she means the star 8 light minutes from earth, not the symbol in her brain.

Fictional characters though are interesting since they seem to exist. But what exist in that case is a really elaborated symbol, nothing else.

But the funny thing us that the symbol "Green Latern" refers to something that exist: a globally known fantasy figure.

hey, thanks for the reply.
I am pretty sure I agree with you.
and "creepy green lantern" is a whole different symbol, right?

 

[DBT]

Gibberish. The santa is a imaginative person. Thus imagined to have physical as well as superphysical properties.

But an imaginative person is not a kind of person.

Yes it is. If you doesnt implicitly exclude them by defining "person" as "non-fictive person"

No, it's not. Don't let the wording misdirect you. Take for instance a toy car. A toy car is not a kind of car. It's a kind of toy. An imaginary person isn't a real person. In fact, it's not a person at all and so can't be a kind of person.

A fictional person is not an actual person, but it is a defined character that's endowed with a recognizably human personality through the means of an author's narrative. Human traits and characteristics that are both recognizable and actual because we deal with them on a daily basis, consequently we are able to relate to a fictional story with its set of fictional characters.

 

[Speakpigeon]

a. A characteristic trait or peculiarity, esp. serving to define or describe its possessor.
b. A characteristic attribute possessed by all members of a class.

I think that the idea that a property is somehow possessed by a thing makes it of a similar nature of this thing. So a material thing would possess only material properties and an imaginary thing would only possess imaginary properties. Possession of a material property would entail material existence, while possession of an imaginary property would entail imaginary existence. So, if something weighs a ton it exists materially. Something like Santa Claus does not possess material properties that I know of, only the imaginary one of distributing toys to children the world over on Noël night while singing Ho-Ho-Ho, so we can say that it is an imaginary being, i.e. one that does not exist. I think it's fair to add that presumably my very real idea of Santa Claus as different from this imaginary Santa Claus may be said to only have mental properties and therefore to exist only in my mind.
Why not?
EB

Gibberish. The santa is a imaginative person.

Imaginary person, yes, that's what I said. I don't believe in Santa Claus any more.

Thus imagined to have physical as well as superphysical properties.

No, it depends who you are talking about. For me, and you too I hope, and indeed for most adults, and sad to say most children, Santa Claus is seen as an imaginary person because we don't believe that it exists as a material being and therefore we don't believe it has any material properties. The story lends him imaginarily material properties, like being able to carry imaginary presents using imaginary reindeers. I don't think of the Santa Claus as being actually shorter or taller than me. I imagine him as being imaginarily shorter than me. Nothing properly material.
Some people and a few children do believe he has material properties but you are not currently having this discussion with them I don't think.

Gibberish

n.
1. Unintelligible or nonsensical.
2.
a. Highly technical or esoteric linguistic statements.
b. Using needlessly pretentious or vague language.

I don't believe for a moment that what I say deserve to be described as "gibberish".
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

real cars are raced at a local race track here, the people there call them toys... are they toys or cars?
Harry Potter, character of fiction or fictional character? and definitions of both fictional character and character of fiction...

Most cars are not toys. Most toys, including most toy cars, are not cars. Some cars are toys and therefore some toys are cars but, to repeat, most toy cars are not cars. So the onus is on the poster who first introduced the contentious term to make clear what he is talking about, here either (a) toy cars that are toys but not cars, or (b) toy cars that are toys but nonetheless are also real cars.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

you say fictional characters don't exist, then why is it possible to have a conversation about something that doesn't exist?

Because the brain uses symbols. The symbols are used as representatives, labels, of the real thing. But since it awkward to explicitly dereference the symbol (fex say "what the sun represents")

It's not that it is awkward to constantly refer to the symbols in our mind (or brain?) it's that we don't even think of the idea of the sun (the symbol in our mind) as a symbol. We see it as the real thing. I certainly do. It's only philosophical and then scientific exchanges over the centuries that allow people to come up with this notion that we had ideas and ideas were really symbols. Human beings use language, where words are understood to work as symbols of things or our ideas about things, and this helped our ancestors get a grip on the symbolic nature of our ideas. That this is true is supported by how we use the word "idea". We make a clear distinction between the idea of the sun as it is inside our mind (or brain) and what we think of as the real, material sun. But that's still a recent discovery of humakind. So, in effect, it is not true that it is awkward the refer to symbols inside our mind since we very often do, each time we refer to an idea rather than what this idea is the symbol of.
EB