Horatio Parker
Veteran Member
Churchill's bold readiness to run such double risks, in the endeavor to gain success in Africa and preserve the British position in Egypt, was in striking contrast to the attitude of Hitler and Halder, who were agreed in trying to curtail the German commitment in the Mediterranean there. In October, when Gen. von Thoma had been sent on an exploratory visit to Cyrenaica, he had reported that a force of four panzer divisions would be needed, and should suffice, to ensure success in the invasion of Egypt...
Liddell-Hart History of the Second World War
In a June 30, 1940 memorandum, Jodl wrote that if the strike across the Channel did not come off, the Mediterranean offered the best arena to defeat Britain…
No one realized this truth better than Winston Churchill. In a message to President Roosevelt a few months later, he asserted that if Egypt and the Middle East were lost, continuation for the war "would be a hard, long, and bleak proposition," even if the US entered.
How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat
By Bevin Alexander
Moreover, by early June,
the military situation seemed much better. To everyone’s relief and amazement,
335,000 Allied troops had been evacuated from Dunkirk, and it also became
clear that Hitler intended to finish off the French before he turned his attention
to Britain. With the immediate crisis averted, a consensus now formed in the
Cabinet around the Churchillian position that no question of peace terms could
be raised until the Battle of Britain had been won. However, the hope was still
that, by continuing the struggle, Britain would eventually secure not total victory
but acceptable terms. Halifax and Butler were particularly emphatic on this
point, fearing that Churchill would be carried away by emotion and bravado into
prolonging the war unnecessarily.
Where did Churchill stand on this issue? On 13 May he had told the
Commons that his policy was ‘Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror,
however long and hard the road may be, for without victory there is no survival.’
Privately on 18 May and 1 June he spoke of his conviction that Britain would
beat Germany and he rejected the idea of preparing contingency plans to
evacuate the royal family and government abroad.
But in Cabinet during the
Dunkirk crisis he was much less adamant that total victory was the only
acceptable result. When asked by Halifax on 26 May ‘whether, if he was satisfied
that matters vital to the independence of this country were unaffected, he would
be prepared to discuss terms’, Churchill replied ‘that he would be thankful to get
out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retained the essentials
and the elements of our vital strength, even at the cost of some territory’.
In
Chamberlain’s more colourful account of the exchange, Churchill is recorded as
saying that ‘if we could get out of this jam by giving up Malta and Gibraltar and
some African colonies he would jump at it’, although he did not see any such
prospect.
The following day he took a similar line. According to the War
Cabinet minutes he commented that ‘if Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace
on the terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of
Central Europe, that was one thing’, but he felt that such an offer was ‘most
unlikely’.
Summing up his position on 28 May, Churchill stressed that in the
present crisis they could not get acceptable terms from Italy and Germany:
Signor Mussolini, if he came in as mediator, would take his whack out of us. It was
impossible to imagine that Herr Hitler would be so foolish as to let us continue our
rearmament. In effect, his terms would put us completely at his mercy. We should get no
worse terms if we went on fighting, even if we were beaten, than were open to us now. If,
however, we continued the war and Germany attacked us, no doubt we should suffer
some damage, but they would also suffer severe losses. Their oil supplies might be
reduced. A time might come when we felt that we had to put an end to the struggle, but
the terms would not then be more mortal than those offered to us now.
FROM WORLD WAR TO COLD WAR
David Reynolds