Laws of Nature... emergent property of matter or immaterial rules imposed upon matter?

[Kharakov]

Every time I read something by untermensche, I think "what are they trying to illuminate by contradiction", since they always seem to try to avoid speaking the truth in the interest of perpetuating conversation.

 

[untermensche]

Every time I read something by untermensche, I think "what are they trying to illuminate by contradiction", since they always seem to try to avoid speaking the truth in the interest of perpetuating conversation.

The truth?

The truth about magic things that have existence but no beginning?

I dispute your claims that you know what the truth is.

 

[Malintent]

Obviously something always existed in some form or another. If nothing (simple non-existence) was the case, it would be eternal. Nothing is perfectly balanced- it has no forces one way or another, no tendencies to act one way or another. If it had the tendency to form stuff, to act in certain ways (even to act randomly or chaotically), it would be something that existed, with existing characteristics (the tendency to form stuff an/or act randomly/chaotically are characteristics of something, not nothing).

Anyway- the eternal something exists without a cause. It isn't even possible for it to not exist. It might cause other causes, but something was always there. Causing. Waiting. Watching. Hungry. Patient.

- - - Updated - - -

I was going to say something similar... that "things" can have causes that themselves are not "things".

Something semantic? I'm curious.

something immaterial, but measurable... such as forces, fields, and energy.

 

[Malintent]

There's a clear distinction between Krauss' gross claim that nothingness could somehow cause something to appear, which is logically idiotic, and the idea that it is logically possible for something to appear on its own, spontaneously, which means "without external cause".

Are you being sly with the word external? Because some sort of framework of existence that causes things to appear spontaneously must exist before something exists spontaneously.... and I'm using spontaneous like "the guy laughed spontaneously at the comic's joke, because he was drunk, and the comedian was quite good". In other words- not spontaneous as in uncaused, but spontaneous as in not coerced.... or something like that.

So, then you want to have your cake and eat it too... you want a lack of spontaneity to imply causation, and also for spontaneity to not mean uncaused.
Sorry, but that word... I do not think it means what you think it means.

The word I think you are looking for is "suddenly", not "spontaneously".

 

[fast]

Obviously something always existed in some form or another. If nothing (simple non-existence) was the case, it would be eternal. Nothing is perfectly balanced- it has no forces one way or another, no tendencies to act one way or another. If it had the tendency to form stuff, to act in certain ways (even to act randomly or chaotically), it would be something that existed, with existing characteristics (the tendency to form stuff an/or act randomly/chaotically are characteristics of something, not nothing).

Anyway- the eternal something exists without a cause. It isn't even possible for it to not exist. It might cause other causes, but something was always there. Causing. Waiting. Watching. Hungry. Patient.

- - - Updated - - -



Something semantic? I'm curious.

something immaterial, but measurable... such as forces, fields, and energy.

If there is some thing, then there is something, but the inverse is not (directly) true, for if there is something, there is not (necessarily) some thing. For instance, a book is something, and it's some thing. Energy is something but not some thing. So, we are on the same page as to the existence of that which is immaterial.

The brain is some thing and something while although the mind is something it's not some thing. Digestion is something but not some thing.

Underlying the somethings of the world, however, are things. We can have a brain and no mind, but we can't have a mind without a brain. We can have a stomach with no digestion but no digestion can we have without a stomach. We can have that which gives rise to energy but we can't have energy without that which gives rise to it.

Underlying the somethings of the world that are not in fact things of the world do have things that underlie them.

Not arguing, just talking out loud

 

[Kharakov]

I was going to say something similar... that "things" can have causes that themselves are not "things".

Something semantic? I'm curious.

something immaterial, but measurable... such as forces, fields, and energy.

Ok, I use the slutty definition of thing, as in anything that exists. A thought is a thing, an idea is a thing, a square is a thing. The slutty definition of sling does not require thing to be a material object.

By slutty definition of some word like things, I mean it can mean a lot of different things.

 

[fast]

I was going to say something similar... that "things" can have causes that themselves are not "things".

Something semantic? I'm curious.

something immaterial, but measurable... such as forces, fields, and energy.

Ok, I use the slutty definition of thing, as in anything that exists. A thought is a thing, an idea is a thing, a square is a thing. The slutty definition of sling does not require thing to be a material object.

By slutty definition of some word like things, I mean it can mean a lot of different things.

To say of something that it exists is to say of something that it has properties.

We can characterize things by scope: small scope and large scope.

Small scope: some thing (material)
Large scope: something (material or immaterial)

 

[PyramidHead]

Semantically, we should be careful when we say that something was caused to happen by a law of nature. Laws don't actually cause things to happen, other things that happen cause things to happen. Laws are just how we describe the whole situation from our perspective. Relationships, correlations, patterns, and tendencies exist out there, but laws are inventions. Seems like a trivial distinction and it probably is, but it's good practice to keep the difference between things and descriptions of things straight in one's head.

 

[fast]

Semantically, we should be careful when we say that something was caused to happen by a law of nature. Laws don't actually cause things to happen, other things that happen cause things to happen. Laws are just how we describe the whole situation from our perspective. Relationships, correlations, patterns, and tendencies exist out there, but laws are inventions. Seems like a trivial distinction and it probably is, but it's good practice to keep the difference between things and descriptions of things straight in one's head.

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

 

[PyramidHead]

Semantically, we should be careful when we say that something was caused to happen by a law of nature. Laws don't actually cause things to happen, other things that happen cause things to happen. Laws are just how we describe the whole situation from our perspective. Relationships, correlations, patterns, and tendencies exist out there, but laws are inventions. Seems like a trivial distinction and it probably is, but it's good practice to keep the difference between things and descriptions of things straight in one's head.

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

Ehhh... then we need a word for the descriptions themselves, don't we? I like "law". Boyle's law can be written on a piece of paper. It's a description. The relationship between temperature and pressure is what it's describing. Seems more parsimonious than saying the written law is describing an 'inherent' law, because then you need to keep track of which sense of the word you're using.

 

[Malintent]

Semantically, we should be careful when we say that something was caused to happen by a law of nature. Laws don't actually cause things to happen, other things that happen cause things to happen. Laws are just how we describe the whole situation from our perspective. Relationships, correlations, patterns, and tendencies exist out there, but laws are inventions. Seems like a trivial distinction and it probably is, but it's good practice to keep the difference between things and descriptions of things straight in one's head.

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

Forces. What "law of nature" (old fashioned term) does not boil down to the effect of a force?

 

[Malintent]

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

Ehhh... then we need a word for the descriptions themselves, don't we? I like "law". Boyle's law can be written on a piece of paper. It's a description. The relationship between temperature and pressure is what it's describing. Seems more parsimonious than saying the written law is describing an 'inherent' law, because then you need to keep track of which sense of the word you're using.

Thermodynamics... great example. That relationship was figured out before Einstein's time... the Law of Thermodynamics was already well accepted as an accurate description... Scientists, however, still did not "believe in" molecules. It is the behavior of molecules (electromagnetic force) that causes the effect we see that we call the Law of Thermodynamics.

Laws are old... before we had a better understanding of some of the more fundamental properties of our universe.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Spontaneously means without external cause so it's a logical contradiction to insist that something causes something else to appear spontaneously. If it is spontaneous, there's no external cause.

Yeah, which is impossible. If nothing exists, nothing existing is an external cause for nothing to occur. The whole spontaneous appearance of something from nothing thing is... silly at best..

I'm fine with the idea that spontaneous appearance may seem a silly idea. Yet, it seems more important to me whether it's logically acceptable and to me the idea is logically acceptable. I can't think of any reason it wouldn't be.
EB

 

[Kharakov]

The word I think you are looking for is "suddenly", not "spontaneously".

Suddenly I was joking about words, creating confusion about what I intended to convey, yet again.

Semantically, we should be careful when we say that something was caused to happen by a law of nature. Laws don't actually cause things to happen, other things that happen cause things to happen. Laws are just how we describe the whole situation from our perspective. Relationships, correlations, patterns, and tendencies exist out there, but laws are inventions. Seems like a trivial distinction and it probably is, but it's good practice to keep the difference between things and descriptions of things straight in one's head.

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

Ehhh... then we need a word for the descriptions themselves, don't we? I like "law". Boyle's law can be written on a piece of paper. It's a description. The relationship between temperature and pressure is what it's describing. Seems more parsimonious than saying the written law is describing an 'inherent' law, because then you need to keep track of which sense of the word you're using.

One of the laws of conscious linguistic interaction causes the existence of the descriptive laws of nature, by which certain repeated patterns that occur in nature are described with various precision by mathematics, which is thee language of precise description of things which can be precisely described by ratios, etc.

Of course, nature is smooth, and a lot (if not all) of mathematics is discrete.

 

[Speakpigeon]

If there is some thing, then there is something, but the inverse is not (directly) true, for if there is something, there is not (necessarily) some thing. For instance, a book is something, and it's some thing. Energy is something but not some thing. So, we are on the same page as to the existence of that which is immaterial.

The brain is some thing and something while although the mind is something it's not some thing. Digestion is something but not some thing.

Underlying the somethings of the world, however, are things. We can have a brain and no mind, but we can't have a mind without a brain. We can have a stomach with no digestion but no digestion can we have without a stomach. We can have that which gives rise to energy but we can't have energy without that which gives rise to it.

Underlying the somethings of the world that are not in fact things of the world do have things that underlie them.

Not arguing, just talking out loud

This isn't how the word "thing" is used in its main acceptation.

A thing is an entity but not necessarily a material one. If you think of the mind as an entity separate from the brain then you're perfectly justified in saying the mind is a thing, just as much as you would for the brain. The fact that the mind would be immaterial is irrelevant. A thing can be an idea, an action etc. as long as it is thought of by the speaker as a separate entity. The question of whether something in particular is or isn't a separate entity is irrelevant as to the meaning of the word "thing", although this is what should determine whether the speaker should use the word "thing" to refer to this particular something. Energy is a thing to someone who thinks of it as a separate entity. Thinking of something as a separate entity is good enough for using the word "thing".

We also have enough qualifiers to make clear the many different kind of things we want to talk about: material, immaterial, physical, ethereal, abstract, ideal, etc. So the distinction you're making is contrary to usage, including by proficient speakers of English. And me who thought you wanted to insist on meaning as tied up with the way proficient speakers express themselves?! You are being inconsistent here. Your distinction is in fact not based on linguistic considerations but on your personal philosophical outlook.
EB

 

[fast]

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

Forces. What "law of nature" (old fashioned term) does not boil down to the effect of a force?

None. Every law of nature (which isn't a mind-dependent description, of course) is (or as you say, boils down to) the forces. The regularities we observe (not that observation is necessary) is a consequence of the forces (laws of nature).

 

[fast]

Laws are said to be descriptions, but that's an error. Laws are not descriptions. Laws are what the descriptions are descriptions of.

Ehhh... then we need a word for the descriptions themselves, don't we? I like "law". Boyle's law can be written on a piece of paper. It's a description. The relationship between temperature and pressure is what it's describing. Seems more parsimonious than saying the written law is describing an 'inherent' law, because then you need to keep track of which sense of the word you're using.

Oh the insanity of language! I can no more (literally) write Boyle's law on paper than I can write the moon on paper. The term, "moon" refers to the moon. The term, "Boyle's law" doesn't refer to the description, "the relationship between temperature and pressure"; rather, it refers to the relationship between temperature and pressure.

 

[fast]

If there is some thing, then there is something, but the inverse is not (directly) true, for if there is something, there is not (necessarily) some thing. For instance, a book is something, and it's some thing. Energy is something but not some thing. So, we are on the same page as to the existence of that which is immaterial.

The brain is some thing and something while although the mind is something it's not some thing. Digestion is something but not some thing.

Underlying the somethings of the world, however, are things. We can have a brain and no mind, but we can't have a mind without a brain. We can have a stomach with no digestion but no digestion can we have without a stomach. We can have that which gives rise to energy but we can't have energy without that which gives rise to it.

Underlying the somethings of the world that are not in fact things of the world do have things that underlie them.

Not arguing, just talking out loud

This isn't how the word "thing" is used in its main acceptation.

A thing is an entity but not necessarily a material one. If you think of the mind as an entity separate from the brain then you're perfectly justified in saying the mind is a thing, just as much as you would for the brain. The fact that the mind would be immaterial is irrelevant. A thing can be an idea, an action etc. as long as it is thought of by the speaker as a separate entity. The question of whether something in particular is or isn't a separate entity is irrelevant as to the meaning of the word "thing", although this is what should determine whether the speaker should use the word "thing" to refer to this particular something. Energy is a thing to someone who thinks of it as a separate entity. Thinking of something as a separate entity is good enough for using the word "thing".

We also have enough qualifiers to make clear the many different kind of things we want to talk about: material, immaterial, physical, ethereal, abstract, ideal, etc. So the distinction you're making is contrary to usage, including by proficient speakers of English. And me who thought you wanted to insist on meaning as tied up with the way proficient speakers express themselves?! You are being inconsistent here. Your distinction is in fact not based on linguistic considerations but on your personal philosophical outlook.
EB

This post I'm writing now isn't to dispute anything you've said. I agree that the mind is a thing. It's just not a thing when using the term in its most constrained way.

Take the word, "object" when used in the two-worded term, "abstract object" as a second example. The term "object" also has a scopic variance; There is no material object that is abstract, so if you hold it true that there are abstract objects (plus that), then you would deny that an abstract object is an object in the narrow more constrained way while agreeing that an abstract object is an object in the broader more encompassing way.

 

[Bomb#20]

Forces. What "law of nature" (old fashioned term) does not boil down to the effect of a force?

None. Every law of nature (which isn't a mind-dependent description, of course) is (or as you say, boils down to) the forces. The regularities we observe (not that observation is necessary) is a consequence of the forces (laws of nature).

That appears to be a philosophical opinion, not a scientific one; and philosophers' opinions about science usually sound like they're based on the latest 19th-century science. What force is quantum entanglement the effect of? You can prepare two entangled photons, let them separate hundreds of kilometers, measure the polarization of one, measure the polarization of the other a few microseconds later*, and statistically** it will look like the second photon somehow "knows" how the measurement of the first came out. But if some force pushed the first photon through one side or the other of the polarization detector, and some force propagated the fact of which way it went to the second photon, then that force propagated the information faster than the speed of light. So why should we believe every law of nature boils down to forces?

(* I.e., a few microseconds later in the Earth's reference frame.)

(* I.e., you can't show what I just said for any given photon -- any given photon might have just refracted randomly and gotten lucky. But it happens too often for luck to account for the phenomenon.)

 

[fast]

None. Every law of nature (which isn't a mind-dependent description, of course) is (or as you say, boils down to) the forces. The regularities we observe (not that observation is necessary) is a consequence of the forces (laws of nature).

That appears to be a philosophical opinion, not a scientific one; and philosophers' opinions about science usually sound like they're based on the latest 19th-century science. What force is quantum entanglement the effect of? You can prepare two entangled photons, let them separate hundreds of kilometers, measure the polarization of one, measure the polarization of the other a few microseconds later*, and statistically** it will look like the second photon somehow "knows" how the measurement of the first came out. But if some force pushed the first photon through one side or the other of the polarization detector, and some force propagated the fact of which way it went to the second photon, then that force propagated the information faster than the speed of light. So why should we believe every law of nature boils down to forces?

(* I.e., a few microseconds later in the Earth's reference frame.)

(* I.e., you can't show what I just said for any given photon -- any given photon might have just refracted randomly and gotten lucky. But it happens too often for luck to account for the phenomenon.)

Give me a few; I'll work on that.