And nobody says it does.
You are attacking a strawman.
skpeticalbip said:
...Of course you would first have to understand what gravitational waves are before it would make any sense to you sorta like an experiment that measured ocean waves wouldn’t mean anything to someone who denied the existence of the ocean...
Skepticalbip's language use here infers that someone must
first believe in the objective metaphysical reality of the ocean in order to interpret empirical data about the ocean. You see the way he has phrased this implies the metaphysical belief in the metaphysical reality of the ocean.
skpeticalbip said:
...Spacetime existed before humanity and will still exist long after humanity is gone...
Here again, he infers that space-time as we know it is not a property of human cognition but rather a metaphysical reality. Can you see the intellectual dishonesty? You can't say "yeah sure, we know the limits of science in telling us about the thing-in-itself" but then go on to take the results of empiricism to infer something about the thing-in-itself. Sure, we know that something might continue once humanity has dies out but we can't call it "space-time" as we know it.
But ok, granted, this was not
you saying that, so I take it we are on the same page then?
So the implications of this are that our scientific models are not actually the descriptions of a metaphysical reality but rather descriptions of our cognitive conception of a metaphysical reality (whatever it might be). In the same way mythology is a description of certain cognitive conceptions, our social reality, our psychological behaviours and so on. We know for example that just as "7" does not exist as a metaphysically real object in the world but is rather an "idea", a part of human cognition - we know that maths and physics are simply used as ideas to describe the cognition of the thing-in-itself. But so is the idea of "father" an archetypal "idea" that describes an object of experience (just like our cognitive space-time) in the world. From there we can continue to extrapolate - so is "the archetypal dark mother" or "the Witch of Repunzel" a description of a psycho-social (cognitive) reality.
This is fine, (pseudo) skeptics here seem to accept the idea reasonably well. They seem to agree that mythology can be a description of a cognitive "object of experience" but then say it's not the same as science, it's a description of an "idea", like Mickey Mouse and that science really tells us something about a metaphysical reality. Do you see the problem?
Maybe we need to approach this differently. Let's forget about metaphysics for the time being.
We would probably all agree that both "space-time" and "mother" are objects of experience. Right?
Of course the difference would be that we would say that there is only one space-time that is common to all human experience and there are many experiences of "mother" that may differ from individual to individual. The point is that these are
both objects of experience. We would hence expect to find a single and consistent description of space-time but many differing descriptions of "mother". In fact we actually find different descriptions of space-time within different context, at different scales and inside a black hole for example, just as we find different description of "mother" depending on the individual context. Still both are "objects of experience". Since we don't conflate our differing models of space-time with the actual object of experience we don't conflate our mythological descriptions of with the actual object of experience. It too is a "model". We say that not everyone experiences that dark archetypal all-consuming mother described by Baba Yaga, but we can say that our myth describes the all-consuming mother as an object of experience in the world in certain individual contexts. The mistake everyone is making in the theist-atheist debate is saying "Baba Yaga" does (theist) or does not (atheist) exist as a direct object of experience, but in the same way we don't mean scientifically or mathematically that "7" exists as an object of experience. Ok, yes, they can be objects of experience in the sense of "ideas" as in I can experience the "idea" of Baba Yaga or the idea of "7" but these ideas are a different order of idea, a different kind of "object of experience" from our pre-conscious cognitive intuitive conception of space-time or "mother" which are experienced as "objects in the world". So epistemologically, science and mythology are effectively on an equal footing here.
Where it becomes interesting is when we do draw in metaphysics and if we posit that philosophical idealism is true, then ideas themselves as "objects of experience" have a metaphysical reality. So we can say that the idea of "7" really does exist as a metaphysical object but then we also have to say that God or Baba Yaga really exist as metaphysical objects. But that would be a faith-based position just as metaphysical materialism is a faith-based position.