"Objective" Evidence

[untermensche]

First they condemn.

Then they wave their arms.

Then they see.

Then they say it is nothing of interest.

View attachment 16005

If you are bored feel free to go away.

You have nothing of interest to say.

You are bored because you are boring.

 

[untermensche]

You cannot tell me of any thing you know that is not an experience.

That was not the point. I've already mentioned the distinction that can be made between objective reality and our experience of it.

The distinction is something in your mind like color.

Using your logic that says if we experience something about the world that means it exists in the world is turned on it's head with the experience of color.

Color does not exist in the world.

It only exists as an experience.

What you experience does not exist in the world. There may be a table but it is not brown. So the brown table you experience does not exist anywhere but your mind.

Whether it exists in the world is unknown.

One can assume it does and that has certain consequences or one can assume it does not and that has other consequences.

But the consequences are just subjective experiences as well.

All that is really known is the experiences are happening.

The table is not known. It is assumed. It is a product of faith.

 

[Speakpigeon]

In order to have a subjective experience, there must first be something objective to subjectively experience. That is a matter of logic

Your logic maybe, not mine.

For all I know there may just be my subjective experience and nothing else, at all.

Sure I believe there's something else, something beyond my subjective experience. Still, it doesn't even need to be objective. You may all exists but if you are all p-zombies then "objective" really doesn't mean much.

Still, I believe you exist and you're not so different from me. Perhaps with a bit of a short fuse but we're all a bit different, no biggie. Still, that I believe this doesn't logically entail that I know it. Not even if what I believe happens to be true, and not even if you could say that what I believe is justified by, precisely, my subjective experience.

All I really know is my subjective experience. Therefore, for all I know, there may well be absolutely nothing beyond my subjective experience.

And that's what's logical to me. Unless you could explained where I get it wrong exactly.

Still, I guess, either way, that would make absolutely no difference as to what I experience. Well, precisely.

Calling that process a “belief” is just sophomoric dramatics and typically intended to imply a “religious” belief; i.e., one held in spite of the evidence contradicting it. That is at the heart of all of this nonsense, since we all agree that the hard problem is one of function not form.

The "hard problem" is to try and explain subjective experience in terms of a physical, or at least non-subjective, world that we all somehow believe exists. We're free to try that but there's no logical necessity in trying this idea. I think we just get carried away with the impressive success of science and thought that maybe it could be done. I fail to see what could possibly be the usefulness of that and I also doubt it could be done, but I accept I might be wrong on that.

Still, me, I expect rather, if anything at all, that our broadly common notion of the physical world would have to be fundamentally reconsidered. As it is, I don't think it could work.

And I somehow doubt that our ape brain could do the trick.

It would be too much like self-denial, sort of.
EB

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

For all I know there may just be my subjective experience and nothing else, at all.

Do you not understand the distinction between inference and "knowing"?

Sure I believe there's something else

Based on?

Still, it doesn't even need to be objective.

UM continues to hoist himself with his own petard by asserting that a brain creates both "mind" and the "presentations" for that "mind" to "experience." Do you not see how that instantiates an objective condition?

that I believe this doesn't logically entail that I know it.

And if that weren't a strawman, perhaps you'd have a point.

All I really know is my subjective experience.

Yes, that has been well established for thousands of years, because ontologically speaking, "to know" simply means "to directly experience" and since our brains use maps of the external world, all that we could ever assert is that "we" directly experience our brain's activity. That, however, has fuck-all to do with the point being made, which is that inference is not equivalent to religious belief or "faith" as UM appears to be equivocating.

Religious belief or "faith" is holding a proposition to be true in spite of the evidence that would contradict that condition. Inference is holding a proposition to be true based upon the strength of the evidence that would support that condition.

Therefore, for all I know infer, there may well be absolutely nothing something beyond my subjective experience.

Easily fixed and non-controversial and brings us current to the year 2018, rather than 1641, where UM petulantly remains.

And that's what's logical to me. Unless you could explained where I get it wrong exactly.

See above.

 

[DBT]

You cannot tell me of any thing you know that is not an experience.

That was not the point. I've already mentioned the distinction that can be made between objective reality and our experience of it.

The distinction is something in your mind like color.

I was pointing out the fact that your physical body literally and objectively cannot pass through a solid wall regardless of your experience of it. The same is true for everybody, including objects. You cannot throw a ball through a solid wall, yet your ball has no experience,

Using your logic that says if we experience something about the world that means it exists in the world is turned on it's head with the experience of color.

Color does not exist in the world.

It only exists as an experience.

What you experience does not exist in the world. There may be a table but it is not brown. So the brown table you experience does not exist anywhere but your mind.

Whether it exists in the world is unknown.

One can assume it does and that has certain consequences or one can assume it does not and that has other consequences.

But the consequences are just subjective experiences as well.

All that is really known is the experiences are happening.

The table is not known. It is assumed. It is a product of faith.

Nonsense. You talk like a Solipsist.

 

[untermensche]

The distinction is something in your mind like color.

I was pointing out the fact that your physical body literally and objectively cannot pass through a solid wall regardless of your experience of it. The same is true for everybody, including objects. You cannot throw a ball through a solid wall, yet your ball has no experience,

There is nothing literal about it.

You have some experiences. That is all. You have the experience of your body and the experience of your body encountering the experience of a wall. Experience on top of experience. Nothing else.

Except what you with your mind make out of the experience.

All you have are experiences.

You have no wall.

None that you could prove exist.

Just repeating the same lameness over and over about having some experiences of the wall is getting old. They are just experiences.

Not a wall.

The wall is something you have faith in based on subjective experiences.

 

[untermensche]

UM continues to hoist himself with his own petard by asserting that a brain creates both "mind" and the "presentations" for that "mind" to "experience." Do you not see how that instantiates an objective condition?

That is a subjective conclusion I have made from the knowledge of experience.

It is something I believe. I believe a brain is there based on the knowledge of experience.

It is not something I know.

All I know is experience.

All that I can work with are experiences.

This is all about the difference between believing and knowing.

We know experience.

We believe there are objects behind the experience.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

UM continues to hoist himself with his own petard by asserting that a brain creates both "mind" and the "presentations" for that "mind" to "experience." Do you not see how that instantiates an objective condition?

That is a subjective conclusion I have made from the knowledge of experience.

Aka, inference.

This is all about the difference between believing and knowing.

Wrong. “Knowing” (in the ontological sense, not merely colloquial) means to directly experience something, not to hold or affirm a truth value. As I think everyone itt agrees, due to the structure of our bodies and the fact that the brain is in a “vat” connected to the external via a network of sensory input devices that could be tampered with, the brain only directly experiences the electro-chemically transferred information from these sensory input devices.

In your assertions of “mind” the “mind” would likewise only directly experience the brain activity that generates it. It would not—could not—directly experience the content of the presentations, just the information contained that makes up that content. The difference is subtle, but significant, particularly as it relates to whatever point you keep trying to skate around.

In short, only the body could be said to directly experience—or know—the external world. What you have been talking about is brain activity making up a virtural representation (or “model” or “map”) of the external world based upon the information provide by the sensory input devices of the body.

Actually, the body itself is really just one big sensory input/output device, so that’s redundant.

This is all about the difference between believing (holding a truth value in spite of the evidence contradicting it) and inferring (holding a truth value based upon the strength of the evidence in support of it).

It is straightforward and non-controversial and centuries old; a wheel that was already invented that for you—for some still unstated reason—seem hell bent on trying to reinvent.

 

[untermensche]

Aka, inference.

Meaningless quibble.

It is not a necessary inference.

One does not have to conclude a table is there behind experience.

There is experienced utility in making that conclusion, having that belief. That is all.

One can choose to conclude it.

One can freely infer it with their subjective mind.

But that is a subjective act. A choice. An act of faith.

Nothing forced.

Wrong. “Knowing” (in the ontological sense, not merely colloquial) means to directly experience something

Yes, experience is knowledge. I have said that about a thousand times.

What one freely chooses with their free mind to make of that knowledge is subjective.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Do you not understand the distinction between inference and "knowing"?



Based on?

Still, it doesn't even need to be objective.

UM continues to hoist himself with his own petard by asserting that a brain creates both "mind" and the "presentations" for that "mind" to "experience." Do you not see how that instantiates an objective condition?

that I believe this doesn't logically entail that I know it.

And if that weren't a strawman, perhaps you'd have a point.

All I really know is my subjective experience.

Yes, that has been well established for thousands of years, because ontologically speaking, "to know" simply means "to directly experience" and since our brains use maps of the external world, all that we could ever assert is that "we" directly experience our brain's activity. That, however, has fuck-all to do with the point being made, which is that inference is not equivalent to religious belief or "faith" as UM appears to be equivocating.

Religious belief or "faith" is holding a proposition to be true in spite of the evidence that would contradict that condition. Inference is holding a proposition to be true based upon the strength of the evidence that would support that condition.

Therefore, for all I know infer, there may well be absolutely nothing something beyond my subjective experience.

Easily fixed and non-controversial and brings us current to the year 2018, rather than 1641, where UM petulantly remains.

And that's what's logical to me. Unless you could explained where I get it wrong exactly.

See above.

???

I haven't found any explanations in the above here.

Well, never mind.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

..ears, then tophat, disappear down the, let's call it, rabbit hole .....

inference or knowledge?

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Aka, inference.

Meaningless quibble.

All important distinction.

It is not a necessary inference.

No inference is necessary. You are confusing induction with deduction.

Wrong. “Knowing” (in the ontological sense, not merely colloquial) means to directly experience something

Yes, experience is knowledge.

WRONG. Once again, in the ontological sense, “knowing” means to directly experience. In your fallacy, the “mind” can only be said to directly experience the brain activity that creates it. It can not—and does not—directly experience the content of the “presentations” that you claim the brain creates for the “mind” to “experience.”

If you are an actor given a script wherein the character you play kills another character, you—the actor—have not directly experienced killing another human being. This, however, is exaclty what you are claiming is the case; that the “mind” is the “thing that experiences” (i.e., directly). It can not by your own assertions. Exactly like an actor, it would, at best, be reading the lines the brain wrote for it and not directly experiencing anything (other than the process or “reading” the script).

I have said that about a thousand times.

And you have been fundamentally inaccurate—based primarily on equivocation—every single time as has been pointed out to you about a thousand and one times. And it will clearly need to be pointed out to again and again and again because you are just going to continue to repeat the same fallacy over and over again.

Why?

 

[untermensche]

It is not a necessary inference.

No inference is necessary.

Yes. My point. You are not forced by anything to make it.

A person can conclude a table is there or they can conclude just the experience of the table is there.

Nobody really knows.

All we know are our experiences.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

It is not a necessary inference.

No inference is necessary.

Yes. My point.

No, your evasion.

Once again, in the ontological sense, “knowing” means to directly experience. In your fallacy, the “mind” can only be said to directly experience the brain activity that creates it. It can not—and does not—directly experience the content of the “presentations” that you claim the brain creates for the “mind” to “experience.”

If you are an actor given a script wherein the character you play kills another character, you—the actor—have not directly experienced killing another human being. This, however, is exaclty what you are claiming is the case; that the “mind” is the “thing that experiences” (i.e., directly). It can not by your own assertions. Exactly like an actor, it would, at best, be reading the lines the brain wrote for it and not directly experiencing anything (other than the process or “reading” the script).

I have said that about a thousand times.

And you have been fundamentally inaccurate—based primarily on equivocation—every single time as has been pointed out to you about a thousand and one times. And it will clearly need to be pointed out to again and again and again because you are just going to continue to repeat the same fallacy over and over again.

Why?

 

[untermensche]

Once again, in the ontological sense, “knowing” means to directly experience.

Yes. My unwavering position throughout.

In your fallacy, the “mind” can only be said to directly experience the brain activity that creates it.

No. It does not experience activity.

The mind experiences products of activity.

The mind experiences things like color. Something not found in the world. Not a property of anything in the world.

Color is not activity.

It is a finished product created by activity.

It can not—and does not—directly experience the content of the “presentations” that you claim the brain creates for the “mind” to “experience.”

The mind experiences presentations. Finished products of activity.

It experiences presentations like color.

If you are an actor given a script wherein the character you play kills another character, you—the actor—have not directly experienced killing another human being.

No.

This, however, is exaclty what you are claiming is the case; that the “mind” is the “thing that experiences” (i.e., directly).

It experiences things like color.

Fabrications, presentations, creations, finished products.

 

[fast]

It's really annoying that given all we know (and not merely believing) that actual knowledge is conflated with the possibility that we might be mistaken. It's the hallmark of extremism to push an idea into a boxed corner that virtually leaves no room. People become so fixated on the ideas they have that they contort language and the meaning of words. It seems so hopeless to make true progress.

 

[steve_bank]

It's really annoying that given all we know (and not merely believing) that actual knowledge is conflated with the possibility that we might be mistaken. It's the hallmark of extremism to push an idea into a boxed corner that virtually leaves no room. People become so fixated on the ideas they have that they contort language and the meaning of words. It seems so hopeless to make true progress.

The fact that we have been to the moon and we know disease is caused by bacteria and viruses instead of evil spitits says otherwise.

It is not that we can be mistaken, it is more that we can not know anything with absolute certainty. It was obvious the Sun went round the Earth. Now it is obviously not true. In general science created knowledge using arbitrary reference points and units. Untermenche conflates that with subjective.

 

[fast]

It's really annoying that given all we know (and not merely believing) that actual knowledge is conflated with the possibility that we might be mistaken. It's the hallmark of extremism to push an idea into a boxed corner that virtually leaves no room. People become so fixated on the ideas they have that they contort language and the meaning of words. It seems so hopeless to make true progress.

The fact that we have been to the moon and we know disease is caused by bacteria and viruses instead of evil spitits says otherwise.

It is not that we can be mistaken, it is more that we can not know anything with absolute certainty. It was obvious the Sun went round the Earth. Now it is obviously not true. In general science created knowledge using arbitrary reference points and units. Untermenche conflates that with subjective.

I agree with a lot of that. We do know things, but many who recklessly philosophize deny that. Knowledge is often confused with Cartesian certainty. That kind of certainty (not to be confused with confidence) is knowing something with the impossibility of being mistaken. It's precisely because we can be mistaken that people often claim that we don't "really know" the things I think we often do. At its core, they confuse actuality with possibility. In my view, the possibility of mistake doesn't negate knowledge. If I ACTUALLY hold a justified true belief, then save Gettier-type issues, we actually know the very thing we claim to know. If it turns out that I did not know what I thought I knew, then it was never so that I actually had a justified true belief. People think that unless we know that we know we cannot know, but I disagree, as I do not place the bar for what is knowledge such that it guarantees that we cannot err--as the central issue isn't that we cannot be mistaken ... just that we are not mistaken. And, how do we know that we are not mistaken? That should be relegated to being off topic; hence, that's an entirely different question.

 

[bilby]

We cannot know that what we think of as the real world is not just some elaborate simulation (indeed, even if what appears to be real is real, our internal model of it is a simulation anyway). But who cares? If what we know about the world is, in fact, stuff we know about the simulation, then it's still useful knowledge. After all, we only interact with the simulation. It's useful to be able to predict how it will react to what we do.

 

[fast]

We cannot know that what we think of as the real world is not just some elaborate simulation (indeed, even if what appears to be real is real, our internal model of it is a simulation anyway). But who cares? If what we know about the world is, in fact, stuff we know about the simulation, then it's still useful knowledge. After all, we only interact with the simulation. It's useful to be able to predict how it will react to what we do.

But we do know that what we think of as the real world is not just some elaborate simulation. We do in fact know this. It's not just a belief. It's something we know. It's more than a strong belief. We have justification, really good justification. There are times when we have strong justification for believing something that turns out to not be true, but this isn't one of those times. Sure, it's possible that I'm mistaken, but that doesn't matter. What matters is if I'm actually mistaken. I'm not. How do I know THAT? THAT'S another question and an irrelevant one to boot, as that would go to heart of how I know that I know, and that's not important, as that's not a necessary condition that needs to be satisfied.