fromderinside
Mazzie Daius
- Joined
- Oct 6, 2008
- Messages
- 15,945
- Basic Beliefs
- optimist
My position is that as minds all is subjective.
All we have are experiences.
Our experiences of the world and the world are not the same thing. The world has no color but our experiences do. Because our experiences are created by an evolved brain. Experiences are not the world somehow directly entering our minds.
"Objective" is a subset of subjective experience.
It is an assumption that there are 'things' in the world behind some of our experiences.
We experience ourselves standing on the planet and not falling through it. So we assume there is something behind the experience causing the experience.
When we assume there is something out there "behind" our experiences we label that 'thing', not the experience of it, as "objective".
"Objective" is a subjective assumption about things in the world related to our experiences.
We can't prove there are "objects" behind our experiences because all we have are experiences.
But there is great utility in assuming there are 'things' behind certain experiences and if we fail to make the assumption we will not survive long.
If we don't assume there is something behind our experience of the cliff we will not survive long. Evolution drives us to make that assumption.
Welcome to FDI's wheelhouse.
Psychology went through such as you propose about 150 years ago.
Rat
Wilhelm Wundt
C.S. Sherrington repeatedly quotes Wundt's research on the physiology of the reflexes in his textbook,[60] but not Wundt's neuropsychological concepts.[59]
Tat
Introspection
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/However, when we consider research on the topic, this conclusion seems less self-evident. If, for example, extensive introspection can cause people to make decisions that they later regret, then one very reasonable possibility is that the introspection caused them to 'lose touch with their feelings'. In short, empirical studies suggest that people can fail to appraise adequately (i.e. are wrong about) their own experiential
Bumpf
Other recent arguments against the accuracy of introspective judgments about conscious experience turn on citing the widespread disagreement about whether there is a “phenomenology of thinking” beyond that of imagery and emotion, about whether sensory experience as a whole is “rich” (including for example constant tactile experience of one’s feet in one’s shoes) or “thin” (limited mostly just to what is in attention at any one time), and about the nature of visual imagery experience (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007; Bayne and Spener 2010; Schwitzgebel 2011b; though see Hohwy 2011).
Irvine (2013, forthcoming) has argued that the methodological problems in this area are so severe that the term “consciousness” should be eliminated from scientific discourse as impossible to effectively operationalize or measure. Feest (2014) and Timmermans and Cleeremans (2015) similarly highlight the substantial methodological challenges using introspective reports in the science of consciousness, though without being quite as pessimistic as Irvine.
Introspection has a bad patina, it stink's of philosophy and elitism and continuous failure to actually explain anything.
Self fulfilling prophesy is the most generous I can be about such garbage when wrapped in the claimed attribute of science. Here even Gazzaniga destroys self reporting as anything other than rationalization.
The world isn't subjective else there would be only one of us. No way around that conclusion independent of material verification which is denial of the idea of introspection.
I leave you with plenty of stuff to whataba whataba whataba about.