Physicalism

[ryan]

Do properties (not concepts) exist outside of our brains?

The moon is a concept. Does the moon exist outside out brain?

Juma, the Moon is not a concept. There is a concept of the Moon.

 

[DBT]

Does the brain exist outside of or inside the brain?

More to the point: do multiple "I's" exist outside (or inside) of your "I"? At what point does something have existence as an "I" other than your "I" within your body (self)?

Depends on your definition of ''I''

 

[Juma]

How does the concept of the Moon exist only inside your brain, and yet the same concept appears in everyone else's brain as well?

easy. The same concept does not appear in everyones brains. My concept of the moon is only similar to yours, it is not the same.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Do properties (not concepts) exist outside of our brains?

The moon is a concept. Does the moon exist outside out brain?

Juma, the Moon is not a concept. There is a concept of the Moon.

And, if the Moon was a concept (why not?), then the brain presumably would have to be a concept too and then surely the concept of the Moon would have to exist outside the concept of the brain...

Outside, of course, would have to be a concept too...

So, Juma is wrong.
EB

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How does the concept of the Moon exist only inside your brain, and yet the same concept appears in everyone else's brain as well?

easy. The same concept does not appear in everyones brains. My concept of the moon is only similar to yours, it is not the same.

Yeah! Juma is right!
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

That the moon exist is beyond any doubt.

Clearly not.

We can only be talking about the Moon as we imagine it and depending on one's familiarity with science there are wildly diverging notions of, and beliefs about, the Moon.

But more fundamentally, in the vein of Descartes, for a miryad of reasons, you may well imagine the Moon without there being a Moon at all.

This is basic in philosophy and this is a philosophical forum (is it, really?) so your assumption in framing your views should start from there, meaning you should have been explicit with Ryan that the existence of the Moon should be taken as beyond doubt. This would help.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Yeah! Juma is right!
EB

So there is no stereotype upon which we can all agree represents our concept of the moon? I'm pretty partial to 'substantially the same' as good enough for reporting 'the same'. That way I don't get tossed around in salads when it comes to such as stereotypes. I call it the gnats ass theory of conceptualization.

 

[ryan]

Do properties (not concepts) exist outside of our brains?

The moon is a concept. Does the moon exist outside out brain?

Juma, the Moon is not a concept. There is a concept of the Moon.

And, if the Moon was a concept (why not?), then the brain presumably would have to be a concept too and then surely the concept of the Moon would have to exist outside the concept of the brain...

Outside, of course, would have to be a concept too...

So, Juma is wrong.
EB

How could the Moon be a concept? What object would the Moon conceptualise? We would have to redefine concept or redefine "Moon".

 

[Togo]

How does the concept of the Moon exist only inside your brain, and yet the same concept appears in everyone else's brain as well?

easy. The same concept does not appear in everyones brains. My concept of the moon is only similar to yours, it is not the same.

Do we have the same concept of 2? Is 1+1=2 true, or do we not actually have the same concept of 2 after all? Logic, maths, science all depend critically on concepts being shared between people. If you want to declare concepts to be physical objects or forces, then you need to explain how they work.

There is a reason why so many philosophers are dualists. It's not because they somehow hate science, it's because they've actually thought about the problem.

 

[Underseer]

[...]

This is basic in philosophy and this is a philosophical forum (is it, really?) so your assumption in framing your views should start from there, meaning you should have been explicit with Ryan that the existence of the Moon should be taken as beyond doubt. This would help.
EB

But we can't possibly say that the moon objectively/absolutely exists without claiming that evidence-based epistemologies can produce absolute/objective truths. Isn't that a big no-no?

 

[none]

How does the concept of the Moon exist only inside your brain, and yet the same concept appears in everyone else's brain as well?

easy. The same concept does not appear in everyones brains. My concept of the moon is only similar to yours, it is not the same.

Do we have the same concept of 2? Is 1+1=2 true, or do we not actually have the same concept of 2 after all? Logic, maths, science all depend critically on concepts being shared between people. If you want to declare concepts to be physical objects or forces, then you need to explain how they work.

There is a reason why so many philosophers are dualists. It's not because they somehow hate science, it's because they've actually thought about the problem.

brain activity, if there weren't brain activity there wouldn't be concepts.

 

[DBT]

But we can't possibly say that the moon objectively/absolutely exists without claiming that evidence-based epistemologies can produce absolute/objective truths. Isn't that a big no-no?

''Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief that is true just because of luck does not qualify as knowledge. Beliefs that are lacking justification are false more often than not. However, on occasion, such beliefs happen to be true.''

''The analysis of knowledge may be approached by asking the following question: What turns a true belief into knowledge? An uncontroversial answer to this question would be: the sort of thing that effectively prevents a belief from being true as a result of epistemic luck. Controversy begins as soon as this formula is turned into a substantive proposal. According to evidentialism, which endorses the JTB+ conception of knowledge, the combination of two things accomplishes this goal: evidentialist justification plus degettierization (a condition that prevents a true and justified belief from being "gettiered"). However, according to an alternative approach that has in the last three decades become increasingly popular, what stands in the way of epistemic luck — what turns a true belief into knowledge — is the reliability of the cognitive process that produced the belief. Consider how we acquire knowledge of our physical environment: we do so through sense experience. Sense experiential processes are, at least under normal conditions, highly reliable. There is nothing accidental about the truth of the beliefs these processes produce. Thus beliefs produced by sense experience, if true, should qualify as instances of knowledge. An analogous point could be made for other reliable cognitive processes, such as introspection, memory, and rational intuition. We might, therefore, say that what turns true belief into knowledge is the reliability of our cognitive processes.''

 

[Juma]

Yeah! Juma is right!
EB

So there is no stereotype upon which we can all agree represents our concept of the moon? I'm pretty partial to 'substantially the same' as good enough for reporting 'the same'. That way I don't get tossed around in salads when it comes to such as stereotypes. I call it the gnats ass theory of conceptualization.

But then you fall in the same ditch as Togo.

 

[Togo]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

 

[DBT]

Concepts are are a form of physical information. Information that is interpreted by a brain as being a 'concept.' Everything that exists in the universe is in some way a physical manifestation.

 

[Juma]

Do we have the same concept of 2? Is 1+1=2 true, or do we not actually have the same concept of 2 after all?[ /QUOTE]
How do you define same? I have a process going on in ny brain. That process behaves in such way that if you as me "1+1=?" I would probably answer "2". But I can be wrong and answer "3" instead or I can misunderstand the context and answer "10".

The concept of 2 is something specific to my brain but is probably similar to yours because: 1) we have similar background, 2) we are(probably) of the same species so our brainfunction is similar.

Logic, maths, science all depend critically on concepts being shared between people. If you want to declare concepts to be physical objects or forces, then you need to explain how they work.

Nah. That is the easy thing to do. Try to explain them as non-physical seems to be totally impossible.

There is a reason why so many philosophers are dualists. It's not because they somehow hate science, it's because they've actually thought about the problem.

It is because they have fundamentally misunderstood how meaning, reference and intention work. They look for objects where there are only behaviour/processes.

 

[Juma]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

Are running computer programs non-physical?

 

[ryan]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

But Togo, no side can win or lose by this argument because we don't know if the processes are identical.

 

[Juma]

Do properties (not concepts) exist outside of our brains?

The moon is a concept. Does the moon exist outside out brain?

Juma, the Moon is not a concept. There is a concept of the Moon.

Good. So I should interpret your question as "do the 'reference of the concept of a specific property' exist outside the brain"?

 

[Togo]

Do we have the same concept of 2? Is 1+1=2 true, or do we not actually have the same concept of 2 after all?

How do you define same?

Sharing an identity. That is, neither different nor separate.

I have a process going on in ny brain. That process behaves in such way that if you as me "1+1=?" I would probably answer "2". But I can be wrong and answer "3" instead or I can misunderstand the context and answer "10".

The concept of 2 is something specific to my brain but is probably similar to yours because: 1) we have similar background, 2) we are(probably) of the same species so our brainfunction is similar.

So we all have similar but not identical concepts called '2', and there is no actual 2. This has some interesting consequences, such as 1+1=2 being a contingent truth, and leading to statements such as '2+2=5 for large values of 2'. Then there's the issue of how you tell whether you are wrong that 1+1=3. There isn't a 'right' answer, because there are no right conceptions of the letters - 2 is only a label for a series of physical processes, no one of which is any more right than any other.

That isn't maths as I recognise it.

Logic, maths, science all depend critically on concepts being shared between people. If you want to declare concepts to be physical objects or forces, then you need to explain how they work.

Nah. That is the easy thing to do.

So go ahead.

There is a reason why so many philosophers are dualists. It's not because they somehow hate science, it's because they've actually thought about the problem.

It is because they have fundamentally misunderstood how meaning, reference and intention work. They look for objects where there are only behaviour/processes.

Can you give an example? Which philosophers have you studied, and what mistakes do you feel they have made?

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

Are running computer programs non-physical?

I'd say it's a physical process, why?

 

[Togo]

Either they are identical (share an identity - i.e. are the same thing) or they are not. If you just say they're close enough for all practical purposes, then you end up with a class of instances none of which can be said to be identical to the class, and concepts end up as non-physical after all.

But Togo, no side can win or lose by this argument because we don't know if the processes are identical.

We know that all the conceptions of '2' everywhere in the world are not usefully understood as one giant physical process.