Having determined that John has adequately alleged that Purdue deprived him of a liberty interest, we turn to whether he has adequately claimed that Purdue used fundamentally unfair procedures in determining his guilt. When a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, a state “may not withdraw [it] on grounds of misconduct ab-sent[] fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. Deter-mining what is fundamentally fair is always a context-specific inquiry. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978) (“[W]e have frequently emphasized that ‘[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situa-tion.’” (citation omitted)). Thus, for example, a university has much more flexibility in administering academic standards than its code of conduct. See id. (“[T]here are distinct differ-ences between decisions to suspend or dismiss a student for disciplinary purposes and similar actions taken for academic reasons which may call for hearings in connection with the former but not the latter.”). And even in the disciplinary con-text, the process due depends on a number of factors, includ-ing the severity of the consequence and the level of education. A 10-day suspension warrants fewer procedural safeguards than a longer one, Goss, 419 U.S. at 584, and universities are subject to more rigorous requirements than high schools, Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2004). John’s circumstances entitled him to relatively formal pro-cedures: he was suspended by a university rather than a high school, for sexual violence rather than academic failure, anfor an academic year rather than a few days. Yet Purdue’s pro-cess fell short of what even a high school must provide to a student facing a days-long suspension. “[D]ue process re-quires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evi-dence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. John received notice of Jane’s allegations and denied them, but Purdue did not dis-close its evidence to John. And withholding the evidence on which it relied in adjudicating his guilt was itself sufficient to render the process fundamentally unfair. See id. at 580 (“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided deter-mination of facts decisive of rights....” (quoting Joint Anti-Fas-cist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frank-furter, J., concurring))).