“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[peacegirl]

Is this a new take which people on this forum already discussed with you like, at least several years ago?

It has been ongoing, on and off, for a decade or more. The given definition of determinism is not my personal definition, just how it is defined. Where, if determinism is true, the past states of the system must necessarily set the present state of the system, which in turn sets/determines the future states of the system.

We are very similar to computer systems that have learned to take in information, compare options based on the available data, and spit out the best response based on that input.

Any information that we receive is inseparable from the system itself, as is the state of the brain/mind that acquires and processes that information.

True. The only difference between what I am presenting and the standard definition is that the past is gone. It cannot cause the present. The memory of what occurred presents conditions in the present that determine our choices or preferences, but we must give consent. Nothing is chosen without our consent so we cannot blame something or someone for what is our responsibility in an action.

The past is gone and the future is yet to happen, yet the system - if deterministic - progresses or evolves from past to present and future states of the system without deviation or realizable alternate actions.

Each and every point in the past was a present state of the system, as shall each and every point in time in all future states of the system.

But you continue to omit that humans are part of the deterministic process, and not mindless meat puppets of the big bang. Deterministically, a menu of options is generated from which humans can determine the next output in the system.

I don't.

I have said many times that the human part of a deterministic world is inseparable from it.

Being inseparable, humans are a part or aspect of the evolution or progression of the events of the system.

If it is a deterministic system, everything you see, feel, think and do is inseparable from the progression of events that is the system, where nothing is able to act independent of it. If it did, it would not be a deterministic system.

Of course, but that’s the compatibilist position you deny.

But I don't deny the compatibilist definition of determinism. Never have and never will. I agree with it. Just as I agree with your constant conjunction.

The given definition of determinism is not the issue. It never has been.

The difference between the earth moving through space and an astronaut moving through the space is that the earth does not choose to do so, but the astronaut does.

That's where you refer to the given and agreed upon definition of determinism.


Constant Conjuction
Term used by Hume to describe the relation between two events one of which invariably accompanies the other. If catching influenza is always followed by fever, these events are 'constantly conjoined'; if there is no smoke without fire, there is a constant conjunction between the production of smoke and burning........''

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I initially raised “constant conjunction” in one of the other threads to make the point that the phrase, as Hume uses it, says nothing about free will or, for that matter, determinism.

Yes you did. And the point is that there is no real disagreement on the given definition of determinism, not the compatibilist definition, not Hume's.

The issue has always been the disputed definition of free will in relation to the undisputed definition of determinism.

Maybe so, but as you can see in this thread, even though determinism itself isn't being disputed, the definition is. Remember, definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless they reflect what is actually going on IN REALITY.

“Constant conjunction” refers to the idea that when we observe over many instances event B following event A, then they are in “constant conjunction” and we infer from this observation that event A causes event B. However, we do not KNOW this — does, for example, the crowing of the rooster followed by the rise of the sun mean the rooster caused the sun to rise? — and, further, constant conjunction is undermined by Hume’s own Problem of Induction

Perhaps the truly relevant point, though, is that Hume was a compatibilist, and believed we are morally responsible for our actions, provided they are consistent with our known character and not because of some fleeting or erratic, uncharacteristic urge (such as going mad). It therefore seems perverse to invoke his thesis of “constant conjunction” in defense of HARD determinism, because he himself believed no such thing can be derived from his own thesis.

It doesn't matter that Hume was a compatibilist, the point in this instance is that the given definition of determinism is not being disputed.

The definition of determinism as it stands is being disputed by this author and makes a huge difference in how the phrase "free will" is used that is not contradictory.

The definition, as it stands, is not accurate. The past does not cause us to do anything. It just presents the conditions (in memory) that help us to decide our next move. This inaccuracy is causing big problems, as I've tried to explain.

It is the implications of the given undisputed definition of determinism that is the point of contention.

For instance, you said; ''The difference between the earth moving through space and an astronaut moving through the space is that the earth does not choose to do so, but the astronaut does.''

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

Most of the world's population don't get the option to go into space. Some have the right stuff, they are in the right place, they have the desire and the drive, they are selected for a mission from pool of qualified people, etc, etc.


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They are different because the earth has no choice moving through space, but the astronaut gets to make a choice, albeit an unfree one given that he can only move in one direction, the direction of what gives him greater satisfaction when contemplating alternatives. This has HUGE implications for our understanding and benefit.

 

[pood]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

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[pood]

It doesn't matter that Hume was a compatibilist, the point in this instance is that the given definition of determinism is not being disputed.

Yes, it IS being disputed, and that is the point. We’ve been over this again and again, too. YOUR definition of determinism is actually HARD determinism. MY definition of determinism is SOFT determinism. You don’t get to monopolize the meaning of the word “determinism.” I don’t either, so the point is to contest which definition is correct. In the end your whole argument is question-begging, because you assume what must be proved: that hard determinism is correct. You’ve incorporated your conclusion into your very first premise.

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[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

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I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

 

[pood]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

That is absolutely true. But that's not what the compatibilists are saying. They are saying that regardless of the conditions that prevail, a person who doesn't choose what they deem appropriate (i.e. without having severe issues that would allow them to be judged less severely), then they feel that person should be punished in a way that is commensurate with the crime. This is due to the fact that they believe a person could have chosen or should have chosen otherwise (made a better choice based on this "freedom” they think people have. This goes back to a bait and switch semantic. In this case, we are talking about the same conditions. Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been exactly the same (which is impossible, by the way because we can’t replicate the same conditions unless we can turn back the clock and undo what was already done which is an an impossibility, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel or not. I'm not sure where "would" enters into this at all because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why you think this version of compatibilist free will comes close to what the author is saying. To say that the astronaut was free to choose A (to travel) or B (not to travel) EQUALLY if there was no external force, does not give him a free choice at all because it doesn't consider the fact that his internal compulsion is what is driving him and what the compatibilists don’t take into account. Compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment if the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You did say let's not talk about labels, so let's not, which can lead us down a rabbit hole that will mess up the discussion.

 

[pood]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions. Now that the choice has been made, it could not have been otherwise. This is also why this law of our nature is preventative since, given different circumstances, our choices in the direction of greater satisfaction will be different. We have the ability to choose not to hurt others with a first blow given the alternative, which becomes less satisfying under new environmental conditions. It goes back to the meaning of why man's will is not free. Determinism cannot force a choice that we ourselves don't make. So, in this context, to say I would not have traveled instead of I could not have traveled, makes sense if you're arguing over the meaning of determinism (which is the elephant in the room), but it doesn't change the fact that just because we have a choice, it does not equate with having a "free' choice.

 

[pood]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

These are nuances that don't matter as long as it's understood that we have no free choice (the kind that matters in this debate) in anything we do. If we have no free choice, compatibilists can't claim that we do unless they admit that their definition is libertarianism because they believe that a person could have acted differently and are therefore deserving of blame.

 

[pood]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

These are nuances that don't matter as long as it's understood that we have no free choice (the kind that matters in this debate) in anything we do. If we have no free choice, compatibilists can't claim that we do unless they admit that their definition is libertarianism because they believe that a person could have acted differently and are therefore deserving of blame.

Well, that is your opinion. Compatibilism is not libertarianism. Libertarianism insists that each act is agent-causal. Compatibilists are fully aware of the deterministic influences on their acts. The “could have acted differently” claim is a red herring, because there is only one timeline, so the hard determinist claim that someone “could not have acted differently” automatically collapses to, “did not act differently,” which is compatibilism.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

These are nuances that don't matter as long as it's understood that we have no free choice (the kind that matters in this debate) in anything we do. If we have no free choice, compatibilists can't claim that we do unless they admit that their definition is libertarianism because they believe that a person could have acted differently and are therefore deserving of blame.

Well, that is your opinion. Compatibilism is not libertarianism. Libertarianism insists that each act is agent-causal. Compatibilists are fully aware of the deterministic influences on their acts. The “could have acted differently” claim is a red herring, because there is only one timeline, so the hard determinist claim that someone “could not have acted differently” automatically collapses to, “did not act differently,” which is compatibilism.

You are splitting hairs. They did not act differently because they could not act differently, under their particular circumstances, or they would have chosen the option to ____________ fill in the blank. It's a play on words and more importantly, what is their point? What does it change? How does their philosophy that we have no free will and free will (ouch) help society? It does nothing to change the status quo other than giving some people a pass from blame and punishment.

 

[pood]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

These are nuances that don't matter as long as it's understood that we have no free choice (the kind that matters in this debate) in anything we do. If we have no free choice, compatibilists can't claim that we do unless they admit that their definition is libertarianism because they believe that a person could have acted differently and are therefore deserving of blame.

Well, that is your opinion. Compatibilism is not libertarianism. Libertarianism insists that each act is agent-causal. Compatibilists are fully aware of the deterministic influences on their acts. The “could have acted differently” claim is a red herring, because there is only one timeline, so the hard determinist claim that someone “could not have acted differently” automatically collapses to, “did not act differently,” which is compatibilism.

You are splitting hairs. They did not act differently because they could not act differently, under their particular circumstances, or they would have chosen the option to ____________ fill in the blank. It's a play on words and more importantly, what is their point? What does it change? How does their philosophy that we have no free will and free will (ouch) help society? It does nothing to change the status quo other than giving some people a pass from blame and punishment.

I think your author’s position is essentially compatibilist, but I agree that if it is, that has no bearing on the substance of his subsequent argument.

 

[peacegirl]

Yet as determinism is defined, there are no alternate actions in any given instance that an option is realized, where the option that is taken is necessarily taken.

And, one again, you just commit the modal fallacy. Every single time you do this. As I’ve noted, necessarily true propositions are those that are true at all possible words (possible-worlds heuristic of modal logic). Contingently true propositions are those that are true at some possible worlds, false at others. “Astronaut moving through space” is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world).

.

I would add to that sentence, and in keeping with this thread: "Astronauts moving through space" is of the latter type, contingently true, hence it is, was, and always will be the case (principle of the fixity of modal status) that the astronaut could have chosen not to travel through space (possible non-actual world) ADDED: had he so desired. In a non-actual world, the only way he could have not traveled through space is if the conditions leading up to his decision were slightly different. If they were exactly the same down to the time and place, his choice, although contingent on all of his considerations, would be exactly the same in a possible non-actual world. Maybe I'm missing something.

That is pretty much it, though I would change “could” to “would” in the sentence “the only way he could have not traveled …” And that’s compatibilism, and still sounds to me very similar to what your author is saying. In a possible non-actual world where antecedents are slightly different, the person moving in the direction of greatest satisfaction would have move in a DIFFERENT direction.

Why would it be "would" not have traveled rather than "could have not traveled." We are assuming that the conditions in a non-actual world would have been the same, therefore, under the same conditions, he could not have traveled. If the conditions were in any way different, then we still don't know if he would have chosen to travel. I'm not sure where "would" enters into it because we really don't know what he would have done under a different set of circumstances. I'm also not sure why this is compatibilist free will. Saying that he was free to choose to travel or not is okay to use in that context, but the difference is that compatibilists believe in the status quo of blame and punishment IF the "free" choice that they have arbitrarily defined doesn't meet their requirements for exemption. You said let's not talk about labels, so let's not talk about compatibilist free will, which is a label.

The reason the word should be “would not have traveled” instead of “could not have traveled” is a matter of basic logic. DBT always misses this. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise. I MUST do x always means I could NOT have done otherwise. But you CAN do otherwise, provided what you do is a contingently true proposition, which it is. On the other hand, there are no possible worlds at which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married.

The choices are always contingent on circumstances. I WILL do x always means I could have done otherwise HAD WANTED TO, BUT I DIDN'T WANT TO under the conditions.

Yes. That’s compatibilism, except I would properly phrase it as, I WOULD have done otherwise, HAD I WANTED TO. And it’s perfectly OK to recast your author’s argument as, I WILL ALWAYS move in the direction of greater satisfaction, rather than I MUST ALWAYS do so. The change will not affect the substance of his arguments at all.

These are nuances that don't matter as long as it's understood that we have no free choice (the kind that matters in this debate) in anything we do. If we have no free choice, compatibilists can't claim that we do unless they admit that their definition is libertarianism because they believe that a person could have acted differently and are therefore deserving of blame.

Well, that is your opinion. Compatibilism is not libertarianism. Libertarianism insists that each act is agent-causal. Compatibilists are fully aware of the deterministic influences on their acts. The “could have acted differently” claim is a red herring, because there is only one timeline, so the hard determinist claim that someone “could not have acted differently” automatically collapses to, “did not act differently,” which is compatibilism.

You are splitting hairs. They did not act differently because they could not act differently, under their particular circumstances, or they would have chosen the option to ____________ fill in the blank. It's a play on words and more importantly, what is their point? What does it change? How does their philosophy that we have no free will and free will (ouch) help society? It does nothing to change the status quo other than giving some people a pass from blame and punishment.

I think your author’s position is essentially compatibilist, but I agree that if it is, that has no bearing on the substance of his subsequent argument.

Pood, he was 100% not a compatibilist. I do not know why you are harboring on this!

 

[pood]

Pood, he was 100% not a compatibilist. I do not know why you are harboring on this!

I think he was a compatibilist without realizing it, but it makes no difference because I don’t think any label you want to slap on his position, or not slap on it, has any relevance to the overall substance of his argument.

 

[peacegirl]

Pood, he was 100% not a compatibilist. I do not know why you are harboring on this!

I think he was a compatibilist without realizing it, but it makes no difference because I don’t think any label you want to slap on his position, or not slap on it, has any relevance to the overall substance of his argument.

It's a little unnerving that you cannot see that the phrase "I did this of my own free will" does not mean we have freedom of the will. He was not a compatibilist in any sense of the word. I'm curious, did you read anything I posted of Chapter Two and Three, or did you believe you have all you need to know in regard to his definition of determinism? It seems to me you didn't read anything. Tell me I'm wrong.

 

[pood]

Pood, he was 100% not a compatibilist. I do not know why you are harboring on this!

I think he was a compatibilist without realizing it, but it makes no difference because I don’t think any label you want to slap on his position, or not slap on it, has any relevance to the overall substance of his argument.

It's a little unnerving that you cannot see that the phrase "I did this of my own free will" does not mean we have freedom of the will. He was not a compatibilist in any sense of the word. I'm curious, did you read anything I posted of Chapter Two and Three, or did you believe you have all you need to know in regard to his definition of determinism? It seems to me you didn't read anything. Tell me I'm wrong.

I’ve read all of it already; I know what he is saying.

 

[peacegirl]

Pood, he was 100% not a compatibilist. I do not know why you are harboring on this!

I think he was a compatibilist without realizing it, but it makes no difference because I don’t think any label you want to slap on his position, or not slap on it, has any relevance to the overall substance of his argument.

It's a little unnerving that you cannot see that the phrase "I did this of my own free will" does not mean we have freedom of the will. He was not a compatibilist in any sense of the word. I'm curious, did you read anything I posted of Chapter Two and Three, or did you believe you have all you need to know in regard to his definition of determinism? It seems to me you didn't read anything. Tell me I'm wrong.

I’ve read all of it already; I know what he is saying.

 

[peacegirl]

Pood, he was 100% not a compatibilist. I do not know why you are harboring on this!

I think he was a compatibilist without realizing it, but it makes no difference because I don’t think any label you want to slap on his position, or not slap on it, has any relevance to the overall substance of his argument.

It's a little unnerving that you cannot see that the phrase "I did this of my own free will" does not mean we have freedom of the will. He was not a compatibilist in any sense of the word. I'm curious, did you read anything I posted of Chapter Two and Three, or did you believe you have all you need to know in regard to his definition of determinism? It seems to me you didn't read anything. Tell me I'm wrong.

I’ve read all of it already; I know what he is saying.

If you read all of it, do you understand the two-sided equation and why not blaming (only after other things are put in place) increases responsibility, not decreases it, like many philosophers believe? Your response could be helpful to others who are watching.