Scientism

[Togo]

What the heck? A pre-emptive drive-by attack from Juma?

We've had variations on this discussion several times.

On one side we have people who try and link all human knowledge back to the scientific method. It's possible, but you have to do some very strange things, like label all practical activity as 'science' (the 'monkey with a stick' argument), and try and rope in all logic, maths and reasoning as being science. You end up with a very wishy washy definition of science and the scientific method, that doesn't really correspond to what people mean by science, and doesn't take you anywhere useful.

On the other side we have people who try and create a distinction between scientific method, and other forms and sources of human understanding. You can argue about where the boundaries are, of course, but this is the only approach that allows you to say anything substantive about science in particular, as opposed to about human understanding in general.

What "other forms of human understanding" are you referring to.

I didn't use the phrase you've put in quotes, so I can't tell which statement you're referring to. I've used similar language at a few points, but I don't know which one you are referring to.

If you want an example of non-scientific understanding, how about one that both I and Duke Leto referred to, such as mathematics?

When you buy a hotdog for a 99cents, and pay a dollar, on what basis do you workout how much change to expect? Do you conduct an empirical study in which hotdogs in various contexts are bought for a dollar and the amount of change received back is analysed? If someone did a study that showed that in practice most people buying a 99cent hotdog with a dollar don't actually bother to get any change, does this empirical finding about the behaviour of such transactions override your theoretical understanding of the situation? Or is practical experience and observation of the real-world actions of hotdog vendors and their customers actually entirely irrelevant to your knowledge of how much change you are owed? Is your knowledge actually based on the appreciation of a priori axioms that simply override real-world observations?

 

[Juma]

What "other forms of human understanding" are you referring to.

I didn't use the phrase you've put in quotes, so I can't tell which statement you're referring to. I've used similar language at a few points, but I don't know which one you are referring to.

If you want an example of non-scientific understanding, how about one that both I and Duke Leto referred to, such as mathematics?

When you buy a hotdog for a 99cents, and pay a dollar, on what basis do you workout how much change to expect? Do you conduct an empirical study in which hotdogs in various contexts are bought for a dollar and the amount of change received back is analysed? If someone did a study that showed that in practice most people buying a 99cent hotdog with a dollar don't actually bother to get any change, does this empirical finding about the behaviour of such transactions override your theoretical understanding of the situation? Or is practical experience and observation of the real-world actions of hotdog vendors and their customers actually entirely irrelevant to your knowledge of how much change you are owed? Is your knowledge actually based on the appreciation of a priori axioms that simply override real-world observations?

This is all you got? Bitching over a quasi-citation that you infact had no problem of interpreting and then twist the dukes reference to math (which made me wonder if you even read his post). Whatever: math is part of the tools science uses. But math initself is not the way to really new information. It is just reformulation.

 

[Duke Leto]

When you buy a hotdog for a 99cents, and pay a dollar, on what basis do you workout how much change to expect? Do you conduct an empirical study in which hotdogs in various contexts are bought for a dollar and the amount of change received back is analysed? If someone did a study that showed that in practice most people buying a 99cent hotdog with a dollar don't actually bother to get any change, does this empirical finding about the behaviour of such transactions override your theoretical understanding of the situation? Or is practical experience and observation of the real-world actions of hotdog vendors and their customers actually entirely irrelevant to your knowledge of how much change you are owed? Is your knowledge actually based on the appreciation of a priori axioms that simply override real-world observations?

First, I'm saying that math, or rationality, is a fundamental part of the scientific toolkit, somewhat akin to what Susan Haack asserted in Perspicuo's quotation above.

Second, the scenario you describe above is pseudoscience because it explicitly shuts out rationality (and to a lesser extent empiricism). Demonstrating that a significant portion of the population foregoes taking change would be good evidence that denominating currency in less than 5 or 10 cent increments is a total waste of time, but it would not prove that the difference between the stated value of the proffered dollar bill and the stated price of the 99 cent hot dog was not exactly equal to 1 cent.

If you want to define science as solely laboratory experiments than that's your business, but you're going to have a bunch of irate Paleontologists and Archaeologists to fend off. (And Economists.)

 

[PyramidHead]

I think the more salient point is that nobody who accuses someone of scientism will be convinced by the reply "okay, math and rationality are fine too." The charge of scientism is only ever made by people who want to include in other forms and sources of human understanding their particular brand of woo. No math professors can be found among the choir of people accusing Dennett of scientism.

 

[Duke Leto]

Interestingly, there are actual proposals for a system where you can give a person a dollar bill for a 99 cent hot dog and be asked for the rest.

But this depends on fundamentally changing the nature of paper money. (See Miles Kimball's electronic money proposal.)

 

[Togo]

And thereby limiting "science" to just the measurers and experimenters.

Well, would you agree that people who exercise rationality, but neither measure nor experiment nor perform any kind of verification on the real world, are following the scientific method? Because that would describe philosophy, theology and poetry.

and making a reductio ad absurdum to the effect that using such a broad definition of scientific endeavors must make all human knowledge science derived, even the pre-human "experimentation" of a "monkey with a stick".

Ah.. It's not a reductio I'm afraid - it's an actual claim made on these boards by a poster who was arguing that science was the source of all knowledge. To support this theory, the definition of science was stretched (by him) to include a monkey using a stick as a tool. It's been used as a standard description of this kind of overreaching claim ever since.

For Togo's original assertion to have merit, in my view, there would have to be some academic discipline where an increase in the application of rationality, empiricism and experimentation do not result in improved results.

And I don't agree that you can include rationality in this, because rationality isn't just the basis of science, it's the basis of everything. So you're using something not unique to science, as part of science, to demonstrate the universal superiority of science. You really can't see why that's a problem?

philosophy and the humanities have some charmed circle of individual consciousness into which measurement and experimentation can not (and must not) penetrate. Being Dennett fan, I don't think much of that approach.

I'd agree that theology, poetry, and philosophy use almost no measurement or experimentation, except in special cases. Being not in agreement with Dennet, I don't have a problem with that.

First, I'm saying that math, or rationality, is a fundamental part of the scientific toolkit, somewhat akin to what Susan Haack asserted in Perspicuo's quotation above.

Sure, and I'm agreeing with you. But the fact that science absolutely requires maths and rationality for it to make sense of the world, doesn't in itself make maths and rationality part of science. It makes science dependent on rationality, just like most other disciplines. Why the special pleading for science?

 

[Duke Leto]

Conflicting definitions, impasse.

Further discussion is basically pointless.

To answer your questions about Philosophy, Theology and Poetry, I see them as examples of disciplines which could be improved by more measurement and experimentation, thus making them more scientific, although in the case of Theology it would be to realize that it's a pseudo-discipline that doesn't advance human learning in any way.

With Philosophy as it is now practiced, the way forward is to take on board the toolset of Cognitive Science and apply 3rd person observation of human behavior to the realm of speculation on conscious experience. This would result in better knowledge from Philosophy.

As to Poetry, it first has to be asked whether you consider creating poems to be creating knowledge in the same way that learning what its meter is. Even if you do admit poetry as a means of creating knowledge, you're wrong about it being devoid of experimentation. Most poets learn their craft by testing people's reactions to their writing, noting, if only subconsciously, what produces good effects and what doesn't. I don't think I know of any great poet who did all their best work in a locked room with no feedback from the outside, even if, like Beckett, they did something like that in their later years they still were learning that way in their younger years. It's not as rigorous a form of experimentation as the laboratory variety, but it is there, and is actually referred to as "experimentation". This is again making a division between the end result, the actual poems, probably not being knowledge, and the abilities required to consistently produce good poems, which probably is.

Let me try and explain what I think you are fundamentally misunderstanding about my position.

You want a rigid definition of "science" that excludes some disciplines as fundamentally unscientific to avoid fuzzy borderline cases.

I'm actively embracing the fuzziness.

I'm not actually claiming that the scientific methods are the only way to achieve knowledge, but I am saying that they are the most reliable methods, AND that any discipline whose actual object is the creation of knowledge can be improved by adopting scientific methods more than they already do. More scientifically minded Philosophers will make better Philosophy, and Artists who better understand how their mediums impact (most or many) human beings will make better Art, especially if they understand some of the science involved (see for example Musicians who understand the science of acoustics).

I'm not claiming that the first monkey who learned something from poking it with a stick was "doing science" any more than I would claim there was a first mammal. We're talking about a process where the nearer it approaches the ideal the better it works. Like, for example, a building where the final angles of intersection of walls deviate from the ideal prescribed in the blueprints, but are worse the more they deviate from that ideal.

So that brings us back to the Scientism canard. By your definition, the Humanities are nor and can not be Sciences. I say they can improve themselves by adopting more scientific methods, and it's almost always when I suggest such a course that I hear the cry of "Scientism".

 

[Togo]

I think the more salient point is that nobody who accuses someone of scientism will be convinced by the reply "okay, math and rationality are fine too." The charge of scientism is only ever made by people who want to include in other forms and sources of human understanding their particular brand of woo.

Sure they will. Because generally what they want to include is some form of rationality that isn't based on real-world observation. Theologians, for example, produce highly rational arguments. If the claim is that 'everything should be like science' then that's going to attract accusations of scientism, perhaps rightly so. If the claim is that 'everything should be like science, theology and poetry', then I'm pretty sure more poets and theologians will be ok with it. Even those that object, won't accuse you of scientism, because theology is not generally considered a science.

Conflicting definitions, impasse.

Further discussion is basically pointless.

Piffle - This is a philosophy board, and philosophy resolves conflicting definitions all the time. It's only an impasse if you're unwilling to examine the merits of your chosen definition.

To answer your questions about Philosophy, Theology and Poetry, I see them as examples of disciplines which could be improved by more measurement and experimentation, thus making them more scientific,

How would this 'improve' them? Improve in what sense? Or to put it more technically, the concept of improvement is a value judgement. What value are you proposing here, and why is it of overriding importance?

With Philosophy as it is now practiced, the way forward is to take on board the toolset of Cognitive Science and apply 3rd person observation of human behaviour to the realm of speculation on conscious experience. This would result in better knowledge from Philosophy.

Fortunately, as a Cognitive Scientist, I'm excellently placed to implement anything you might propose. So what are you proposing? Please be specific.

As to Poetry, it first has to be asked whether you consider creating poems to be creating knowledge in the same way that learning what its meter is.

I don't understand what you mean by 'creating knowledge' at all. It seems to be somehow bound up with the amassing of facts?

You want a rigid definition of "science" that excludes some disciplines as fundamentally unscientific to avoid fuzzy borderline cases.

Not quite. I want a rigid definition of science that excludes most human activity so that the conclusion we draw from any discussion of science end up being meaningful in some way. Because if you're using 'science' as a shorthand for 'rationality that we approve of' then it's a pretty meaningless distinction to draw.

I'm not actually claiming that the scientific methods are the only way to achieve knowledge, but I am saying that they are the most reliable methods, AND that any discipline whose actual object is the creation of knowledge can be improved by adopting scientific methods more than they already do. More scientifically minded Philosophers will make better Philosophy, and Artists who better understand how their mediums impact (most or many) human beings will make better Art, especially if they understand some of the science involved (see for example Musicians who understand the science of acoustics).

Can you give an example?

So that brings us back to the Scientism canard. By your definition, the Humanities are nor and can not be Sciences. I say they can improve themselves by adopting more scientific methods, and it's almost always when I suggest such a course that I hear the cry of "Scientism".

It sounds like it's an accurate label. You're treating scientific techniques as being inherently more desirable than existing practice, without knowing or caring what the existing practice is. Can you explain why adopting more scientific methods would make them better than they are now?

 

[PyramidHead]

Sure they will. Because generally what they want to include is some form of rationality that isn't based on real-world observation. Theologians, for example, produce highly rational arguments. If the claim is that 'everything should be like science' then that's going to attract accusations of scientism, perhaps rightly so. If the claim is that 'everything should be like science, theology and poetry', then I'm pretty sure more poets and theologians will be ok with it. Even those that object, won't accuse you of scientism, because theology is not generally considered a science.

The claim of people accused of scientism is not 'everything should be like science,' it's 'science is the only method that can provide us with information about the actual world.' Theology and poetry do not provide us with any information about the actual world, other than what can be learned by science alone. Poets and other artists don't mind this too much, but theologians need to preserve the illusion of talking about something that truly exists in order to be taken seriously. This is probably why, at least in my experience, a great many artists are also science enthusiasts and skeptics. They don't have a problem with music, etc. being an emotional phenomenon, rather than an emotion-neutral medium for information. It is only the combination of rationality that isn't based on real-world observation AND claiming to discover real facts about the universe that produces the cry of 'scientism' when these features are pointed out.

 

[Togo]

Sure they will. Because generally what they want to include is some form of rationality that isn't based on real-world observation.

The claim of people accused of scientism is not 'everything should be like science,' it's 'science is the only method that can provide us with information about the actual world.'

Which is why I use a definition based on the use of real-world observation, aka empiricism.

[Theology and poetry do not provide us with any information about the actual world, other than what can be learned by science alone.

Nor does maths. Or rationality. I'm agreeing with your definition, and disagreeing with Duke Letos. However, using this definition means that many of tools regarded as vital by scientists, are not defined as science, which means in turn that science itself is dependent on non-science to function. Which suggests that expecting every discipline to be more like science is actively counter-productive.

It is only the combination of rationality that isn't based on real-world observation AND claiming to discover real facts about the universe that produces the cry of 'scientism' when these features are pointed out.

I dunno, when I use the term, it's generally to describe people who are trying to evaluate everything in terms of its proximity to science, (and within science, to physics) without stopping to consider whether that measure is appropriate or useful. I suspect we operate in entirely different circles, though.

 

[Duke Leto]

It sounds like it's an accurate label. You're treating scientific techniques as being inherently more desirable than existing practice, without knowing or caring what the existing practice is. Can you explain why adopting more scientific methods would make them better than they are now?

I found the above highlighted description of my position sufficiently fucking insulting as to almost conclude that it could not be the result of honest misunderstanding, and was therefore inclined to terminate the discussion.

What, good sir, in anything I have written above caused you to come to THAT conclusion?

For the sake of simplicity, let's say that I entirely agree with another description of my position you made earlier, that Science actually is the set of all effective methods of obtaining human knowledge. Then we genuinely do have a simple difference in definition (and I've read enough of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to question your presumed right to settle a question of conflicting definitions).

Let's take up also PyramidHead's helpful tentative definition of human knowledge as "discovered real facts about the universe".

Let me also adopt the verb to scientize as a shorthand for the process by which I expect to improve a discipline by having it adhere more strongly to the ideal of rationality (math), empiricism and experiment (evidence). Let me also point out what you should know damned well, what was called "Science" in the Middle Ages and the Classical era had demonstrably less rationality, empiricism and experiment than the "Hard Sciences" of today.

Let me set out to "scientize" the worst of the Humanities by treading into the foulest swamp of post-modernist bullshit, Literary Criticism. (Please don't waste everyone's time by pointing out that wetlands have important ecological functions, it's a metaphor.) I don't want to dally around your domain of cognitive science because it's been a while since I've read my Dennett and I'm therefore afraid of getting outmaneuvered due to unfamiliarity.

I picked a wikiquote citation of Harold Bloom which is mercifully short:

"Hamlet, Kiekegaard (sic presumably wiki's error), Kafka are ironists in the wake of Jesus. All Western irony is a repetition of Jesus' enigmas/riddles, in amalgam with the ironies of Socrates."

How would I go about scientizing this? Well it actually is a pair of hypotheses, that Shakespeare, Kierkegaard and Kafka all got their particular style of irony from Jesus in the Gospels, and that all use of irony by Western authors is derived from a combination of Jesus and Socrates. (We'll leave out Crossan and Earl Doherty's contention that Jesus use of irony effectively was plagiarizing Socrates, or at least Diogenes, we're only interested in Bloom's assertion

The problem with that is that Bloom does not appear to provide any evidence for these interesting hypotheses. Now, this being a wikiquote citation, it is possible that within the book it is taken from "Jesus and Yahweh: the names divine" he actually does provide reams of evidence supporting that assertion, but to be blunt, I doubt it, and this is the sort of unsupported assertion I'm used to seeing from scholars in the Humanities.

So what would I want Bloom to have done?

Prove it!

Show me the chain of influences that leads from the first three authors back to Jesus, and show me enough examples of that same chain of influences in all other Western authors to make conclude that this generalization has merit. It's not an impossible request, I doubt any author on Earth has had their influences more minutely analyzed than Shakespeare, so in that realm at least, the fruit is low hanging. Is there something uniquely Jesusy and Socratic about the Western use of irony? Common characteristics that appear over and over again? List them. All of them. Don't whine about how this is not doable in book format, hypertext and database driven content delivery are things and have been for nearly 20 years. Give me in each case the influential parallel and if possible some discussion as to why the apparent influence can't be from some other source or sources.

Only then will you have established a compelling argument that it is a discovered fact about the real universe that all Western Irony is derived from Jesus and Socrates.

Suppose that Bloom did not mean for his statement to be taken as a discovered fact about the real universe, but meant it as an illustrative metaphor or a poetic construct. Fine, but then it is art or literature and not a rigorous critical analysis of art or literature.

Now suppose that Bloom and other Literary Critics have, by virtue of native talent or exhaustive study of the topic, developed some sort of "critical sense", which allows them to intuit the sort of relationships of influence I described above without doing the work I demanded at a conscious level? Maybe such a thing exists, but someone has to do the grunt work anyway. Even if such a critical sense did exist, it might be developed in such a way that a critic who is reliable in his intuitions about one author might be out of their depth with respect to most other authors and have no idea of it. You also would have no way of reliably differentiating people with a legitimate critical sense from people just convincingly faking it. It might even be that the methodologically rigorous sort of literary criticism I describe above assists in the development of "critical sense".

That's change one that I'd force on Literary Criticism, and I fully expect it to be denounced as Scientistic, especially by the people who have hitherto been convincingly faking critical sense.

The second change would be a demand for a form of experimentation. I would end the sole dominance of first person impressions as the means by which literature is critiqued, and add the results of asking groups of people what they thought about works of literature, and see where critical and popular senses diverge. Take the rottentomatoes.com approach of aggregation of both critical and popular impressions of various works, only make sure to do it over and over again and note any changes in critical and popular response over population and time.

There's an example of a work that used to be highly regarded that almost no one likes any more in the case of Shakespeare's "Coriolanus". The moral of which is basically that popular control of politics is always disastrous. This was a much more popular idea 200 years ago then it is today.

I'm not demanding the elimination of the first person narrative critique as evidence, I just want it to make room for 3rd person mass reviews as systematic evidence as well. You might actually improve secondary education student's reactions to Literature by noting some dissonances between what the actually get from the alleged Classics and what the curriculum says they should be getting.

In that way, Literary Criticism becomes more empiric and even a bit experimental. It is therefore in my sense more sciencey and better for the change. Instead of (just) critical navalgazing, we have something that can aspire to make general statements about how people react to works literature, actual "facts in the real universe". (You'd also teach its practitioners how to do an honest day's work, which might help the ones who get a degree but no tenure.)

If you use my definition of Science as basically the sum total of ways to get legitimate human knowledge, and use PyramidHead's definition of knowledge as real facts about the universe, then my definition of scientism as the cries of Humanities scholars asked to stop being bullshit artists has merit and utility and I stand by it.

You, (Togo) may have a valid claim if one accepts the Sciences as methodologically different from the Humanities, which I obviously don't, or even as a consistent subset of Academic disciplines with a simple set of common characteristics that can be demarcated with your tight definition of "Science", but I would contend that that idea is a fantasy. Draw any line of demarcation you care to and I'll find an irritating exception.

If we define scientism as you do as people trying to apply the methods of Physics to every discipline, as you do, you may even have a point. It'd be foolish to demand of Meteorology that it have the same precise predictive power as Two Body mechanics in General Relativity, but it'd be equally wrong to admit the Farmer's Almanac as an equally reliable source of Meteorological knowledge, which is the equivalent of what the post-modernist fucktards who cry scientism are doing.

 

[Togo]

It sounds like it's an accurate label. You're treating scientific techniques as being inherently more desirable than existing practice, without knowing or caring what the existing practice is. Can you explain why adopting more scientific methods would make them better than they are now?

I found the above highlighted description of my position sufficiently fucking insulting as to almost conclude that it could not be the result of honest misunderstanding, and was therefore inclined to terminate the discussion.

What, good sir, in anything I have written above caused you to come to THAT conclusion?

Well, that you're talking about replacing (making room for) at least some existing practice in order to import what you see as a scientific methodology. That means either that there is no value (or not much value) in the current practice, and that everyone who has ever engaged in it was essentially wasting their time, or that you've missed something. Anyone who disagrees with your stance in the Humanities, and does regard them as valuable, is thus forced to the conclusion that you either don't know why they are practiced, or you do know, but don't regard it as valuable (i.e. don't care.) It's not an attempt to disparage you, it's just the inevitable conclusion of the reasoning you're displaying.

(and I've read enough of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to question your presumed right to settle a question of conflicting definitions).

You're not distinguishing between 'presuming a right' to settle definitions, and pointing out that the mere existence of differing definitions is not in itself enough to render an argument insoluble

Prove it!

Why? Does it become less valuable if the assertion is untrue? Does a maths formula become less valuable if it describes something that doesn't correspond to the real world?

Suppose that Bloom did not mean for his statement to be taken as a discovered fact about the real universe, but meant it as an illustrative metaphor or a poetic construct. Fine, but then it is art or literature and not a rigorous critical analysis of art or literature.

Ok, so far you've argued that literary criticism is Art. There are probably quite a few literary critics who would agree with you. So what?

That's change one that I'd force on Literary Criticism, and I fully expect it to be denounced as Scientistic,

It probably would be.

However, what I asked you was to explain how making this change would make the discipline better than it is now. I can't help noticing you've not done that.

The second change would be a demand for a form of experimentation. I would end the sole dominance of first person impressions as the means by which literature is critiqued, and add the results of asking groups of people what they thought about works of literature, and see where critical and popular senses diverge.

??? You want to add popularity statistics and focus groups to literary criticism. Why?

Take the rottentomatoes.com approach of aggregation of both critical and popular impressions of various works, only make sure to do it over and over again and note any changes in critical and popular response over population and time.

So, include data on sociological change. Again, why?

There's an example of a work that used to be highly regarded that almost no one likes any more in the case of Shakespeare's "Coriolanus". The moral of which is basically that popular control of politics is always disastrous. This was a much more popular idea 200 years ago then it is today.

As with most of Shakespeare's work it's more complicated than that. The hero is obviously, blatantly flawed, but he's also in an impossible situation in which his (military) ethics are tested against the riotous populist politics of the period, and found wanting. In pursuing what his ideals tell him is the most moral course of action, he ends up fighting for his enemies, condemning those he's trying to serve, and betrayed by both sides. As you say, it's unpopular because it's out of step with the times, particularly in the US, where the limited ethical code he practices crops up in shows such as Battlestar Galactica, as a military code of honour that is redeeming in the face of intrigue suspicion and betrayal. I think Coriolanus is considerably more nuanced than that.

I'm not demanding the elimination of the first person narrative critique as evidence, I just want it to make room for 3rd person mass reviews as systematic evidence as well.

So.. more like Media studies then? Again, why?

You might actually improve secondary education student's reactions to Literature by noting some dissonances between what the actually get from the alleged Classics and what the curriculum says they should be getting.

It's very difficult to save any subject from being badly taught. The idea of a literature student being instructed that inadequate but famous authors are 'great' and therefore must be given unconditional respect is one I see over and over again in US literature, but I've never actually seen it here in Europe. Maybe you'd get a better reaction from students if you didn't tell them what their opinions should be at all?

In that way, Literary Criticism becomes more empiric and even a bit experimental. It is therefore in my sense more sciencey and better for the change. Instead of (just) critical navalgazing, we have something that can aspire to make general statements about how people react to works literature, actual "facts in the real universe".

??? Why on earth would anyone care about general statements of how people react to works of literature? Is that what you think the subject is about?

If you use my definition of Science as basically the sum total of ways to get legitimate human knowledge, and use PyramidHead's definition of knowledge as real facts about the universe, then

Rationality in general, and maths in particular, isn't real knowledge, because it doesn't deal with facts about the universe.

Instead it's a reformulation of existing ideas to make new uses of them. A bit like Literary Criticism. To insist that Literary Criticism produce stats on popularity is like insisting that mathematicians produce usage statistics for various different variations on the same formula. It misses entirely the point of the exercise.

my definition of scientism as the cries of Humanities scholars asked to stop being bullshit artists has merit and utility and I stand by it.

But despite my specifically asking for an explanation of why your approach is better, you've not actually addressed either merit or utility, let alone given a criteria for 'bullshit'. You've said not why your approach is better, you'd not said why being 'more sciency' is better, you've not said why any of the activities you've suggested would improve Literary Criticism, and you've certainly not given any reason why existing practice is bullshit.

You, (Togo) may have a valid claim if one accepts the Sciences as methodologically different from the Humanities, which I obviously don't,

I'd say that not only are they methodologically different (which is surely implied by your insistence that they should change their methodology), but that they have different aims.

If we define scientism as you do as people trying to apply the methods of Physics to every discipline, as you do, you may even have a point. It'd be foolish to demand of Meteorology that it have the same precise predictive power as Two Body mechanics in General Relativity, but it'd be equally wrong to admit the Farmer's Almanac as an equally reliable source of Meteorological knowledge, which is the equivalent of what the post-modernist fucktards who cry scientism are doing.

It's really not. You're saying that Literary Criticism doesn't produce empirically verifiable claims. You're right, but you've yet to establish that that is the proper business of Literary Criticism. As long as you keep on applying the standards of Physics to other disciplines without any thought to how appropriate they are, you're going to be vulnerable to accusations of scientism. Simply because you're replacing existing criteria with scientific criteria without even trying to establish that doing so is an improvement. You appear to be just assuming 'sciency=good'. I can't comment on people who have criticised you in the past, but I'm happy to stand by the idea that you've not produced a coherent argument for your position now.

 

[Duke Leto]

Ok, we're done here.

 

[fromderinside]

No, it isn't.

From Wiki:
Scientism is belief in the universal applicability of the scientific method and approach, and the view that empirical science constitutes the most authoritative worldview or most valuable part of human learning to the exclusion of other viewpoints.

Scientism is the science version of religious fundamentalism, not religion. It's the belief that science is all you need to know and that any other approach is inferior and irrelevent. Just like religious fundamentalism, scientism is a irrational, self-serving, and atypical. Most scientists are no more guilty of scientism than most religioius people are of fundamentalism, they know that science is good for certain kinds of problem and modelling, and not for others.

Until you began to unwrap your take on what was written in Wiki as a definition of Scientism I was thinking so "I'm a believer just not a practitioner". Practice comes in with the exclusion of something whether it be other viewpoints or practices.

I believe the scientific method is universally applicable and I believe empirical science constitutes the best worldview -full stop - My practice reflects applicability of SM and I always post results of SM as my most authoritative position statement. I remain a scientist because I do not exclude other forms of reasoning from consideration.

Why do I do that? I do that because other forms of reasoning often trigger areas I've missed where I can now approach them with the SM. Holding a firm belief does not constitute religion in my view. Even holding two contrary beliefs does not eliminate one from being a scientist. I give you John Eccles.

Obviously I reject your analysis in its entirety. I think you wrote that to justify critics as legitimate deciders of who and what is scientism.

All that remains from the Wiki definition of scientism is the dogma which I reject. IMHO scientists cannot have closed minds regardless of their beliefs. So when someone says they are closed minded about anything other than the SM they become scientism-ists and only then. Others attempting to denigrate scientists and scientific findings by calling them practitioners of scientism are just quacks, religious or otherwise.

If, on the other hand, scientists bring forward evidence that other systems are flawed or or just plain wrong they are just being asshole scientists which is a very good place to be.

To all the asshole scientists in the world bottoms up.

Addendum: When someone goes forth and tries to apply the SM to something like literary criticism maybe they should first try to relate literary criticism to some aspect of quasi scientific psychology or sociology and then iron out the problems there. Its kind of how we got from physics to chemistry to biology to, Geology, to meteorology some day soon, psychology and a bit later sociology, economics, etc. as SM reducible to physics. I believe the above are proving accurate but I still see a lot of work to be don and a lot more powerful computers required.

Beliefs are what anchor us to whatever we do. Acting as if those beliefs are all we can do is religion.

 

[Duke Leto]

Having reflected briefly on the discussion, I'm again wondering if Togo is being deliberately obtuse.

I thought I was extremely clear about what I thought was wrong with Literary Criticism.

I cited an example of a sweeping claim, presented basically without evidence, that I do not believe was true. I feel this is characteristic of the discipline and undesirable.

One assumes that if criticism is designed to help people better understand and appreciate literature, that making claims that are true is a desirable trait.

I'm frankly astounded that anyone would question that.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Having reflected briefly on the discussion, I'm again wondering if Togo is being deliberately obtuse.

I thought I was extremely clear about what I thought was wrong with Literary Criticism.

I cited an example of a sweeping claim, presented basically without evidence, that I do not believe was true. I feel this is characteristic of the discipline and undesirable.

One assumes that if criticism is designed to help people better understand and appreciate literature, that making claims that are true is a desirable trait.

I'm frankly astounded that anyone would question that.

It struck me as strange. These aren't empirical things.

I know Bloom feels the classics aren't taught enough. I don't know the context, but statements like that often are designed to provoke thought and invite debate. A reader that engages and explores that idea hopefully won't feel it a waste of time, but that's the chance you take. Myself, I wondered why Jesus/Socrates, what about irony in say Homer or the OT? Am I better off for that? I dunno, but Im no worse off for it and don't feel I wasted my time so I guess yes.

I'm trained in music. What good is SM to music composition or appreciation? How does one objectively play a passage marked "warmly"? Some things are just fuzzy.

 

[Duke Leto]

I'm trained in music. What good is SM to music composition or appreciation? How does one objectively play a passage marked "warmly"? Some things are just fuzzy.

Well, there wouldn't be a SM adaptation for musical composition or appreciation, because these two things are definitely outside of the realm of objective facts about the world. Everyone's reaction to a piece will be different, and no individual reactions are invalid per se. There's no way to contradict someone genuinely saying "I love Vanilla Ice". The best you can do is note that this is not most people's reaction to it. (Although note that it might be possible to make a strong claim that a person is lying about such a claim, if you were willing to do the work. (Check their iTunes library and count the number Vanilla Ice songs and the frequency with which they're played, that kind of thing.))

Music criticism, teaching methods, performance styles and judgments about performance talent might well benefit from being more methodological. It's possible to judge empirically that "Ice Ice, Baby" was plagiarized from "Under Pressure", so it should also be possible to trace parallels and influences of the same nature systematically. You could, in principle, compare the average effectiveness of different books for teaching people to play their instruments. You could note that some methods of holding and fingering instruments during the course of performance work better than others. I understand that auditions for orchestras are now done blind because it was demonstrated that sexist prejudice was influencing conductors' subjective appreciation of music.

As to method for how to play something that is noted "warmly", well you have one option that was not available to performers 150 years ago: you can obtain a wide variety of recordings of different artist's take on the piece where such exists, and extrapolate what works and what doesn't from the sample.

There also actually IS a degree of SM in the preparation of Pop Music, there's extensive post production market research, but there are also a lot of editing tricks like, (if I recall correctly) evening the volume of a piece to a uniform louder. The recording companies do have a pretty good track record of outputting content that will sell, but whether it creates something that most enjoy is another issue.

The absolute key to this whole thing is evidence. And the center to the kind of scientific method I'm talking about is "you use whatever you can to get evidence that works". In those cases where there genuinely can't be any evidence contradicting something, there can't be any application of method.

 

[Juma]

I'm trained in music. What good is SM to music composition or appreciation? How does one objectively play a passage marked "warmly"? Some things are just fuzzy.

What? You constantly test what you do. You probably also test it on others: the audience. It is definitely an empirical endeavour.

 

[Togo]

I feel this is characteristic of the discipline and undesirable.

And I'm asking why it is undesirable.

One assumes that if criticism is designed to help people better understand and appreciate literature, that making claims that are true is a desirable trait.

I'm frankly astounded that anyone would question that.

I am questioning that.

'True' is missing the point. The last performance I saw of 'As You Like It' had Rosalind being played by a six foot muscular black male actor. Is that what Shakespeare intended? No. Is it what audiances particularly wanted? No. Is it making an interesting point about the source material? Absolutely.

The Humanities are not about making true claims. They tend to deal with subjects that can not usefully be assigned a truth value. The reason they don't employ empirical methods is because they aren't appropriate for what they're trying to achieve.

You wouldn't demand that a mathematician restrict themselves to real numbers, on the basis that those are the only values you can observe in the real world, would you?

 

[DBT]

Musical notes envoke feelings and emotions in the listener, rock, ballads, country and western, classical, etc, in fairly predictable ways, sadness, melancholy, joy, elation, and so on, with variations in individual experience based on what the person has experienced in life and where they are psychologically in the moment that the music is playing. The same bit of music may envoke a different response in the listener depending on when it happens to be played in relation to the mood of the listener.