Scientism

[Horatio Parker]

Well, there wouldn't be a SM adaptation for musical composition or appreciation, because these two things are definitely outside of the realm of objective facts about the world. Everyone's reaction to a piece will be different, and no individual reactions are invalid per se. There's no way to contradict someone genuinely saying "I love Vanilla Ice". The best you can do is note that this is not most people's reaction to it. (Although note that it might be possible to make a strong claim that a person is lying about such a claim, if you were willing to do the work. (Check their iTunes library and count the number Vanilla Ice songs and the frequency with which they're played, that kind of thing.))

Exactly. Literature is less abstract, but the point is still valid. Mark Twain didn't think Dickens was funny. Was Twain lying or stupid? Can his view be tested?

A century ago, many musicians felt Wagner's music was virile and masculine while Mozart's was effeminate. Now, the opposite view is more common. As far as either Wagner or Mozart goes, is this important?

So Bloom feels that, in the case of irony, there's nothing new under the western sun. I think one very strong counter example from an author such as Shakespeare would be enough to refute him - for me.

Music criticism, teaching methods, performance styles and judgments about performance talent might well benefit from being more methodological. It's possible to judge empirically that "Ice Ice, Baby" was plagiarized from "Under Pressure", so it should also be possible to trace parallels and influences of the same nature systematically. You could, in principle, compare the average effectiveness of different books for teaching people to play their instruments. You could note that some methods of holding and fingering instruments during the course of performance work better than others. I understand that auditions for orchestras are now done blind because it was demonstrated that sexist prejudice was influencing conductors' subjective appreciation of music.

These things are done, but too often there are no rules, only guidelines and suggestions. Classic piano technic dictates that the elbows be level with the keyboard. Horowitz and Gould sat lower with their elbows below the keyboard. Were they wrong?

As to method for how to play something that is noted "warmly", well you have one option that was not available to performers 150 years ago: you can obtain a wide variety of recordings of different artist's take on the piece where such exists, and extrapolate what works and what doesn't from the sample.

You can hear what others think it sounds like, but how do you know? The point I'm after is that it's a feeling, an emotional connection, a light bulb going off. I have a friend who says he can't teach anyone anything. He explains or demonstrates and they either get it or they don't. Pure information is useless without that connection.

There also actually IS a degree of SM in the preparation of Pop Music, there's extensive post production market research, but there are also a lot of editing tricks like, (if I recall correctly) evening the volume of a piece to a uniform louder. The recording companies do have a pretty good track record of outputting content that will sell, but whether it creates something that most enjoy is another issue.

Yes there is a lot of impressive production technology out there, but it touches none of the most important things such as what makes something good.

And the science of marketing only indicates what others think is good. It can't make a connection. Pop music for a long time has largely consisted of attempts to find the same thing, only different.

The absolute key to this whole thing is evidence. And the center to the kind of scientific method I'm talking about is "you use whatever you can to get evidence that works". In those cases where there genuinely can't be any evidence contradicting something, there can't be any application of method.

That's the problem. Feeling is evidence. Knowing what others think is vital, but less critical than an individual understanding.

 

[Horatio Parker]

I'm trained in music. What good is SM to music composition or appreciation? How does one objectively play a passage marked "warmly"? Some things are just fuzzy.

What? You constantly test what you do. You probably also test it on others: the audience. It is definitely an empirical endeavour.

I meant empirical as objective. I may think a performance rates a 10, someone else a 5. There is no objective measure.

To me, "warmly" usually means more legato, if possible, and that the pulse be broken before the phrase; a touch of rubato, which helps to make the phrase stand out from it's context(I'm a jazz player, so my idea of pulse tends to be more rigid than a classical player's). That direction may help a student, but that they have to do the rest themselves.

 

[Duke Leto]

You wouldn't demand that a mathematician restrict themselves to real numbers, on the basis that those are the only values you can observe in the real world, would you?

Now you're deliberately equivocating. You know perfectly well that the word "real" has different meanings in those two contexts.

 

[Duke Leto]

The absolute key to this whole thing is evidence. And the center to the kind of scientific method I'm talking about is "you use whatever you can to get evidence that works". In those cases where there genuinely can't be any evidence contradicting something, there can't be any application of method.

That's the problem. Feeling is evidence. Knowing what others think is vital, but less critical than an individual understanding.

Despite Togo's continuing misrepresentation of my position, I'm not claiming that first person feeling isn't evidence. I'm claiming that systematically going about gathering other people's first person feelings is also evidence. Nobody's going to claim that one person's individual appreciation of a piece is false. (Well they might, if literally everyone else has an unpleasant reaction to it. Like say for example someone claimed to find aesthetic beauty in a forty five minute compilation recording of people scratching their nails over a chalkboard.)

But statements about the tastes of aggregates of people can have truth value.

If I said "No one likes Wagner's tedious recaps of previous operas in the later works of the Ring cycle." then that has a definite true/false value. I only have to produce one person who authentically claims to appreciate them and that statement is false.

If I said "Most people dislike Wagner's tedious recaps of previous operas in the later works of the Ring cycle." then that still has a definite true/false value. I have to show that a majority of people who are familiar with the entire Ring cycle dislike those passages.

You're not even out of the woods on "Many people dislike Wagner's tedious recaps of previous operas in the later works of the Ring cycle." because you then have to show evidence of meaningfully more than one person having that viewpoint.

Looking systematically at the differences in taste for a variety of different populations might show us patterns in taste as well. For example, I get the impression that Leonard Cohen's music is significantly more popular among musicians than it is among the general populace. (At least in the US.)

I'm only interested in holding people to truth where there's a reasonable chance of discovering truth. Despite Togo's claim to the contrary, the Humanities actually do sometimes deal with questions that can be proven True or False, and just about anyone looking at things honestly would realize that the Bloom example I cited is one of them. (You did, for example, Horatio Parker.)

Compare a parallel statement of influence that a hypothetical music critic might make. (Note that it's formally identical to the Bloom quotation.)

"Siegfried, Verdi, and Strauss are polyphonous in the tradition of the Taiwanese Amis folk singers. All Western polyphony is a repetition of Amis' folk songs, in amalgam with the multi-part harmonies of Sub-Saharan Africa."

This is not just a statement that can be proven true or false, it's demonstrably false and preposterous. The only time Amis folk singers have ever influenced European music (to the best of my knowledge) is with the Enigma single "Return to Innocence" and the assertion that 19th Century European Opera was immediately influenced by Africa is ridiculous in the extreme. It's admittedly more obviously false than Bloom's assertion because there is no conceivable way that it could be true, even in a trivial sense.

So the only possible objection is the one that Togo implied (but did not actually argue in favor of) and you suggested, which is that these sort of statements by Humanities scholars, which can be proven to be factually false, have some sort of value separate from their accuracy. You suggested that the hyperbole might inspire reflection and investigation, which might be the case, but I'd argue that actually saying things that are true also inspires reflection and investigation and saves time. You could argue that the criticism itself is an art form and therefore has aesthetic appeal, which is its only quality. OK, but show me a scholar who actually claims that their critiques should be read as literature rather than an important source of knowledge. Very few people find Aesthetic beauty in Derrida or Habermas.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Here's an interview with Bloom.

Reading it, I'm much more impressed with that quote, and very impressed by Bloom(whom I only knew from a Charlie Rose segment). He speaks of, among other things, the sea change from OT Yahweh to the Hellenistic Jesus. So that probably accounts for his dating of irony to Jesus/Socrates.

I would say, based on that little bit, that you have your work cut out for you.

You'll appreciate this:

Take up any of Harold Bloom's books on our Western religious traditions and you will find, nearly every third page, sentences that seem overstated, if not unhinged. To read him is often a hair-raising experience: the critic, one frequently tells oneself, is ranting. But on second consideration--when one rethinks Bloom's assertions in the wider context of the centuries-long unfolding of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, with all their twists and heresies and inhumanity--he usually seems vindicated.

 

[Duke Leto]

Now you're missing the point, Horatio Parker.

I picked Bloom over the tribe of Post-Structuralists because he has the advantage of comparative clarity, and I wanted to show an example of a statement that seemed unsupported that potentially could be supported.

Even so, I have my doubts give that your Bloom reviewer immediately follows that paragraph up with:

Though even Bloom's wilder formulations are often well-founded, it's not always so, and there's definitely something of the crank to him, a crankishness that comes through not so much in his ideas as in his delight in hearing himself repeat these ideas. Bloom's writing is superb, magisterial; he employs terms with the keenest subtlety (a precision often misunderstood by those who would dismiss him, as when Bible scholars scoffed at his discussion of irony in the J writer: see The Book of J). Bloom's flaw, however, is a kind of thumping redundancy. The great critic's assertions, often in the superlative, return again and again, needlessly so. Fortunately, his books are otherwise such a pleasure to read, his own personality so learned and charismatic, that one will overlook this tic of repetition.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Maybe so.

Still, it sounds Quixotic to me.

When there's an international standard for western and non-western irony, maybe then you'll have a shot. And Bloom seems to me, granted I only spent a few minutes of study, too worthy a target. Go for a loon, not a good guy.

 

[Duke Leto]

Maybe so.

Still, it sounds Quixotic to me.

I admit, it's not really in the upper echelons of my to do list.

 

[Togo]

You wouldn't demand that a mathematician restrict themselves to real numbers, on the basis that those are the only values you can observe in the real world, would you?

Now you're deliberately equivocating. You know perfectly well that the word "real" has different meanings in those two contexts.

No, I'm not. I've not presented an argument that relies upon a common definition of 'real'. The point I'm making is that mathematicians use non-real numbers (i.e. imaginary numbers), and that these numbers are not found in nature. They are not observed values, they are not tested against anything real, they are based on axiomatic assumption that fit within a framework. When you see the same approach being taken in literary criticism - floating an axiom and working out the implications, you dismiss it as naval gazing, and insist that the axiom must be proven to be true before it can be considered.

There is part of the principle problem with what you are proposing, which is that you can't give a reason for applying it beyond a sentiment in favour of statements that have a truth value. This isn't unique to you, it's a problem with positivism generally, which is why when I see a positivist-style argument, that's the first thing I look for. The reasons why that inability is a problem are many and various, and include questions such as why it is you're applying this change to literature, and not to mathematics, and why the emphasis on statements with a truth value must be applied to literature, but not to your own proposal, which notably lacks any statement as to what needs to be done and why that would be subject to any kind truth value testable against the real world.

That's the problem. Feeling is evidence. Knowing what others think is vital, but less critical than an individual understanding.

Despite Togo's continuing misrepresentation of my position, I'm not claiming that first person feeling isn't evidence.

Sorry, where have I claimed otherwise?

If I said "No one likes Wagner's tedious recaps of previous operas in the later works of the Ring cycle." then that has a definite true/false value. I only have to produce one person who authentically claims to appreciate them and that statement is false.

If I said "Most people dislike Wagner's tedious recaps of previous operas in the later works of the Ring cycle." then that still has a definite true/false value. I have to show that a majority of people who are familiar with the entire Ring cycle dislike those passages.

You're not even out of the woods on "Many people dislike Wagner's tedious recaps of previous operas in the later works of the Ring cycle." because you then have to show evidence of meaningfully more than one person having that viewpoint.

Looking systematically at the differences in taste for a variety of different populations might show us patterns in taste as well. For example, I get the impression that Leonard Cohen's music is significantly more popular among musicians than it is among the general populace. (At least in the US.).

Sure, but are people engaged in literary criticism ever going to care either way?

Granted you can measure these things, but since literary criticism isn't about telling people what they like and what they don't like, this all seems fairly tangential to the question of the qualities of the work being analysed.

I'm only interested in holding people to truth where there's a reasonable chance of discovering truth. Despite Togo's claim to the contrary, the Humanities actually do sometimes deal with questions that can be proven True or False, and just about anyone looking at things honestly would realize that the Bloom example I cited is one of them. (You did, for example, Horatio Parker.)

Sure, and sciences sometimes deal with opinions, and emotional attachment. Heck, you can even do science experiments on literature, such as investigating the role of cultural expectations in comprehension of a story. But that doesn't mean science is improved by importing literary techniques. My claim was that literary criticism is not primarily about questions that have an observable truth value, and that stands even if you can find literary critics who are find of making sweeping claims.

"Siegfried, Verdi, and Strauss are polyphonous in the tradition of the Taiwanese Amis folk singers. All Western polyphony is a repetition of Amis' folk songs, in amalgam with the multi-part harmonies of Sub-Saharan Africa."

This is not just a statement that can be proven true or false, it's demonstrably false and preposterous. The only time Amis folk singers have ever influenced European music (to the best of my knowledge) is with the Enigma single "Return to Innocence" and the assertion that 19th Century European Opera was immediately influenced by Africa is ridiculous in the extreme.

That's unfortunate. because it was a claim that arose from an early attempt to apply scientific methods to the study of music.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanticism

It was only toward the end of the 19th century that the newly emergent discipline of Musikwissenschaft (musicology)—itself a product of the historicizing proclivity of the age—attempted a more scientific periodization of music history, and a distinction between Viennese Classical and Romantic periods was proposed.

The Romantic period here is a link to the Romantic period in the arts generally, where there was an effort to get away from overly analytical art, and return to the more emotional 'roots', by seeking out inspiration from the Arab world, and the African subcontinent.

So the only possible objection is the one that Togo implied (but did not actually argue in favor of) and you suggested, which is that these sort of statements by Humanities scholars, which can be proven to be factually false, have some sort of value separate from their accuracy. You suggested that the hyperbole might inspire reflection and investigation, which might be the case, but I'd argue that actually saying things that are true also inspires reflection and investigation and saves time.

As long as the people practicing the discipline are familiar with the communicative conventions of the discipline, where's the problem? What this reminds me of is those long tracts by evangelicals trying to prove that Evolution is 'just a theory'. Granted the word theory is used, but that's not what it means in context. Similarly, Bloom may be using words that appear refer to the relative popularity of Wagner's Ring Cycle, and I can see you getting frustrated that these terms are not used with the literal precision that you are used to, but no one in literary criticism would be remotely impressed by a market research survey that tried to disprove his statement, because that's not the point, in the context of literary criticism, that Bloom is making.

 

[Duke Leto]

Which part of "the conversation is over" was I ambiguous about?

 

[Horatio Parker]

OT

It's important to understand the difference between musical inspiration and emulation or incorporation. A piece inspired by Africa doesn't have to include one note of African music.

To my knowledge, European composers didn't start incorporating non-European sounds until the late 19th century, eg Debussy and the Gamelon. I was taught that that was a characteristic of 20th century, not Romantic, technique.

Pat Metheny used Amis(I had to look that up, I hadn't heard the term) style singing on several of his recordings. Starts at 2:32.

 

[fromderinside]

The point I'm making is that mathematicians use non-real numbers (i.e. imaginary numbers), and that these numbers are not found in nature. They are not observed values, they are not tested against anything real, they are based on axiomatic assumption that fit within a framework. When you see the same approach being taken in literary criticism - floating an axiom and working out the implications, you dismiss it as naval gazing, and insist that the axiom must be proven to be true before it can be considered.

Consider  Complex Numbers I believe your use of framework to analogize the frame "imaginary numbers" with "literary criticism floating an axiom" that Bloom would make. Obviously the two logics are not parallel. Analogy fail.

 

[Togo]

Which part of "the conversation is over" was I ambiguous about?

The bit where you carried on talking about the topic, while making specific references to me by name?

 

[Togo]

The point I'm making is that mathematicians use non-real numbers (i.e. imaginary numbers), and that these numbers are not found in nature. They are not observed values, they are not tested against anything real, they are based on axiomatic assumption that fit within a framework. When you see the same approach being taken in literary criticism - floating an axiom and working out the implications, you dismiss it as naval gazing, and insist that the axiom must be proven to be true before it can be considered.

Consider  Complex Numbers I believe your use of framework to analogize the frame "imaginary numbers" with "literary criticism floating an axiom" that Bloom would make. Obviously the two logics are not parallel. Analogy fail.

Of course they're not entirely the same, or even parallel. Why would they need to be? They both, however, fall afoul of the same complaints that DL is making about Bloom - that they seen ridiculous on the face of it, and aren't backed up by observational evidence.

 

[Duke Leto]

Which part of "the conversation is over" was I ambiguous about?

The bit where you carried on talking about the topic, while making specific references to me by name?

Then let me be specific, I'm done talking to you on this. I may response to others if they ask questions that interest me, I may make reference to you, but I have no intention of engaging you directly.

You seem to be confused on the use of mathematics in your analogy, as fromderinside notes. Complex and imaginary numbers apparently do have practical applications in circuit design, although I do not have the time to look up examples at the moment. The conflation of the set of reals with reality is not quite as glaring a conceptual error as if you had suggested that mathematicians eliminate irrational numbers if they wish to stay sane, but it's exactly the same kind of intellectual dishonesty.

You also don't seem to understand that the quotation about Siegfried, Verdi and Strauss is one that I fabricated so that it is the same form as Bloom's assertion about irony but is definitely false.

The purpose was to show that Humanities scholars can and do make statements of fact that can be verified or falsified. Those are the sort of statements I would like to see subjected to some form of quality control.

 

[fromderinside]

Consider  Complex Numbers I believe your use of framework to analogize the frame "imaginary numbers" with "literary criticism floating an axiom" that Bloom would make. Obviously the two logics are not parallel. Analogy fail.

Of course they're not entirely the same, or even parallel. Why would they need to be? They both, however, fall afoul of the same complaints that DL is making about Bloom - that they seen ridiculous on the face of it, and aren't backed up by observational evidence.

Not really.

I don't think anything Bloom discussed can be used like Complex data analysis in high-resolution SSFP fMRI http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17457883

The analogy worlds are completely different, not reducible to similarity. Please how does this example run afoul of Duke Leto's complaints about Bloom?

 

[Togo]

The bit where you carried on talking about the topic, while making specific references to me by name?

Then let me be specific, I'm done talking to you on this. I may response to others if they ask questions that interest me, I may make reference to you, but I have no intention of engaging you directly.

Then why do you keep on addressing me directly in posts, talking about my arguments, and referring to me personally? If you want to stop, stop. You don't need an announcement or a fanfare. No one is forcing you, and there's no action for me in this.

However, if you keeping posting to me or about me, then you are engaging me directly, and I may well reply. Given that you filled the same post that said you were done talking with discussion of a whole list of points that we've been talking about, it seems at least you're a little conflicted here.

The conflation of the set of reals with reality

Not what I was doing, as previously addressed.

The purpose was to show that Humanities scholars can and do make statements of fact that can be verified or falsified.

Yes we agree on this. The point I was making concerned their importance to the discipline.

Those are the sort of statements I would like to see subjected to some form of quality control.

Does this desire for quality control extend to scientists who make pronouncements outside their speciality?
Does it extend to your own claims that fields such as philosophy would be improved by such? Or is this just a rule for other people?

Of course they're not entirely the same, or even parallel. Why would they need to be? They both, however, fall afoul of the same complaints that DL is making about Bloom - that they seen ridiculous on the face of it, and aren't backed up by observational evidence.

Not really.

I don't think anything Bloom discussed can be used like Complex data analysis in high-resolution SSFP fMRI http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17457883

Um..the link doesn't tell you how anything is being used. It just describes a variant on MRI and says that complex data analysis will be used. Is this is a data analysis technique using complex numbers? I'm happy to believe such exist. I'm also happy to believe that Bloom's work is read and used by others in the same or related disciplines.

The analogy worlds are completely different, not reducible to similarity.

Can you explain how? You just keep repeating that they're different, but without a reason any answer I give you is unlikely to satisfy, except by chance.

Please how does this example run afoul of Duke Leto's complaints about Bloom?

That puts me in the awkward position of having to recap DL's position at a time when he is claiming to want to disengage from conversation. He's already accusing me of deliberate misrepresentation, evasion and deceit, and intellectual dishonesty in general, a charge with which he appears to imply your support. I'd rather not rile him with a description that's he's bound to disagree with. Let me try and answer without referencing his position directly.

The problem in more general terms is as follows:
The proposal is:
1) There exists a problem X with disciplines other than science
2) The solution is introduce scientific methods into other disciplines so that their pronouncements of fact are more rigorous.

The objections to this approach include
1) There is no attempt to demonstrate that the phenomenon cited is a problem
2) There is no attempt to justify the alteration of other disciplines as an improvement

The closest we have come to criteria that might systemise the proposal into something that could be demonstrated, is a somewhat vague discussion about statements with truth values that can be established through observation. IFF (sic) that is the objection to the work of people such as Bloom, then it could equally be applied to disciplines such as mathematics, where axioms are established a priori without any reference to observation whatsoever. To illustrate this point, I pointed out that mathematics would not be improved by cutting out axiomatic work, such as the derivations of imaginary numbers, any more than Bloom's work would be improved by cutting out his own base assumptions (axioms) around the derivation of sources of influence. Does that make it clearer?

Of course that may not be the actual criteria being applied. I've spent most of this thread trying to establish what those criteria might be. It may well be that this is really only about 'bullshit statements that annoy', but then it's not very clear why it's only being applied outside the sciences, or why it's being presented on a philosophy board.

 

[Duke Leto]

The purpose was to show that Humanities scholars can and do make statements of fact that can be verified or falsified.

Yes we agree on this. The point I was making concerned their importance to the discipline.

How can stating things as fact that are wrong NOT be an important problem? I simply do not understand why I even have to defend this, and this is why I think further discussion with you is pointless.

Those are the sort of statements I would like to see subjected to some form of quality control.

Does this desire for quality control extend to scientists who make pronouncements outside their speciality?
Does it extend to your own claims that fields such as philosophy would be improved by such? Or is this just a rule for other people?

It extends to scientists who make pronouncements outside their specialty only if they try to characterize subjective opinions as objective facts OR the reasoning in their arguments is flawed. I'm not going to give String Theorists or Chicago School Economists a free reign to cut themselves off from needed external criticism simply because they have the relevant letters and their critics don't any more than I would give Post-Structuralists that right. I'll say it would behoove any outside critic to consider carefully the objections made by insiders, but at the end of the day, if the insiders are talking nonsense and the outsider can prove it with evidence, the outsider wins.

As stated above, my prescriptions for Philosophy are basically those of Dan Dennett with a liberal dash of Richard Carrier, but it has been quite some time since I read "Consciousness Explained" and I have only looked at Carrier's lecture on "is philosophy stupid?" and not his fuller philosophical works. Because of that, I don't want to go into specifics because I don't trust myself not to make a really dumb faux pas.

I targeted Literary Criticism because I consider it the least rigorous of the humanities by a pretty wide margin, and I decided to pick on Bloom because I remembered his name and it turns out he writes clearly, which is not a trait that the Post-Structuralists who I really want to see burned away with purging fire have. Bloom at least makes statements, you can't say the same about Derrida, I'd have my work cut out for me nailing him down to an actual assertion that I could then criticize as unsupported. I'll allow it is remotely possible that Bloom makes the case for his assertion in the broader context of his book, although probably not as rigorously as I would like. If I had a gold standard for that sort of work, it'd probably be E.K. Chambers.

My actual discipline of undergraduate study was History, and that's what's informing my prejudices. If I were to go back to it, and change it for the better, it would be to take on the Dennett/Dawkins concept of cultural evolution with a bit of Gould's punctuated equilibrium, insisting that there is no such thing as an essential national character beyond perhaps the mental prejudices enforced by language and no long term stasis in the essences of social structures or ideas unless the economic conditions change first. The short version of that would be "Death to all Fucking -isms!".

 

[fromderinside]

The analogy worlds are completely different, not reducible to similarity.

Can you explain how? You just keep repeating that they're different, but without a reason any answer I give you is unlikely to satisfy, except by chance.

Please how does this example run afoul of Duke Leto's complaints about Bloom?

That puts me in the awkward position of having to recap DL's position at a time when he is claiming to want to disengage from conversation. He's already accusing me of deliberate misrepresentation, evasion and deceit, and intellectual dishonesty in general, a charge with which he appears to imply your support. I'd rather not rile him with a description that's he's bound to disagree with. Let me try and answer without referencing his position directly.

The problem in more general terms is as follows:
The proposal is:
1) There exists a problem X with disciplines other than science
2) The solution is introduce scientific methods into other disciplines so that their pronouncements of fact are more rigorous.

The objections to this approach include
1) There is no attempt to demonstrate that the phenomenon cited is a problem
2) There is no attempt to justify the alteration of other disciplines as an improvement

The closest we have come to criteria that might systemise the proposal into something that could be demonstrated, is a somewhat vague discussion about statements with truth values that can be established through observation. IFF (sic) that is the objection to the work of people such as Bloom, then it could equally be applied to disciplines such as mathematics, where axioms are established a priori without any reference to observation whatsoever. To illustrate this point, I pointed out that mathematics would not be improved by cutting out axiomatic work, such as the derivations of imaginary numbers, any more than Bloom's work would be improved by cutting out his own base assumptions (axioms) around the derivation of sources of influence. Does that make it clearer?

Of course that may not be the actual criteria being applied. I've spent most of this thread trying to establish what those criteria might be. It may well be that this is really only about 'bullshit statements that annoy', but then it's not very clear why it's only being applied outside the sciences, or why it's being presented on a philosophy board.

Last first. Scientism is discussion in this thread by those interested in scientists, SM, and pseudoscience, and those of philosophical bent interested in determining connections through this discussion between science and SM and the humanities relevant to understanding compilation (I don't use knowledge or truth even here).

OK.

The first proposition is foolish since such methodologies can't be achieved any time within the foreseeable future. Also I don't think Duke Leto was asking for more rigorous pronouncement, but, for more empirically verifiable pronouncement (keeping the parallel here).

Didn't we try this sort of thing back in Positivism days? I believe the results to be catastrophic. I'm reminded of Kurt Lewin's Hodological/vector theory, or, as its now called field theory looks like its set the world of scientific sociology back about 90 years now.

Some of us consider attempts to call oneself a scientist include being empirical as well as some method toolbox. By that I mean experiments relating to physical bases connected by repeatable measures supported by some larger theory also veritably resting on a physical base.

The last two statements seem more to the point.

Why should literary criticism be tied to a scientific base and employ the SM.

While I'm convinced that ultimately other disciplines than the acknowledged sciences both with and without an overarching global theory would generate more reliable and sustainable understanding base if it could be empirically connected to basis physical theory (but not like Hull who used metrics like bollae as defining physical metrics (kinda squashes Skinner and clan, and Freud and clan too)(oh, and I'm really upset with Chomsky too)).

Those in the humanities who use the scientific method with nothing more than correlation or statistics to support their may be working as scientists without a science, or, they may just be practicing scientism.

So getting back to how humanities can become not only empirical, but scientific they need to be linked to physical law. Just the way things are.

The best hope is to keep scientists involved in humanities (see above) where they may ultimately find places on some hierarchy that ultimately connects measurably to physical law. IOW scientific study in humanities, not archaeology or anthropology or auditorium acoustics or anything like that, but, similar to Lewin with more orientation to physical, chemical, biological, neuroscience connections might get there.

 

[fromderinside]

My actual discipline of undergraduate study was History, and that's what's informing my prejudices. If I were to go back to it, and change it for the better, it would be to take on the Dennett/Dawkins concept of cultural evolution with a bit of Gould's punctuated equilibrium, insisting that there is no such thing as an essential national character beyond perhaps the mental prejudices enforced by language and no long term stasis in the essences of social structures or ideas unless the economic conditions change first. The short version of that would be "Death to all Fucking -isms!".

Yeah. Go team. Right direction. Boo hiss. Really bad inferences. Philosophical cultural evolution proposals, unsupported punctuated equilibrium. Go back and review Kurt Lewin. He was trying to connect to physics too. I'm more inclined to finding clues for history in comparative neuroscience models just as medicine is finding cheap evidence basis in rodents and monkey models.

Fellow iconoclast!