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SCOTUS to take the cake

I'm most certainly hoping that the justices aren't stupid enough to fall for this.

Any legal filing that includes text that reads: "Cake making dates back to at least 1175 B.C." can't be taken too seriously. I'm surprised they didn't cite the rainbow as a symbolic gesture of a new covenant with man in the write-up.

cert said:
In addition, Phillips argued that CADA should beread narrowly to avoid a constitutional violationbecause requiring him to create custom weddingcakes to celebrate a same-sex wedding ceremonywould violate the compelled speech doctrine and hisright to the free exercise of religion under the Firstand Fourteenth Amendments of the United StatesConstitution.
I don't see how this claim is not applicable to inter-racial couples as well.

I'm most certainly hoping that the justices aren't stupid enough to fall for this...Any legal filing that includes text that reads: "Cake making dates back to at least 1175 B.C." can't be taken too seriously. I'm surprised they didn't cite the rainbow as a symbolic gesture of a new covenant with man in the write-up.

Thanks for that vaunted analysis Higgins! It isn't too difficult to conceive of the plausible argument of why making custom cakes is an art and expressive conduct. My point, you are too easily dismissive of petitioner's argument as frivolous and their argument isn't frivolous.
James, your snide attitude is wonderful too. Baking a cake = art/expression. Selling a cake = commerce.
 
James, your snide attitude is wonderful too. Baking a cake = art/expression. Selling a cake = commerce.

Either way, it's not religious exercise. Where in the Bible does it say "Thou shalt bake cakes and sell them to the populace, except for the gays."?
 
James,
Why wouldn't the logic used in Employement Divison vs Smith apply the same fee speech ask?

Because Employment Division v. Smith didn't involve the Free Speech Clause but instead the Free Exercise of Religion Clause. The Court's jurisprudence in the two clauses is, generally, radically different from each other. And, at issue in Employment Division v. Smith was purely conduct, not expressive speech conduct, but religious conduct, which the Court held was different from a belief and the religious conduct could be burdened.

Here, we have expressive speech, expressive conduct, and a Free Speech principle that people cannot be compelled by the government to speak, which would also mean they cannot be compelled to engage in expressive speech/expressive conduct.


though reading the opinion from that case I don't see how it would be any different from the religious case. But we will see.
 
Wrong. Very wrong. The Court has never determined whether some belief or conduct was a "legitimate religious practice."

They have examined whether the person's/entity's religious beliefs are a "sincere held religious belief" by the person/entity, but they have NEVER determined whether the belief/conduct was a "legitimate religious" belief or "practice."

The court has defined what is and is not a religion.

I cannot say that my religion is smoking marijuana and legally smoke it in places where it is forbidden by law.

That is in effect defining what is legitimate practice.

There is no reason the courts can't define what is and is not legitimate religious practice.

No law should ever enshrine something that is not legitimate religious practice.

To not take it into account here is to live in a fantasy world and to abandon reason.

There is no reason the courts can't define what is and is not legitimate religious practice.

The reason is because the Court has said they cannot do so, the Court has stated the U.S. Constitution forbids them from doing so, and they have stated no court in America may do so.

No law should ever enshrine something that is not legitimate religious practice.

To not take it into account here is to live in a fantasy world and to abandon reason.

You can invoke fictional legal standards, such as "not legitimate religious practice" but this will not and does not change the fact this is not a question for the Court, any court in the U.S., to properly take into consideration or decide.

The "fantasy world" is your invocation of non-existent legal standards and declaring the Court can make a determination in an area it has specifically stated, unequivocally, the Court cannot and will do.
 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal the Court had to determine if the importation of a controlled substance constituted legitimate religious practice to decide the case.

Importing something is not a belief.

Actions can be looked at as to their legitimacy in terms of religious practice.

And how any reasonable person could conclude that being opposed to the legal rights of others could constitute a legitimate religious right is beyond belief.
 
Because Employment Division v. Smith didn't involve the Free Speech Clause but instead the Free Exercise of Religion Clause. The Court's jurisprudence in the two clauses is, generally, radically different from each other. And, at issue in Employment Division v. Smith was purely conduct, not expressive speech conduct, but religious conduct, which the Court held was different from a belief and the religious conduct could be burdened.

Here, we have expressive speech, expressive conduct, and a Free Speech principle that people cannot be compelled by the government to speak, which would also mean they cannot be compelled to engage in expressive speech/expressive conduct.


though reading the opinion from that case I don't see how it would be any different from the religious case. But we will see.

Because Employment Division v. Smith is not a free speech case and they didn't espouse a free speech test. Employment Division v. Smith was a freedom of religion claim, litigated under the free exercise of religion clause, in which the Court espoused a legal standard permitting general and neutral statutes to burden religious conduct under the free exercise clause of the 1st Amendment. Rather difficult to take a case, decided under a different clause of the 1st Amendment, and espousing a test for that specific clause, and then assert the test and rational of that case is applicable to an entirely different clause, such as the free speech clause.
 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal the Court had to determine if the importation of a controlled substance constituted legitimate religious practice to decide the case.

Importing something is not a belief.

Actions can be looked at as to their legitimacy in terms of religious practice.

And how any reasonable person could conclude that being opposed to the legal rights of others could constitute a legitimate religious right is beyond belief.

n Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal the Court had to determine if the importation of a controlled substance constituted legitimate religious practice to decide the case.

Nope. The Court never decided whether "importation of a controlled substance constituted a legitimate religious practice."
 
n Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal the Court had to determine if the importation of a controlled substance constituted legitimate religious practice to decide the case.

Nope. The Court never decided whether "importation of a controlled substance constituted a legitimate religious practice."

It has to.

It concluded the US government had failed to prove it had a compelling interest to stop the practice.

It can only be a legitimate practice if the government has no compelling interest to control it.

I assure you if I start importing some controlled substance the courts will not conclude the government cannot prove it has a compelling interest to stop me.
 
James, your snide attitude is wonderful too. Baking a cake = art/expression. Selling a cake = commerce.

Either way, it's not religious exercise. Where in the Bible does it say "Thou shalt bake cakes and sell them to the populace, except for the gays."?
According to the doc, cakes predate the Bible. So I think maybe we should be worshiping cakes. Regardless, the lawyers say this is forcing his expression to be used by people who have a different message. I wonder what people thought about his straight wedding cakes and how it advocated against gay weddings.
 
Nope. The Court never decided whether "importation of a controlled substance constituted a legitimate religious practice."

It has to.

It concluded the US government had failed to prove it had a compelling interest to stop the practice.

It can only be a legitimate practice if the government has no compelling interest to control it.

I assure you if I start importing some controlled substance the courts will not conclude the government cannot prove it has a compelling interest to stop me.

Wrong again. The case involved a claim under RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The Court did not at any time in the decision determine "importation of a controlled substance constituted a legitimate religious practice."

It concluded the US government had failed to prove it had a compelling interest to stop the practice.

It can only be a legitimate practice if the government has no compelling interest to control it.

Nope! First, "legitimacy" is not, as I have said before, something the Court determines. Second, whether the government has a "compelling interest" is unrelated to whether there is a religious belief/religious practice.

Furthermore, there is a very brief line in the opinion in which the government conceded the "sincerity" of the religious belief/practice, not its "legitimacy, but its sincerity. I previously stated, the Court and courts can inquire as to whether the religious belief/practice is a "sincerely held religious" belief/practice. In the case you cited, the government conceded the religious belief/religious conduct was "sincere," so the Court didn't even have to address whether the the religious belief/religious practice was a "sincerely" held belief/practice by the people/entity.

So, no, the Court never determined the "legitimacy" of any religious belief or practice in this decision. Ever!
 
It has to.

It concluded the US government had failed to prove it had a compelling interest to stop the practice.

It can only be a legitimate practice if the government has no compelling interest to control it.

I assure you if I start importing some controlled substance the courts will not conclude the government cannot prove it has a compelling interest to stop me.

Wrong again. The case involved a claim under RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The Court did not at any time in the decision determine "importation of a controlled substance constituted a legitimate religious practice."

It concluded the US government had failed to prove it had a compelling interest to stop the practice.

It can only be a legitimate practice if the government has no compelling interest to control it.

Nope! First, "legitimacy" is not, as I have said before, something the Court determines. Second, whether the government has a "compelling interest" is unrelated to whether there is a religious belief/religious practice.

Furthermore, there is a very brief line in the opinion in which the government conceded the "sincerity" of the religious belief/practice, not its "legitimacy, but its sincerity. I previously stated, the Court and courts can inquire as to whether the religious belief/practice is a "sincerely held religious" belief/practice. In the case you cited, the government conceded the religious belief/religious conduct was "sincere," so the Court didn't even have to address whether the the religious belief/religious practice was a "sincerely" held belief/practice by the people/entity.

So, no, the Court never determined the "legitimacy" of any religious belief or practice in this decision. Ever!

I don't accept your subjective analysis.

The case involved religious practice.

The only way the government could fail to show interest in this specific case is if the use of the drug is considered legitimate religious practice.

Again, the government would not have any such problem if I imported controlled substances. Because my use of them cannot be claimed to be legitimate religious practice.
 
Wrong again. The case involved a claim under RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The Court did not at any time in the decision determine "importation of a controlled substance constituted a legitimate religious practice."

It concluded the US government had failed to prove it had a compelling interest to stop the practice.

It can only be a legitimate practice if the government has no compelling interest to control it.

Nope! First, "legitimacy" is not, as I have said before, something the Court determines. Second, whether the government has a "compelling interest" is unrelated to whether there is a religious belief/religious practice.

Furthermore, there is a very brief line in the opinion in which the government conceded the "sincerity" of the religious belief/practice, not its "legitimacy, but its sincerity. I previously stated, the Court and courts can inquire as to whether the religious belief/practice is a "sincerely held religious" belief/practice. In the case you cited, the government conceded the religious belief/religious conduct was "sincere," so the Court didn't even have to address whether the the religious belief/religious practice was a "sincerely" held belief/practice by the people/entity.

So, no, the Court never determined the "legitimacy" of any religious belief or practice in this decision. Ever!

I don't accept your subjective analysis.

The case involved religious practice.

The only way the government could fail to show interest is if the use of the drug is considered legitimate religious practice.

Again, the government would not have any such problem if I imported controlled substances. Because my use of them cannot be claimed to be legitimate religious practice.


The only way the government could fail to show interest is if the use of the drug is considered legitimate religious practice.

Nope. There is a very brief line in the opinion in which the government conceded the "sincerity" of the religious belief/practice, not its "legitimacy, but its sincerity. I previously stated, the Court and courts can inquire as to whether the religious belief/practice is a "sincerely held religious" belief/practice. In the case you cited, the government conceded the religious belief/religious conduct was "sincere." So, the Court didn't even have to address whether the the religious belief/religious practice was a "sincerely" held belief/practice by the people/entity.

So, no, the Court never determined the "legitimacy" of any religious belief or practice in this decision. Ever!

And what you do not understand is that religious beliefs and practices, including those that you characterize as "legitimate" can be burdened by the government. The existence of a religious belief/practice, even "legitimate" as you might say, can be burdened by the government. So, your entire notion the government's "fail to show" a "compelling interest if...a legitimate religious practice" was involved is legal fiction.

As I told you previously, whether the government can show a "compelling" state interest is unrelated to whether a religious belief/religious practice is sincere, or as you might say "legitimate."

Because my use of them cannot be claimed to be legitimate religious practice.

No, it could be cause you do not have a "sincerely held" religious belief but whether your belief is "legitimate religious practice" isn't something the Court will determine.
 
I previously stated, the Court and courts can inquire as to whether the religious belief/practice is a "sincerely held religious" belief/practice.
This would be handy, I assume, in dealing with the prison ministry that insists that porterhouse steaks are part of their communion?

Can't decide if it's any more or less legitimate than wine or grape juice communion, but can decide that the people may be joining the Church of the New Song for less than sincere reasons.
 
I previously stated, the Court and courts can inquire as to whether the religious belief/practice is a "sincerely held religious" belief/practice.
This would be handy, I assume, in dealing with the prison ministry that insists that porterhouse steaks are part of their communion?

Can't decide if it's any more or less legitimate than wine or grape juice communion, but can decide that the people may be joining the Church of the New Song for less than sincere reasons.

Sort of...it would look more like the following example.

1. Person X is drafted to fight in Vietnam
2. Person X asserts his religious beliefs, which are in part formed by Assemblies of God organization, in which he is a member of an Assemblies of God Church, prohibit him from killing anyone
3. Person X also asserts his religious beliefs preclude him from even serving in a non-combat role in the military because serving non-combat, during a time of war, is to facilitate the war effort, i.e. facilitate killing the enemy.

So, the Court begins to discover Person X has never officially been a member of any Assemblies of God Church, is not known to frequently visit those churches, and has never previously expressed or professed to anyone on this planet his belief to kill someone in combat, as a member of the military, is sinful, wrong, immoral, and/or against his religious dictates and beliefs.

This would appear, to the Court, to be a religious belief Person X has only recently and conveniently adopted for the express purpose of avoiding the draft. In other words, this is not a "sincerely held religious belief" of Person X.
 
No, it could be cause you do not have a "sincerely held" religious belief but whether your belief is "legitimate religious practice" isn't something the Court will determine.

This hiding behind "sincerity" is just a way to pick and choose which practices are considered legitimate.

Why should we honor a sincerely held delusion that causes harm?

Fuck the law for one second. What about a sane society? Do lawyers ever have an opinion on that?
 
Either way, it's not religious exercise. Where in the Bible does it say "Thou shalt bake cakes and sell them to the populace, except for the gays."?
According to the doc, cakes predate the Bible.

Well then, it would seem to be quite the oversight not to have mentioned them in the Ten Commandments, eh?
 
No, it could be cause you do not have a "sincerely held" religious belief but whether your belief is "legitimate religious practice" isn't something the Court will determine.

This hiding behind "sincerity" is just a way to pick and choose which practices are considered legitimate.

Lol! There ya go, double down on your error. The mechanics and scrutiny for assessing whether some religious belief/conduct is "sincerely held" by someone is different than determine whether the belief/conduct is "legitimate."

A perfect illustration is my example to KC&Co in my most recent post preceding this reply. There whether assessing whether the religious belief was detached from determining whether the belief was "legitimately" religious.

But if you find comfort in equating the "sincerely held" religious belief test to be your ill-conceived "legitimately" religious notion, and perceive yourself as being right along, then proceed.

I will not be an impediment to your effort to rectify your error and futilely show you were right along, except to say you're still wrong. Does that qualify as an impediment?


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This hiding behind "sincerity" is just a way to pick and choose which practices are considered legitimate.

Lol! There ya go, double down on your error. The mechanics and scrutiny for assessing whether some religious belief/conduct is "sincerely held" by someone is different than determine whether the belief/conduct is "legitimate."

A perfect illustration is my example to KC&Co in my most recent post preceding this reply. There whether assessing whether the religious belief was detached from determining whether the belief was "legitimately" religious.

But if you find comfort in equating the "sincerely held" religious belief test to be your ill-conceived "legitimately" religious notion, and perceive yourself as being right along, then proceed.

I will not be an impediment to your effort to rectify your error and futilely show you were right along, except to say you're still wrong. Does that qualify as an impediment?


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Bullshit!

The process is arbitrary.

Lets get real. There are a lot of bigots that don't think homosexuals should have the right to get married.

That is the ONLY reason this absurd claim that opposing the legal rights of others constitutes a legitimate religious practice.

In a sane society the thing would have been laughed out of the lowest court.
 
Lol! There ya go, double down on your error. The mechanics and scrutiny for assessing whether some religious belief/conduct is "sincerely held" by someone is different than determine whether the belief/conduct is "legitimate."

A perfect illustration is my example to KC&Co in my most recent post preceding this reply. There whether assessing whether the religious belief was detached from determining whether the belief was "legitimately" religious.

But if you find comfort in equating the "sincerely held" religious belief test to be your ill-conceived "legitimately" religious notion, and perceive yourself as being right along, then proceed.

I will not be an impediment to your effort to rectify your error and futilely show you were right along, except to say you're still wrong. Does that qualify as an impediment?


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Bullshit!

The process is arbitrary.

Lets get real. There are a lot of bigots that don't think homosexuals should have the right to get married.

That is the ONLY reason this absurd claim that opposing the legal rights of others constitutes a legitimate religious practice.

In a sane society the thing would have been laughed out of the lowest court.

Stunning, vacuous analysis!


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