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Should we be responsible for the decisions others make?

fast

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I’ve been all scattered about trying to make heads or tails of two kinds of cause. The first kind is physics related. If I forcefully throw a fragile wine glass down onto hard concrete and the glass breaks, I accept that I have caused the glass to break. Granted, there’s a myriad of things going on, how forceful, how fragile, and how hard the respective things are is relevant to the final outcome, but the main point is to characterize this scenario as a cause of the first kind.

Now, you see me break that favorite glass of yours, and you decide to throw your dinner plate at me. You miss and it hits the person behind me. She gets shitten and throws her chair at you and your finger gets broke.

It’s my general view that each person is responsible for the consequences of their subsequent actions up to the point there is an intermediary mind-bearing agent who is capable of processing a decision. So, in the scenario above, my responsibility is limited. Where does the buck stop? Right up to where you are making a decision.

Now, I’ve come up with a lot of scenarios, and I realize this view screams to throw exceptions my way, but like I said, it’s a general view, and as the saying goes, it’s the exceptions that prove the rule.

I’m flip flopping back and forth in my head thinking about responsibility on the one hand and the two kinds of cause on the other. Oh, the second cause (decision related) is where there is an intermediate decision maker. In the first sense, I did not cause you to throw the plate, but if you said I did, it lacks the physics present in the first.

For example, an official with the authority to alter the interstate speed limit decides to increase the speed limits to 100 MPH. All other traffic laws, however, remain unchanged, so things like the prohibition of following too closely remain in effect. Let’s say accidents and fatalities subsequently and immediately shoot up like nobody’s business.

We know what people are going to say. The official caused it, but because there are drivers making bad decisions, I would deny that the official is the cause in the first sense while it may be so that he is the cause in the second.

If an officer shoots an unarmed and non-threatening black man and that triggers riots, is the officer responsible for the destruction caused by the protesters? If a cop chases a speeding car and the cop gets into an accident, the responsibility may be bestowed upon the speeder, but if he also caused the accident, it’s limited only to the second kind if the speeder played no part in the physics of the crash.
 
I do not think intelligent agents are beyond physics, so it's all physics related. But generally, I would say the morality of a behavior depends only on features of the mind of the agent who carries it out (it's debatable whether diachronically or synchronically, but that's another matter). This includes what the agent knew, but not what other agents do.

fast said:
If I forcefully throw a fragile wine glass down onto hard concrete and the glass breaks, I accept that I have caused the glass to break.
Suppose the glass quantum-tunnels through the concrete and falls into a pool full of water. It does not break. Then, the morality of your behavior is just the same. It does not matter whether it actually breaks or not, even though that may be relevant to other people, who might or might not decide to take punitive action depending on whether the result negatively affects them.

fast said:
If an officer shoots an unarmed and non-threatening black man and that triggers riots, is the officer responsible for the destruction caused by the protesters?
The morality of the behavior of the officer does not depend on whether there are riots. But then again, the morality of the behavior of the officer also (given same state of mind of the officer) does not depend on whether the unarmed and non-threatening Black man is killed by the bullet, or (say) the bullet hits a steel plate in his pocket and causes only a small injury. The morality of his behavior only depends on factors such as his intent, the information available to him, his beliefs (not the same, as he might assess the information irrationally), and generally, some facts about his mind.
 
The flip side is should others be responsible for the decions I make?

If I go off in the wilderness and get lost should tax dollars be used to find me?

If you smoke odds are otters will pay higher insurance premiums when you get sick from it.
 
Suppose the glass quantum-tunnels through the concrete and falls into a pool full of water.
Then i’ll accept that I caused the glass to fall into a pool of water. I’ll accept all blame for each and every micro event that subsequently occurs as a physical result of what I set in motion. But, there’s a limit. Inject a person into the equation that makes a subsequent decision supposedly because I did what I did, then I draw the line.

I want to be responsible for everything I do. I accept the consequences for what I have done. If I throw a bat that hits a chair that quantum tunnels to DisneyLand and pops out and knocks someone over, then oops, it’s all my bad—and I’m sorry. But, if that person decides to throw rocks through windows because he’s fed up and frustrated with all the quantum tunneling going around, then even though it may be the case that he would not have thrown rocks had I not initially threw the bat, I refuse to say that I caused him to throw rocks; however, if one refuses to accept my position that I am the cause, then fine, but know that that cause is not born of the same cloth as the other cause.

My idea of cause doesn’t permeate through a decision. If I push you and you fall, I caused you to fall, and when you get up and push me back and I fall, anyone can say I got what was coming or that I deserved it, but I only take responsibility for my decision and everything that happened next but not anything that followed your decision. My responsibility ended at your fall. That’s all I caused. I didn’t cause you to push me. When YOU made the decision to retaliate, it’s then on you. I didn’t cause you to retaliate; that’s a function of your decision. I caused you to fall.

Suppose I try (but fail) to incite a riot. Blame me for all that I did.
Suppose I try (and succeed) in inciting a riot. Blame me for all that I did.
But, blame me no different for the latter than the first since all harm that came originated from the rioters. They could have made a choice, and they did, and it’s their choice that ultimately caused the actual harm.

You can argue that I am originally the blame, but that intermediary bunch of decision makers acted as they didn’t have to.

I can pinch a hundred girls on their butts, and 40 might slap me, but there’s nothing in the pinches that determine which ones will and which ones won’t. Did I cause their decision? No, not physically, but yes, what I did is the reason they did, so in one way, no (not a function of any laws of physics), but in one way yes (a completely different kind of cause).

“Cause” and “cause.” Same word but two very different animals.
 
The flip side is should others be responsible for the decions I make?


If I go off in the wilderness and get lost should tax dollars be used to find me?

If you smoke odds are otters will pay higher insurance premiums when you get sick from it.
If laws are passed, I blame the law makers.
If you get lost, and there’s no foul play (tricked with a bad map), I say you are the cause for what you cause.
If people obey some law that says to look for you, you neither caused the law nor the search party.
 
The flip side is should others be responsible for the decions I make?


If I go off in the wilderness and get lost should tax dollars be used to find me?

If you smoke odds are otters will pay higher insurance premiums when you get sick from it.
If laws are passed, I blame the law makers.
If you get lost, and there’s no foul play (tricked with a bad map), I say you are the cause for what you cause.
If people obey some law that says to look for you, you neither caused the law nor the search party.

So if I find you along a trail with a broken leg because you made a stupid mistake, then tough shit. Not my problem.
 
So if I find you along a trail with a broken leg because you made a stupid mistake, then tough shit. Not my problem.

No. What she did is on her. That you came upon her after she broke her leg is your challenge. You are responsible for making the effort to recover her from the condition she's in. You have the opportunity to prevent more harm which is just another way of saying do no harm.

Still think I'm one with whom you'd share drinks?

I've been known to be a bit preachy.
 
The flip side is should others be responsible for the decions I make?


If I go off in the wilderness and get lost should tax dollars be used to find me?

If you smoke odds are otters will pay higher insurance premiums when you get sick from it.
If laws are passed, I blame the law makers.
If you get lost, and there’s no foul play (tricked with a bad map), I say you are the cause for what you cause.
If people obey some law that says to look for you, you neither caused the law nor the search party.

So if I find you along a trail with a broken leg because you made a stupid mistake, then tough shit. Not my problem.
If I find you along a trail with a broken leg because you made a stupid mistake, I can, would, and should assist in helping you. I can because i’m able, I would because I’m willing, and I should because it’s the right thing to do.

If I walk into a room where there are two children and see crayon markings on the wall where there were no such markings before and say “who’s responsible for this (?),” would the answer really be all that different than if I had asked, “who did this?” I’m not trying to invoke some sense of moral obligation.

You find me along a trail with a broken leg. Why would I think you were responsible for my predicament? Of course that’s not what you meant to suggest. You find me along a trail with a broken leg because I made a stupid mistake. So, if I didn’t make a stupid mistake, you wouldn’t have found me? That too is not what you meant. I can twist things and make it out as if you meant one thing when you really didn’t. Let me tell you what I meant. When you came along and found me with a broken leg because of a stupid mistake I made, another person came along just as you were standing over me with what appeared to be a sadistic glee. “What have you done (?!) the person exclaims in interrogatory tone. I come to your defense.

I say that YOU didn’t cause this. You are not the one responsible for the predicament I am in. No blame should go to you for the position I got myself in.

However, let’s say (just for the sake of argument) that you did in fact just so happen to come across me on that treacherous trail where I (and I alone) made a mistake and broke my leg. You notice me, look over, grasp the severity of the situation, and walk off to your favorite fishing hole. If I later say you caused the accident, that would be a lie. If I said you were responsible (!), that wouldn’t be true. Fact is, so I think, you didn’t in fact even have a responsibility to help. You had no legal duty to help (because of no involvement). A moral obligation? Maybe, recall I said I should help.

At any rate, the distinction screaming out is between having a responsibility to help vs you being responsible. You were never responsible for my situation even if you have a responsibility to help. I hope that clears things up a bit.
 
So if I find you along a trail with a broken leg because you made a stupid mistake, then tough shit. Not my problem.

No. What she did is on her. That you came upon her after she broke her leg is your challenge. You are responsible for making the effort to recover her from the condition she's in. You have the opportunity to prevent more harm which is just another way of saying do no harm.

Still think I'm one with whom you'd share drinks?

I've been known to be a bit preachy.
Is that what you think I think?

A little girl is sitting in class minding her own business. A little boy behind her tugs on one of her pig tails. She turns around and slaps the shit out of him. The teacher turns to see what the slap sound is as she witnesses the boy dropping to the floor. “What happened?,” with a look of astonishment.

The girl says, “he made me do it!”

I object to that answer. While I do agree that what he did plays a part in the reason for why she did what she did, there was nothing about what he did that forced her to make the decision she did.

Again, there is reason on the one hand. There was a reason for doing what she did. Maybe not a good reason. Maybe not a justifiable reason. But in stating why when asked to answer what, she answers why she did what she did. She gives an explanation, a reason, and answers why she knocked the hell out of him.

“He made me do it”
That’s up the same alley as
“He caused me to do it.”

Did he? Did he cause her to hit him? The answer will tell me what sense or conception of “cause” you’re basing your answer to me on. If you say “no”, then like me, you understand that she should be held responsible for slapping him—because she’s the one who slapped him, not him! If you say, “yes,” then like me, you understand the excuse she’s giving for her actions. That’s regardless of our take on whether the reason was justified or not.
 
Social responsibility. Helping someone who is injured means that if you find yourself in that position that you are helped in turn regardless of fault. A kind of social no blame insurance policy, aid where aid is required no matter what the morality or ethical issues happen to be.
 
Social responsibility. Helping someone who is injured means that if you find yourself in that position that you are helped in turn regardless of fault. A kind of social no blame insurance policy, aid where aid is required no matter what the morality or ethical issues happen to be.
I think ambiguity has reared its head again. Suppose I do have a responsibility to help, that responsibility is of a different kind. If people see me do something such that it’s obvious I did it and shouldn’t have, there’s no wonder people will say that I am the cause, to blame, at fault, and responsible for what happened. That’s a use of “responsible” that has a different meaning. Saying I have a responsibility to help isn’t to say I was responsible for the situation.
 
fast said:
Angra Mainyu said:
Suppose the glass quantum-tunnels through the concrete and falls into a pool full of water.
Then i’ll accept that I caused the glass to fall into a pool of water. I’ll accept all blame for each and every micro event that subsequently occurs as a physical result of what I set in motion. But, there’s a limit. Inject a person into the equation that makes a subsequent decision supposedly because I did what I did, then I draw the line.
That's not what I was going for. But in any case, suppose the glass quantum-tunnels through the concrete and hits a baby in the head, seriously injuring her. Would you accept that you caused the glass to hit a baby in the head, and accept the blame for it?

Any any rate, why do you think a person's action is not a "physical result"?

fast said:
I want to be responsible for everything I do. I accept the consequences for what I have done. If I throw a bat that hits a chair that quantum tunnels to DisneyLand and pops out and knocks someone over, then oops, it’s all my bad—and I’m sorry.
I disagree. It's not your bad (though as before, this is not what I was going for, either).
Consider this alternative scenario: you are playing soccer. You kick the ball, trying to score. The ball quantum-tunnels and hits a kid in the head, killing her. Your bad? I do not think so.

fast said:
My idea of cause doesn’t permeate through a decision. If I push you and you fall, I caused you to fall, and when you get up and push me back and I fall, anyone can say I got what was coming or that I deserved it, but I only take responsibility for my decision and everything that happened next but not anything that followed your decision. My responsibility ended at your fall. That’s all I caused. I didn’t cause you to push me. When YOU made the decision to retaliate, it’s then on you. I didn’t cause you to retaliate; that’s a function of your decision. I caused you to fall.
Suppose you push a terminator, who decides to push back - or to kill a bunch of people. What then? The terminator made the decision. But it's a computer, so it seems the decision is also the result of physical causes (but isn't the same with a human brain, instead of a computer; how is a human choice not physical?).


fast said:
Suppose I try (but fail) to incite a riot. Blame me for all that I did.
Sure, I blame you for that (assuming I have enough info to make that assessment). Unless it was justified to incite a riot. In which case, I do not blame you.

fast said:
Suppose I try (and succeed) in inciting a riot. Blame me for all that I did.
Sure (assuming info, etc.). But I do not blame you more than I do if you fail, given the same actions. Or maybe I do because I got hurt in the riot so that peaked my interest, whereas I did not even register your failed attempt to incite a riot. But my point is that if I fairly assess both your failed and your successful attempts, at least given the same state of mind on your part (including intent, information, beliefs, etc.), I blame you to the same extent in both cases.

fast said:
But, blame me no different for the latter than the first since all harm that came originated from the rioters. They could have made a choice, and they did, and it’s their choice that ultimately caused the actual harm.
Sure, I blame you no different for the latter than the first, but not for that reason.
First, imagine instead of rioters, you try to get a couple of Rottweilers. In the first case, you are unsuccessful: they just run away, without attacking anyone. In the second one, you are successful, and they attack people. Do you deserve more blame in the second case? I do not think so. You did not make any different decisions. It just happened that the dogs chose differently. I don't blame you differently.

Second, imagine instead of rioters, it's armed drones. Suppose Muhammad and Omar both want to murder civilians, in the service of IS. They both make bombs following online IS instructions, buy the materials in the same way, etc. It turns out that a vendor sold Omar a faulty component, and then his bomb - unlike Muhammad - does not go off. But their intent, information, beliefs, etc., are the same. Then I blame both to the same extent. There might be practical reasons for the law to punish successful attempts more than unsuccessful ones in general, but I say they deserve the same amount of blame.

I do not blame people differently because of what other people do, or because of what dogs do, nor because of any other consequence of their actions. Consequences are useful tools to ascertain what the actions were (i.e., intent, beliefs, available information), but the blame is because of their decisions (intent, beliefs, etc.), not for their results and/or anything anyone else does.
 
Social responsibility. Helping someone who is injured means that if you find yourself in that position that you are helped in turn regardless of fault. A kind of social no blame insurance policy, aid where aid is required no matter what the morality or ethical issues happen to be.
I think ambiguity has reared its head again. Suppose I do have a responsibility to help, that responsibility is of a different kind. If people see me do something such that it’s obvious I did it and shouldn’t have, there’s no wonder people will say that I am the cause, to blame, at fault, and responsible for what happened. That’s a use of “responsible” that has a different meaning. Saying I have a responsibility to help isn’t to say I was responsible for the situation.

I didn't say that the person helping someone is responsible for the actions or errors of the one in trouble, just that offering aid is a social responsibility regardless of blame or fault.
 
Is that what you think I think?

Not about what I think you think is it. It's about what I think about a situation where I find one lying along the road with a broken leg. My statement is inelegant but essentially reflects what I think I should do as a person with my set of ethics.

I presume you wrote what you think you are entitled to do when you encounter the situation with or without taking into account previous behavior by the one who now has a broken leg. It's not your responsibility. Fine. I won't do something stupid which results in me getting a broken leg when you are about to come along.

Notice now we have two improbable situations. Neither you nor I can ascertain prior or future conditions.

That is why I responded as I did to your silly proposition. It's only silly because you put stuff into it that is beyond and outside what is needed for one to resolve an ethical question.

As DBT says many may believe it profitable to pay it forward so they assist disregarding finding reasons for why the leg became broken.
 
Typing a long ass post on a cell phone (one letter at a time) can be so easily ruined by a single inadvertent click. Grrr
 
Typing a long ass post on a cell phone (one letter at a time) can be so easily ruined by a single inadvertent click. Grrr

Yeah, that's annoying. :eek:
I suggest either not writing posts on cell phones, or try to install an app that saves the text after an interval one can choose (and then, choose something like 2 minutes or so). Personally, I choose the first one.
 
I’m not saying there’s no underlying internal physical cause that allows our brains to function. I’m saying the macro events that occur outside the body prior to micro event decision making doesn’t cause the subsequent macro events that are put in motion outside our bodies afterwards.

Consider a series of events where no rational agents are involved: the wind blows. Tree branch sways. Pine cone falls. It splashes in water below. Sound emits. Possum is startled. These causal events trickle along with nothing to alter the course of events. The possum being startled can be traced all the way back to the wind.

Falling is not something we do; it’s something that happens to us. If I come up behind you, you might become startled and flinch; you might even involuntarily jerk and inadvertently break your finger. Those events (under the sense of “do” I’m using) is not something you do. Did you break your finger? Yes, but it wasn’t a function of your deliberation. I did do something if I came up behind you.

Now, be it as it may, I am not including animals (at least not at this time) in the group that I am regarding as intelligent rational agents with moral culpability.

Let’s say the possum runs after becoming startled.
Then you notice possum run.

If you go get a gun, then regardless of any buzz words one might use (blame, praise, fault, justified), I will not in anyway invoke the wind as being in the same series of unimpeded events. Every human action that results after thinking starts a new chain. You had a choice, and it’s that choice that severs the seeming unending chain of events that occur.

If you shoot the gun, that’s a choice you made.
Sound emits.
Neighbor hears.
Neighbor sees what you did.
Neighbor goes back to watching tv

If the neighbor had called the police instead, we don’t blame the wind.
I wouldn’t even blame the shooter. Blame is obviously not the right word, but as far back as I would go to use whatever word I should is the neighbors decision.

That’s why if I push you and you fall, a new chain hasn’t begun. When you decide what to do next, those will be events attributable to you since you made the decision, no matter how I might have influenced your decision.

If you break a rib as a result of the fall and decide to go to the hospital, I’m not saying there are no ties to moral responsibility on my part, but I did not cause you to go to the hospital—not in the sense of “cause” I’m using—which is a different sense of cause if you say I did—in which case would be a reason.

If you thought you were fine and went to the movies instead, that too would have been an action that resulted as a consequence of your decision.
 
fast said:
I’m not saying there’s no underlying internal physical cause that allows our brains to function. I’m saying the macro events that occur outside the body prior to micro event decision making doesn’t cause the subsequent macro events that are put in motion outside our bodies afterwards.
But why do you think that?


fast said:
Consider a series of events where no rational agents are involved: the wind blows. Tree branch sways. Pine cone falls. It splashes in water below. Sound emits. Possum is startled. These causal events trickle along with nothing to alter the course of events. The possum being startled can be traced all the way back to the wind.
And the human being startled cannot? How about the chimp?

fast said:
Now, be it as it may, I am not including animals (at least not at this time) in the group that I am regarding as intelligent rational agents with moral culpability.
My objection isn't about that (though one could be raised), but about causality. It's a weird and improbable picture of the world: consider our latest common ancestor with chimps: no causality, all traceable to the wind. Now, consider her offspring, and their offspring, etc., up to the present. You seem to be positing a radical change in causality while there seems to be continuity and gradualism in minds. It's odd.

fast said:
Let’s say the possum runs after becoming startled.
Then you notice possum run.

If you go get a gun, then regardless of any buzz words one might use (blame, praise, fault, justified), I will not in anyway invoke the wind as being in the same series of unimpeded events. Every human action that results after thinking starts a new chain. You had a choice, and it’s that choice that severs the seeming unending chain of events that occur.
Yes, I had a choice. So did the chimp. But why would you think that somehow my choice severs the chain of events? Why not the chimp's choice? It's weird.

fast said:
If you break a rib as a result of the fall and decide to go to the hospital, I’m not saying there are no ties to moral responsibility on my part, but I did not cause you to go to the hospital—not in the sense of “cause” I’m using—which is a different sense of cause if you say I did—in which case would be a reason.

If you thought you were fine and went to the movies instead, that too would have been an action that resulted as a consequence of your decision.
I don't see why you are linking moral responsibility to causality in that way. Looks like some sort of weird contra-causal free will.
At any rate, I would raise the moral objections I made in my previous post independently of the causal discussion.
 
There is a substantive and meaningful causal difference between events with no interceding decision than it is between events with an interceding decision. For instance, if after loading the car up with groceries, I simply shove the empty shopping cart out into the parking lot and it rolls, changes direction and slams into your car, there was absolutely no interceding decision between the point I made the decision to shove the cart and the point you noticed the cart hit your car.

There is a clear causal connection between all of that including my decision to shove the cart, it rolling, it changing direction, it hitting your car, a dent forming, and you reflexively noticing what had happened.

If you get out and shoot at me, it’s ludicrous to say I caused you to shoot me. An explanation for why you may do so doesn’t carry the same causal weight as the preceding causal events.

I’m not saying that all events that do occur are necessary events, but lacking any contingent events, we should be able to fully predict everything that occurred once I shoved the buggy up to you noticing it, but the buck stops there (and that’s what makes the substantive difference). I can’t turn to science or physics and predict the guarenteed outcome of your actual decision. You could have simply yelled at me; that too is a decision you could have made.

So, a causal connection of the first type is purely physics related and carries the potential of full guarenteed predictability. The buggy didn’t have free will, so it’s changing of direction was dependent on non-mental factors like the curvature of the ground, resistance of the wheels, gravity, force of the buggy, etc. In that instance, I’m fine with taking the blame (or credit) for my decision and the consequences of it (from the shove to the dent). Hell, i’ll even take credit for your noticing what I did since it’s like falling, not something you do (but rather something that happens to you).

But, as soon as you start thinking about what to do next, I take no part in accepting blame. If you get out the car to check for damage, that (getting out the car) was not caused by me. I didn’t cause you to get out the car. Your decision is the culprit behind that.
 
fast said:
There is a substantive and meaningful causal difference between events with no interceding decision than it is between events with an interceding decision. For instance, if after loading the car up with groceries, I simply shove the empty shopping cart out into the parking lot and it rolls, changes direction and slams into your car, there was absolutely no interceding decision between the point I made the decision to shove the cart and the point you noticed the cart hit your car.

There is a clear causal connection between all of that including my decision to shove the cart, it rolling, it changing direction, it hitting your car, a dent forming, and you reflexively noticing what had happened.
Imagine that what caused the shopping cart to change direction was that Joe pushed into a completely different direction from the one you pushed it towards. Is there still a clear causal connection? Now imagine Joe is 4 years old. Is there still a clear causal connection? Now let's say that Joe is a lion that escaped from a zoo. Still a clear causal connection? Now suppose that the cart changed direction because it was hit by a piece of debris coming from a nearby meteor hit.

My point is that in all of those cases, you caused some event, and then other causes played a role in diverting the cart. The causal connections are still there. The question is what causes one cares about.

fast said:
If you get out and shoot at me, it’s ludicrous to say I caused you to shoot me. An explanation for why you may do so doesn’t carry the same causal weight as the preceding causal events.
Your decision was one of the causes, but the expression 'I caused you to shoot me' is interpreted by many as excluding moral responsibility, so it's better not to use it.
But that aside, what if my dog gets out and bites you? Would you say that you caused the dog to bite you?


fast said:
I’m not saying that all events that do occur are necessary events, but lacking any contingent events, we should be able to fully predict everything that occurred once I shoved the buggy up to you noticing it, but the buck stops there (and that’s what makes the substantive difference). I can’t turn to science or physics and predict the guarenteed outcome of your actual decision. You could have simply yelled at me; that too is a decision you could have made.
Why should we be able to predict that?
We have no means of predicting where the debris of the meteor hit will go, or whether Joe the chimp will push the cart.

fast said:
So, a causal connection of the first type is purely physics related and carries the potential of full guarenteed predictability.
Physics does not seem to carry that potential. But if it did, it seems it would also apply to the whole system, including the particles in your brain, my brain, etc.

fast said:
The buggy didn’t have free will, so it’s changing of direction was dependent on non-mental factors like the curvature of the ground, resistance of the wheels, gravity, force of the buggy, etc.
Joe the lion did not have free will, but its choice to push the cart dependent on mental factors too. Unless you say Joe the lion did have free will, in which case, the person/non-person involvement dychotomy is not tenable, either, and it's mental/non-mental instead. Now I do not believe there are sufficient reasons to believe that somehow minds are not determined by previous events involving particles and the like. But assuming they are not, that still does not seem to make a difference in terms of moral blame.


fast said:
In that instance, I’m fine with taking the blame (or credit) for my decision and the consequences of it (from the shove to the dent). Hell, i’ll even take credit for your noticing what I did since it’s like falling, not something you do (but rather something that happens to you).
You are to blame for your decision (given intent, knowledge, beliefs, available information), not for what happens afterwards. That might not be apparent because what happens afterwards is what we use as information to figure your intent, beliefs, etc. But you don't get more blame because a meteor hit, or Joe (the adult human, or the kid, or the lion).

fast said:
But, as soon as you start thinking about what to do next, I take no part in accepting blame. If you get out the car to check for damage, that (getting out the car) was not caused by me.
There is a difference between blame for your behavior and the compensation you are obligated to pay later. In terms of blame, consequences do not matter. You do not deserve more punishment in one case than the other. But in some cases other people get hurt, or their stuff gets damaged, etc., whereas in others, that does not happen. It seems in the former case, you are also obligated to pay for the damages, but that's not punitive (or it should not be, if it is).
 
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