Should we be responsible for the decisions others make?

[fast]

Imagine that what caused the shopping cart to change direction was that Joe pushed into a completely different direction from the one you pushed it towards. Is there still a clear causal connection?

It’s as clear as that. I shoved it. Things happened as a result. Joe then pushed it. Things happened as a result of that. I would not say I caused Joe to push it. If he is asked what caused him to push it, he will only give an explanation for WHY he pushed it. His acting on his decision is what CAUSED it to happen.

That distinction is paramount. On the one hand, there are things happening that can be traced back causally. But as we go back, when we hit a decision maker, that’s full stop. Actions predicated on decisions mark event chain beginnings. Any so-called cause for a decision is not of like kind.

Now imagine Joe is 4 years old. Is there still a clear causal connection?

Clear as day. I made a decison, acted on it, and consequences resulted. Joe too is technically an interceding decision maker that lies between my decison to shove the grocery store shopping car and it finally winding up causing a dent to your vehicle.

What’s not always so clear is who might blame who. A child’s mother might scold Joe for what Joe did because of both the decision Joe made and the consequences that occurred as a result. In fact, it might be the consequences of like decisions that spawned feeling the need to scold Joe for the decison based action of pushing the cart in that manner.

The father might blame me. Let’s say that if the child did not intervene, the buggy (shopping cart) would have rolled straight into the outside shopping cart bins where they belong. I’m the adult! I should have noticed a child and not taken the chance that the child might dart over and push it. Just as a gun owner who is responsible for the final resting place of spent bullets, one can argue that the final resting place of irresponsibly shoving a grocery cart rests with the adult who set the events in motion.

Now let's say that Joe is a lion that escaped from a zoo. Still a clear causal connection?

He he. If someone accuses me of shoving the buggy, my story for the officer has been rehearsed:

Yes officer, I was going to slowly walk the buggy back to where it belongs like I always do. I’m never really in a hurry and wouldn’t have been at that time either, but honestly officer, once I saw that prehistoric man eating creature with those ferocious dinosaur fangs, I don’t remember much of anything else other than me slamming my own butt in the car door I got in so fast. Didn’t even know my feet could still move like that!

Now suppose that the cart changed direction because it was hit by a piece of debris coming from a nearby meteor hit.

It’s a physical phenomena acting in accordance to the laws of nature.

Imagine looking outside an oceanside hotel window and notice people running. The question pops into your mind, “what’s causing them to run?” Your wife points out towards a tsunami wave crashing over. Question answered!

Right?

Well, that’s exactly the kind of cause I’m saying is an explanation. The wave is not causing the people to run—in the alternative sense of cause I’m recognizing. It’s an acceptable usage; I have no problem with that. My issue is with the ambiguity that goes unrecognized in conversations.

If you turned to me and said, “so fast, what’s causing these people to run,” i’ll say the same thing your wife did.

You continue: No, no, fast, I mean in your alternative usage of the word, “cause,”; what is causing the people to run?

That’s easy. It’s not just the decison itself but intentionally acting upon that decison that is causing the people to run. It’s self-caused in a way. Consider the two people who want to die that are not moving. If the gigantic wave is such a causal factor, how come it’s not causing everyone to move? It’s not physically causing anyone to move; it merely serves as the reason that explains why they are running — to escape the consequences.

My point is that in all of those cases, you caused some event, and then other causes played a role in diverting the cart. The causal connections are still there. The question is what causes one cares about.

A cause not fueled by a being with the ability to make a rational choice and a cause fueled by a being with the ability to make a rational choice is not trivial. A rioter that throws a brick through a window after a protest (over a white cop shooting an unarmed and non-threatening black person) goes bad, might explain his actions for doing what he did, but the tsunami didn’t cause the people to run, and the white officer didn’t cause the window to break.

Your decision was one of the causes, but the expression 'I caused you to shoot me' is interpreted by many as excluding moral responsibility, so it's better not to use it.

Please elaborate. That’s intriguing.

But that aside, what if my dog gets out and bites you? Would you say that you caused the dog to bite you?

No, but if I run, things get tricky. The link between dropping a fragile wine glass onto hard concrete and it shattering is quite different than the link between my running and the dog chasing after me. A tsunami wave is gonna crash down. The wine glass is gonna drop. With no intervening events, these things must happen. It’s different when there are creatures capable of making and acting upon choices. The more rational they are, the more morally culpable one may be.

Why should we be able to predict that?
We have no means of predicting where the debris of the meteor hit will go, or whether Joe the chimp will push the cart.

We have no means of predicting the exact coordinates and trajectory of every piece of metor debri, but that’s a technological challenge that might one day be overcome. The chimp, however, can never be fully predicted, not because it’s extraordinarily difficult to meet the challenges of complex systems but because of true choice.

I’ll address the remainder later. We have some underlying philosophical differences on determinism.

 

[fromderinside]

Arguing something is the result of determination when much of the evidence is outside the purview of the the one charged with determining is fatally flawed.

 

[fast]

Arguing something is the result of determination when much of the evidence is outside the purview of the the one charged with determining is fatally flawed.

If you do something, it’s generally as a result of choosing to do it.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

It’s as clear as that. I shoved it. Things happened as a result. Joe then pushed it. Things happened as a result of that. I would not say I caused Joe to push it. If he is asked what caused him to push it, he will only give an explanation for WHY he pushed it. His acting on his decision is what CAUSED it to happen.

That distinction is paramount. On the one hand, there are things happening that can be traced back causally. But as we go back, when we hit a decision maker, that’s full stop. Actions predicated on decisions mark event chain beginnings. Any so-called cause for a decision is not of like kind.

No, I mean whether there is a clear causal connection between your action and the cart hitting the car. If, as you go back, when you hit a decision maker, that is full stop, then you stop at Joe, and there is no trace back to you.

Clear as day. I made a decison, acted on it, and consequences resulted. Joe too is technically an interceding decision maker that lies between my decison to shove the grocery store shopping car and it finally winding up causing a dent to your vehicle.

If, as you go back, "when you hit a decision maker, that is full stop", then you stop at Joe, and there is no trace back to you.

The father might blame me. Let’s say that if the child did not intervene, the buggy (shopping cart) would have rolled straight into the outside shopping cart bins where they belong. I’m the adult! I should have noticed a child and not taken the chance that the child might dart over and push it. Just as a gun owner who is responsible for the final resting place of spent bullets, one can argue that the final resting place of irresponsibly shoving a grocery cart rests with the adult who set the events in motion.

Say the child was hiding, so with reasonable care, you would not have noticed him. Moreover, again, if as you go back, "when you hit a decision maker, that is full stop", then you stop at Joe, and there is no trace back to you.

He he. If someone accuses me of shoving the buggy, my story for the officer has been rehearsed:

Joe the lion was in hiding and came out of nowhere. You had not seen it.

It’s a physical phenomena acting in accordance to the laws of nature.

And lions aren't? Children? Adult humans? Do they violate the laws of nature? What would that even mean?

A cause not fueled by a being with the ability to make a rational choice and a cause fueled by a being with the ability to make a rational choice is not trivial. A rioter that throws a brick through a window after a protest (over a white cop shooting an unarmed and non-threatening black person) goes bad, might explain his actions for doing what he did, but the tsunami didn’t cause the people to run, and the white officer didn’t cause the window to break.

They were contributing causes, but not causes we care in that context. But what caused the particles in the brains of those people to act as they did, if not previous interactions of those and other particles, etc.?

Please elaborate. That’s intriguing.

In that context, "caused" is sometimes interpreted as "compelled", or some people mistakenly believe that causation implies compulsion.

But that aside, what if my dog gets out and bites you? Would you say that you caused the dog to bite you?

No, but if I run, things get tricky.

No problem, because my interest is in the case where the dog bites you. You say you did not cause the dog to bite you. Why not? You said earlier that " On the one hand, there are things happening that can be traced back causally. But as we go back, when we hit a decision maker, that’s full stop. Actions predicated on decisions mark event chain beginnings. Any so-called cause for a decision is not of like kind.". So, in order to say that the dog did not cause you to bite you, you are implying that the dog is the decision maker. So, it seems your distinction is now not limited to humans, but extends to other decision makers, like dogs. Do dogs violate the laws of nature?

We have no means of predicting the exact coordinates and trajectory of every piece of metor debri, but that’s a technological challenge that might one day be overcome.

No, it is not, for many, many reasons. But if all other reasons failed (they do not), there is always the Uncertainty Principle.

The chimp, however, can never be fully predicted, not because it’s extraordinarily difficult to meet the challenges of complex systems but because of true choice.

Neither can the photon ever be predicted! (uncertainty!) Is that true choice as well? And the same applies to tiny particles, and to...everything else.
But moreover, how is choice related to predictability? You seem to be pushing for some acausal choices. It's weird. What causes the chimp's choice, then? Or the dog's choice?

 

[fast]

Every event has a cause. At least that’s the view I posit. So, it’s not like I believe some events are uncaused. Heck, there could be uncaused events in some quantum mechanical way (so far as I know), but I’m not espousing such a view. The micro events that occur in a functioning brain is no different (those events have a cause too), but there’s something unique going on, and that’s the ability to contemplate, decide, and act.

If we lived in a world where no brain existed, it would still not be the case that all events are necessary events, but the contingent events set in motion with nary a mind to alter the course of any event invokes the idea of a clockwork-like universe. I believe the ability to make decisions and act on them disallows such an idea to reflect reality. I still think any atom in motion can be traced to a preceding cause, but mind bearing creatures have the ability to make choices, choices that are not a must.

With no intervening contingencies where a fragile wine glass breaks upon being forcefully thrown on hard concrete, a replay of the same scenario under identical conditions will result again with a shattered glass. But, a rational being that threw that glass might sometimes under identical situations choose otherwise.

 

[fast]

As far as the dog bite goes, whether I caused it or not depends on which “cause” we’re discussing. If my running causes the dog to chase, that’s what you might call a contributing cause, but that just explains why the dog ran. The atoms of my body in motion doesn’t physically connect in some domino-like path to the atoms in the dogs brain. Be it instinctual or not, the cause (of the kind to which I speak) resides in the brain which allows for conscious thought. I hesitate to speak of moral culpability with a dog that doesn’t have the cognitive skills of humans.

 

[fromderinside]

Lighten up. What you do may have consequences for you but what you do usually has no consequences for those you observe when you do what you do. They have their own chain and you are probably no part of it. Unless the person in the OP told you she did something stupid that resulted in her broken leg you have no notion how she got that condition having not witnessed the incident. Even then you can only presume she actually did something stupid. It all comes back to at time t=0 thereafter. If you want to draw a causal chain from butterfly to hurricane be my guest. For me to do so would be a waste of my time.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Every event has a cause. At least that’s the view I posit. So, it’s not like I believe some events are uncaused. Heck, there could be uncaused events in some quantum mechanical way (so far as I know), but I’m not espousing such a view. The micro events that occur in a functioning brain is no different (those events have a cause too), but there’s something unique going on, and that’s the ability to contemplate, decide, and act.

If we lived in a world where no brain existed, it would still not be the case that all events are necessary events, but the contingent events set in motion with nary a mind to alter the course of any event invokes the idea of a clockwork-like universe. I believe the ability to make decisions and act on them disallows such an idea to reflect reality. I still think any atom in motion can be traced to a preceding cause, but mind bearing creatures have the ability to make choices, choices that are not a must.

With no intervening contingencies where a fragile wine glass breaks upon being forcefully thrown on hard concrete, a replay of the same scenario under identical conditions will result again with a shattered glass. But, a rational being that threw that glass might sometimes under identical situations choose otherwise.

But how is that possible? If the particles can all be traced to a previous cause, and things just keep happening in a clockwork manner, then the same goes for the particles that make up the brains and the rest of the bodies of intelligent agents. Why not?

As far as the dog bite goes, whether I caused it or not depends on which “cause” we’re discussing. If my running causes the dog to chase, that’s what you might call a contributing cause, but that just explains why the dog ran. The atoms of my body in motion doesn’t physically connect in some domino-like path to the atoms in the dogs brain. Be it instinctual or not, the cause (of the kind to which I speak) resides in the brain which allows for conscious thought. I hesitate to speak of moral culpability with a dog that doesn’t have the cognitive skills of humans.

But how is it that "the atoms of my body in motion doesn’t physically connect in some domino-like path to the atoms in the dogs brain", but the connection happens when there is no dog, but, say, a robot?
Imagine it's not a real dog, but a robotic dog. Would that make a difference in whether there is a domino-like path? Why? Do you think some sort of soul stops the atoms? Or a non-physical mind that appears from the physical and stops the chains of causality? Or something else stops the dominoes? Please explain.

 

[fast]

Every event has a cause. At least that’s the view I posit. So, it’s not like I believe some events are uncaused. Heck, there could be uncaused events in some quantum mechanical way (so far as I know), but I’m not espousing such a view. The micro events that occur in a functioning brain is no different (those events have a cause too), but there’s something unique going on, and that’s the ability to contemplate, decide, and act.

If we lived in a world where no brain existed, it would still not be the case that all events are necessary events, but the contingent events set in motion with nary a mind to alter the course of any event invokes the idea of a clockwork-like universe. I believe the ability to make decisions and act on them disallows such an idea to reflect reality. I still think any atom in motion can be traced to a preceding cause, but mind bearing creatures have the ability to make choices, choices that are not a must.

With no intervening contingencies where a fragile wine glass breaks upon being forcefully thrown on hard concrete, a replay of the same scenario under identical conditions will result again with a shattered glass. But, a rational being that threw that glass might sometimes under identical situations choose otherwise.

But how is that possible? If the particles can all be traced to a previous cause, and things just keep happening in a clockwork manner, then the same goes for the particles that make up the brains and the rest of the bodies of intelligent agents. Why not?

As far as the dog bite goes, whether I caused it or not depends on which “cause” we’re discussing. If my running causes the dog to chase, that’s what you might call a contributing cause, but that just explains why the dog ran. The atoms of my body in motion doesn’t physically connect in some domino-like path to the atoms in the dogs brain. Be it instinctual or not, the cause (of the kind to which I speak) resides in the brain which allows for conscious thought. I hesitate to speak of moral culpability with a dog that doesn’t have the cognitive skills of humans.

But how is it that "the atoms of my body in motion doesn’t physically connect in some domino-like path to the atoms in the dogs brain", but the connection happens when there is no dog, but, say, a robot?
Imagine it's not a real dog, but a robotic dog. Would that make a difference in whether there is a domino-like path? Why? Do you think some sort of soul stops the atoms? Or a non-physical mind that appears from the physical and stops the chains of causality? Or something else stops the dominoes? Please explain.

A robot can do no more than that which its programming allows. We personify complex systems that mimic choices, and we use words to describe machinery that would otherwise be used to describe biological entities capable of real choice, but computers don’t think; they don’t contemplate; they don’t deliberate. We expand the scope of words to include those things, but that’s just a semantic nightmare.

However, this issue isn’t something I have to be right about to maintain the position I have taken regarding cause. Our ability to choose a course of action nullifies any sense of clockwork action that would be evoked with the wine glass breaking example. For instance, why must you choose to protest by standing in the middle of a road? We have self-control. Let me reword that. We have the ability to self-control. We may want to protest and act accordingly, but there is nothing an officer has done that guarentees the consequence.

If the speed limit in residential areas is increased from 30MPH to 100MPH, we can point to the decison as being a contributing cause to the barrage of subsequent widespread accidents that would occur, but that decison, predictable as the outcome is would not be a physical cause that guarentees the outcome, and that’s because the people driving still maintain the ability to mull over their actions before slamming the hammer down. That ability to exercise free will means something. Sure, there are physical causes underpinning our internal micro events in motion, but they’re not influenced such as our reasons are.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

A robot can do no more than that which its programming allows. We personify complex systems that mimic choices, and we use words to describe machinery that would otherwise be used to describe biological entities capable of real choice, but computers don’t think; they don’t contemplate; they don’t deliberate. We expand the scope of words to include those things, but that’s just a semantic nightmare.

How would the fact that they are programmed mean they do not deliberate? I'm not talking about present-day robots only. Consider more advanced robots, superintelligent computers, etc. You say they are programmed. But they can be as complex as a human brain, or even more so. Is it the stuff brains are made of? Carbon-based vs. silicon-based? Is it something else?

However, this issue isn’t something I have to be right about to maintain the position I have taken regarding cause. Our ability to choose a course of action nullifies any sense of clockwork action that would be evoked with the wine glass breaking example. For instance, why must you choose to protest by standing in the middle of a road? We have self-control. Let me reword that. We have the ability to self-control. We may want to protest and act accordingly, but there is nothing an officer has done that guarantees the consequence.

Sure, we have the ability to self-control. But do you think that implies that the movements of particles in our brains and in the rest of us can't be traced back to, say, conditions 1000 years ago?
I mean, I'm pretty sure in a considerably strong sense they can't be traced back, but then, the same goes for what particles do. There is no clockwork anywhere, in the sense of actual traceability, it seems. That does not settle the question of determinism. But if particles are deterministic, it seems so are we (even if due to some weird physics stuff, things cannot be traced back).

If the speed limit in residential areas is increased from 30MPH to 100MPH, we can point to the decison as being a contributing cause to the barrage of subsequent widespread accidents that would occur, but that decison, predictable as the outcome is would not be a physical cause that guarentees the outcome, and that’s because the people driving still maintain the ability to mull over their actions before slamming the hammer down.

But is it a soul, or what is it? My point is that if you are right that physical causes guarantee somehow the outcome (which we do not know, but let's say), the brain is also physical stuff, and so decisions would also be guaranteed unless, say, a soul intervenes and makes it not-guaranteed.

That ability to exercise free will means something. Sure, there are physical causes underpinning our internal micro events in motion, but they’re not influenced such as our reasons are.

I agree it means something. We don't agree about what it means. But I'm curious about the physical causes you talk about. If there are such physical causes, and physical causes guarantee future physical causes, then those physical causes guarantee everything we will do, because we are made of particles. So, for example, the people driving are made of particles, so that they drive an at which speed is also guaranteed, etc.

 

[fast]

Let’s say there’s a planet somewhere out in the far reaches of the galaxy where there has never been life either there or within a two million year reach of it.

If we could rewind time a million years and let it start anew with all electrons beginning just as they did a million years ago, the distant planet would come to look just as it does today. It would be like rewinding a video cassette and watching events unfold again with no difference in how it did the first time. The same meteor hits would hit just as before. The craters the second go-round could not be distinguished from the first time they occurred.

That is more (much more) than determinism. That is clock-like where what happened before will occur again with no yielded differences to be found along the second journey.

Remind earth a million years and let it begin again, then it’s a different ballgame, as it’s teaming with a particular kind of life, mind-bearing life. Of yes, it’s still determined, but it wouldn’t be clock like.

To say of an event that it’s determined isn’t to speak of upcoming future events. It’s a past looking perspective. Pick an event, any event, and to say it is determined is merely to say there was a cause. Whether a batter knocks a home run or foul, whatever happens, there was a cause. But, there being a cause doesn’t make subsequent events clock like. It won’t be like a rewound video tape where we’ll get bored by watching the same set of events unfold.

The ability to think and act on our choices.
The ability to think and act on our choices.
That’s what guarentees that our futures will not play out in some fated kind of way. Sure, there will be a cause for what happens; there always is, so far as I can tell, but having a conscious allows us to manipulate upcoming events.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Let’s say there’s a planet somewhere out in the far reaches of the galaxy where there has never been life either there or within a two million year reach of it.

Okay.

If we could rewind time a million years and let it start anew with all electrons beginning just as they did a million years ago, the distant planet would come to look just as it does today. It would be like rewinding a video cassette and watching events unfold again with no difference in how it did the first time. The same meteor hits would hit just as before. The craters the second go-round could not be distinguished from the first time they occurred.

Why do you think so?
There seems to be no good reason for it. Maybe it would be very similar (or maybe not so much), and the same goes for the cassette. But the same, down to the subatomic level? I do not see any good evidence for it.

That is more (much more) than determinism. That is clock-like where what happened before will occur again with no yielded differences to be found along the second journey.

Remind earth a million years and let it begin again, then it’s a different ballgame, as it’s teaming with a particular kind of life, mind-bearing life. Of yes, it’s still determined, but it wouldn’t be clock like.

Clocks aren't arbitrarily precise, either, but that aside, I do not see why there would be a difference, determinism-wise.

That’s what guarentees that our futures will not play out in some fated kind of way. Sure, there will be a cause for what happens; there always is, so far as I can tell, but having a conscious allows us to manipulate upcoming events.

Here you equate determined with fated. I disagree. Sure, having a consciousness allows us to manipulate events. But I see no good reason to believe one is more clock-like than the other.

 

[fast]

Why do you think so?
There seems to be no good reason for it. Maybe it would be very similar (or maybe not so much), and the same goes for the cassette. But the same, down to the subatomic level? I do not see any good evidence for it.

The laws of nature. There is matter, and there is energy. Both are bound to be reactionary to the forces upon them. Even on a lifeless planet, there will be contingent events, but without a mind-bearing creature to choose between alternative choices, all events will transpire just as before— if all started out just as before, especially at the subatomic level.

Clocks aren't arbitrarily precise, either, but that aside, I do not see why there would be a difference, determinism-wise.

All events on such a lifeless planet are determined.
All events on a planet teaming with life are determined.

All I mean by determined is caused. Others tend to invoke more than that. I do not. If there is a determined event, then there is a preceding cause. If there is an event, it wasn’t uncaused.

What’s the same is that all events on both planets have a preceding cause. So, determinism holds true for both.

What’s different isn’t to do with determinism; what’s different is the subsequent state of affairs, should time reset itself. On the far off planet where no life is within reach, events will transpire and unfold just as before. Same ole events (contingent or otherwise) will be like watching a re-run.

On Earth, where mind-bearing creatures are abound, there will be an actual difference in how events unfold. See, the events that occur on the distant planet are not necessary events. It is teaming with contingent events too. The reason the events on Planet X (to give it a name) seems to be necessary is because they must follow the laws of nature. The real reason the course of events do not change is because there’s no entity to make choices that alter any events as they transpire.

Here you equate determined with fated. I disagree. Sure, having a consciousness allows us to manipulate events. But I see no good reason to believe one is more clock-like than the other.

I do not see how I equated the two. They are different.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

The laws of nature. There is matter, and there is energy. Both are bound to be reactionary to the forces upon them. Even on a lifeless planet, there will be contingent events, but without a mind-bearing creature to choose between alternative choices, all events will transpire just as before— if all started out just as before, especially at the subatomic level.

But why do you think the laws of nature are like that? I do not see any good evidence of it.

On the far off planet where no life is within reach, events will transpire and unfold just as before. Same ole events (contingent or otherwise) will be like watching a re-run.

Why?

On Earth, where mind-bearing creatures are abound, there will be an actual difference in how events unfold. See, the events that occur on the distant planet are not necessary events. It is teaming with contingent events too. The reason the events on Planet X (to give it a name) seems to be necessary is because they must follow the laws of nature. The real reason the course of events do not change is because there’s no entity to make choices that alter any events as they transpire.

Do you think that life goes against the laws of nature? If so, what do you mean by "laws of nature"? Is life not part of nature? If so, what do you mean by "nature"?

I do not see how I equated the two. They are different.

But you seemed to equate them as far as I can tell.

 

[fast]

Do you think that life goes against the laws of nature? If so, what do you mean by "laws of nature"? Is life not part of nature? If so, what do you mean by "nature"?

Life does not go against the laws of nature.
Life is apart of nature.

A rock is made of atoms. A person is made of atoms.
Rocks can’t make decisions. People can. If a rock starts rolling down an embankment, barring interceding events, it’s future is a function of the laws of nature. We are not immune to the forces of nature, but there’s nothing about the laws of nature that guarentees what decison I will make if also rolling down an embankment. Atoms are not alive, and though the laws of nature plays the master role in what will happen to them overall, we have some limited control in what happens to us—because we can think and act upon it.

But you seemed to equate them as far as I can tell.

A determinist holds the position that all events are caused while an indeterminist holds the position that not all events are caused. I’m a determinist. I regard it as a looking back position. If there is an event, then preceding it is a cause. Even if I discuss a future event and say it’ll be determined, I’m talking about what precedes the event as being a cause for it.

I do not regard it as a looking forward position.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Life does not go against the laws of nature.
Life is apart of nature.

A rock is made of atoms. A person is made of atoms.
Rocks can’t make decisions. People can. If a rock starts rolling down an embankment, barring interceding events, it’s future is a function of the laws of nature. We are not immune to the forces of nature, but there’s nothing about the laws of nature that guarentees what decison I will make if also rolling down an embankment. Atoms are not alive, and though the laws of nature plays the master role in what will happen to them overall, we have some limited control in what happens to us—because we can think and act upon it.

But unless we are souls, we are bunches of atoms thinking together. If the laws of nature say what the atoms will do, then they say what we will do. Of course, that does not mean we cannot control what we do: that we are caused by previous events does not preclude that we cause future events.

A determinist holds the position that all events are caused while an indeterminist holds the position that not all events are caused.

That is an unusual definition. But I wasn't talking about that, but about "That’s what guarentees that our futures will not play out in some fated kind of way." Even if our futures are caused by earlier events and fully determined, that does not imply that we are not free - and if it did imply that, how is non-determinism going to help? After all, our choices, if not determined by previous events, will introduce a certain amount of randomness. But it does not seem to make us freer.

 

[fast]

But unless we are souls, we are bunches of atoms thinking together.

That sounds like a fallacy—Speaking of the parts as we would of the whole. People are composed of atoms, but while people think, atoms do not.

If the laws of nature say what the atoms will do, then they say what we will do.

Doing as we please is not inconsistent with the laws of nature. Because of the underlying laws of nature, events will occur, but we should resist the temptation of thinking of future events as necessary events. Recognizing that an event has a preceding cause is no where near the same as saying the event was a necessary event.

I bounced a small bouncy-ball on a pier near the ocean years ago. It bounced upwards but never came back down. A seagull flying by swooped in for the catch ... and away it went. Looking back at that day, there was an event and of course, there was a cause preceding it, but what followed the cause was not a necessary event.

Determinism isn’t the view that future events are determined by preceding events in the sense that what will happen must happen. If there wasn’t an intervening flying bird thief, there would have also been an event and of course a preceding cause.

Of course, that does not mean we cannot control what we do:

Yes, we have some control over the choices we make and what we do.

that we are caused by previous events does not preclude that we cause future events.

The wording gets tricky. Yes, I think. The laws of nature pretty much guarentee that something will happen, but it doesn’t guarentee what will happen. We live in a world where the actual events that do occur are contingent. If there are no mind-bearing entities, prediction of future events is theoretically possible (and the future will play out accordingly), but throw mind bearing entities into the mix, then prediction is a major problem to overcome. But, not because of complexity. We are abiding by the laws of nature (and so are the atoms of which we are composed), but that we are able to alter the course of many events that happen before us, our futures will not unfold with the perfect prediction possible on a lifeless planet.

That is an unusual definition. But I wasn't talking about that, but about "That’s what guarentees that our futures will not play out in some fated kind of way."

On a planet with no mind bearing creature, what’s to interrupt the course of events from unfolding how they will? Given all the contengencies at play, any series of events that do occur under the exact same conditions would occur again. If that is the case with mind bearing animals too, how illusory (and dark) our lives must be. I think the fact events are not necessary events and our ability to make choices consistent with the laws of nature allows us to effect outcomes that are not set in stone.

This material has been argued over for ages. There are still people that think if God unmistakably knows what choices we will make that we must make them. They’re wrong. Knowledge doesn’t turn events into necessary events. If I am under no compulsion to act in opposition to how I want to act, I have free will and the ability to do what I want so long as it’s consistent with the laws of nature. I will act as He knows I will (assuming there’s a Him and He knows, of course), but must act as I will, no—and that’s because I have free will.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

That sounds like a fallacy—Speaking of the parts as we would of the whole. People are composed of atoms, but while people think, atoms do not.

It's not a fallacy of composition because of the "bunch of" part. I'm not saying individual atoms think. But bunch of atoms arrange in certain manners (that's humans, for example) do just that.

However, some things that are true of the parts are true of the whole. For example, if the parts are all determined by previous events, so is the whole.

Doing as we please is not inconsistent with the laws of nature. Because of the underlying laws of nature, events will occur, but we should resist the temptation of thinking of future events as necessary events. Recognizing that an event has a preceding cause is no where near the same as saying the event was a necessary event.

True, but you use unusual terminology, so it's difficult to understand what exactly you're saying here. But I think I have provided enough arguments. We just do not agree, and I'm afraid I'm out of ideas.

The wording gets tricky. Yes, I think. The laws of nature pretty much guarentee that something will happen, but it doesn’t guarentee what will happen.

Why do you think so? I do not think we know that. But in any case, if it guarantees what will happen when it comes to particles, then it does when it comes to humans because humans are made of particles. Else, they do not guarantee what will happen when it comes to particles.

We live in a world where the actual events that do occur are contingent. If there are no mind-bearing entities, prediction of future events is theoretically possible (and the future will play out accordingly), but throw mind bearing entities into the mix, then prediction is a major problem to overcome. But, not because of complexity. We are abiding by the laws of nature (and so are the atoms of which we are composed), but that we are able to alter the course of many events that happen before us, our futures will not unfold with the perfect prediction possible on a lifeless planet.

Actually, prediction of future events is not theoretically possible (e.g., look up Uncertainty Principle).
But that aside, I do not see any good evidence in support of the mind-bearing/no mind bearing distinction you make here. Why do you believe that?

On a planet with no mind bearing creature, what’s to interrupt the course of events from unfolding how they will?

On a planet with a mind bearing creature made of particles, how come the creature made of particles change the way the events work in accordance to the laws of nature and at a subatomic level. A choice is made by creature that is a bunch of particles. How can the particles not behave as the laws of nature say particles behave based on previous events (assuming the laws of nature are like that for particles, which you believe).

Given all the contengencies at play, any series of events that do occur under the exact same conditions would occur again. If that is the case with mind bearing animals too, how illusory (and dark) our lives must be.

I do not agree. Why would they be illusory? And how do we get out of that? By making choices that are not determined by previous events? But if the choice is not determined by our previous thoughts, how is it more free? (except when one wants to make a random choice, maybe).

This material has been argued over for ages. There are still people that think if God unmistakably knows what choices we will make that we must make them. They’re wrong. Knowledge doesn’t turn events into necessary events. If I am under no compulsion to act in opposition to how I want to act, I have free will and the ability to do what I want so long as it’s consistent with the laws of nature. I will act as He knows I will (assuming there’s a Him and He knows, of course), but must act as I will, no—and that’s because I have free will.

I agree. But I do not see why you make the distinction between particles and mind-bearing entities, and also why you think determinism would conflict with free will.

 

[bilby]

Not all events have a cause. There are two things that prevent an isolated lifeless planet from looking exactly identical if you rewound time and played it again: uncertainty and chaos.

Uncertainty is fundamental. You can predict the half-life of a large collection of radioactive atoms with great precision; But you can't predict the time it will take for any given nucleus to decay.

Chaos is inherent in complex systems. If there are even tiny changes in the starting conditions in a chaotic system, this can lead to very large differences in the final condition of the system.

In the case of the isolated lifeless planet, we can see that a large meteor impact will make a big change to the planet. And so if that meteor misses the planet on one iteration, but hits on another iteration, we will see a large difference in the final state and appearance of the planet.

But if the meteor has traveled through interstellar space, then the diffence between hitting and missing the planet could be very tiny indeed - an alpha particle emitted by an atomic decay on one side of the rock, rather than the other, could be enough to make that difference.

It's moderately entertaining to contemplate what a deterministic universe might look like. But it's a gross error to believe that the universe we inhabit is such a place. It's not.

Life differs from non-life only in complexity. We usually see more chaos in living systems than in non-living ones; And that can give the misleading impression that life is uniquely non-deterministic - but that's incorrect. All systems are non-deterministic, but those that are less chaotic tend not to be as obviously so, at the macroscopic level.

A good example of a non-living chaotic (and therefore unpredictable) system is the weather. The famous 'butterfly effect' implies a living thing as the perturbing factor that leads to major differences in outcomes; But life is not required. A much smaller, but still sufficient, peturbation could be as simple as a carbon-14 atom decaying now, instead of then.

Complex systems are impossible to predict; Even if the starting conditions are known to an arbitrary degree of perfection. Strict determinism is incompatible with Quantum Field Theory; It is therefore almost certainly wrong.

 

[fast]

Not all events have a cause. There are two things that prevent an isolated lifeless planet from looking exactly identical if you rewound time and played it again: uncertainty and chaos.

Uncertainty is fundamental. You can predict the half-life of a large collection of radioactive atoms with great precision; But you can't predict the time it will take for any given nucleus to decay.

Chaos is inherent in complex systems. If there are even tiny changes in the starting conditions in a chaotic system, this can lead to very large differences in the final condition of the system.

Saying that there was an event but no preceding cause for it is like saying it just happened causelessly. Prediction is in part a function of ability, and if the ever-so tiny changes are outside our abilities to track, then sure, we can’t predict the changes, but our inability to predict because of our inability to track the changes isn’t to say there’s no underlying preceding physical cause for an event. That’s why I express the prediction as being theoretical. When I rewind a VHS cassestte and hit play, the same movie plays again. When I talk about rewinding and starting anew, I mean it such there are no tiny changes.

In the case of the isolated lifeless planet, we can see that a large meteor impact will make a big change to the planet. And so if that meteor misses the planet on one iteration, but hits on another iteration, we will see a large difference in the final state and appearance of the planet.

No disagreement here. But, the hypothetical assumes no change in initial conditions, not even by one single iteration—of any sort.

But if the meteor has traveled through interstellar space, then the diffence between hitting and missing the planet could be very tiny indeed - an alpha particle emitted by an atomic decay on one side of the rock, rather than the other, could be enough to make that difference.

Maybe there is something to alpha particles that make it so that the future will not unfold the same. I don’t want to challenge that really. But, that truth, even if so, affects only my assessment of what will happen on a lifeless planet. It doesn’t dissipate the distinction I’m trying to make.

It's moderately entertaining to contemplate what a deterministic universe might look like. But it's a gross error to believe that the universe we inhabit is such a place. It's not.

No one has shown that they even understand my conception of what a deterministic universe might look like. My view is (apparently) unusual. It’s not determinism (but the laws of nature) that allows for the forwarding looking perspective. Determinism (to me) is all about looking to the past.

Let’s say A causes B and B causes C. If we concentrate on B and ask if it was determined, we look to see if there was an A. If so, B was determined. However, upon leaning that B was determined, that says nothing about C. The point is that there is nothing about determinism that should have us think we can predict the future. If (just if, mind you) that determinism is true, it’s not that which tells us C will occur. Determinism just means (in my view) there is a preceding (preceding) cause for an event. If event L will happen on May 1st 2050, there is a tie-in cause that comes before (before) event L.

People speak of determinism (unfortunately) as if C must occur if determinism is true. It’s that which I’m saying is not so, and agreeing with me but for the wrong reasons is problematic to my point. So, just for the sake of argument, accept that determinism is true and still see what I’m saying.

Life differs from non-life only in complexity.

No, no, no. Never mind determinism for a moment—or what might merely be my version of or perspective towards determinism. Also, the important divide isn’t between life and non-life. It’s between life of a particular kind and all else. Trees are alive, but they have no consciousness—at least not of any normal kind to which I am speaking of.

Everything in any group not only will but also must act in accordance to the laws of nature. People are no different from trees or rocks in that regard, but unlike trees and rocks, people can pick from certain contingent events to come.

Determinism being true (if it is) isn’t responsible for what will happen when the fragile wine glass hits a concrete floor with great force. Determinism is just the view that there is a preceding cause for events that occur. When it shatters into a million pieces, it’s not in disaccord to the laws of nature—whether the force was caused by the wind knocking it out of tree branch or being throw by a person with the same force and trajectory. It’ll shatter either way, and either way, there is a cause. Both are compatible with the laws of nature. Determinism didn’t cause anything to happen, but with no people, the forces consistent with the laws of nature will yield a shattered glass should the wind blow, but the laws of nature does not guarentee what choice a person will make.