Skepticism

[Marvin Edwards]

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

I disagree. It's pragmatism. If a person has the virtue of intending good for himself and others, then the probability that he will actually achieve that good will be higher than if he intended harm.

And if he intended good for others, then all of his other virtues such as honesty, perseverance, strength, etc. would more likely be harnessed to accomplish good rather than evil.

Believe it or not, there were people around who thought they were doing good by doing their level best to exterminate what they thought to be the twin scourges brought about by communists and Jews. At least 55 million human lives were lost in the process. Of course the perpetrators were wrong, but as far as they were concerned - and there were millions of them - they were convinced of their 'good will'. So, you see, the problem lies in having to define 'good'. Kant did not. He wrote that 'good will' is good in itself. It is not.

Good's not that hard. We call something "good" if it meets a real need we have as a person, as a society, or as a species.

 

[Hermit]

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

I disagree. It's pragmatism. If a person has the virtue of intending good for himself and others, then the probability that he will actually achieve that good will be higher than if he intended harm.

And if he intended good for others, then all of his other virtues such as honesty, perseverance, strength, etc. would more likely be harnessed to accomplish good rather than evil.

Believe it or not, there were people around who thought they were doing good by doing their level best to exterminate what they thought to be the twin scourges brought about by communists and Jews. At least 55 million human lives were lost in the process. Of course the perpetrators were wrong, but as far as they were concerned - and there were millions of them - they were convinced of their 'good will'. So, you see, the problem lies in having to define 'good'. Kant did not. He wrote that 'good will' is good in itself. It is not.

Good's not that hard. We call something "good" if it meets a real need we have as a person, as a society, or as a species.

Firstly, Kant said there is no need to define the 'good' in good will. He wrote that good will is good in itself. Secondly, your definition is inadequate. The people who did their level best to exterminate what they thought to be the twin scourges brought about by communists and Jews were convinced they met a real need of a person, a society, or as a species.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

I disagree. It's pragmatism. If a person has the virtue of intending good for himself and others, then the probability that he will actually achieve that good will be higher than if he intended harm.

And if he intended good for others, then all of his other virtues such as honesty, perseverance, strength, etc. would more likely be harnessed to accomplish good rather than evil.

Believe it or not, there were people around who thought they were doing good by doing their level best to exterminate what they thought to be the twin scourges brought about by communists and Jews. At least 55 million human lives were lost in the process. Of course the perpetrators were wrong, but as far as they were concerned - and there were millions of them - they were convinced of their 'good will'. So, you see, the problem lies in having to define 'good'. Kant did not. He wrote that 'good will' is good in itself. It is not.

Good's not that hard. We call something "good" if it meets a real need we have as a person, as a society, or as a species.

Firstly, Kant said there is no need to define the 'good' in good will. He wrote that good will is good in itself. Secondly, your definition is inadequate. The people who did their level best to exterminate what they thought to be the twin scourges brought about by communists and Jews were convinced they met a real need of a person, a society, or as a species.

Morality seeks the best good and the least harm for everyone. It's that "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" thing (which Kant turned into one of the rules for making rules, that we should not make a rule that we ourselves would not wish to follow).

 

[Hermit]

Morality seeks the best good and the least harm for everyone. It's that "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" thing (which Kant turned into one of the rules for making rules, that we should not make a rule that we ourselves would not wish to follow).

Yes.

At this juncture it might be a good idea to cast your eye back to my objection:

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Morality seeks the best good and the least harm for everyone. It's that "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" thing (which Kant turned into one of the rules for making rules, that we should not make a rule that we ourselves would not wish to follow).

Yes.

At this juncture it might be a good idea to cast your eye back to my objection:

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

I don't see it as circular. "Good" would be defined elsewhere. For example, we call something "good" if it meets a real need that we have as an individual, as a society, or as a species. Or, perhaps Kant did not provide a definition of "good" because he assumed it was common knowledge. I'm not an expert on Kant. I've only read scraps.

 

[Hermit]

Morality seeks the best good and the least harm for everyone. It's that "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" thing (which Kant turned into one of the rules for making rules, that we should not make a rule that we ourselves would not wish to follow).

Yes.

At this juncture it might be a good idea to cast your eye back to my objection:

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

I don't see it as circular. "Good" would be defined elsewhere. For example, we call something "good" if it meets a real need that we have as an individual, as a society, or as a species. Or, perhaps Kant did not provide a definition of "good" because he assumed it was common knowledge. I'm not an expert on Kant. I've only read scraps.

Kant explicitly rejects defining the 'good' in 'good will'. Read his sentence again, paying particular attention to the words I highlighted: "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." Contracted to "good will is good in itself." is as circular as an argument can get. The sentence becomes even more nonsensical when you add "only because of its volition".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Morality seeks the best good and the least harm for everyone. It's that "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" thing (which Kant turned into one of the rules for making rules, that we should not make a rule that we ourselves would not wish to follow).

Yes.

At this juncture it might be a good idea to cast your eye back to my objection:

I suppose Kant was right when he suggested that no virtue, other than a good will, could reliably produce good results.

Kant's conception of 'good will' makes his suggestion tautologous. "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." His Grundlegung is an exercise in circularity, but what else can you expect from metaphysics?

I don't see it as circular. "Good" would be defined elsewhere. For example, we call something "good" if it meets a real need that we have as an individual, as a society, or as a species. Or, perhaps Kant did not provide a definition of "good" because he assumed it was common knowledge. I'm not an expert on Kant. I've only read scraps.

Kant explicitly rejects defining the 'good' in 'good will'. Read his sentence again, paying particular attention to the words I highlighted: "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself." Contracted to "good will is good in itself." is as circular as an argument can get. The sentence becomes even more nonsensical when you add "only because of its volition".

I read that differently. I see it as making a distinction between a moral person and a moral act.

A moral person has the intention (will) to be good and to do good. However, sometimes the best of intentions have bad results.

A moral act benefits someone without causing unnecessary harm (the pain of a vaccine is a necessary harm).

In Christianity, the notion of salvation includes the reformation of ones intentions, from the intention to do harm to the intention to do good, that is, from a bad will to a good will. Satan in ones heart is replaced by Jesus, as in "Come into my heart Lord Jesus".

A person with a good will is often excused for a bad act with "he meant well" or "he did it with a good heart". Suggesting that there is goodness in the intention regardless of its results.

And that seems to me to be what Kant is trying to say with, "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end." But rather, a good heart is a good thing, even if it fails to achieve its good intentions, and even if it produces bad results.

 

[Hermit]

A person with a good will is often excused for a bad act with "he meant well" or "he did it with a good heart". Suggesting that there is goodness in the intention regardless of its results.

And that seems to me to be what Kant is trying to say with, "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end." But rather, a good heart is a good thing, even if it fails to achieve its good intentions, and even if it produces bad results.

Yes. That is precisely what I described as even more nonsensical when the words "only because of its volition" are taken into consideration. In 1099 the crusaders reportedly massacred 10,000 Muslims in the Temple of Solomon with a good heart and the best of intentions.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

A person with a good will is often excused for a bad act with "he meant well" or "he did it with a good heart". Suggesting that there is goodness in the intention regardless of its results.

And that seems to me to be what Kant is trying to say with, "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end." But rather, a good heart is a good thing, even if it fails to achieve its good intentions, and even if it produces bad results.

Yes. That is precisely what I described as even more nonsensical when the words "only because of its volition" are taken into consideration. In 1099 the crusaders reportedly massacred 10,000 Muslims in the Temple of Solomon with a good heart and the best of intentions.

Exactly.