So if you cut a worm in half...

[LordKiran]

So if you cut a worm in half and both halves regrow back into full worms, which is the worm you started with?

 

[braces_for_impact]

Neither is. That worm was gone the moment the cut was completed.

That aside this reminds me of a science project I did as a kid. I trained flatworms (planaria) to run a "T" shaped maze with a combination of positive reinforcement (food) and negative reinforcement (mild electric shocks) and then cut the worms in half once trained to see if they retained their information. Long story short: Halves of halvof halves still performed the maze well, as did several generations of their descendants.

 

[bilby]

Neither is. That worm was gone the moment the cut was completed.

That aside this reminds me of a science project I did as a kid. I trained flatworms (planaria) to run a "T" shaped maze with a combination of positive reinforcement (food) and negative reinforcement (mild electric shocks) and then cut the worms in half once trained to see if they retained their information. Long story short: Halves of halvof halves still performed the maze well, as did several generations of their descendants.

I understand that the information can also be retained if the pieces of trained worms are used as food for their previously untrained brethren. Flatworms are weird like that.

The OP is a fine example of an innate cognitive error common to all humans - the tendency to reify completely imaginary categorizations. We think that 'a worm' is a closed description of a real object; and when we find that experiment shows that our object is not real at all, we ask silly questions designed to allow us to continue in our error.

Having decided that 'a worm' is a meaningful description of something real, we find it extremely hard to accept that the evidence shows that it is not. 'The worm you started with' was never an adequate label - even though its inadequacy was not revealed until both halves became worms in their own right.

To understand reality, first we must grasp that our descriptions of it are based on guesses, and that our guesses are often wrong - even though they feel unassailable.

You can't cut a worm in half - because in this context, it's meaningless to describe the thing you are cutting as 'a worm'. You can, however, pick up a worm - because in that context, the label 'a worm' is meaningful.

Of course, if you have a common earthworm, and you cut it in half, you have a shortened worm, and a dead bit of worm (or two dead bits of worm if you cut in the wrong place). So for some kinds of worms (and, by extension, some kinds of living things) the category 'a worm' (or 'a human', or 'a cat') actually does define something real, even in the context of bisection.

The universe is under no obligation to be easy for us to understand.

 

[braces_for_impact]

Originally Posted by bilby

I understand that the information can also be retained if the trained worms are used as food for their previously untrained brethren. Flatworms are weird like that.

You know, I remember now that was part of the experiment, it's been a long time since high school.

To understand reality, first we must grasp that our descriptions of it are based on guesses, and that our guesses are often wrong - even though they feel unassailable.

I agree. I think if more people kept this in mind, maybe communication would be better.

 

[ryan]

Neither is. That worm was gone the moment the cut was completed.

That aside this reminds me of a science project I did as a kid. I trained flatworms (planaria) to run a "T" shaped maze with a combination of positive reinforcement (food) and negative reinforcement (mild electric shocks) and then cut the worms in half once trained to see if they retained their information. Long story short: Halves of halvof halves still performed the maze well, as did several generations of their descendants.

I understand that the information can also be retained if the pieces of trained worms are used as food for their previously untrained brethren. Flatworms are weird like that.

The OP is a fine example of an innate cognitive error common to all humans - the tendency to reify completely imaginary categorizations. We think that 'a worm' is a closed description of a real object; and when we find that experiment shows that our object is not real at all, we ask silly questions designed to allow us to continue in our error.

Having decided that 'a worm' is a meaningful description of something real, we find it extremely hard to accept that the evidence shows that it is not. 'The worm you started with' was never an adequate label - even though its inadequacy was not revealed until both halves became worms in their own right.

To understand reality, first we must grasp that our descriptions of it are based on guesses, and that our guesses are often wrong

I think the OP is assuming perfect knowledge of the worm. In which case it depends how the worm is initially defined qualitatively, spatially and temporally.

But yeah, if the poster defines the worm at some exact moment in some exact state, then it won't even be the same worm a moment later nevermind having been cut.

 

[LordKiran]

Neither is. That worm was gone the moment the cut was completed.

That aside this reminds me of a science project I did as a kid. I trained flatworms (planaria) to run a "T" shaped maze with a combination of positive reinforcement (food) and negative reinforcement (mild electric shocks) and then cut the worms in half once trained to see if they retained their information. Long story short: Halves of halvof halves still performed the maze well, as did several generations of their descendants.

I understand that the information can also be retained if the pieces of trained worms are used as food for their previously untrained brethren. Flatworms are weird like that.

The OP is a fine example of an innate cognitive error common to all humans - the tendency to reify completely imaginary categorizations. We think that 'a worm' is a closed description of a real object; and when we find that experiment shows that our object is not real at all, we ask silly questions designed to allow us to continue in our error.

Having decided that 'a worm' is a meaningful description of something real, we find it extremely hard to accept that the evidence shows that it is not. 'The worm you started with' was never an adequate label - even though its inadequacy was not revealed until both halves became worms in their own right.

To understand reality, first we must grasp that our descriptions of it are based on guesses, and that our guesses are often wrong - even though they feel unassailable.

You can't cut a worm in half - because in this context, it's meaningless to describe the thing you are cutting as 'a worm'. You can, however, pick up a worm - because in that context, the label 'a worm' is meaningful.

Of course, if you have a common earthworm, and you cut it in half, you have a shortened worm, and a dead bit of worm (or two dead bits of worm if you cut in the wrong place). So for some kinds of worms (and, by extension, some kinds of living things) the category 'a worm' (or 'a human', or 'a cat') actually does define something real, even in the context of bisection.

The universe is under no obligation to be easy for us to understand.

I'll be honest Bilby, I don't think I'm grasping what you're getting at. Assuming I'm not being messed with, how is cutting a worm qualitatively different from picking up a worm?

 

[LordKiran]

Neither is. That worm was gone the moment the cut was completed.

But how do you know? This line of thought makes sense with people because people and their personalities fall under chaos theory in that if you took two clones of a person and gave them the same upbringing to a G, they would still end up mentally and emotionally distinct. Are worms cognizant and intellectually developed enough to recognize themselves as distinct in relativity to other worms? If not, then is one worm of the same species (And gender where applicable?) truly different from another?

Also in retrospect, if what you said is true, then what happened to the waking mind of the worm you cut? did it pass out and 'reboot'?

 

[Juma]

There is a pile of stones before you,
you move half of the stones to the left and the rest to the right.
Which of the new piles are the original pile? Both?

 

[bilby]

I understand that the information can also be retained if the pieces of trained worms are used as food for their previously untrained brethren. Flatworms are weird like that.

The OP is a fine example of an innate cognitive error common to all humans - the tendency to reify completely imaginary categorizations. We think that 'a worm' is a closed description of a real object; and when we find that experiment shows that our object is not real at all, we ask silly questions designed to allow us to continue in our error.

Having decided that 'a worm' is a meaningful description of something real, we find it extremely hard to accept that the evidence shows that it is not. 'The worm you started with' was never an adequate label - even though its inadequacy was not revealed until both halves became worms in their own right.

To understand reality, first we must grasp that our descriptions of it are based on guesses, and that our guesses are often wrong - even though they feel unassailable.

You can't cut a worm in half - because in this context, it's meaningless to describe the thing you are cutting as 'a worm'. You can, however, pick up a worm - because in that context, the label 'a worm' is meaningful.

Of course, if you have a common earthworm, and you cut it in half, you have a shortened worm, and a dead bit of worm (or two dead bits of worm if you cut in the wrong place). So for some kinds of worms (and, by extension, some kinds of living things) the category 'a worm' (or 'a human', or 'a cat') actually does define something real, even in the context of bisection.

The universe is under no obligation to be easy for us to understand.

I'll be honest Bilby, I don't think I'm grasping what you're getting at. Assuming I'm not being messed with, how is cutting a worm qualitatively different from picking up a worm?

The difference is in the relevance of the label. 'A worm' is a label. It appears to describe a discrete object; But as Juma's example of 'a pile of stones' exemplifies, the label may not in fact refer to a discrete object - our expectation that a worm is a discrete object is not confounded when we pick up a worm; but is confounded when we cut it in half, and both halves remain 'a worm'.

 

[LordKiran]

I'll be honest Bilby, I don't think I'm grasping what you're getting at. Assuming I'm not being messed with, how is cutting a worm qualitatively different from picking up a worm?

The difference is in the relevance of the label. 'A worm' is a label. It appears to describe a discrete object; But as Juma's example of 'a pile of stones' exemplifies, the label may not in fact refer to a discrete object - our expectation that a worm is a discrete object is not confounded when we pick up a worm; but is confounded when we cut it in half, and both halves remain 'a worm'.

well they don't remain 'a worm' but rather 'two halves of a worm' which eventually grow into two worms. In Juma's example, the two piles of stones don't grow to the same size and dimensions as the pile you started with, so neither pile is the pile you started with.

 

[untermensche]

So if you cut a worm in half and both halves regrow back into full worms, which is the worm you started with?

This is merely a question about what we should call things. It is not a question about what things are.

The original worm was the uncut worm.

Once cut nothing else can be called the "original worm".

 

[Speakpigeon]

So if you cut a worm in half and both halves regrow back into full worms, which is the worm you started with?

You seem to accept the premise that a worm identified at time t1 can be cut in two at time t2. Cut me here if you disagree.

So, if you agree with that, then the label 'worm' identifies not just something at time t1, but something at time t2 and, presumably, at all times in between t1 and t2. So the label seems to identify, to you, an object having both space and time dimensions.

This clearly applies to all sorts of things: persons, houses, cities, planets, galaxies, the universe etc.

So, where would be the problem? Most of the time, if you cut something in two, we tend to think the thing no longer exists. If you cut King Louis XVI in two, we think he's dead, i.e. his person no longer exist. But wait! If somebody cuts your house in two but then you put it back together, you're still going to say it's your house, and most people would agree with that. If you cut a cake in two, the two halves still make up the same cake, though it's cut in two. You can even cut it into ten or more slices and it will still be the same cake, though cut into ten or more slices. If you cut a car in two, it's still your car, though it probably isn't going to work very well. If I have a treasure, you can cut it in two and it's still the same treasure.

Now, what about a pile of stones (I don't know why this example comes to my mind)? If you cut a pile of stones in two you're likely to end up with two smaller piles of stones. Also, depending on how you make the cut, it might be impossible to reform the original pile. Yet, if you remove, say, one stone and put it on the ground, you have cut the pile in two and the original pile no longer exists. Yet, what if you put the stone back to where it was originally with the other stones? If you do it well, you'll have the original pile back into existence. Think of masterpiece paintings. Say we cut the Joconde in two. Presumably, we can say that the Joconde no longer exists. Yet, suppose restauration work successfully puts it back together. People would say that the result is the Joconde. It will be the Joconde somewhat altered but still the Joconde.

What is interesting in your example is that the two halves of the original worm each regrow a complete worm, probably undistinguishable from the original one. This is a somewhat unusual feature as these things go. People don't do that. Masterpieces don't do that. The situation clearly defeats the cognitive mechanism by which we identify things. Namely, we can't cope with two occurrences of the same thing. We can have two identical things; for example two coins, two twins, two electrons. But it's not possible to have two different things that are the same thing (I'm speaking to people who speak properly English here, this being a particular point that many people around here can't get right because their English is so sloppy). Now, think of lizards. They somehow cut their own tail to escape predators. So, the result is two halves of lizard. However, only the bit with the heart, and the brain etc. will survive. It will also regrow a tail, though it takes time. Yet, we're going to think of it as the same lizard and no problem. The same thing would happen I'm sure if people could regrow missing limbs. So, the problem with the worm is that we end up with two worms instead of one and so we're stuck. The problem is that the two regrown worms will be as good as identical to the original worm but only one of these two worms could possibly be the same as the original worm. This is just being the way our brain works.

Now, I think this shows something very interesting. Ah, I see it's time to regrow myself a full stomach, so maybe next time, folks, if it's still me then, I don't know.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

So if you cut a worm in half and both halves regrow back into full worms, which is the worm you started with?

Now, I think this shows something very interesting. Ah, I see it's time to regrow myself a full stomach, so maybe next time, folks, if it's still me then, I don't know.
EB

I recommend you donate part of your liver instead. It makes the discussion more on rail. Now we get to the place where there is something that is two which shares something which was one which seems more palatable unless you want to be pure, change the discussion from beings to parts and put liver parts in vats of nutrients. Then the discussion moves from the being(s) to being(s) and the environment surrounding them. Actually, if we do that ,we should go back and include reproduction.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You seem to accept the premise that a worm identified at time t1 can be cut in two at time t2. Cut me here if you disagree.

So, if you agree with that, then the label 'worm' identifies not just something at time t1, but something at time t2 and, presumably, at all times in between t1 and t2. So the label seems to identify, to you, an object having both space and time dimensions.


This clearly applies to all sorts of things: persons, houses, cities, planets, galaxies, the universe etc.

So what we see we take to be what the person, the city, the planet etc. looks like at a particular time. At any one time we only see one aspect of the thing. We have to wait to see what a person we're talking to now will look like tomorrow. The same person. The person will be the same but they will look somewhat different, perhaps even very different. So, if you are looking at your house that has been destroyed by an explosion, it can no longer properly be said to be a house because a destroyed house isn't a house but you will still say that it was your house. That is to say, the smoldering thing you would be looking at would no longer be a house but it would still be the same thing as your house. What you would be looking at would be what this thing that was your house only yesterday would now look like after having been destroyed by an explosion. The house is destroyed but the destroyed house is still something and clearly it's a destroyed house. And clearly it's the same thing as what was your house yesterday. Only it looks very different. It's no way near being identical. But it's the same thing. Now it's a destroyed house, yesterday it was still a perfectly good house. The perfectly good house and the destroyed house are just two aspects of the same thing at two different times. A broken glass is the same as the glass still unbroken. It's difficult to recognised that they are the same thing but it's still possible. Your will know it's your house, though it be destroyed, just because of the location, if however, you are able to identify the location. It's more difficult to identify broken glass with a particular unbroken glass. You may need to be present as the glass is being broken.

Earth worms are probably ranking lowest in our consideration and it's only because cruel bastards are actually paid to cut perfectly good worms in two that we get to know that the two halves of a cut worm will each regrow a complete worm. We have to be creative at this juncture because it's a new situation. There's nothing like earth worms that the human brain had to take into account when it worked out the most efficient model of our environment. And once our brain has a model, it's difficult to regrow a new model to take earth worms' trick into account. We wouldn't be the same person if our brain suddenly decided to regrow a new model. Saying that only one of the two regrown worms is the same as the original conflicts with our perception that the situation is symmetrical between the two regrown worms: why not say the same thing of the other regrown worm? But saying that the two regrown worms are each the same as the original conflicts with our perception that there was only one original worm and that we now have two regrown worms. In practical terms, each of the two regrown worms is as good as being the same as the original worm. It's just that this solution produces a conceptual conflict for our model of reality and it seems so fundamental that we can't get our heads around the problem.

Even saying none of the two regrown worms is the same as the original is problematic. They may be both more identical with the original worm than for example a person injured in a serious accident would be to what they were before the accident and in this case we still see the injured person as the same person. There's also a clear space-time continuity between the original worm and each of the two regrown ones. And we can't say that the two regrown worms are collectively the same as the original because we can only see them as two worms, not one. We would have to ask Kant to solve the metaphysics of this conceptual problem but clearly we are stuck.

Well, it's Ok. These things are just earth worms. And maybe our brain chose to attribute the lowest ranking in the Creation to earth worms to try to stop us noticing this problem. Our brain thought we could go mad just having to think through this paradox.

Notice that there isn't such a big difference with for example sexual reproduction. It's just that we are normally able to tell who are the parents and who are the children because the parents do usually survive parturition. And the bit 'cut' from the parents is so small we don't really think of it as cut from the parents. So clearly it's all a matter of convention, except that our routine for agreeing conventions doesn't work for cut earth worms.
EB

 

[Tigers!]

The difference is in the relevance of the label. 'A worm' is a label. It appears to describe a discrete object; But as Juma's example of 'a pile of stones' exemplifies, the label may not in fact refer to a discrete object - our expectation that a worm is a discrete object is not confounded when we pick up a worm; but is confounded when we cut it in half, and both halves remain 'a worm'.

I would have thought both halves are half a worm each.

 

[Malintent]

Neither is. That worm was gone the moment the cut was completed.

That aside this reminds me of a science project I did as a kid. I trained flatworms (planaria) to run a "T" shaped maze with a combination of positive reinforcement (food) and negative reinforcement (mild electric shocks) and then cut the worms in half once trained to see if they retained their information. Long story short: Halves of halvof halves still performed the maze well, as did several generations of their descendants.

"neither" and "both" are valid responses. Human's have a concept of identity, and that identity is part of a discrete neurological system that cannot be duplicated by cutting it in half. So, this concept of "which one is the original one" is invalid. It's like asking which half of a sliced apple is the real apple.

Worms have distributed neurological systems... any concept of identity is equally distributed across the entire organism. If you loose one of your fingers, are you no longer you? is that severed finger now another "you". of course not. because we have an artificial identity created by a single organ that cannot be divided.

in a worm, there is just as much "identity" in any group of neurons as another.

- - - Updated - - -

The difference is in the relevance of the label. 'A worm' is a label. It appears to describe a discrete object; But as Juma's example of 'a pile of stones' exemplifies, the label may not in fact refer to a discrete object - our expectation that a worm is a discrete object is not confounded when we pick up a worm; but is confounded when we cut it in half, and both halves remain 'a worm'.

I would have thought both halves are half a worm each.

Yes... with respect to the original worm... but they exist independently, so it is also equally accurate to say that the original worm was destroyed and two new worms were created.