The 3 is's

[fast]

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad....is-of-identity-and-the-is-of-predication.html

A couple side notes before I begin.

1) I do know from previous discussions that there are at least three common descriptions in philosophy regarding the word, "is." One is the is of identity, one is the is of predication, and I don't recall the third right now. Also, i only have a rough familiarization, and I'd be nervous to identify them in a long passage.

2) I have been trying to pin down my view on what a proposition is for a long time. I have some views, but articulating them correctly might prove long winded.

One offered definition by others is: a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence.

Now, I don't deny that per se, but my issue is with the word "is". Which one is it? I'm confused. On the one hand, I think it's the is of identity since it's a definition, but even though I think a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence, I do not, however, believe that a proposition is sentence dependent.

I think a proposition is (and I'm not attempting to give a definition here) an analytical tool that allows us to dispense with the notion that propositions are temporal or human or mind dependent.

Let me give you an example:

Consider the sentence: The Moon orbits Earth

Was the proposition expressed by that sentence true before there were humans to create the sentence? See the problem?

Solution:

Consider not the sentence.
Instead, consider the proposition: The Moon orbits Earth

Objection: no proposition without a sentence.

My stance: false, propositions are not sentence dependent, yet I fully agree that propositions are expressed by sentences, but if you think a sentence is a necessary condition for a proposition, then I disagree.

They are abstract, in my view, and I rarely encounter someone with the patience to refrain from arguing against abstractions, so this thread isn't about propositions per se, but the 'is' in the sentence where one says what a proposition is becomes perplexing because I feel like I want to say it is and isn't the is of identity depending on how I'm viewing it at any given moment. As a definition, yes, but as a mere truth, then no, so when thinking both, I contradict myself.

Can anyone make sense of this mess?

 

[Speakpigeon]

The third "is" is existence. God is = God exists.

If you say as you did that a proposition is what is expressed by a sentence then is seems indeed to be the "is" of identity: proposition = what is expressed by a sentence.

This seems problematic for the reasons you give although it should be said that not all philosophers insisted on making the distinction between the sentence and the proposition expressed by the sentence, Quine for one, although possibly mainly for pragmatic reasons.

If you had said that a proposition is expressed by a sentence the "is" here seems to be predicative. If so the problem you identified no longer exists although other problems seem to be lurking in the shadows.


Also, there seems to be a problem in your presentation of the notion of proposition. Sorry if I misunderstood. Your example of the proposition "The Moon orbits the Earth" seems to suggest you equate a proposition with a mere fact (here, the fact that the Moon orbits the Earth) and you want therefore propositions to be not only independent of any particular sentence, as most philosophers seem to insist, but independent of man kind so to speak. However, while a proposition may somehow be related to a fact, this is not necessarily so. For example, the proposition "The Earth is orbiting Jupiter" is not considered to be related to any actual fact. That may be why Frege insisted that propositions referred to truth values, not facts.

That being said, I don't have a solution for your problem. I think sentences express meanings, not propositions, and as I see it meanings are ideas, i.e. mental objects, an idea for which there is a long philosophical tradition.

I also think the notion of proposition has been produced as a result of wishful thinking, as if it was possible to speak of the material world with no presuppositions about it.
EB

 

[Togo]

It may be more helpful to think of sentences and propositions as corresponding with truth, rather than being true in and of themselves.

Thus the Moon orbits the Earth is a proposition that corresponds with the truth. The truth it corresponds with was true before the existence of humanity, or of the proposition. The structure and meaning of the proposition are dependent on human intellect and human meaning, but the truth value to which it corresponds is not.

Does that help?

 

[fast]

It may be more helpful to think of sentences and propositions as corresponding with truth, rather than being true in and of themselves.

Thus the Moon orbits the Earth is a proposition that corresponds with the truth. The truth it corresponds with was true before the existence of humanity, or of the proposition. The structure and meaning of the proposition are dependent on human intellect and human meaning, but the truth value to which it corresponds is not.

Does that help?

I'm not sure it's more helpful, but I deny neither that propositions are the the kinds of things that are true or false, nor that propositions are the kinds of things that correspond with truth.

As for sentences, well, i do believe that it's acceptable to affirm that declarative sentences that express propositions are true or false. I suppose it's okay to say some sentences correspond with truth.

I want to be exceptionally careful not to deny the fact that there were truths before man, in both senses of the term, "truth". There is the fact that there were orbiting bodies in space prior to the dawn of man, so because there were facts, so too were there truths, but that's to say there were truths in the sense where facts are truths, but in another sense more aligned with the correspondence theory of truth, I want to side with the camp that says there were such truths as well long before there were people to utter sentences that express propositions that correspond to the facts of the world.

 

[Kharakov]

Just replace "IS" with "BE".


What is it? What it be?

Is that the doorbell?
That be the doorbell?

That ham sammich be yummy.
That is one damn fine brotha chuckin sammich.

Wait.. does the is in the above sentence work better as a be?

That be one damn brotha chuckin sammich, you surly motherfucker.



Ultimately, it depends on what the meaning of the word be be.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I don't have the problem you seem to want to address here as I don't believe words have meanings.

Hey, where did you find your sammich?
EB

 

[Togo]

There's a game out this year, called Ugh-tect. You have to direct the other players to build a little monument out of coloured blocks. The problem is that you can't speak, and can't point or gesture with anything other than a giant club.

That suggests that propositions are quite possible without sentences, or indeed without words.

A friend of mine ran a role-playing game called Ugh, which had a limited vocabulary of 20 words, made up of various Ughs. The game lasted for 3.5 hours, and by the end the players had established a vocabulary of some 120 words.

I have no problem with the idea that meaning and words are independent of each other. If they weren't, then we wouldn't be able to conceive of things we had no word for.

 

[Kharakov]

Hey, where did you find your sammich?
EB

Safeway actually makes a decent sammich platter, to tell you the truth (well, depends on the Safeway, perhaps?). A lazy, but decent way, to feed family and friends.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There's a game out this year, called Ugh-tect. You have to direct the other players to build a little monument out of coloured blocks. The problem is that you can't speak, and can't point or gesture with anything other than a giant club.

That suggests that propositions are quite possible without sentences, or indeed without words.

A friend of mine ran a role-playing game called Ugh, which had a limited vocabulary of 20 words, made up of various Ughs. The game lasted for 3.5 hours, and by the end the players had established a vocabulary of some 120 words.

I have no problem with the idea that meaning and words are independent of each other. If they weren't, then we wouldn't be able to conceive of things we had no word for.

Yes, apt example.

Others include sign language, verbal communication, non-verbal communication, empathy... also same spelling different meanings in different languages or in the same language but spoken by different speech communities (e.g. "table the motion" in U.S. and British English), etc.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I want to come back on one aspect of the OP.

One offered definition by others is: a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence.

I think this sentence would be misleading as a definition but I suspect that it's really meant as an explanation (of the notion of proposition). However, it would be more apt in this case to put it like this instead: a proposition can be expressed by a sentence.

If you want the "is" back, you could put it like this: a proposition is something that can be expressed by a sentence. However, in this case it seems clear that the "is" is predicative so your problem is solved I think.

Consider the sentence: The Moon orbits Earth

Was the proposition expressed by that sentence true before there were humans to create the sentence? See the problem?

Solution:

Consider not the sentence.
Instead, consider the proposition: The Moon orbits Earth

Objection: no proposition without a sentence.

If we take a proposition to be an idea of a fact then we can make the distinction between sentences, ideas and facts, as follows:

The sentence "The Moon orbits Earth" is clearly dependent on mankind and even on a particular language.

However, somebody who uses the sentence "The Moon orbits Earth" will mean a certain idea, i.e. <The Moon orbits Earth>. This idea is also dependent on mankind and even on the particular individual who is entertaining it in his mind. The idea is not dependent on any particular sentence but its linguistic expression is dependent on our hability to use languages . However, the idea can also be expressed using a drawing representing the Moon orbititing the Earth.

Finally, the idea <The Moon orbits Earth> may mean a fact, i.e. the fact that the Moon orbits the Earth. The fact, if there is one, would not depend on the idea, nor on any particular individual, nor on mankind. Whether a fact might depend on something else I think we don't know except perhaps to say that it would depend on the only fact that may be truly necessary, i.e. reality.

According to this, if we take the definition to be "A proposition is someone's idea of a fact", the "is" means identity. Then an explanation could be: "Propositions can be expressed by sentences", where the "is" has disappeared. Another explanation may be: "A proposition is something that can be expressed by a sentence", where the "is" is predicative. Now, the sentence "A proposition is what can be expressed by a sentence" is misleading if it's meant as a definition, because the "is" would have to express identity, making the sentence false.
EB

 

[fast]

I want to come back on one aspect of the OP.


I think this sentence would be misleading as a definition but I suspect that it's really meant as an explanation (of the notion of proposition). However, it would be more apt in this case to put it like this instead: a proposition can be expressed by a sentence.

If you want the "is" back, you could put it like this: a proposition is something that can be expressed by a sentence. However, in this case it seems clear that the "is" is predicative so your problem is solved I think.

Consider the sentence: The Moon orbits Earth

Was the proposition expressed by that sentence true before there were humans to create the sentence? See the problem?

Solution:

Consider not the sentence.
Instead, consider the proposition: The Moon orbits Earth

Objection: no proposition without a sentence.

If we take a proposition to be an idea of a fact then we can make the distinction between sentences, ideas and facts, as follows:

The sentence "The Moon orbits Earth" is clearly dependent on mankind and even on a particular language.

However, somebody who uses the sentence "The Moon orbits Earth" will mean a certain idea, i.e. <The Moon orbits Earth>. This idea is also dependent on mankind and even on the particular individual who is entertaining it in his mind. The idea is not dependent on any particular sentence but its linguistic expression is dependent on our hability to use languages . However, the idea can also be expressed using a drawing representing the Moon orbititing the Earth.

Finally, the idea <The Moon orbits Earth> may mean a fact, i.e. the fact that the Moon orbits the Earth. The fact, if there is one, would not depend on the idea, nor on any particular individual, nor on mankind. Whether a fact might depend on something else I think we don't know except perhaps to say that it would depend on the only fact that may be truly necessary, i.e. reality.

According to this, if we take the definition to be "A proposition is someone's idea of a fact", the "is" means identity. Then an explanation could be: "Propositions can be expressed by sentences", where the "is" has disappeared. Another explanation may be: "A proposition is something that can be expressed by a sentence", where the "is" is predicative. Now, the sentence "A proposition is what can be expressed by a sentence" is misleading if it's meant as a definition, because the "is" would have to express identity, making the sentence false.
EB

Thoughtful post.

I still have a good deal to mull over. Been busy lately. A few short thoughts before I go.

Definition versus meaning:

A definition is an explanation.

Of course, not all explanations are definitions.

A definition is an explanation of meaning.

When we look in a dictionary, we find definitions. We do not (directly) find the meaning of words. We glean the meaning of words when we interpret what we see: the written definition that (you guessed it) explain what the words mean.

Meaning (lexical meaning, that is) is a function of the collective usage of words. I say collective usage in contrast to individual usage so no one mistakenly thinks that a words meaning (true lexical meaning) is a product of what one may happen to mean when one uses a word.

Words denote, and what words denote is meaning.

...

Words, meaning (collective usage), sentences, definitions (explanations): simply not around way back then.

Reality ... Oh yes, nature, facts, the truth (in one sense) .... Been around awhile

Propositions ... What's it's birthday? (Yes, I'm tired, jumbled thoughts and rambling) ... Reality has been on the scene for awhile, like, since forever. Petty human explanations, well, they came much later. But, a proposition? A human invention, a late bloomer to the scene?

Maybe, maybe not. It depends on the referent.

The word moon came long after the moon was formed. The meaning of the word moon came long after the moon formed. The object to which the word refers, namely the moon predates well all of it.

The word proposition may be a creation of man. What it means is, of course, a function of how it's used in our lexicon. But, that which instantiates the word is still in question. Because it's not physical, there is going to be the added distraction of having to entertain the notion of abstract objects, and it's a daunting task to get someone on the same page about the true consequences of accepting the notion of abstract objects.

It's not as mystic as some think.

Consider the spoken definition of a word never written after human extinction. Awe, the truths of non-physical entities.

And then, there's the issue of dealing with the silly belief that they're in our heads.

Fireball cinnamon whiskey

 

[Speakpigeon]

THAT was rambling.

Still, I still don't know what's your peeve about meaning being inside people's head? If anyhting at all is to be found somewhere surely meaning could be inside people's head. Aren't words mainly signs that we exchange between us to achieve communication, not so differently from what animals do, or even cells. Computers do do something also very similar, somewhat less creatively and romantically but they demonstrate the basics of lexical and syntaxic communication even though their languages come from outwith.
EB