fast
Contributor
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad....is-of-identity-and-the-is-of-predication.html
A couple side notes before I begin.
1) I do know from previous discussions that there are at least three common descriptions in philosophy regarding the word, "is." One is the is of identity, one is the is of predication, and I don't recall the third right now. Also, i only have a rough familiarization, and I'd be nervous to identify them in a long passage.
2) I have been trying to pin down my view on what a proposition is for a long time. I have some views, but articulating them correctly might prove long winded.
One offered definition by others is: a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence.
Now, I don't deny that per se, but my issue is with the word "is". Which one is it? I'm confused. On the one hand, I think it's the is of identity since it's a definition, but even though I think a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence, I do not, however, believe that a proposition is sentence dependent.
I think a proposition is (and I'm not attempting to give a definition here) an analytical tool that allows us to dispense with the notion that propositions are temporal or human or mind dependent.
Let me give you an example:
Consider the sentence: The Moon orbits Earth
Was the proposition expressed by that sentence true before there were humans to create the sentence? See the problem?
Solution:
Consider not the sentence.
Instead, consider the proposition: The Moon orbits Earth
Objection: no proposition without a sentence.
My stance: false, propositions are not sentence dependent, yet I fully agree that propositions are expressed by sentences, but if you think a sentence is a necessary condition for a proposition, then I disagree.
They are abstract, in my view, and I rarely encounter someone with the patience to refrain from arguing against abstractions, so this thread isn't about propositions per se, but the 'is' in the sentence where one says what a proposition is becomes perplexing because I feel like I want to say it is and isn't the is of identity depending on how I'm viewing it at any given moment. As a definition, yes, but as a mere truth, then no, so when thinking both, I contradict myself.
Can anyone make sense of this mess?
A couple side notes before I begin.
1) I do know from previous discussions that there are at least three common descriptions in philosophy regarding the word, "is." One is the is of identity, one is the is of predication, and I don't recall the third right now. Also, i only have a rough familiarization, and I'd be nervous to identify them in a long passage.
2) I have been trying to pin down my view on what a proposition is for a long time. I have some views, but articulating them correctly might prove long winded.
One offered definition by others is: a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence.
Now, I don't deny that per se, but my issue is with the word "is". Which one is it? I'm confused. On the one hand, I think it's the is of identity since it's a definition, but even though I think a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence, I do not, however, believe that a proposition is sentence dependent.
I think a proposition is (and I'm not attempting to give a definition here) an analytical tool that allows us to dispense with the notion that propositions are temporal or human or mind dependent.
Let me give you an example:
Consider the sentence: The Moon orbits Earth
Was the proposition expressed by that sentence true before there were humans to create the sentence? See the problem?
Solution:
Consider not the sentence.
Instead, consider the proposition: The Moon orbits Earth
Objection: no proposition without a sentence.
My stance: false, propositions are not sentence dependent, yet I fully agree that propositions are expressed by sentences, but if you think a sentence is a necessary condition for a proposition, then I disagree.
They are abstract, in my view, and I rarely encounter someone with the patience to refrain from arguing against abstractions, so this thread isn't about propositions per se, but the 'is' in the sentence where one says what a proposition is becomes perplexing because I feel like I want to say it is and isn't the is of identity depending on how I'm viewing it at any given moment. As a definition, yes, but as a mere truth, then no, so when thinking both, I contradict myself.
Can anyone make sense of this mess?
Last edited: