We all get to think for ourselves.
How?
With our electrochemical brains, of course. We get one each. No two are alike, so thoughts form in one brain that do not form in another. I can figure out facts Haldane couldn't. He could figure out facts I couldn't.
As you state latter our brains are atomic movement. Atomic movement does not have free will or capacity to think. We don’t get to think if free will does not exist. By your reasoning there…..What you just said, you had no choice to say, you had to say it because the movement of atoms caused you to say it. The rational outcome of that reasoning infers that your thoughts… that your response…. was reasoned…. was just an illusion.
That appears to be the "fallacy of composition". From the fact that a moving atom has no capacity to think, it does not follow that a trillion trillion atoms have no capacity to think.
Have you ever played chess against a computer? A computer is made up of thousands or millions of transistors. A transistor has no capacity to play chess -- all it can do is vary its resistance deterministically in response to an applied voltage. But put a million transistors together, in just the right combination, and connect a battery to them, and they'll checkmate you. Is the checkmate just an illusion? The
combination of transistors evidently has the capacity to play chess, even though its individual parts don't. Supposing that what is true of the parts must be true of the whole is a fallacy.
The same principle applies to reasoning in general: an atom cannot reason, but a machine made up of enough atoms, assembled in just the right way, will reason. We can tell this is possible because a transistor is made of atoms, and
playing chess well requires reasoning. In order to checkmate you, the computer has to consider what you will probably do if it makes a certain move and it has to draw a correct inference about whether your countermove will bring victory closer to you or bring it closer to the computer. If the computer doesn't reason but you do, the computer will lose.
(Of course for all I know you may have won every game you've played against a computer. But that would just mean you haven't played the best computers.)
And in the second place, there's no reason to think material causes are incompatible with free will.
I freely choose not to reason that at all. I have the free will to correctly acknowledge that material causes are all around us. Hence they are completely compatible. What I’m protesting is that my thoughts on that were determined by a material cause.
Sorry, I'll try to speak more precisely. There's no reason to think thoughts being determined by material causes is incompatible with free will. Maybe my brain is deterministic; maybe it isn't; I'm agnostic on that question; and either way I have free will.
The classic argument that causality conflicts with freedom is a reasoning error that Hume refuted back in the 1700s.
I’m unaware of any classical argument stated that way. So please provide a link to that….should be easy if it is a classic.
Sorry, I've been speaking imprecisely again. I meant the classic argument that freedom conflicts with human actions being wholly determined by prior causes. It's in the "of liberty and necessity" chapter of
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (In Hume's 1748 terminology, freedom is "liberty" and a determined event is "necessary".)
"I hope, therefore, to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words."
I.e., he's saying the common opinion that freedom is incompatible with prior causes determining human action was derived from unreasonable definitions of terms. Here's the link.
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/...ing-the-principles-of-morals#lf0222_label_043
I really don’t see how the two relate. But I’m open to hear your thoughts on it.
Because…….
When you say “causality conflicts with freedom” you can mean one of two thoughts here. (as I read it.) And neither is reasonable at all.
You are inferring the material causality and thought are incompatible.
I'm certainly not inferring that.
Which is what I just redressed above. They are not in conflict unless you are asserting the free will has a material cause.
Or….
You are saying that the free will has a material cause.
Yes. More precisely, I'm saying free will
can have a material cause. Of course for all I know there might be some beings whose free will has material causes and other beings whose free will has immaterial causes. It's a big multiverse.
Which is a flat out contradiction. And not “Hume-rous” at all.
I don't see any contradiction. I said "free will can have a material cause." I didn't say "free will can't have a material cause." So I didn't contradict myself on that point. I take it when you call it a flat out contradiction, what you mean is that the premise "free will can have a material cause" logically implies the conclusion "free will can't have a material cause." I don't see how it implies that. Can you point me to the derivation?
The opinion persists because of cultural inertia. The intuitive basis for its plausibility is Western culture's previous general acceptance of Cartesian Dualism -- the notion that we have a physical brain and a separate immaterial mind.
AKA substance dualism. OK.
And you assert that it is wrong. OK.
But….
Here is the issue I have with that.
But to what end?
Is your view one of physicalism or property dualism?
Or some other alternative I haven’t heard of yet?
I am unconvinced that the term "physical" is sufficiently well-defined to make all those metaphysical distinctions coherent. I guess that makes it "some other alternative".
And this……..as I understand it this here is…………
So if an action is caused by atoms in your brain then that means it isn't caused by your mind, so your mind is a helpless passenger rather than the driver of the vehicle. But Cartesian dualism is wrong. You ***are*** the atoms in your brain. So when the atoms in your brain cause your finger to move, that's ***you*** causing your finger to move. You are the driver. Where you go is your choice. You aren't a helpless passenger.
…….your attempt to show the substance dualism is wrong.
So….let examine your attempt.
That's not at all what I was attempting to show. I was showing how (Determinism + Substance Dualism) implies (No free will), in order to draw attention to the fact that (Determinism all by itself) does not imply (No free will).
Showing substance dualism is wrong would take a whole separate argument.
I am the atoms of my brain. The atoms move my fingers presumably to control the vehicle. Thus I am the driver and not a helpless passenger.
But that means………
Since I am the atoms of my brain and I am the driver, then the atoms are the driver.
So where in there is free will?
Same place as the chess-playing ability: it's in the structure in which the atoms combine.
Because
Atoms do not choose nor reason. Their movements are determined by material causation.
Gravity does not choose to act. Nor can it act differently.
Atoms do not choose to stop the car or go, turn left or right, go to the movies or the beach.
And you think that means a trillion trillion atoms do not choose nor reason? That's the fallacy of composition.
How am I not a helpless passenger if there is no free will?
Somewhere in there you deceived yourself. Do you see where?
Well…
You smuggled in free will with your nebulous “YOU”. You assumed “YOU” has a choice to reason.
That's not me deceiving myself; that's me recognizing who set out to show what, and me showing no more than I need to.
You're reversing burden-of-proof. You're the one claiming that free will having a material cause is a "flat out contradiction"; that makes it your job to show that my nebulous "YOU" has no choice. We can walk away right now and agree to disagree, with you still thinking all those atoms have no choice and me still thinking they have a choice, neither of us establishing we're right. If we do that,
you lose the argument. You claimed we atheists were contradicting ourselves, but all you showed was that you disagree with us.
“YOU” can’t choose if “YOU” is just atomic movement.
Let's see you derive ("YOU" can't choose) from ("YOU" is just atomic movement) without relying on the fallacy of composition.
Free will is argued against in semi-atheistic reasoning -- reasoning that adopts some atheistic premises and some theistic premises and tries to draw reasonable conclusions from the hopeless chimera formed by mixing the two.
Explain this semi-atheistic reasoning to me. You simply make an assertion there without reason of what the premises are and why the reasoning fails. Meaning your assertion at this point is baseless until you make a case for your assertion.
Huh? I explained it. And you quoted it back to me. (In pieces. I take it you didn't recognize it as a single semi-atheistic argument once you'd broken it up in order to address the fragments separately. No worries.)
"we have a physical brain and a separate immaterial mind. So if an action is caused by atoms in your brain then that means it isn't caused by your mind, so your mind is a helpless passenger rather than the driver of the vehicle."
That's the semi-atheistic reasoning. "An action is caused by atoms in your brain" is the atheistic premise. "We have a physical brain and a separate immaterial mind" is the theistic premise. "Your mind is a helpless passenger rather than the driver of the vehicle" is the conclusion that follows from the chimera of mixed premises.
That's what you've been doing all along in this thread -- trying to figure out what atheism implies by adding atheistic premises to your premise set, but without deleting all of the conflicting theistic premises you live and breathe and take for granted.
That’s your interpretation.
But
My conclusions have been reach by examining the alternatives of this issue. Substance dualism to me is the only reasonable choice.
I understand you think it's the only reasonable choice; but that's not a premise I or most atheists share. So if you want to find out whether free will having a material cause is a "flat out contradiction", you have to either delete the assumption of substance dualism and try to derive a contradiction without it, or else you need to
prove substance dualism is correct. And I mean "prove" literally: a deductive proof from pure logic. A mere inductive argument that it's more likely than not, or a deductive argument from some other premise you think is obviously true, won't do you any good here. If you convince yourself substance dualism is the only reasonable choice inductively or from a different assumption, then free will having a material cause won't be a flat out contradiction -- it will merely be a hypothesis you think you have good reason to disagree with.
You have attempted to make your case that my belief in substance dualism is assumed. Yet I’ve addressed all of the concerns you presented so far.
Your attempts to address it look to me like they involved circular arguments and/or the fallacy of composition. If you think you made a case for substance dualism somewhere that didn't commit either of those fallacies, let me know which post I need to reread more carefully.
You have provided no reason as to why I should delete my premises.
By "delete your premises", I didn't mean "Stop believing your premises"; I meant "Stop relying on your premises when you argue about what atheists' premises imply". I provided you a reason for that: so that you won't screw up your argument and draw a false conclusion about what our premises imply. "I believe X. You believe Y. Y implies NOT X. Therefore your beliefs are contradictory." is invalid reasoning.
We have free will or we do not. If we do not have free will then we have determinism. You have been miserably trying to make the case that determinism provides free will.
No I haven't -- I've been trying to make the case that you haven't made the case that it doesn't. For a positive case that it does, see the above link to Hume. Be persuaded or not -- it doesn't matter to me. Like I said from the start, "in the first place, free will is an irrelevance to the issue at hand". Haldane committed a non-sequitur even if free will requires non-determinism.
I examined your case, provided reasons as to why it is not reasonable. To believe that determinism provides free will IS a contradiction. Perhaps that is a premise you should delete?
That's no premise of mine. Like I said, I'm agnostic about determinism. Like Hume said, "liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance". Chance does not provide free will; therefore non-determinism does not provide free will.
Not at all. Bilby simply pointed out that Haldane had not made a logical argument. Haldane's conclusion does not follow from his stated premises.
And I countered his charge of it being a massive non sequitur. Which you have failed the reason into your assertion there. Simply repeating bibly’s error does not make it correct.
So……
Prove to me that you’ve reasoned that correctly. Give me the Haldane’s premises, conclusion and the reasoning from the premises to the conclusion and then point out where any of it is wrong.
His premises: "my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain."
His conclusion: "I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true"
His reasoning: Hard to say. Maybe no reasoning. Maybe a feeling of truthiness. Maybe "They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically." Maybe a truly remarkable proof of this theorem which the margin was too small to contain.
In the event that Haldane intended "They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically." to be his reasoning from his premise to his conclusion, it's an invalid argument. It's of the form "X is not a Y; therefore I have no Y." That's the fallacy of hasty generalization.
Before you reply, you may want to first go back and read my reply to bibly on that.
You mean this?
"Haldane’s point is from a naturistic viewpoint (foundational to atheism) there is no thinking. He simply had to say that. You had to disagree with him. Christians have to believe what they believe. That’s the way naturalism works….there is no freewill, thinking or choice. It is all but illusion bc all is naturally deterministic."
That's still a non-sequitur. Even if Haldane simply had to say it, and Bilby had to disagree, and you have to agree, and naturalism rules out free will and choice,
how would any of that imply it rules out thinking? Just because the
free will and the
choice are illusion in no way imply the
thinking is illusion. Quite the reverse. Your own argument specifies Bilby
disagreeing and Christians
believing. Well, disagreeing and believing are species of
thought. So even if we conclude the mind is a helpless passenger because atoms can't provide freedom, that doesn't make it an
unthinking passenger. Just because a mind is stuck on a railroad track with only one possible destination doesn't mean that track isn't carrying it
through a chain of reasoning.
You also replied with this:
"And to support my point you added (also from post 33)…..
bilby said:
Do you think that if the output of a CPU is determined wholly by the motion of electrons in the chip you have no reason to suppose that the output is correct? If so, you have no way to tell whether I even wrote this, so you would be crazy to respond to it.
I don’t think that at all, I’m theistic. That is the logical product of atheistic thinking. Which again was my point. Hence why I claimed that you seemingly supported my reasoning."
You don't think the output of a CPU is determined wholly by the motion of electrons in the chip, because you're theistic? Does that mean God personally intervenes in order to set the voltages on the chip wires? You trust the output of your computer to tell you the truth about what Bilby typed, not because electrons follow Maxwell's equations, and the engineers knew what they were doing when they designed the circuit, and the manufacturers knew what they were doing when they built it, but because you trust God not to want you to get the wrong idea?