ruby sparks said:
Correct, it does not imply that 'you' (the system that calls itself 'Angra') cannot want not to have a want, but it does imply that you cannot freely want to have or not have a want, because at any given instant, any want you have seems to be fully (key word) explained by deterministic causes (if we are temporarily setting randomness aside).
But again, how does that imply it? In other words, how do you derive the conclusion from the premises? It does not follow without implicit premises, and those are the ones I'm asking you to defend - and those are not about the universe or about determinism, but about the meaning of the words. The rest are side disagreements.
ruby sparks said:
I don't see how it's a side issue at all in the slightest. It's the issue.
Not at all. The issue is this. You earlier claimed
ruby sparks said:
Something that is determined (and/or random) is not freely willed or freely done. I don't think I know how to put it any more bluntly than that.
That, however, does not follow. The argument is of the form:
Premise 1: X is P.
Conclusion: X is not Q.
That is of course invalid. You need further premises, linking P to Q. But you have not supported them. In particular, you said:
ruby sparks said:
Because free and determined (constrained) are effectively opposites.
However, you have not argued that 'causally determined' means 'constrained', nor that the expression 'out of my own free will' is such that,
by the meaning of the words, I can only act of my own free will if there is no causal determinism.
ruby sparks said:
You are starting to sound like one of those fudge-makers.
You're now beginning to get it. I take issue with your characterization of compatibists as fudge-makers, or something to that effect. You make very negative claims, but present no presenting linguistic evidence to back up your claims or implications about the meaning of the words.
ruby sparks said:
I mean, we could do the same with god, couldn't we? Maybe in some linguistic ways, there's a god. Are we any further on? I don't think so. We have just made some nice sophistry fudge.
You're getting closer to the real point of contention now.
Of course, changing the definition of what it is to act of one's own free will to make it so that one can act of one's own free will would be some nice sophistry fudge. I'm not doing that. The people you accuse of doing that, are not doing that. Rather,
we do not agree with your claims or implications about what 'of one's own free will' and/or related expressions mean, and you have not properly supported your claims or implications (actually, it seems you haven't even tried, as you're still talking physics, biology, etc., rather than language, usage among English speakers, etc.).
ruby sparks said:
What if I say to you that it's obvious to me that the leaves on the trees outside my window are held up by invisible angels? Is that really much of an explanation?
No, but if you told me that it's obvious to you that you are writing your posts because you feel like it, I would say it pretty much is. The problem with your comparison is that you badly misunderstand my claim.
ruby sparks said:
I get that it strongly feels to you that you have free will.
You do not seem to get that at all, because you seem to think that acting of my own free will involves lack of causal determinism, which is something
I do not have the slightest idea how it would feel like.
ruby sparks said:
It's much the same set of sensations for me.
Could you please describe what you feel, and why do you think it is related to whether you act of your own free will?
ruby sparks said:
But neither belief can seem to be rationally explained as to how they could even be possible.
Well, I do not have any feelings of anything that appears impossible or improbable going on. But maybe you do? Again, could you describe your feelings, please?
ruby sparks said:
You may not be compelled by any threats, but surely you must be compelled by causal determinants, even if you don't detect them?
Why? Why would causal determinants be
a form of compulsion?
Words have meaning, and that goes for the word 'compulsion'. If I say I'm not compelled to write it, I do not understand myself to be suggesting that my writing this was not brought about causally by previous events, like my previous thinking on these matters, reading from other people, my preferences to post, and so on. Nor do I understand myself as talking about causes before my birth. I'm not being coerced at gun or knife point. My brain is not failing in a way that produces a compulsion - like a heroin addict, or a kleptomaniac, etc. I'm acting of my own free will.
ruby sparks said:
How, for example, can any one, or any group, of your brain neurons (that might be involved in a decision) 'fire' unless something has just caused it/them to do so? Then rinse and repeat the same question. Then again. Etc.
How is that relevant to whether I act of my own free will?
ruby sparks said:
As to evidence, it is in the nature of illusions and delusions to not be noticeable to the person deceived by them.
You're going for the wrong evidence. The key disagreement is
about the meaning of the expression 'of one's own free will', and related ones', not at all about what happens in the brain, or the early universe, or whatever.
ruby sparks said:
*ETA: while there is no conclusive empirical evidence, there is a great deal of empirical (eg neuroscientific) evidence from the last approximately 40 years that suggests free will may be unlikely.
I am familiar with such claims. I have no objection to the empirical evidence. I disagree with the claim that such empirical evidence makes it unlikely that we act of our own free will.