The "me-ness" of being me

[PyramidHead]

Teleology has nothing to do with it. If you dismiss teleology, as you rightly should, there is a glaring problem in need of explanation: why, when it would have been immensely more probable for things to go differently than they did, did they in fact go the exact way they did in order to bring you into existence? It's like playing Russian roulette with 5 bullets in each gun, and winning thousands of times in a row. One small change, one instance of a different sperm from one of your ancestors making it to the egg first, and you would not be here at all--assuming the ordinary view is correct. From your perspective, that means something grossly improbable has occurred, and it is improbable for an improbable thing to occur.

From all the foregoing arguments and thought experiments, it should at least strike you as logically possible that you would have been any conscious being that was born in your place, even if conditions were different (and therefore you must be any conscious being right now). So, two explanations are on the table for your begetting: one that makes your existence a ridiculously improbable stroke of luck, and the other that makes it virtually inevitable. If I randomly drew a red bead from an urn containing a million beads, and asked you which of two hypothetical urns it was, one containing all red beads or one containing just one red beads while all the others were blue, you would have to answer that the former hypothesis is a million times more likely than the latter. In the same way, if universalism is possibly true, it must be trillions upon trillions of times more likely than the ordinary view, because there are many more than a million ways that your existence could have been prevented under that view. This statistical inference elevates universalism from merely being a plausible way of solving some thought experiments to a metaphysical near-necessity.

If we are to use an abstract model to represent this problem, I would put it like this. Suppose there is something I will call "bare consciousness" (or empty consciousness, i.e. consciousness without any content), and that this consciousness is instantiated by "actors" in search of a role to enact. So there are actors and there is something like the material world but with zombie humans in it. Zombie people would be things physically identical to the kind of beings we are but without consciousness. They have working brains, but nothing is having the subjective experience of being them. They're zombies. And then, actors randomly choose one of those humans to "haunt" them and thereby subjectively experience what it is like to being the human they have picked out. So, each actors is allowed to experience whatever is going on in a particular brain. At that's all the actor is able to experience. There's nothing else for the actor to experience. All the actor can remember is whatever this one particular human happens to remember. I don't see therefore how the actor wouldn't take whatever biographical data, perception data, memory data etc. he is made to experience, and take this set of data to entirely define its me-ness.

Accessorily, I don't see in this model where there would be any "probability" problem. Each actor picks out one human at random and that's it. The actor itself is identical to all other actors. Whatever is specific to his experience of haunting a human being comes from this human being. There's a one hundred percent probability of each actor picking out one human and this human is whatever it happens to be. And of course, each human can only produce the biographical data and thoughts that go with what it is. There's no lottery. Each drop of water is whatever it is. Fat chance. Well, 100% certainty.

Where we disagree here may be that you may still want to call each actor "me". As I seen it, each actor experiencing a human being will not think of himself as a me because actors don't think for themselves in this model. Instead, each actor will subjectively experience one human being thinking of himself as a "me". What matters here is not the actor subjectively experiencing the me-ness data created by the brain of the human being he is haunting, but it is the data itself in that it is specific to that human being and it is the mechanism giving rise to that sense of being me, mechanism which is probably best understood as a survival mechanism produced by evolution. So, all humans will have it and all actors haunting a human will subjectively experience the me-ness of the particular human they're haunting. Actors can even hop from one human to another every now and then, every millisecond if you wish, without any difference in the model.

In that model, I wouldn't see why it would be better to talk of "me" like you propose to do. It's completely irrelevant that we can conceive a thought -experiment where there would be strictly identical humans with identical biographical data and possibly identical perception and impressions etc. They will both create a sense of being me and these would be identical. So what? Each would still have the sense of being themselves without confusion and with the potential to diverge as soon as something different would come into the relative experience as it will always be possible.
EB

Your model does not solve the probability problem, because despite the stipulation that these actors are all identical, they are nonetheless not indistinguishable, i.e., not just one actor. There would still need to be some mechanism of determining which actor was YOU, and why THAT actor (identical though it was to all the others) was selected to inhabit the life of EB, rather than another actor which would not be you. Additionally, there is also the larger problem, not related to probability but perhaps to ontology, of why you are even among the bare consciousnesses that are available to inhabit human beings. What could possibly justify one way or another your presence among the potential bearers of conscious experience, if they are all distinct from one another numerically?

It also does not solve any of the problems of twins in the womb, brain bisection, teleportation, and so on. Parfit's example of splitting his brain temporarily, listening to a boring lecture in one ear and a radio concert in the other, and then restoring the connection, still leaves open the question of what kind of experience I will have, who will be having it, how many subjects of experience will there be, what happens to them when they multiply or fuse, and so on. The many-subjects model in any form, bare or not, just couches the problem in a supernatural context without actually changing anything substantive.

With one small tweak, your model can be rescued: there is just one actor. This actor plays all the roles simultaneously, though as you point out, from each perspective the actor only has access to the integrated contents of whatever it is "inhabiting". Note that this interpretation is purely figurative; there are actually no disembodied bare consciousnesses, singular or plural. Universalism is not committed to there being something like a "universal consciousness", a substance or entity that literally inhabits otherwise zombie-fied bodies. It is simply a way of showing that any conscious experience is equally mine, irrespective of the nature of consciousness or self. Even if there was no such thing as a persisting self, and all that could be spoken of were infinitesimal time-slices of isolated experience stitched together by brains to form the illusion of an enduring consciousness, all of those experiences would still be happening to me, would still be this and here and now.

 

[PyramidHead]

Keep reading. You ARE experiencing that pain. Due to physiological constraints (that are not absolute metaphysical barriers), it falsely appears from each perspective that its contents comprise the entirety of your experience. The situation is exactly the same as someone who experiences the hemispheres of his own brain separately due to aphasia or surgery, in that it appears to him that the contents of what is experienced by each half is the totality of what he is experiencing, even though he is experiencing both simultaneously (though they are no longer physiologically integrated).

That's very debatable, imo. It may not be entirely like a two hemisphere situation. It could be not me (as in being one of the hemispheres in your skull and not one in my skull). You are suggesting that part of me is experiencing a view of the room you are in.

Great article by the way. Writer is very rigorous.

That's just the tendency he is trying to break: the association between you and a particular object (your brain, your mental pattern, some psychological process). If half of your brain were in my skull and half remained in yours, what would you experience? Would you have warped from one place to another? Would half your field of vision have my content and half of it yours? Would we both cease to exist and be replaced by somebody else? I don't think there's any way to adjudicate it one way or another if we remain committed to keeping the ratio of brains to selves 1:1.

 

[ruby sparks]

That's just the tendency he is trying to break: the association between you and a particular object (your brain, your mental pattern, some psychological process). If half of your brain were in my skull and half remained in yours, what would you experience? Would you have warped from one place to another? Would half your field of vision have my content and half of it yours? Would we both cease to exist and be replaced by somebody else? I don't think there's any way to adjudicate it one way or another if we remain committed to keeping the ratio of brains to selves 1:1.

Sure, and I don't mind having my tendencies examined, or broken. I try to be open. At this point....not convinced. But I will read it again. Maybe 'my brain' (using the term loosely of course) will not hurt so much the next time.

Just before I go though, it does not seem to me, and I admit I have not thought this through, that we could move away from the idea of a 1:1 brain to self ratio relatively easily without necessarily having to go as far as to say there is only one self in the universe.

Laters. Thanks for posting such an interesting and challenging argument.

 

[ruby sparks]

"It does seem to me...", I meant above.

 

[PyramidHead]

I also want to reiterate that universalism is not a statement about the number of "selves" so much, because that gives the self a legitimacy as a substance or a spirit. It's less about that and more about what experiences are mine; by extension, any being whose experiences are mine is just me. It's not that there is one "big" consciousness, but rather the enabling conditions for an experience being had by me are less stringent than what is ordinarily proposed.

I'll let Zuboff's words make this a little clearer (this is from a manuscript of an unpublished work that he recently emailed to me):

Let me take a moment to address an occasional objection to universalism that focuses on the role of this claim that the immediacy of experience is universal in all experience. It is easy to agree that being immediate, that being “mine” for somebody or something, is a feature of all experience. The tough, substantive step is seeing that this immediacy, this being “mine” for somebody, is equivalent to being mine for me, so that I am all the “somebodies”. I would not want to be taken to be indulging in an equivocation, whereby the initial easy agreement on the universality of immediacy was disguised as already, in itself, an agreement to the surprising conclusion that all experience is Arnold Zuboff’s. Neither do I want to be seen as making a crazy verbal recommendation, that we just call all possessors of experience “Arnold Zuboff”.

[...]

Bodily continuity and psychological continuity as criteria of personal identity are both fully vulnerable to our critique of the usual, less philosophical view of personhood. Either a body or a mind can divide or be conceived of as changing by degree, but the subject of experience and self-interest cannot. The subject of experience is indivisible and its identity is all or nothing. (Aside from the psychological fission that occurs in brain bisection, there is also a special fusion problem for the proponent of psychological continuity: On his view a person with memory loss could not be identical with the person before the memory loss. Yet it seems that on this same view, if a person after such a memory loss recovers the old memories while retaining memories also of the episode of amnesia, that person would have to be identical with both the person before the loss and the supposedly distinct person after the loss.) And finally, of course, a subject that depended for existence on the narrow specifications for identity of either a bodily or a psychological process must find incredibly unlikely both its own existence and the agreement of its identity conditions with a type that is among the tiny fraction of types that tend to occur in the natural world.

This next bit gets to the model Speakpigeon suggested in his last post.

Advocates of physical or mental criteria of personal identity were really looking for a third thing, which could be imagined as present in either a continuing body or a continuing mind. This third thing, the quality of immediacy, was incapable of division or changing by degree and was inevitable for any experience rather than incredibly improbable for it. Now, the characteristics of indivisibility and all-or-nothing identity, as recognized in the true core of the ordinary view of personhood, have seemed to some philosophers to recommend a simple, indivisible immaterial substance as candidate for the self of personal identity. But this thesis too is vulnerable to both the conceptual and statistical objections to the usual view of personhood. For the appearance in the world and fate of a particular simple substance would be in some way dependent on the physical and mental organism whose self it was. If, for example, an embryo had split, the different identities of the products would have required distinct such simple substances to be assigned to each. In all the possible lines of begettings there would have been countless such possibilities of distinct simple substances, the overwhelming majority, of course, never appearing in the world.

The results of splittings would be as paradoxical as ever if we conceived of them as occurring in association with a simple, indivisible mental substance. Consider how after brain bisection there seem to be two subjects where before there was one. How are these two subjects related to the original simple substance? That original substance would have survived with either hemisphere if a stroke had wiped out the other. But can it now be with both? Can it be with neither? Can it be with only one or the other? And if we imagine gradual changes from, say, your bodily and mental conditions to mine, when does your simple substance disappear in favor of mine? Finally, that those conditions to which your simple substance is attached arose in the world and that you were not instead among the countless possible simple substances that on such a view will never exist must be incredibly improbable for you. So the simple substance thesis must also be rejected.

But perhaps what we need is a compromise between this rejected thesis of many distinct simple substances and universalism. Could we not say that there is but one self and this one self is a simple substance somehow existing equally in all experiences? This universal substance view, however, solves neither the conceptual nor the statistical problems of the usual view. There is in it, in fact, a further, much more obvious conceptual incoherence and a much greater improbability. Merely asserting that one substance is somehow present at once in all experience does not make it understandable how this could be or what it could mean. (By contrast the quality of immediacy is naturally present in all experiential content, as anyone must admit. How all experience could be mine and now if this depended on nothing but this natural quality would be no mystery). And the improbability of your existence must be even greater than in the usual view if it depends on the existence of a simple substance that is somehow the only one allowed to exist. Think of the countless other simple substances, all of which will not make it into the world on such a view. You would have been required to have been luckier on this hypothesis than on any other. (If, however, something in the very logic of experience, the presence in it of an inevitable quality, ensures that any conceivable subject of experience possesses all of experience, then the improbability for a subject that it exists has been therein eliminated.)

 

[Speakpigeon]

Your model does not solve the probability problem,

I'm sure it does.

because despite the stipulation that these actors are all identical, they are nonetheless not indistinguishable, i.e., not just one actor.

Clearly, they wouldn't be the same one thing. Each one would have a specific location in space and time. Each one would haunt a different human.

There's no difference that I can see with the case of elementary particles. All neutrons at rest are identical to each other but they all have a different location and their speed relative to a measuring device affects their measured mass.

There would still need to be some mechanism of determining which actor was YOU, and why THAT actor (identical though it was to all the others) was selected to inhabit the life of EB, rather than another actor which would not be you.

No actor would be me. That's the whole point of the model. Actors would just haunt humans, i.e. subjectively experience whatever mental data the humans' brains would produce. So, actors wouldn't be any human. Never.

The mechanism is irrelevant. It could be anything that does the job. Actors wouldn't even need to exist at all outside their haunting job. And again, they could switch between humans as long as each human alive remains haunted.

So, the only distinction of an actor would be which human it is haunting.

Probability problem solved.

Additionally, there is also the larger problem, not related to probability but perhaps to ontology, of why you are even among the bare consciousnesses that are available to inhabit human beings. What could possibly justify one way or another your presence among the potential bearers of conscious experience, if they are all distinct from one another numerically?

Same thing for neutrons. Not a problem.

Even less of a problem if actors can appear and disappear according to haunting needs.

And again, actors are not anybody. They're not people. They're not individuals. They don't have a memory. They don't possess any kind of intrinsic identity. They're all identical.

It also does not solve any of the problems of twins in the womb, brain bisection, teleportation, and so on. Parfit's example of splitting his brain temporarily, listening to a boring lecture in one ear and a radio concert in the other, and then restoring the connection, still leaves open the question of what kind of experience I will have, who will be having it, how many subjects of experience will there be, what happens to them when they multiply or fuse, and so on. The many-subjects model in any form, bare or not, just couches the problem in a supernatural context without actually changing anything substantive.

One isolated piece of brain tissu or neuronal network, one actor.

Actors could fuse or split accordingly. It doesn't matter, they're not people. They're not individuals.

So, I don't see any problems with twins in the womb, brain bisection, teleportation, Parfit's split brain and so on.

With one small tweak, your model can be rescued: there is just one actor.

Not interested. Different model. You haven't shown my model doesn't work. You've just shown you haven't understood the details.

This actor plays all the roles simultaneously, though as you point out, from each perspective the actor only has access to the integrated contents of whatever it is "inhabiting". Note that this interpretation is purely figurative; there are actually no disembodied bare consciousnesses, singular or plural. Universalism is not committed to there being something like a "universal consciousness", a substance or entity that literally inhabits otherwise zombie-fied bodies. It is simply a way of showing that any conscious experience is equally mine, irrespective of the nature of consciousness or self. Even if there was no such thing as a persisting self, and all that could be spoken of were infinitesimal time-slices of isolated experience stitched together by brains to form the illusion of an enduring consciousness, all of those experiences would still be happening to me, would still be this and here and now.

It's fine, really, except for calling that a "me".

My model shows each actor isn't anything like a "me" and that there's no problem with probabilities except in your imagination.

It wasn't so difficult if you ask me.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

No actor would be me. That's the whole point of the model. Actors would just haunt humans, i.e. subjectively experience whatever mental data the humans' brains would produce. So, actors wouldn't be any human. Never.

In which case, your model has nothing to say about the topic of this thread, which is personal identity. I want to know how I came to exist, what person or persons are me, what experiences are mine, and you give me a story about identical jackets that everybody wears. Kind of a letdown after all that buildup.

It wasn't so difficult if you ask me.
EB

It's fortunate for us both that I didn't.

 

[ruby sparks]

PyramidHead,

Re-reading the article. Not understanding this from page 6 (regarding the split brain hemispheres):

"The young man does not experience one side of his visual field—and thus one side of the field he’s standing in—as somehow coming first with the other not arriving till the next day. For him the whole of the field is simply there now."

Not seeing how anything is arriving at a different time.

 

[PyramidHead]

PyramidHead,

Re-reading the article. Not understanding this from page 6 (regarding the split brain hemispheres):

"The young man does not experience one side of his visual field—and thus one side of the field he’s standing in—as somehow coming first with the other not arriving till the next day. For him the whole of the field is simply there now."

Not seeing how anything is arriving at a different time.

In the example, the two scientists provided stimulation to each half of the man's brain separately. The impulses delivered to one side were ahead of the other by about a day. Yet, since the inputs and outputs were exactly like what they would have been if his brain was intact and he was actually standing in the meadow, the order in which the impulses were delivered to each half is inconsequential to his experience.

 

[ruby sparks]

PyramidHead,

Re-reading the article. Not understanding this from page 6 (regarding the split brain hemispheres):

"The young man does not experience one side of his visual field—and thus one side of the field he’s standing in—as somehow coming first with the other not arriving till the next day. For him the whole of the field is simply there now."

Not seeing how anything is arriving at a different time.

In the example, the two scientists provided stimulation to each half of the man's brain separately. The impulses delivered to one side were ahead of the other by about a day. Yet, since the inputs and outputs were exactly like what they would have been if his brain was intact and he was actually standing in the meadow, the order in which the impulses were delivered to each half is inconsequential to his experience.

I didn't see where the impulses were delivered on a different day.

 

[ruby sparks]

"And so it is now possible to have one hemisphere make its contribution to the experience on one day [Fig.4] and the other hemisphere make its contribution a day later [Fig.5] without any change at all to the feeling in the experience."

Not following.

This seems different from overcoming the time lag with impulse cartridges.

Surely if the Right Hemisphere inputs for "I am in a field' don't arrive to correspond (and mesh) with the Left Hemisphere 'goings on', there won't be the experience?

The RH inputs (even if they are perfect predictions about tomorrow) are still arriving today?

 

[ruby sparks]

We are, are we not, imagining the two hemispheres to be so far apart that there would otherwise be a time lag of a day, and we are just compensating for that lag, with perfectly predicting the future, so that the two things coincide. We could equally do it, hypothetically, by 'instantaneous transfer'.

 

[PyramidHead]

PyramidHead,

Re-reading the article. Not understanding this from page 6 (regarding the split brain hemispheres):

"The young man does not experience one side of his visual field—and thus one side of the field he’s standing in—as somehow coming first with the other not arriving till the next day. For him the whole of the field is simply there now."

Not seeing how anything is arriving at a different time.

In the example, the two scientists provided stimulation to each half of the man's brain separately. The impulses delivered to one side were ahead of the other by about a day. Yet, since the inputs and outputs were exactly like what they would have been if his brain was intact and he was actually standing in the meadow, the order in which the impulses were delivered to each half is inconsequential to his experience.

I didn't see where the impulses were delivered on a different day.

It's on page 5:

And so it is now possible to have one hemisphere make its contribution to the
experience on one day [Fig.4] and the other hemisphere make its contribution a
day later [Fig.5] without any change at all to the feeling in the experience. The
experience would not only remain subjectively centred on an intact head but
would be subjectively occurring at a single time.

 

[ruby sparks]

I didn't see where the impulses were delivered on a different day.

It's on page 5:

And so it is now possible to have one hemisphere make its contribution to the
experience on one day [Fig.4] and the other hemisphere make its contribution a
day later [Fig.5] without any change at all to the feeling in the experience. The
experience would not only remain subjectively centred on an intact head but
would be subjectively occurring at a single time.

Yes, I read that, but I don't get it. See my subsequent posts. Sorry. Our posts are crossing.

I'm saying that I think the inputs are meshing (objectively and subjectively) at the same time. Otherwise, there won't, it might seem, be the subjective experience of 'being in that field'.

 

[PyramidHead]

The two parts of the brain are completely unconnected to each other. They receive programmed information from the impulse generators in isolation. That fact alone makes it hard to imagine why synchronization between them should be relevant, since there is no way any lack of synchronization in one hemisphere could be communicated to the other. But the broader point is that everyone agrees brain states supervene on experiential states; that is, there can be no change in experience without a corresponding change in brain state. If you follow the example, there is actually no change from what the brain would have experienced if it were intact and in the head of a man in the meadow; each half receives exactly the proper stimulation that the other would have provided. So, if there is to be a change in the experiential content, it seems odd that there is no functional difference in the brain state of either hemisphere.

One way of getting around this problem is to assume that there are now two identical experiential streams, one for each brain hemisphere, with one running a day behind the other. Yet, the point at which a new one would have been created is impossible to determine, since the setup with the impulse generators is functionally identical to the setup where the hemispheres were in communication via radio waves, which was functionally identical to when the hemispheres were connected to each other. It follows that there can only be a singular stream of experience for every realized brain state, no matter how many times it is duplicated and how the pieces fit together in space and time.

I have another thread on this forum on the topic if you want to check it out: https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?13109-Subjective-and-objective-time

 

[ruby sparks]

The two parts of the brain are completely unconnected to each other. They receive programmed information from the impulse generators in isolation. That fact alone makes it hard to imagine why synchronization between them should be relevant, since there is no way any lack of synchronization in one hemisphere could be communicated to the other. But the broader point is that everyone agrees brain states supervene on experiential states; that is, there can be no change in experience without a corresponding change in brain state. If you follow the example, there is actually no change from what the brain would have experienced if it were intact and in the head of a man in the meadow; each half receives exactly the proper stimulation that the other would have provided. So, if there is to be a change in the experiential content, it seems odd that there is no functional difference in the brain state of either hemisphere.

One way of getting around this problem is to assume that there are now two identical experiential streams, one for each brain hemisphere, with one running a day behind the other. Yet, the point at which a new one would have been created is impossible to determine, since the setup with the impulse generators is functionally identical to the setup where the hemispheres were in communication via radio waves, which was functionally identical to when the hemispheres were connected to each other. It follows that there can only be a singular stream of experience for every realized brain state, no matter how many times it is duplicated and how the pieces fit together in space and time.

I have another thread on this forum on the topic if you want to check it out: https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?13109-Subjective-and-objective-time

Sure, but the inputs surely must be arriving/meshing at the same time, it would seem, despite all that. Otherwise, well, there is no way of saying with any surety what is being experienced.

 

[ruby sparks]

I get that it may not be possible to tell at what time it is happening. I get that. That's the case for the awakening(s) on the assumption that they are identical. I'm just saying that the various inputs seem to have to be meshing at the same time, not (really, objectively) a day apart.

 

[ruby sparks]

Also, away from that particular issue, the whole 'perspective' thing seems to depend on information. If an objective observer has more information, he can be more objective. As the writer says, the objective observer can't 'indulge' in the perspective of the player without the information. Iow, it's the two scenarios which are different, they are not (a) objective and (b) subjective views of the same scenario. For all the 'objective' viewer knows, there is another viewer watching him who has more information than he (or she) has. Changing the scenario is of course going to change the inferences. We're not comparing like with like. The observer is in one scenario and the player is in a different one.

Incidentally, information is why I think it's not a paradox that in one scenario we can tell in advance what our future inference will be and in another scenario we can't. Information changes probability scenarios. It's different set-ups, not objective and subjective views of the same set-up, I'm thinking. Nor is the Awakening experiment of itself a paradox. It (what can be inferred and what can be known about a future inference) can be explained by the amount of information given at the outset.

The relevant information in one case is 'you (the player) will awake' and in the later case 'you (the observer) will see a blue bead'. Those are the equivalent (prior) 'guarantees' in the two scenarios that allow them to be compared as regards whether each person can know in advance what inference they will make when the guaranteed event occurs.

 

[PyramidHead]

I get that it may not be possible to tell at what time it is happening. I get that. That's the case for the awakening(s) on the assumption that they are identical. I'm just saying that the various inputs seem to have to be meshing at the same time, not (really, objectively) a day apart.

Also, away from that particular issue, the whole 'perspective' thing seems to depend on information. If an objective observer has more information, he can be more objective. As the writer says, the objective observer can't 'indulge' in the perspective of the player without the information. Iow, it's the two scenarios which are different, they are not (a) objective and (b) subjective views of the same scenario. For all the 'objective' viewer knows, there is another viewer watching him who has more information than he (or she) has. Changing the scenario is of course going to change the inferences. We're not comparing like with like. The observer is in one scenario and the player is in a different one.

The only condition that differs is that one person was guaranteed to be shown a video of someone who had picked a blue bead. It is from this stipulation alone that he is unable to conclude that the "easy" game or the "hard" game was played, though he can correctly say that the person in the video was right to infer the easy game was being played.

The relevant information in the first case is 'you (the player)will awake' and in the second 'you (the observer) will see a blue bead'. Those are the equivalent (prior) 'guarantees' in the two scenarios that allow them to be compared.

I think you're making the same point as the author. What you're calling scenarios and information he is calling perspective. I think it makes more sense to call it perspective because it is clear that neither case is definitively true while the other is false. Each observer selects the hypothesis that makes what is being observed the most probable, given the information at hand.

 

[ruby sparks]

The Awakening Bead Game
"We can very easily combine the bead game with the awakening game. The same urns are used, and with one exception the same conditions obtain. Here is the change: If a non-blue bead has been assigned to a day the player is to be left sleeping that day instead of being awakened to see it.
Imagine you are the player now awakened and seeing a blue bead. Must you not infer both that the urn that was used was full of blue beads and that you are being awakened every day to see one?
(Page 15)

Must you not infer both that the urn that was used was full of blue beads?........yes

....and that you are being awakened every day to see one?....No?