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The Science and Mechanics of Free Will

Nothing you say about awareness will change the fact that if there is awareness then there is both that which is aware and that which it is aware of.

That is awareness.

Are you essentially saying that the mind observes and everything that is not the mind is observable?

The mind can be aware of imagined dragons.
 
The mind can be aware of imagined dragons.

Okay, but is what I asked a distinguishing feature of the mind versus matter?

To say the mind "observes" is an abstraction. It does not have eyes.

The mind is aware of what comes in through the eyes. Aware of what the brain makes of what comes in is more accurate.
 
Step one, define it.

1) What is free?
2) How is it free?
3) What is it free from?

The entire free will debate is a bullshit debate. The goalposts aren't just being moved around, they're on wheels. No matter what position you have you can prove it's correct. Simply because the terminology of free will is so vague. How the fuck are you planing on using science to explore anything as vague as that?

If you go through the discussion that I had in this thread with DBT, then you will see where we are at.

There's no point. I've summed up the entire debate. I can save you the trouble now. You can stop discussing it.
 
Okay, but is what I asked a distinguishing feature of the mind versus matter?

To say the mind "observes" is an abstraction. It does not have eyes.

The mind is aware of what comes in through the eyes. Aware of what the brain makes of what comes in is more accurate.

Now is being aware the distinguishing feature of the mind from what isn't a mind?
 
To say the mind "observes" is an abstraction. It does not have eyes.

The mind is aware of what comes in through the eyes. Aware of what the brain makes of what comes in is more accurate.

Now is being aware the distinguishing feature of the mind from what isn't a mind?

I would think so. But to be aware in the way one is aware with a mind. Not to just be a thermometer that is "aware" of the temperature.
 
Now is being aware the distinguishing feature of the mind from what isn't a mind?

I would think so. But to be aware in the way one is aware with a mind. Not to just be a thermometer that is "aware" of the temperature.

So if we both agree that the mind exists, then how do we know what isn't a mind? Wouldn't the default assumption be a kind of mental monism? The only other major distinctive property would be discreteness, but that is just the adsence of mind.
 
I would think so. But to be aware in the way one is aware with a mind. Not to just be a thermometer that is "aware" of the temperature.

So if we both agree that the mind exists, then how do we know what isn't a mind? Wouldn't the default assumption be a kind of mental monism? The only other major distinctive property would be discreteness, but that is just the adsence of mind.

No.

There is always that which is aware AND the things it is aware of.

This divide will never go away.
 
That 'which is aware' is the brain gathering information via its senses, integrating this information with memory, enabling recognition and forming a 'mental' representation of that information/readiness potential in the form of 'mind/consciousness' - how this mental representation is manifested is not yet understood.
 
That 'which is aware' is the brain gathering information via its senses, integrating this information with memory, enabling recognition and forming a 'mental' representation of that information/readiness potential in the form of 'mind/consciousness' - how this mental representation is manifested is not yet understood.

The brain somehow creates the things 'that which is aware' is aware of.

But that doesn't explain what 'that which is aware' is or what the brain is doing when it does this stuff.
 
Here's an idea: The mind exists not because it does but because we say it does. Well, there, I said it. That may come across as silly, and without further explanation, I wouldn't expect to garner much support for such a notion; heck, it'd be a struggle even with an explanation. But, I do not by any means intend to portray the notion that saying it alone is what makes it so; therefore, obvious objections that demonstrate my claim to be false won't hold up. Clearly, further explanation is required.

Turning our attention to language, there seems to be a construct whereby it's linguistically permitted to create placeholder terms that allow us to make stuff up. We can't do such things willynilly, however. For instance, there are rules (unwritten rules, unfortunately) whereby the construct does not permit us to argue for the existence of God based on our saying He exists. It's not even permissible to say that with most concrete-type objects. Maybe all--I don't know the rules.

We are so (well, many of us anyways) ... we are so hellbent on denying the existence of things to which there is no evidence for that we completely dismiss the impact language has on its permissibilities. If I say there are abstract objects, for instance, the mere formulation of sentence structure gives the unfortunate portrayal that I'm making the claim that there are objects and that there is a subset to which I speak called abstract; however, there are no such objects called abstract objects that belong as a subset to objects; this, of course, sets the sails for future denials that there are such things, but the wretched creature of language still has its stronghold upon us.

I would submit that the declaration of something as an abstract object is a denial that there is an object at all. No thing at all, but there is something, just not something of material substance. I do not (not even for a moment) believe that the mind is the activity of the brain. Such a notion is a consequence for scientific desperation -- to think that it consists of physical substance.

I think the brain gives rise to the mind, meaning, if there was no brain, there would be no mind, but it takes more than merely a functioning brain for there to be a mind. It requires language and the invocation of a placeholder term that refers not to a material substance. The mind, in part, is a creature of language.

I'm sure this'll go over well, lol.
 
...we say it does...

How does anything say stuff that makes any sense without a mind? Without foresight and understanding and the ability to play with ideas at will?

The mind, in part, is a creature of language.

No. The language ability is an aspect of the mind. And the mind needs to learn the words, the labels for things, for the language ability to have use.

But nobody needs to learn one thing about grammar to have it.
 
How does anything say stuff that makes any sense without a mind? Without foresight and understanding and the ability to play with ideas at will?

The mind, in part, is a creature of language.

No. The language ability is an aspect of the mind. And the mind needs to learn the words, the labels for things, for the language ability to have use.

But nobody needs to learn one thing about grammar to have it.
When we say there are ideas, where shall we say they are? Not what processes that allowed for their formulation but where they actually are? Are they lurking around and bumping around in the brain? No, we create a place (that really isn't a place at all) and say it's in the mind. There is a layer of separation between an idea and a brain, and there's a layer of separation between an idea and the mind, and there are two layers of separation between the brain and the mind. The mind is a broad something yet still not a thing at all. Language has evolved to accommodate our thoughts ... our thinking. Without second thought, we speak as if there is in physical fact a mind, and with no acceptance of the idea there are immaterial objects, there will be those that scramble to either deny or misconstrue the facts.

Just because there are physical processes that give rise to the existence of things like a mind that house ideas, must we be relegated to consider the electrochemical transmissions amidst the mush in the brain as the things we agree that exist? No, we create placeholder names to capture the essence of that which we speak. When we enter the mental realm, abstractions and abstract objects are abound.
 
That 'which is aware' is the brain gathering information via its senses, integrating this information with memory, enabling recognition and forming a 'mental' representation of that information/readiness potential in the form of 'mind/consciousness' - how this mental representation is manifested is not yet understood.

The brain somehow creates the things 'that which is aware' is aware of.

But that doesn't explain what 'that which is aware' is or what the brain is doing when it does this stuff.

What the brain is doing is, as I mentioned, gathering information via it's senses, senses being structures that have evolved to detect wavelength of light, airborne molecules, pressure waves, etc, and represents this information in the form of sight, sound, smell and so on. That it does this is well supported by evidence, the question is not the former but the latter; the how of mental representation.
 
So if we both agree that the mind exists, then how do we know what isn't a mind? Wouldn't the default assumption be a kind of mental monism? The only other major distinctive property would be discreteness, but that is just the adsence of mind.

No.

There is always that which is aware AND the things it is aware of.

This divide will never go away.

But why can't the things that it is aware of just be a different and separated awareness?
 
How does anything say stuff that makes any sense without a mind? Without foresight and understanding and the ability to play with ideas at will?



No. The language ability is an aspect of the mind. And the mind needs to learn the words, the labels for things, for the language ability to have use.

But nobody needs to learn one thing about grammar to have it.
When we say there are ideas, where shall we say they are? Not what processes that allowed for their formulation but where they actually are? Are they lurking around and bumping around in the brain? No, we create a place (that really isn't a place at all) and say it's in the mind. There is a layer of separation between an idea and a brain, and there's a layer of separation between an idea and the mind, and there are two layers of separation between the brain and the mind. The mind is a broad something yet still not a thing at all. Language has evolved to accommodate our thoughts ... our thinking. Without second thought, we speak as if there is in physical fact a mind, and with no acceptance of the idea there are immaterial objects, there will be those that scramble to either deny or misconstrue the facts.

Just because there are physical processes that give rise to the existence of things like a mind that house ideas, must we be relegated to consider the electrochemical transmissions amidst the mush in the brain as the things we agree that exist? No, we create placeholder names to capture the essence of that which we speak. When we enter the mental realm, abstractions and abstract objects are abound.

Ideas are created by minds.

And they are apparent to minds.

Where are they? is a question a mind can form.
 
The brain somehow creates the things 'that which is aware' is aware of.

But that doesn't explain what 'that which is aware' is or what the brain is doing when it does this stuff.

What the brain is doing is, as I mentioned, gathering information via it's senses, senses being structures that have evolved to detect wavelength of light, airborne molecules, pressure waves, etc, and represents this information in the form of sight, sound, smell and so on. That it does this is well supported by evidence, the question is not the former but the latter; the how of mental representation.

You don't make any comment on a word I said.

I wonder why you are saying these things that are very general and not explanatory?
 
No.

There is always that which is aware AND the things it is aware of.

This divide will never go away.

But why can't the things that it is aware of just be a different and separated awareness?

What does it mean to be aware of awareness?

What color is awareness?

- - - Updated - - -

I guess concepts are created by minds too then.

Where did you think they came from?
 
But why can't the things that it is aware of just be a different and separated awareness?

What does it mean to be aware of awareness?

What color is awareness?
Maybe my awareness, which would be a sense of individuality, interacts with a different awareness to form a new awareness such as greenness. Then I will have a green awareness/quale for that moment. If the awareness is something else, then maybe I am aware of a smell. We can simplify this by letting everything be just experiences.
 
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