Unfair Standards

[fast]

In our trades, we pick the right tools for the job, but one tool not doing what another tool does is not a failure. My screwdriver won't cut a board like my skillsaw can, but that's not a failure of the tool. The Logician has tools in his arsenal as well, and it is absolutely positively wrong to blame the inductive argument for not being able to do what a deductive argument can, yet guess what the objection is when a strong inductive argument backed by strong premises is presented. Since the conclusion is not guaranteed by the premises (talk about unfair standards!), the inductive argument is regarded as if it has somehow failed--merely because the tool could not do as another tool could.

 

[Speakpigeon]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge. Since science is based on induction, we never know if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it. In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.
EB

 

[Juma]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge. Since science is based on induction, we never know if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it. In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.
EB

On the contrary. Scientific results are the only way we can know of the world.

Deduction never leads to new knowledge. It is only reformulation of what we already know.

 

[Bronzeage]

Should we all stub our toes at the same time to see if the world is real?

 

[aeebee50]

I wonder at times.

 

[fast]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge. Since science is based on induction, we never know if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it. In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.
EB

On the contrary. Scientific results are the only way we can know of the world.

Deduction never leads to new knowledge. It is only reformulation of what we already know.

If by, "on the contrary," you are meaning to express that you disagree with him, then let me say that I agree with what you mean to express, as I disagree with a substantial portion as well.

When you say, "scientific results are the only way we can know of the world," I recognize the truth of a slightly less qualified version of what you say. I agree that scientific results are one way we can know of the world, but how we can know of the world is not limited to scientific results.

When you say, "deduction never leads to new knowledge," I'm hesitant to agree with that, although I suspect it being a closed system is a strong basis for the reasoning behind such a position. My issue is with post deduction belief formulation. It's not necessarily a case of bringing awareness to what we already know, for belief is a necessary condition of knowledge. For instance, if I don't hold a belief in a conclusion to a sound deductive argument until the argument is made, then I did not know what I came to believe.

- - - Updated - - -

Should we all stub our toes at the same time to see if the world is real?

No. We already know the world is real.

 

[fast]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge.

The notion that science is knowledge comes across as being as silly as the notion that Botany is belief. One thing is one thing, and the other thing is something else. Science--wouldn't that broadly be considered a discipline of sorts? Knowledge wouldn't be that--it'd be something else.

(don't mean to speak about what you're expounding on as if you're espousing their view)

Since science is based on induction,

I'm not trying to be over critical, but the occasional use of inductive arguments in the incredibly large field of science (which is based on substantially more than a particular kind of argument) can hardly give good reason to believe it to be case that science is based on induction. A lot of what goes on in science goes beyond argumentation.

(I hope I didn't gloss over your point)

we never know

I cannot help but highly suspect that the scope of what is meant by the word, "know" is so far stretched that it would be best to just avoid the confusion that using the word brings. If your notion of knowledge excludes the possibility of mistake, then it's a highly stretched notion.

(I don't recall at the moment your exact stance on the breath of that term)

if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it.

That assumes an often distorted sense of what it means to say we know something. We can never truly know anything in this philosophized distortion field, but we really truly do know things about this real world in which we live. We can't actually be mistaken and actually know at the same time, but actually being mistaken and possibly being mistaken is not the same thing (a truth so often glossed over in glassy eyes and dismissed). So long as we're merely possibily mistaken, and not actually mistaken, we can know what we claim we do.

In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.

Doesn't sound fair, but I'm not entirely sure if I'm picking up everything you're putting down.

 

[Juma]

We should ditch the notion of "knowledge" altogether since the concept has instrumentalized beyond real usefullness.
Wether something is true or not is a red herring in most discussions. We, as humans, do not need knowledge in that meaning. We need useful information, useful beliefs.

The facts that empirical sciences brings us is the real ground for this sound belief.
Math snd logic only lets us see other sides of these facts that our mind is to feeble to realize by itself.

 

[Malintent]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge. Since science is based on induction, we never know if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it. In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.
EB

utter nonsense. what you are calling "science" seems to be but one component of it... Hypothesis / Theory... You ignore the experimentation / repetition critical aspect of how science works when you talk philosophy of knowledge.
Experimentation brings knowledge to the "real world", and thus is "real knowledge".

 

[Speakpigeon]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge. Since science is based on induction, we never know if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it. In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.
EB

On the contrary. Scientific results are the only way we can know of the world.

That's possible, i.e. I can conceive of it, but I don't actually know it. Possibly, i.e. conceivably from my perspective, you do know something about the world but I don't know that. I don't even know there's a world to be known. In fact I don't even know what this "you" who seems to know so many things. Congratulation, "you"!

Deduction never leads to new knowledge. It is only reformulation of what we already know.

You are merely repeating what every donkey in the world will feel compeled to repeat without bothering to think about it. I'm not going to explain but of course deduction is absolutely crutial to everything we think, to rationality, and of course to how science is done.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Should we all stub our toes at the same time to see if the world is real?

I'll leave my toes alone if you don't mind but it escapes me that any particuliar action or process should be necessary to prove that the world exist. You guys have really weird ideas.

First, if by "the world" you mean the material world, as I suppose you do, you should have realised by now that you're only aware of whatever you do, assuming you do anything at all, as impressions. All you will know on stubbing your toe will be the impression that you have stubbed your toe. Whether there is an actual material toe that has been physically stubbed against some materially hard object will remain anyone's guess. If there's anyone to guess, that is.

Second, I don't need any particular action to believe there's a matieral world. Every moment of my existence when I'm awake is a testimonial to the existence of some kind of material world.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The notion that science is knowledge comes across as being as silly as the notion that Botany is belief. One thing is one thing, and the other thing is something else. Science--wouldn't that broadly be considered a discipline of sorts? Knowledge wouldn't be that--it'd be something else.

(don't mean to speak about what you're expounding on as if you're espousing their view)

Since science is based on induction,

I'm not trying to be over critical, but the occasional use of inductive arguments in the incredibly large field of science (which is based on substantially more than a particular kind of argument) can hardly give good reason to believe it to be case that science is based on induction. A lot of what goes on in science goes beyond argumentation.

(I hope I didn't gloss over your point)

we never know

I cannot help but highly suspect that the scope of what is meant by the word, "know" is so far stretched that it would be best to just avoid the confusion that using the word brings. If your notion of knowledge excludes the possibility of mistake, then it's a highly stretched notion.

(I don't recall at the moment your exact stance on the breath of that term)

if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it.

That assumes an often distorted sense of what it means to say we know something. We can never truly know anything in this philosophized distortion field, but we really truly do know things about this real world in which we live. We can't actually be mistaken and actually know at the same time, but actually being mistaken and possibly being mistaken is not the same thing (a truth so often glossed over in glassy eyes and dismissed). So long as we're merely possibily mistaken, and not actually mistaken, we can know what we claim we do.

In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.

Doesn't sound fair, but I'm not entirely sure if I'm picking up everything you're putting down.

I can conceive how my beliefs can be construed as a form of knowledge but that in itself doesn't tell me that I know the material world. I fail to see that I should be said to know the world although I don't know that I know it. You are trying to pass off your belief in the metaphysical notion of human beings' knowledge of the world as actual knowledge. Doesn't work.
EB

 

[Juma]

I don't even know there's a world to be known.

then congrats to have got yourself a useless concept "knowledge".

 

[Speakpigeon]

This is an unfair presentation of the issue.

The dispute comes from some hardcore materialists' insistance that science is knowledge. Since science is based on induction, we never know if a scientific result is true or not of the material world and therefore cannot be said to constitute knowledge of it. In such a case, it's fair to point at the distinction between deduction and induction. It's not a critic of induction, which would be idiotic at best, it is a critic of the hardcore materialists' ideological claim.
EB

utter nonsense. what you are calling "science" seems to be but one component of it... Hypothesis / Theory... You ignore the experimentation / repetition critical aspect of how science works when you talk philosophy of knowledge.
Experimentation brings knowledge to the "real world", and thus is "real knowledge".

Unfair criticism. My focus on induction was because I replied to the OP.

Induction is crucial to science. I fail to see how a process based on induction could qualify as knowledge.

Theory is justified by induction and theory is crucial to the idea of propositional knowledge, which is the kind science is said to be.

Experimentation doesn't change the inductive status of a theory. Repeating experiments only brings in more induction, so to speak.

Experimentation does make scientist more confident about their theories but confidence doesn't transmute scientific beliefs into knowledge.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I don't even know there's a world to be known.

then congrats to have got yourself a useless concept "knowledge".

The concept of usefulness is only justified if there's a world where things can be useful.

My concept of knowledge doesn't rely on my belief in the existence of a material world or on my idea of a material world.

The notion of knowledge of the material world is metaphysical. In practice, it is redundant. We don't need it. It's just a way of talking. The notion of belief is sufficient to explain everything we need in relation to the material world.

As you should all know.
EB

 

[Bronzeage]

Should we all stub our toes at the same time to see if the world is real?

I'll leave my toes alone if you don't mind but it escapes me that any particuliar action or process should be necessary to prove that the world exist. You guys have really weird ideas.

First, if by "the world" you mean the material world, as I suppose you do, you should have realised by now that you're only aware of whatever you do, assuming you do anything at all, as impressions. All you will know on stubbing your toe will be the impression that you have stubbed your toe. Whether there is an actual material toe that has been physically stubbed against some materially hard object will remain anyone's guess. If there's anyone to guess, that is.

Second, I don't need any particular action to believe there's a matieral world. Every moment of my existence when I'm awake is a testimonial to the existence of some kind of material world.
EB

From the Life of Johnson.

After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- "I refute it thus."

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes, I know of course.

As I said, you guys have really weird ideas.
EB

 

[Malintent]

utter nonsense. what you are calling "science" seems to be but one component of it... Hypothesis / Theory... You ignore the experimentation / repetition critical aspect of how science works when you talk philosophy of knowledge.
Experimentation brings knowledge to the "real world", and thus is "real knowledge".

Unfair criticism. My focus on induction was because I replied to the OP.

Induction is crucial to science. I fail to see how a process based on induction could qualify as knowledge.

Theory is justified by induction and theory is crucial to the idea of propositional knowledge, which is the kind science is said to be.

Experimentation doesn't change the inductive status of a theory. Repeating experiments only brings in more induction, so to speak.

Experimentation does make scientist more confident about their theories but confidence doesn't transmute scientific beliefs into knowledge.
EB

My criticism was that you seem to claim that all scientific knowledge is derived through induction... when in 'reality', scientific knowledge comes from confirmation in the 'real world'.. not through induction. You called scientific knowledge induction, and further claimed it not part of the 'real world'. That was my criticism.

 

[Speakpigeon]

And, so, I just replied.
EB

 

[Juma]

then congrats to have got yourself a useless concept "knowledge".

The concept of usefulness is only justified if there's a world where things can be useful.

My concept of knowledge doesn't rely on my belief in the existence of a material world or on my idea of a material world.

The notion of knowledge of the material world is metaphysical. In practice, it is redundant. We don't need it. It's just a way of talking. The notion of belief is sufficient to explain everything we need in relation to the material world.

As you should all know.
EB

I definitely needs to know if a tiger is totally safe to be near or if it may rip me to pieces.

Everything that is worth to know comes, ab ovo, from induction.