Value from Heidegger's Being and Time

[rousseau]

I have a good friend who did a philosophy degree and likes Heidegger quite a bit. We've discussed him briefly, and from some of my reading Heidegger seems to be a a pretty influential philosopher.

Figuring I'd never be able to read the source work, I picked up a commentary on Being and Time, hoping to glean relevant points from it. I read a chunk of it and from what I could tell Heidegger was trying to define, or look at, the meaning of the existence of things, as if he were trying to extract some kind of meaningful information out of the existence of the universe and its objects

Usually, when I read any philosophy I always put what I'm reading into the context of natural science, which usually supersedes whatever I'm reading and reveals is as fodder, and that was the case with Being and Time.

In my mind the reality is: things exist, there is no inherent meaning to them, the end

That said, I haven't had the time to actually ready the commentary from end to end so I could be completely ignorant on the subject. So what kind of valuable thoughts came out of this book?

 

[dx713]

Heidegger is very much too high brow for me, so note I might be completely misunderstanding.
But from what I read about philosophy's history (and just refreshed with wikipedia), the valuable thought that he introduced in that book was the idea of time as the experience of being. Time not as an external property of things but as a subjective experience from being, for which we introduce objective measurements just to be able to communicate that experience.
Apparently, that was quite novel an idea when he wrote it, and the distance he took with metaphysics wasn't very popular too.

I still don't see the interest of that kind of reflexion in an exercise that is supposed to inform or practical life, but I suppose that's why he's too high-brow for me.

 

[ontological_realist]

In my mind the reality is: things exist, there is no inherent meaning to them, the end

Are you sure that things exist?

 

[PyramidHead]

In my mind the reality is: things exist, there is no inherent meaning to them, the end

Are you sure that things exist?

...asked "ontological_realist".

 

[Achwienichtig]

From what I understand, Heidegger's "Being and Time" was actually the first volume of what he intended to be a two volume work. The second volume was supposed to extract an ethical theory from what he had written in the first volume, but once he had finished the first volume, he was unable to create such an ethical theory.

 

[ontological_realist]

Are you sure that things exist?

...asked "ontological_realist".

Smart of you to spot the irony.

I am a realist not about material things but 'the ground of material things' in the sense of idealist philosophy. Material things are what 'the ground of material things' looks like to humans. I suppose Heidegger was also subscribing to similar view.

I am still investigating this subject, so I am not sure that what I am writing here is correct.

 

[PyramidHead]

What is the distinction? If there is a 'ground of material things,' is it not also true that individual 'things' can be said to exist?

 

[ontological_realist]

What is the distinction? If there is a 'ground of material things,' is it not also true that individual 'things' can be said to exist?

Please see my posts #6, #7 and #8 in this:-

http://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?2489-Can-there-be-an-object-without-any-subject

 

[ontological_realist]

What is the distinction? If there is a 'ground of material things,' is it not also true that individual 'things' can be said to exist?

Please see my posts #6, #7 and #8 in this:-

http://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?2489-Can-there-be-an-object-without-any-subject

continued:- But please do read my previous post first.

A direct answer to your question: Why there could be a 'ground of material things' but not individual 'things' is because 'ground of material things' may exist prior to any cognitive activity of a subject where as for individual 'things' to be cognitive activity of a subject is necessary. Also, in a sense individual things exist only in the mind of the subject. So no object without a subject.

These are some unfinished thoughts subject to revision.

 

[PyramidHead]

Okay; so something exists, and it is basically what we call reality, but it's only observing minds that parse it into objects. So objects are artificial designators for subsets of reality. I agree with that much, but the distinction between that view and the commonsense position that objects exists is unimportant in practice.

 

[fromderinside]

Okay; so something exists, and it is basically what we call reality, but it's only observing minds that parse it into objects. So objects are artificial designators for subsets of reality. I agree with that much, but the distinction between that view and the commonsense position that objects exists is unimportant in practice.

Gliders exist on the surfaces of ponds thanks to the property of adhesion. Diamonds aren't forever but they're pretty damned long cohered. No mind has to be there to permit their existence. Gliders would skate across water surfaces with or without minds present.

Seems to me that reality is the problem rather than objects. Until there is evidence of a multiuniversal mind there can be no discussion about reality with any reality.

 

[PyramidHead]

Okay; so something exists, and it is basically what we call reality, but it's only observing minds that parse it into objects. So objects are artificial designators for subsets of reality. I agree with that much, but the distinction between that view and the commonsense position that objects exists is unimportant in practice.

Gliders exist on the surfaces of ponds thanks to the property of adhesion. Diamonds aren't forever but they're pretty damned long cohered. No mind has to be there to permit their existence. Gliders would skate across water surfaces with or without minds present.

They would, from our perspective as minds thinking about what reality would be like without minds. But without minds, there would be no sense experience, nothing to be processed and apportioned into categories, such as the distinction between a glider and the surrounding pond. ontological_realist's point, if I'm understanding it correctly, is not that objects vanish when we stop looking at them, it's that the notion of an "object" is predicated on having a brain that can model reality in discrete chunks. The chunks rendered by our internal software are evolutionarily useful entities, but we have no reason to suppose that reality itself is divided along the same lines our minds draw. We can be relatively more confident that something is out there, impinging on our sensory apparatus. This may be what ontological_realist is referring to as the 'ground of material things.'

 

[ontological_realist]

Okay; so something exists, and it is basically what we call reality, but it's only observing minds that parse it into objects. So objects are artificial designators for subsets of reality. I agree with that much, but the distinction between that view and the commonsense position that objects exists is unimportant in practice.

When people say that objects exist, they perhaps think that the objects they are cognizing are the same objects which other conscious beings are cognizing, which may not be true. Just to clarify what I mean it is like the thinking of an ignorant person who thinks that the morality of his tribe is the morality of all human beings or even all cosmos.
Would it not lead to wrong world view or metaphysics? Then what are the consequences?

continued in post #15

 

[ontological_realist]

They would, from our perspective as minds thinking about what reality would be like without minds. But without minds, there would be no sense experience, nothing to be processed and apportioned into categories, such as the distinction between a glider and the surrounding pond. ontological_realist's point, if I'm understanding it correctly, is not that objects vanish when we stop looking at them, it's that the notion of an "object" is predicated on having a brain that can model reality in discrete chunks. The chunks rendered by our internal software are evolutionarily useful entities, but we have no reason to suppose that reality itself is divided along the same lines our minds draw. We can be relatively more confident that something is out there, impinging on our sensory apparatus. This may be what ontological_realist is referring to as the 'ground of material things.'

Yes, you got me. This is what I am trying to express. A mind gets merely a unique perspective on what actually exists. No two perspectives can be exactly the same. Two people's perspectives can be very similar but never the same.

 

[ontological_realist]

Okay; so something exists, and it is basically what we call reality, but it's only observing minds that parse it into objects. So objects are artificial designators for subsets of reality. I agree with that much, but the distinction between that view and the commonsense position that objects exists is unimportant in practice.

When people say that objects exist, they perhaps think that the objects they are cognizing are the same objects which other conscious beings are cognizing, which may not be true. Just to clarify what I mean it is like the thinking of an ignorant person who thinks that the morality of his tribe is the morality of all human beings or even all cosmos.
Would it not lead to wrong world view or metaphysics? Then what are the consequences?

continued in post #15

Common people's view of reality may be that the universe consists of objects like tables, chairs, planets and stars etc.
Present day physicists view may be that the universe consists of sub atomic particles, or waves or strings or other yet to be discovered entities.

But both forget that these are merely views of human mind and hence just perspectives.

 

[PyramidHead]

When people say that objects exist, they perhaps think that the objects they are cognizing are the same objects which other conscious beings are cognizing, which may not be true. Just to clarify what I mean it is like the thinking of an ignorant person who thinks that the morality of his tribe is the morality of all human beings or even all cosmos.
Would it not lead to wrong world view or metaphysics? Then what are the consequences?

continued in post #15

Common people's view of reality may be that the universe consists of objects like tables, chairs, planets and stars etc.
Present day physicists view may be that the universe consists of sub atomic particles, or waves or strings or other yet to be discovered entities.

But both forget that these are merely views of human mind and hence just perspectives.

I think that in essence, there is a simple way to adjudicate between unique perspectives, if they are in conflict: which one better explains sense data? It's not that physicists hold that the universe consists of particles because of some whimsical preference, after all. Nor would most of them deny that the universe also consists of objects. Both models are good at predicting what sensory information will be incoming under certain circumstances. By contrast, the metaphysical view that the universe is comprised of pecan pie fails this test. So, while our models may be artificial representations, they are not wholly arbitrary, and some are clearly more accurate than others.

 

[Achwienichtig]

I think what some people are getting at is Heidegger's scientific instrumentalism. The philosophy of scientific intrumentalism, which is analytic in origin, has much in common with phenomenology. The question of "bracketing" the object as it is from the object as it is "to us" is is central. I think Heidegger used the example of a hammer. When I look at the hammer, I see a tool used to drive nails into some surface. It doesn't matter what the hammer is made out of, or is, apart from my perception. It's toolness will always be true for me. Likewise, by speculating as to the primary physical structure of the world, all we are doing is creating a tool by which we make a certain perception of the world true for us.

But I might be off my rocker. I haven't read Heidegger nor the works of scientific intrumentalism for quite some time now.

 

[ontological_realist]

Common people's view of reality may be that the universe consists of objects like tables, chairs, planets and stars etc.
Present day physicists view may be that the universe consists of sub atomic particles, or waves or strings or other yet to be discovered entities.

But both forget that these are merely views of human mind and hence just perspectives.

I think that in essence, there is a simple way to adjudicate between unique perspectives, if they are in conflict: which one better explains sense data? It's not that physicists hold that the universe consists of particles because of some whimsical preference, after all. Nor would most of them deny that the universe also consists of objects. Both models are good at predicting what sensory information will be incoming under certain circumstances. By contrast, the metaphysical view that the universe is comprised of pecan pie fails this test. So, while our models may be artificial representations, they are not wholly arbitrary, and some are clearly more accurate than others.

Which one better explains sense data?: From the same thing, different subjects will receive different sense data. If a dog whistle is blown, dogs will receive auditory sense data but not humans. Human eyes can receive visual sense data only within a certain frequency of light. All human senses can receive sense data only within a certain range and not outside of it. Bats can receive sense data (some radar like system which I do not remember now) and humans do not have that sense. There may be many senses which humans( including human scientists), do not even know that they do not have. The same goes for human powers of understanding, human mind or consciousness. Human senses and mind can not know what is really existing and happening
in reality. To understand this, imagine a five letter word written so that each of it's letters is written in a different color out of which humans can be aware of only three colors. Then humans can not know what the word is.

 

[ontological_realist]

I think what some people are getting at is Heidegger's scientific instrumentalism. The philosophy of scientific intrumentalism, which is analytic in origin, has much in common with phenomenology. The question of "bracketing" the object as it is from the object as it is "to us" is central. I think Heidegger used the example of a hammer. When I look at the hammer, I see a tool used to drive nails into some surface. It doesn't matter what the hammer is made out of, or is, apart from my perception. It's toolness will always be true for me. Likewise, by speculating as to the primary physical structure of the world, all we are doing is creating a tool by which we make a certain perception of the world true for us.

But I might be off my rocker. I haven't read Heidegger nor the works of scientific intrumentalism for quite some time now.

No, you are not off your rocker. As a matter of fact, I would bet that there is not even the slightest chance of your falling off from your rocker ( excuse a friendly Joke, This subject is very serious so one needs to balance it with some light heartedness )

Now seriously,

The question of "bracketing" the object as it is from the object as it is "to us" is central.

This is the main point I am trying to express. All the rest flows from it. It seems to me that this was the main point of Kant and his successors in which I include Hegel and Heidegger.

Still I must say that 'Being and Time' was too difficult for me.

 

[Achwienichtig]

I think what some people are getting at is Heidegger's scientific instrumentalism. The philosophy of scientific intrumentalism, which is analytic in origin, has much in common with phenomenology. The question of "bracketing" the object as it is from the object as it is "to us" is central. I think Heidegger used the example of a hammer. When I look at the hammer, I see a tool used to drive nails into some surface. It doesn't matter what the hammer is made out of, or is, apart from my perception. It's toolness will always be true for me. Likewise, by speculating as to the primary physical structure of the world, all we are doing is creating a tool by which we make a certain perception of the world true for us.

But I might be off my rocker. I haven't read Heidegger nor the works of scientific intrumentalism for quite some time now.

No, you are not off your rocker. As a matter of fact, I would bet that there is not even the slightest chance of your falling off from your rocker ( excuse a friendly Joke, This subject is very serious so one needs to balance it with some light heartedness )

Now seriously,

The question of "bracketing" the object as it is from the object as it is "to us" is central.

This is the main point I am trying to express. All the rest flows from it. It seems to me that this was the main point of Kant and his successors in which I include Hegel and Heidegger.

Still I must say that 'Being and Time' was too difficult for me.

Well, there are some things to be said here.

1) In Kant's philosophy, science and metaphysics are constrained to discussing reality as it appears to us. We can never fully reach into the noumenal reality of things. However, according to Kant, practical reasoning (i.e. reasoning concerning morality, ethics, and politics) does not have this constraint. In fact, the categorical imperative is an absolute fact of practical reasoning and is the essence and noumenal reality concerning ethics.

Therefore, in Kant's philosophy, ethics and politics contain more absolute truth than science and metaphysics.

2) In Hegel the same remains the case, in that he thought politics is more true than metaphysics. In fact, Hegel's metaphysics is political in essence. He speaks of "world spirit" (Geist) as an abstract reality that has its realization in politics and history. He marries his most abstract thoughts with concrete political examples.

3) Heidegger comes from a tradition of phenomenology, which is essentially anti-Hegelian. The phenomenologists essentially took what Kant said about science and metaphysics as true, but they refused to give politics and morality a greater place than science, as Kant had done. I think that to group Hegel and Heidegger in the same camp is to overlook the different directions they split off into. One fully embraced Kant's politics. The other embraced his metaphysics.