What does it mean for something to be "logically possible"?

[fast]

I didn't mean to complicate matters by introducing a subjective element into the problem. Replace her with a bowling ball. <damn something sounded so not right about that>

I didn't address this aspect of your post. Why do you?

I'm over here. The ball is over there. I submit that I see the ball. You disagree. You think we merely see a mental image (or percept) of the ball. My view is that you're narrowing what it means to say that we see something. Science might show the processes of vision such that the brain never reaches out and touches the ball but rather light streams in to us. That (to me) doesn't change anything, for that's apart of what it means to even say we saw something.

You can't walk around making the claim we don't really see anything outside our minds. People will think you're crazy. When you start to dodge objects in your path and you explain that your movement was due to doppelgänger mental images giving you a video with a setting tuned to human distortion, well, just sayin', it's better to just say you see the thing (just like they do). You can explain how we see, but don't deny that we see, nor deny that we see what we do.

I wouldn't dispute what it is that we mean when we say that we see a bird on a tree. We certainly mean just that, that there's a bird, a tree, the bird is on the tree, and we're looking at that, and that's what we see. That's what people mean and they also usually believe that this describes the reality of the situation, accurately. No dispute here as to meaning.

Yet, we've moved on a bit since the language and the vocabulary we still use today in our everyday lives were settled. We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of what human beings are and, as a consequence, of what it is that human beings typically do. For example in terms of what they do when they look at things. And there's no doubt in this respect that although we say we see things and think we see things, the reality, as we now believe it is, is much more complicated.

And there's nothing much to add.

You replied to something I didn't say (about the subjectivity of your "beautiful woman" example) and you didn't reply to what it is I did say. So, I will only repeat myself, changing the example from the more subjectively charged "beautiful woman" to the more objectively pedestrian "tree".

Here it goes again: I would agree that if you see a tree it's probably because there's something that looks to you as a tree. But then there's no real sense, beyond this, in insisting that this something actually is a tree. All you can say, even objectively if you can get the concurring opinion of several people, is that this something looks like a tree. What it actually is, you still don't know, except that it should be something that looks to you as a tree.

And, crucially, there's no doubt that my description is much more accurate than your "I see a tree", and more realistic than "This is a tree".

That's what I meant.

Oh, and it would help if we drop this fascination with the brain being the person. I don't see percepts, even should it might be the case my brain senses them. I see the rock, the ball, and the girl.

Sure, no issue here.
EB

My apologies for making this difficult. I don't mean to. There is only a subtle difference between seeing a tree and seeing an actual tree. The referent is the same thing. The difference is merely in making it explicit. I accentuate that the tree is an actual tree when I describe it as an actual tree, but the tree I'm saying I see when I say I see a tree is the actual tree, as opposed to a picture of a tree, a drawing of a tree, a mental percept of a tree, or any other alternative.

I get the distinction impression that you will say (say) you see a tree when talking to a child or perhaps an adult in a nonphilosophical context, yet you still think (believe) that you don't see the actual tree; instead, you think the child is mistaken and that the child (because of not being aware of the complexities of what's entailed in seeing something) is mistaken. I (on the other hand) do not think the child is mistaken, despite not understanding the complexities of what's entailed in seeing something.

I think what you hold is that we don't really and truly see an actual tree. I think you're mistaken, and I think the epistemological difficulties in proving it suppresses your willingness to accept what you think I naively hold as true.

I'm not sure how far off base I am in describing your position. Be gentle.

 

[untermensche]

...I think what you hold is that we don't really and truly see an actual tree...

You can do more than just see the tree. You can go up and touch it. You can smell it. You can even taste it.

Many experiences tell you the tree is there.

But you cannot really see a tree.

You can only see the light that reflects off it.

But you don't even really see that.

You see what the brain makes of the light that reflects off it.

 

[fast]

...I think what you hold is that we don't really and truly see an actual tree...

You can do more than just see the tree. You can go up and touch it. You can smell it. You can even taste it.

Many experiences tell you the tree is there.

But you cannot really see a tree.

You can only see the light that reflects off it.

But you don't even really see that.

You see what the brain makes of the light that reflects off it.

That's contradictory.
A) I can see a tree
B) I can really see a tree

A and B are equivalent.

C) I can't see a tree
D) I can't really see a tree

C and D are equivalent

A&B, however, contradicts C&D

 

[untermensche]

I was going to put the first see in quotes. It just means what people say.

The second "see" refers to the facts.

You don't really smell the tree.

Molecules do not have smell.

Smell is like color and sound, something made whole by brains that does not exist as anything besides an experience.

 

[fast]

You see what the brain makes of the light that reflects off it.

No, I see the tree.

What my brain makes of the light reflecting off the tree is a necessary condition for what it means to see a tree. The interpretation of the newfound knowledge should be such that it shows how we see the tree, not a denial that we see a tree.

 

[untermensche]

You see what the brain makes of the light that reflects off it.

No, I see the tree.

What my brain makes of the light reflecting off the tree is a necessary condition for what it means to see a tree. The interpretation of the newfound knowledge should be such that it shows how we see the tree, not a denial that we see a tree.

No you don't.

You experience some brain created representation of the tree.

Color is not an attribute of any tree.

Color is only something experienced.

If humans did not experience them they could not possibly know they existed.

The reflective qualities of objects would still exist but humans would not associate any color with them.

 

[Juma]

That's questionable.

Where do you see the object? On the eye or in the brain?

The clock is on the wall. Where do I see the object? On the wall.

I couldn't see the object unless I had an eye, a brain, and a clock, and I couldn't see where the object is unless there was an eye, a brain, a clock, and (wait for it, wait for it) a wall.

There is nothing ”out there” that looks lika a clock.
Because ”looks like” is a feature created by our brain.

So the question here is just the definition of ”see”.

Thing is: we are totally capable of seeing things that arent there.
”I thought i saw you sister at the station”
”Where is the can, i saw it standing here”

Our cognitive system makes mistakes. Do you really mean that these mistakes are ”out there”?
Of course not. But that means that what we see really are in our brain. we refer to the inferred causes of the input as what it is that we see simply because that what it seems to us..

 

[fast]

Just curious, but is the steadfast resistance I'm putting up to these fleeting moments I'm having of recognizing this strange human independent reality normal?

 

[untermensche]

Fuck no.

That you could think anything besides the things you experience represent things that are out there is a Hollywood, comic book, creation.

This is why many people are terrified by hallucinations.

They are so used to believing the things they experience, when awake, point to real things in the world.

 

[Speakpigeon]

What my brain makes of the light reflecting off the tree is a necessary condition for what it means to see a tree. The interpretation of the newfound knowledge should be such that it shows how we see the tree, not a denial that we see a tree.

Unfortunately, the rational understanding of how we see the world does contradict our deep-rooted certainty that what we see as a tree is a tree. So, it's I think impossible to rationally concede that what we see as a tree is indeed a tree.

However, there's a way around this, and one which is well understood: meaning and reference. It goes like this.

There is a very useful distinction we standardly make between what words mean and what they refer to (keeping in mind that words don't do these things all by themselves).
So, first, we use the word 'tree' to mean trees.
And we also standardly use the word 'tree' to refer to actual trees (unless otherwise specified), not things inside our brain (or mind).
Yet, what human observers are aware of can only be percepts of trees, not the actual trees themselves. Percepts are mental representations, most certainly located somehow inside our brains. They are definitely not trees. They are complex mental constructs built by our brain, inside our brain. And, clearly, these percepts stand for us as proxys for actual trees, which seems both natural and very effective.
And the fact is we cannot help taking these mental proxys for actual trees. We cannot take them for anything but actual trees (even me, by the way). And, it's understandable why that is. It's their 'function'. It would be very ineffective if people could take their mental representation of trees as anything but actual trees. Again, even people like me can't.
Now, the rational view of this is compatible with the standard theory of word reference. The meaning of the word 'tree' can be rationally identified with a "tree percept" inside our brain (or the idea of a tree in our mind). And we all know what we mean when we talk about trees because we're able to consider at the same time our mental representation of trees (either imagined or perceived). However, the reference of the word 'tree' is best identified as the physical thing out there, the actual 'tree' in the physical world, because when we discuss things with other people, we usually want to talk about things we think of as out there, as existing in themselves outside our mind, independently of us, unlike our mental representations.
So, we can agree that the word 'tree' just means tree. But we can give a more accurate characterisation saying what we are aware of are mental representations standing for actual trees. Which fits with the idea that we use the word 'tree' to refer to actual trees. It's just that we're not necessarily aware of the complex organisation of our mind that allow us to use the word 'tree' in this way.
We also need to give an account of the word "see". So, the phrase "I see a tree" conflates two things. First, it asserts perception. Second, it asserts the existence of a tree. Perception can be understood differently by different people. The rational understanding, however, is that the brain forms a mental representation of the tree in itself (or in the mind). So, rationality does not deny there's a tree out there. But it says that what we are aware of as conscious subjects can only be the mental representation of the tree, not the tree itself. And, inevitably, the rational view can only conclude that we are mistaken in taking our mental representation of a tree to be an actual tree. However, this fundamental error is all for our own good for it is this error that allows us to function properly in our environment. And, again, this conception accepts that there is an actual tree. Except that this tree is not the tree we are aware of, and this 'I see a tree' is really just the way we talk, precisely because we think we really see a tree.

Sorry, it's all a bit complicated but you should be able to make sense of it all.
EB

 

[fast]

What my brain makes of the light reflecting off the tree is a necessary condition for what it means to see a tree. The interpretation of the newfound knowledge should be such that it shows how we see the tree, not a denial that we see a tree.

Unfortunately, the rational understanding of how we see the world does contradict our deep-rooted certainty that what we see as a tree is a tree. So, it's I think impossible to rationally concede that what we see as a tree is indeed a tree.

However, there's a way around this, and one which is well understood: meaning and reference. It goes like this.

There is a very useful distinction we standardly make between what words mean and what they refer to (keeping in mind that words don't do these things all by themselves).
So, first, we use the word 'tree' to mean trees.
And we also standardly use the word 'tree' to refer to actual trees (unless otherwise specified), not things inside our brain (or mind).
Yet, what human observers are aware of can only be percepts of trees, not the actual trees themselves. Percepts are mental representations, most certainly located somehow inside our brains. They are definitely not trees. They are complex mental constructs built by our brain, inside our brain. And, clearly, these percepts stand for us as proxys for actual trees, which seems both natural and very effective.
And the fact is we cannot help taking these mental proxys for actual trees. We cannot take them for anything but actual trees (even me, by the way). And, it's understandable why that is. It's their 'function'. It would be very ineffective if people could take their mental representation of trees as anything but actual trees. Again, even people like me can't.
Now, the rational view of this is compatible with the standard theory of word reference. The meaning of the word 'tree' can be rationally identified with a "tree percept" inside our brain (or the idea of a tree in our mind). And we all know what we mean when we talk about trees because we're able to consider at the same time our mental representation of trees (either imagined or perceived). However, the reference of the word 'tree' is best identified as the physical thing out there, the actual 'tree' in the physical world, because when we discuss things with other people, we usually want to talk about things we think of as out there, as existing in themselves outside our mind, independently of us, unlike our mental representations.
So, we can agree that the word 'tree' just means tree. But we can give a more accurate characterisation saying what we are aware of are mental representations standing for actual trees. Which fits with the idea that we use the word 'tree' to refer to actual trees. It's just that we're not necessarily aware of the complex organisation of our mind that allow us to use the word 'tree' in this way.
We also need to give an account of the word "see". So, the phrase "I see a tree" conflates two things. First, it asserts perception. Second, it asserts the existence of a tree. Perception can be understood differently by different people. The rational understanding, however, is that the brain forms a mental representation of the tree in itself (or in the mind). So, rationality does not deny there's a tree out there. But it says that what we are aware of as conscious subjects can only be the mental representation of the tree, not the tree itself. And, inevitably, the rational view can only conclude that we are mistaken in taking our mental representation of a tree to be an actual tree. However, this fundamental error is all for our own good for it is this error that allows us to function properly in our environment. And, again, this conception accepts that there is an actual tree. Except that this tree is not the tree we are aware of, and this 'I see a tree' is really just the way we talk, precisely because we think we really see a tree.

Sorry, it's all a bit complicated but you should be able to make sense of it all.
EB

I still think a mistake is being made early on that can carry us down the path leading us to where you go with this.

There is something external to the mind, and there is something mentally internal that only our brain can access (a percept filtered through a human brain). That being said, I will concede to the notion that tree percept is not precisely representative of what we generally regard as the referent of the term "tree," since the product of what is manifested by a human brain is not the same as what's born of a bat's brain.

I don't think the percept is a true distortion. I think it's just an incomplete picture. For instance, if I had senses that could detect ultraviolet light, my percept would reflect that, and since it's apart of the real world yet not apart of my percept, my percept is just lacking, not distorted.

When I say I see something, I am reporting what is external to the mind. That my brain cannot attach itself directly to what is outside of the mind raises the question of how can I (I, I say) be speaking of something that my brain cannot reach out and touch. I think the explanation lies in proper interpretation of what it means to see something.

The notion that the brain cannot directly tangibly sense the cluster of atoms making up what we generally call a tree seems to be the strength behind epistemological doubt.

 

[untermensche]

The notion that the brain cannot directly tangibly sense the cluster of atoms making up what we generally call a tree seems to be the strength behind epistemological doubt.

The brain is a dumb machine.

What knows about the tree is not the brain.

It is something created by the brain, the mind.

And the mind does not have access to the external world.

 

[fast]

The brain is a dumb machine.

False. The brain is not a dumb machine.

The brain isn't even a machine, and even if it was, it's not the kind of thing that is dumb or smart.

By "brain" I'm not talking about the person. People can be dumb or smart. The brain isn't the person. The brain is an organ of the person.

People design machines. They don't design brains.

What knows about the tree is not the brain.

True. And by "tree," I'm not talking about the internal mental percept of a tree.

By the way, if I were to say that the brain knows the mental percept, I would be using "knows" in a very metaphorical sense, as brains don't know anything. People know things, not their brains.

It is something created by the brain, the mind.

What is, the tree? No, the tree isn't created by the brain, nor is the tree created by the mind.

The tree is the external object, and the tree percept is the so-called internal object, and it (metaphorically) resides in the mind, and its existence is a function of the brain and mind, but the actual tree (which is external to the body and grows out from the actual ground) is not created by the brain and mind. In fact, old trees predate many brains and minds.

And the mind does not have access to the external world.

But the external world has access to the mind.

The prisoner cannot leave the jail, yet the prisoner can know what's going on outside the jail.

 

[untermensche]

The brain is a dumb machine.

False. The brain is not a dumb machine.

It is. Without a mind they don't operate in the world at all.

And the mind does not have access to the external world.

But the external world has access to the mind.

No it doesn't.

The only thing that access to the mind is the brain.

The brain stands between the external world and the mind and the two can never meet.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I still think a mistake is being made early on that can carry us down the path leading us to where you go with this.

There is something external to the mind, and there is something mentally internal that only our brain can access (a percept filtered through a human brain). That being said, I will concede to the notion that tree percept is not precisely representative of what we generally regard as the referent of the term "tree," since the product of what is manifested by a human brain is not the same as what's born of a bat's brain.

I don't think the percept is a true distortion. I think it's just an incomplete picture. For instance, if I had senses that could detect ultraviolet light, my percept would reflect that, and since it's apart of the real world yet not apart of my percept, my percept is just lacking, not distorted.

When I say I see something, I am reporting what is external to the mind. That my brain cannot attach itself directly to what is outside of the mind raises the question of how can I (I, I say) be speaking of something that my brain cannot reach out and touch. I think the explanation lies in proper interpretation of what it means to see something.

The notion that the brain cannot directly tangibly sense the cluster of atoms making up what we generally call a tree seems to be the strength behind epistemological doubt.

My point wasn't about lacking some electromagnetic wavelengths. It doesn't matter that we could theoretically improve our perception system to include the wavelengths we don't use. Even if we did that, we would still have only mental representations, richer and presumably more accurate, but still fundamentally representations. That is, not the things themselves. Our mental representations tell us how things look, that is to say, they tell us how light is affected by bouncing off them. That's obviously very informative and useful, but it's fundamentally different from knowing the things we are "looking" at in themselves.

When we're talking about what we think are things that are outside our minds, we're in fact talking about the things that are inside our minds because that's all we have. That's why we say things like "the flower is red" when there's no redness at all out there in the material world. Redness is all inside our minds. Whatever there is out there in the material world, we just don't really know because we all have to use our mental proxys such as redness and loudness and pain and so on. That's all we have and that's all we actually know.
And it's reasonably easy to understand why this all works so very well despite us having no direct knowledge of the material world.
This idea is now very easy to understand because we're now familiar with computers and how machines can be made autonomous to some extent by having a computer control and drive them. The computer will have a model of the world, and detectors and imagery systems that have the same role as our perception organs and our brain. Thanks to this, we know it's relatively easy for a computer to drive a car at full speed on a winding road. The computer thus has to rely on a digital representation of its environment. A representation which is essentially a dynamic electromagnetic field located in a few electronic components somewhere inside the computer. What the car does is what the computer makes it do, and what the computer does is entirely based on its electromagnetic representation of its environment. Obviously, computers have to be designed by competent and skillful engineers to be able to achieve such a feat. For human beings and other species, science has told us it's 3.5 billion years of Darwinian evolution that did it. A very different process but a somewhat similar result. Our brains harbour very effective mental representations of our environment and we just take these representations for the real world that's out there. We were allowed until not so long ago to keep on believing it because there were no glitches so significant that we would have had to revise our view of our situation. It's really science that called off the charade. And also philosophers, like Plato with his story about the cave.
EB

 

[fast]

Our mental representations tell us how things look, that is to say, they tell us how light is affected by bouncing off them. That's obviously very informative and useful, but it's fundamentally different from knowing the things we are "looking" at in themselves.

You're essentially treating the mental percept as a middleman that stands between us and the objects of the external world, so when I tell you I see an object of the external world, you think I'm mistaken and see not the object but rather the mental percept of the object.

My objections are not as they apparently appear to you. There are two issues that serve to obscure my communication. I'm trying to find a work-around.

As long as nothing gets personified, I'm inclined to agree with you on specifics, but there's still hierarchical description issues. In normal discourse, I'm not going to call anyone out on their word choice so long as a meeting of the minds isn't substantively repressed.

I very much want to understand and accept the scientific results of past endeavors, but I'm highly (highly) resistent to verbal interpretations of their findings. In other words, I'm open-minded to the facts that flow from science, but I cringe at the words used to express their findings.

I see the tree. I don't see, nor does my brain see the tree percept. I have eyes. My brain doesn't have eyes. My eyes allow me to see things external to the skull (through the eye sockets, in particular). Science shouldn't be telling me I can't see things external to my eyes. Science shouldn't be telling me that my brain is what sees and that what it sees is mental percepts. Seeing isn't on the same hierarchical plane. Now, when science explains the factual process with a distinct absence of personification, I'm highly inclined to accept the facts, but when those facts are sprinkled (more like highly garnished) with misinterpretations wrought by poor word choice, I begin to deny the kind of silly verbal (or written) interpretations of their factual conclusions.

 

[Juma]

Our mental representations tell us how things look, that is to say, they tell us how light is affected by bouncing off them. That's obviously very informative and useful, but it's fundamentally different from knowing the things we are "looking" at in themselves.

You're essentially treating the mental percept as a middleman that stands between us and the objects of the external world, so when I tell you I see an object of the external world, you think I'm mistaken and see not the object but rather the mental percept of the object.

My objections are not as they apparently appear to you. There are two issues that serve to obscure my communication. I'm trying to find a work-around.

As long as nothing gets personified, I'm inclined to agree with you on specifics, but there's still hierarchical description issues. In normal discourse, I'm not going to call anyone out on their word choice so long as a meeting of the minds isn't substantively repressed.

I very much want to understand and accept the scientific results of past endeavors, but I'm highly (highly) resistent to verbal interpretations of their findings. In other words, I'm open-minded to the facts that flow from science, but I cringe at the words used to express their findings.

I see the tree. I don't see, nor does my brain see the tree percept. I have eyes. My brain doesn't have eyes. My eyes allow me to see things external to the skull (through the eye sockets, in particular). Science shouldn't be telling me I can't see things external to my eyes. Science shouldn't be telling me that my brain is what sees and that what it sees is mental percepts. Seeing isn't on the same hierarchical plane. Now, when science explains the factual process with a distinct absence of personification, I'm highly inclined to accept the facts, but when those facts are sprinkled (more like highly garnished) with misinterpretations wrought by poor word choice, I begin to deny the kind of silly verbal (or written) interpretations of their factual conclusions.

Fact is that what you really experience is better explained as ”see an internal representation of the tree” than that you ”see the tree”. But if you dont want to listen to fact then dont.

 

[Juma]

I didn't address this aspect of your post. Why do you?

I'm over here. The ball is over there. I submit that I see the ball. You disagree. You think we merely see a mental image (or percept) of the ball. My view is that you're narrowing what it means to say that we see something. Science might show the processes of vision such that the brain never reaches out and touches the ball but rather light streams in to us. That (to me) doesn't change anything, for that's apart of what it means to even say we saw something.

You can't walk around making the claim we don't really see anything outside our minds. People will think you're crazy. When you start to dodge objects in your path and you explain that your movement was due to doppelgänger mental images giving you a video with a setting tuned to human distortion, well, just sayin', it's better to just say you see the thing (just like they do). You can explain how we see, but don't deny that we see, nor deny that we see what we do.

I wouldn't dispute what it is that we mean when we say that we see a bird on a tree. We certainly mean just that, that there's a bird, a tree, the bird is on the tree, and we're looking at that, and that's what we see. That's what people mean and they also usually believe that this describes the reality of the situation, accurately. No dispute here as to meaning.

Yet, we've moved on a bit since the language and the vocabulary we still use today in our everyday lives were settled. We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of what human beings are and, as a consequence, of what it is that human beings typically do. For example in terms of what they do when they look at things. And there's no doubt in this respect that although we say we see things and think we see things, the reality, as we now believe it is, is much more complicated.

And there's nothing much to add.

You replied to something I didn't say (about the subjectivity of your "beautiful woman" example) and you didn't reply to what it is I did say. So, I will only repeat myself, changing the example from the more subjectively charged "beautiful woman" to the more objectively pedestrian "tree".

Here it goes again: I would agree that if you see a tree it's probably because there's something that looks to you as a tree. But then there's no real sense, beyond this, in insisting that this something actually is a tree. All you can say, even objectively if you can get the concurring opinion of several people, is that this something looks like a tree. What it actually is, you still don't know, except that it should be something that looks to you as a tree.

And, crucially, there's no doubt that my description is much more accurate than your "I see a tree", and more realistic than "This is a tree".

That's what I meant.

Oh, and it would help if we drop this fascination with the brain being the person. I don't see percepts, even should it might be the case my brain senses them. I see the rock, the ball, and the girl.

Sure, no issue here.
EB

My apologies for making this difficult. I don't mean to. There is only a subtle difference between seeing a tree and seeing an actual tree. The referent is the same thing. The difference is merely in making it explicit. I accentuate that the tree is an actual tree when I describe it as an actual tree, but the tree I'm saying I see when I say I see a tree is the actual tree, as opposed to a picture of a tree, a drawing of a tree, a mental percept of a tree, or any other alternative.

I get the distinction impression that you will say (say) you see a tree when talking to a child or perhaps an adult in a nonphilosophical context, yet you still think (believe) that you don't see the actual tree; instead, you think the child is mistaken and that the child (because of not being aware of the complexities of what's entailed in seeing something) is mistaken. I (on the other hand) do not think the child is mistaken, despite not understanding the complexities of what's entailed in seeing something.

I think what you hold is that we don't really and truly see an actual tree. I think you're mistaken, and I think the epistemological difficulties in proving it suppresses your willingness to accept what you think I naively hold as true.

I'm not sure how far off base I am in describing your position. Be gentle.

As i described earlier in a response to you I have experienced phenomena thst clearly shows that you se a model of the world, not world itself. We see a model created by the brain. A model based on much less data than what we think it shows us.
You dont see a tree: you experience a symbol of a tree.

 

[fast]

You're essentially treating the mental percept as a middleman that stands between us and the objects of the external world, so when I tell you I see an object of the external world, you think I'm mistaken and see not the object but rather the mental percept of the object.

My objections are not as they apparently appear to you. There are two issues that serve to obscure my communication. I'm trying to find a work-around.

As long as nothing gets personified, I'm inclined to agree with you on specifics, but there's still hierarchical description issues. In normal discourse, I'm not going to call anyone out on their word choice so long as a meeting of the minds isn't substantively repressed.

I very much want to understand and accept the scientific results of past endeavors, but I'm highly (highly) resistent to verbal interpretations of their findings. In other words, I'm open-minded to the facts that flow from science, but I cringe at the words used to express their findings.

I see the tree. I don't see, nor does my brain see the tree percept. I have eyes. My brain doesn't have eyes. My eyes allow me to see things external to the skull (through the eye sockets, in particular). Science shouldn't be telling me I can't see things external to my eyes. Science shouldn't be telling me that my brain is what sees and that what it sees is mental percepts. Seeing isn't on the same hierarchical plane. Now, when science explains the factual process with a distinct absence of personification, I'm highly inclined to accept the facts, but when those facts are sprinkled (more like highly garnished) with misinterpretations wrought by poor word choice, I begin to deny the kind of silly verbal (or written) interpretations of their factual conclusions.

Fact is that what you really experience is better explained as ”see an internal representation of the tree” than that you ”see the tree”. But if you dont want to listen to fact then dont.

It's not a better explanation. It's a confused explanation. That you have thrown "experience" into the mix makes understanding my position even more difficult to grasp. If you cut open my skull and use instruments in just the right way, I may report having external experiences that are nevertheless merely internally caused, and though I agree that under normal conditions, I will report external experiences that must filter through internal processes, I submit that a higher order description that I can visually see the external tree is factually the case despite it also being true that my brain can access no more than the internal filtered percept of the tree.

It's a very dismal view to think we cannot really and truly see the external tree with our eyes. What can we see with our eyes? Nothing? How silly of an interpretation can you get? Then, to makes matters even worse, you're gonna say that an organ that our body has (which has no eyes) is what really sees things but not the tree but rather a mental percept of a tree.

A better explanation is that we often see just what it is we report seeing, with the added understanding that what we ultimately experience is filtered through our brain and therefore there might be a disparity between what is there to be seen and what we think we have saw. This view allows for hallucinations, mirages, mental fatigue, physical brain tampering, and psychotic drugs.

 

[untermensche]

Fact is that what you really experience is better explained as ”see an internal representation of the tree” than that you ”see the tree”. But if you dont want to listen to fact then dont.

It's not a better explanation. It's a confused explanation....

Nothing confused about it.

The light reflecting off the tree hits the eye.

Then the brain turns that stimulation into an experience, an "internal representation" of the tree.

What experiences the tree is the mind and the mind only experiences "internal representations". It has no access to anything else.