#72
Wiploc
. . . in all such examples the proponents of that "something which is harmful on a large scale" can prove the net benefit of it if done on a small scale. So yes, there are such cases where something on a small scale is a net benefit (even though harmful on a larger scale), but in ALL such cases you can PROVE it is a net benefit on the small scale, either with logic or with empirical evidence, and there is a requirement for the proponent of it to make the case.
I'm curious, Lump. Can you name anything that is beneficial on a small scale that wouldn't be harmful on a large enough scale?
Oxygen, water, food, those will all kill you if you get too much.
OK, you can argue that ANYTHING is bad if it's carried too far. No matter what. Too much love, too much justice, too much happiness, too much niceness, etc.
"Too much of a good thing."
The short answer is: no, that's not what I'm saying. Even if it sounds similar, what I'm saying is different.
The difference is something like this: You can get too much sodium or sugar in your diet vs. you can get too much fiber in your diet.
Yes, too much sodium or sugar or fiber can be bad. But isn't there an obvious difference? Have there been any cases of people getting too much fiber in their diet? Is this really a problem? True, in some abstract sense even too much fiber can be bad, but for practical purposes there is hardly such a thing as "too much" fiber.
In real-world experiences, there are many examples that make this point: there is a common illusion that something we see that is bad on a large scale is taken to be OK or beneficial if done here in this limited case before us, and the temptation is to do it because in this limited case it's little or no harm and someone we see here gets a benefit from it.
(This is the real basis for the decisions the Fed makes about QE and suppressing interest rates.)
And yet almost every example might be argued. All I can do is give a long list of examples and show that there is a pattern of this, and that therefore we should always require the proponent of something that is a clear harm if done on a large scale to make the case that it would be beneficial on the smaller or limited scale.
But this is about the cases where the harm done on a large scale is clear or obvious. Like too much sodium or sugar.
I'll just give a laundry list of examples, and the point is to show a PATTERN of this.
What about
employees stealing small items in the workplace. Or a dishonest cashier who finds a way to cheat the system and make off with a few dollars. Don't they reason: It's only a small amount -- it won't be noticed. If we did it too much it would be harmful, but just this small amount is no big deal -- I need the money. Or I won't report the other guy -- he needs the money to pay his bills.
What about
paying farmers not to grow crops. Conceivably there might have been some argument for this in some extreme limited condition, like some kind of soil conservation need, but wasn't virtually all of this harmful because it was done in order to limit production to drive up prices? If done to boost incomes of farmers, isn't it clear that this always did more harm than good, even in just limited amounts, or restricted to a small number of farmers? (Even if it did boost some farmers' incomes, didn't it do overall net harm to the economy, by penalizing consumers, and also those farmers who did not get the subsidies?)
Isn't it always bad, on a large scale or small scale, for the
government to try to set prices of something? On a limited scale it is argued that there was a short-term need. But then isn't the supposed benefit also extremely limited to the point of not being worth it? Isn't there a temptation to say: Oh, just in this one case, just for this limited time or situation, we need these controls. Isn't this generally an illusion that backfires and really makes it worse rather than better?
Don't even left-wing politicians understand that you
can't subsidize every victim group that comes clamoring to them for help? Though they make exceptions, aren't they constantly resisting demands from constituents who demand subsidies to help rescue this or that poor victim group? It's not possible to subsidize everyone. Every demand for such subsidy, however emotional, has to be resisted. Isn't there some kind of assumption, in theory, that those few who can make a real case, or prove that their need is unique, are the ones that might be accomodated, while most demands for subsidies have to be rejected? This mainly agrees with my principle, in that every small demand for a subsidy, NO MATTER HOW SMALL, has to be rejected as more harm than good, unless the demanding party offers some proof that their case uniquely qualifies by some cost-benefit standard.
Isn't
the guy who "cuts in line" thinking that it's no big deal? Sure, not everyone can do it, but what's the harm if it's only me or just a small number?
What about the
prejudice against ticket-scalpers and the attempt to make ticket-scalping illegal? Ticket-scalpers are speculators. Should ALL speculation be suppressed? What about antique dealers or pawn brokers? Should it be illegal to buy ANYTHING with the intent of saving it and then selling it at a higher price? What is this urge to single out certain speculators and suppress them, when we accept most speculators as legitimate businesses? Why do we think some good is served by cracking down on certain ones only, like ticket-scalpers? Isn't this an illusion, that some net good is gained by singling out certain speculators, perhaps because they are conspicuous in some way? We know we would do more harm than good if we criminalized ALL speculators. Why can't we see the net harm, on a smaller scale, of singling out any one select category of speculators? Why isn't this limited category of speculators just as legitimate as all the others, by adding their small contribution to the economy?
Is it good for the
government to subsidize a sports stadium, to "stimulate" the economy? If so, why not also movie theatres and bingo parlors and bowling alleys and saloons and gymnasiums and golf courses and amusement parks and circuses and . . . ? Why do we limit the "stimulus" to only sports stadiums? It's obvious we would wreck the economy if we had the state subsidize every form of recreation or entertainment. Where should we draw the line? At the very beginning! Every such subsidy does just a little more increment of damage to the economy. There is no reason to single out one example, because it's more conspicuous, and say "Oh, here, let's subsidize just this one." No, there's no basis for making any exceptions. On a small scale or large scale it is always a net harm for the state to do these subsidies. (It could be justified on the logic that the state is officially adopting this sport, like baseball or football, as a good-in-itself for society, but not in order to "stimulate" the economy.)
And there are many other examples, including my earlier ones of extortion/blackmail and counterfeiting. Even the parking-meter Good Samaritans, who think they are doing some good on a small scale but who are undermining a legitimate practice of charging drivers who park their cars in areas where there is limited space.
These many examples illustrate a pattern of yielding to the "temptation" to gain a quick easy benefit, which is usually limited to a small number, but which if done on a large scale is obviously a net harm to society, and it's only an illusion that some net good is gained by limiting it to a smaller scale.
No, this is not the same as saying there can be "too much of a good thing." Because we're talking about many examples of a common pattern, and we can easily see that there is net harm when the questionable practice is done on a large scale, and there are real cases of it and constant effort to avoid going beyond the limit.
But there is not a problem too much oxygen or too much water. Yes, in theory there can be too much of these, but in the real world we are not having to resist the "temptation" to have too much of these. In the case of food there might be an analogy to what I'm saying -- too much making us fat or sick, and the illusion that only a little more is no harm.
But this is not the same as saying that everything good can be bad if done too much, which is largely theoretical and unrelated to real-world experience. That theoretical formula might not fit everything that is good. E.g., what about "too much" justice? Or "too much" good? It's not clear that every imaginable good or value can be expanded to some point where it would become a net harm rather than good.
It is better to limit the principle to real examples in practice.
You think everything should be presumed harmful on a small scale if they can be shown harmful on a large scale, but why should we make that assumption?
Unless it is proved otherwise, yes. Because there are so many examples of this, as I've given above. Since there are so many cases where someone is tempted to say, "Oh, just this one case is no harm" because they want some immediate personal gain from it, it's obvious that there is a pattern here of people demanding something because they see some direct limited benefit, while at the same time they don't notice the harm it does to someone else, like someone who has to pay the cost for their limited benefit.
So we should always demand proof from anyone who proposes something that we know clearly would be harmful if done on a large scale. If they can prove that it would really be a net benefit if done only within defined limits, then we might accomodate their proposed scheme. But the burden of proof is on them. If they cannot make the case, then the presumption should be that it would be harmful on a limited scale just as we see clearly that it would be harmful on a larger scale.
Lots of things are beneficial on a small scale. Are any of them not harmful on a large scale?
In some theoretical sense you might claim everything good becomes bad if it's done beyond some point. But that's theoretical. We should limit this to those things that are practical possibilities, or real experiences and real decisions that are made. There are real cases where something went too far. The examples I gave all relate to real cases where something was done and went too far and caused real damage.
We need to apply this to questions about price controls, inflation, minimum wage, "economic stimulus," pollution, crime prevention, debt, corporate welfare -- all issues where there are real cases of excess, where well-intended policies ended up doing more harm than good. And personal choices also, where wrong decisions are made, because the damage done was not obvious and the choice was made with a limited view to only the immediate benefit to be gained. So it's not about theoretical possibilities of some good hypothetically being carried too far, like too much happiness, or kids having too much fun.
Maybe we should switch the burden of proof? Maybe anything harmful on a large scale should be presumed harmful on a small scale? I'm not really in favor of that, but it may make as much sense as the the burden of proof that you like.
That IS the burden of proof I'm suggesting as a "universal" rule.
Did you mean to say "anything harmful on a small scale should be presumed harmful on a large scale"? That also sounds like a good rule.
So, if we know something is harmful when done on a small scale, we should presume that it is also harmful if done on a large scale. So the burden of proof is on the one who proposes doing it on a large scale. They have to prove that it would be a net benefit if done on a large scale even though it would be harmful on a small scale. If they can't make the case, we should reject their proposal, even though we have no empirical evidence that it would be harmful if done on the large scale.