What is free will?

[ruby sparks]

I do have a question. What has this to do with free will? I'm not being disrespectful or cynical in the slightest.

At the moment, I'm thinking it has to do with determinism (or predeterminism) the lack of which (even if it were true) would not, imo, provide free will. It would merely be indeterminancy. I'm fine, by and large, with the idea of indeterminancy, because I allow for the possibility of the truly random.

But I have a feeling that you might be talking about something else?

- - - Updated - - -

Now, let's suppose that I was privileged to have already saw the storyline of life and all it's actual happenings and I wrote about your choice of picking up that quarter (that landed on tails by the way) --back on that beautiful sun filled day.

Please continue.

It does have to do with determinism, but there are two variant themes of it. Determinism is merely that every event has a cause. For instance, if we're riding down the road and see a fallen tree, then if determinism is true, then there was a cause for there being a fallen tree. If lightening struck it, then that is the cause. If the wind blew strongly, then that instead was the cause. Had the lightening not struck or the wind not blew, then there would have been some other cause. Some CONTINGENT event.

Before I begin wrapping things up, one more detour:

The JTB Theory of knowledge speaks of three necessary conditions. Excluding Gettier type examples (which speaks to something else anyhow), there is the Truth condition. Knowledge implies belief whereas the inverse is not true. This is similar in form to what I discussed earlier: knowledge implies truth whereas the inverse is not true.

There is something about this truth condition that shouldn't be forsaken. What's important is that P is true. IS true. Is is is.

The condition is that P is true. Nowhere, anywhere, in any way shape or form, is it so that the condition is "P must be true." No necessary event required ; contingent truths will do.

Are you on my heels?

ETA. I had said in agreement that it has to do with determinism, but though true, the main thrust was to keep you locked in to remembering (and embracing) the possibilities for what they are.

Possibilities are possibilities are possibilities. They do not become figments of our imagination upon learning of actualities.

I think I'm following you. But I may not be.

I suppose, in a nutshell, I'm wondering how this all relates to free will?

 

[OLDMAN]

Who can say what a conscious intention is?

Who can say what phenomena is involved?

Sam Harris doesn't know.

His talk of conscious intention is as empty as a Christian talking about the soul.

Back to that are we? We do know quite a bit about how the brain functions, how we develop through childhood, which parts of the brain do what, but as soon as we get to an unknown, you pretend its all magic and shit and couldn't possibly be related to anything like normal brain functions.

The best way to describe it for me is a seamless flow of information and functions, which allows for imagined events and thoughts that have or could happen again or have the appearance of happening for the first time.

 

[untermensche]

Who can say what a conscious intention is?

Who can say what phenomena is involved?

Sam Harris doesn't know.

His talk of conscious intention is as empty as a Christian talking about the soul.

Back to that are we? We do know quite a bit about how the brain functions, how we develop through childhood, which parts of the brain do what, but as soon as we get to an unknown, you pretend its all magic and shit and couldn't possibly be related to anything like normal brain functions.

The best way to describe it for me is a seamless flow of information and functions, which allows for imagined events and thoughts that have or could happen again or have the appearance of happening for the first time.

Coming back to reality is never a problem.

Everything we know about the mind we know about from subjective reports.

Objectively we have no idea what it is.

Or what it is capable of doing.

 

[fast]

I recall a poster a few years back who repeatedly denied that there's nothing in an empty drawer. The misplaced logic was in treating nothing as if it was an actual something. To his mind, since there was no object that is referred to by the term, then it was false that there was nothing in an empty drawer.

What else is nothing if not the absence of something?

When we set out to discover whether we have free will, we need to understand that it's not something but rather the absence of something. Imagine a picture of a man, and next to this picture is another picture depicting a man behind a closed and locked cell. When comparing the two pictures, one picture can be thought of as confinement. The other (in comparative relation) depicts the absence of confinement.

When we observe someone acting because of compulsion, what we are not observing is someone acting of ones own free will. To observe someone acting of their own free will requires an observation that lacks compulsion. The man as depicted in the picture without a closed and locked cell has the ability to do as he pleases whereas the man depicted in the cell is compelled against his will. He wants to leave but is compelled to stay.

With that understanding of free will, let's turn to our children who we are taking to the ice cream shop. Your child wants vanilla flavored ice cream, just as my child does as well; you gave your child the option to choose between whatever flavor she wants. You did not compel her to choose vanilla. There was no pressure to choose vanilla. She freely chose vanilla.

My child wants vanilla flavored ice-cream, but I'm not allowing my child to have any ice-cream today because she refused to recite the "I love Trump pledge" that she's been taught to recite on demand.

The entire ordeal was videoed. I was there. You were there. We both know that your child was not compelled in her choice, and we both know I was a compelling force preventing my child from getting what she wanted.

My wife is about to watch the video. She does not know what choice your child made. It was never true that her choice was a necessary choice. It was contingent upon nothing involving compelling forces that made her act against what she wanted; that is of paramount importance. She could have chosen otherwise; our knowledge of the facts didn't cause the facts; the mechanics that went into her choice had no attached compelling forces.

If I'm clairvoyant, have a crystal ball, or am God himself, my knowledge of the truth does not and will not influence the mechanics of the choice that was or will be devoid of compelling forces. See, I'm privy to actual choices you will make; that doesn't mean you will be compelled in the future choices you will make; I just know what choices you're gonna make of your own free will. I've simply watched the video of life.

When my wife views our little ice-cream shop video, she too will know what happened--and I have a funny feeling she ain't gonna be happy with me.

 

[DBT]

This issue usually comes down to labeling.

Some people just label the ability to consciously select an option from a range of alternatives as an example of 'free will' - that an absence of coercion is an instance of free will, etc, etc, but this is just applying a label without considering how decisions are made, applying a label without taking into account the neuronal mechanisms of decision making.

 

[fast]

This issue usually comes down to labeling.

Some people just label the ability to consciously select an option from a range of alternatives as an example of 'free will' - that an absence of coercion is an instance of free will, etc, etc, but this is just applying a label without considering how decisions are made, applying a label without taking into account the neuronal mechanisms of decision making.

I think there are two very different topics that can be discussed--neither of which are related to each other except that the term "free will" is used in both topics; there is the one I always default to which is post compatibilism while the other is precompatibilism. That last one has what I think of as having very dark overtones.

I associate any relevance to the brain's inner workings as belonging to the precompatibilist discussion. The darkness sets in with hard determinist views when pitted alongside postcompatibilist verbiage for reference.

 

[DBT]

The brain and its state, condition and role in decision making is essential to the issue of free will, essential to the question of whether we actually have something we can formally define as being 'free will' or not, or whether the term itself has any relevance beyond common usage, ie, the 'sun is setting'

 

[fast]

The brain and its state, condition and role in decision making is essential to the issue of free will, essential to the question of whether we actually have something we can formally define as being 'free will' or not, or whether the term itself has any relevance beyond common usage, ie, the 'sun is setting'

I don't see how the scope of "compulsion" allows for the relevancy of that. I'm thinking (speculating) that maybe if you came up with a brain-related example of compulsion that I might deny that it's an example at all.

(Don't hit me)

 

[ruby sparks]

I recall a poster a few years back who repeatedly denied that there's nothing in an empty drawer. The misplaced logic was in treating nothing as if it was an actual something. To his mind, since there was no object that is referred to by the term, then it was false that there was nothing in an empty drawer.

What else is nothing if not the absence of something?

When we set out to discover whether we have free will, we need to understand that it's not something but rather the absence of something. Imagine a picture of a man, and next to this picture is another picture depicting a man behind a closed and locked cell. When comparing the two pictures, one picture can be thought of as confinement. The other (in comparative relation) depicts the absence of confinement.

When we observe someone acting because of compulsion, what we are not observing is someone acting of ones own free will. To observe someone acting of their own free will requires an observation that lacks compulsion. The man as depicted in the picture without a closed and locked cell has the ability to do as he pleases whereas the man depicted in the cell is compelled against his will. He wants to leave but is compelled to stay.

With that understanding of free will, let's turn to our children who we are taking to the ice cream shop. Your child wants vanilla flavored ice cream, just as my child does as well; you gave your child the option to choose between whatever flavor she wants. You did not compel her to choose vanilla. There was no pressure to choose vanilla. She freely chose vanilla.

My child wants vanilla flavored ice-cream, but I'm not allowing my child to have any ice-cream today because she refused to recite the "I love Trump pledge" that she's been taught to recite on demand.

The entire ordeal was videoed. I was there. You were there. We both know that your child was not compelled in her choice, and we both know I was a compelling force preventing my child from getting what she wanted.

My wife is about to watch the video. She does not know what choice your child made. It was never true that her choice was a necessary choice. It was contingent upon nothing involving compelling forces that made her act against what she wanted; that is of paramount importance. She could have chosen otherwise; our knowledge of the facts didn't cause the facts; the mechanics that went into her choice had no attached compelling forces.

If I'm clairvoyant, have a crystal ball, or am God himself, my knowledge of the truth does not and will not influence the mechanics of the choice that was or will be devoid of compelling forces. See, I'm privy to actual choices you will make; that doesn't mean you will be compelled in the future choices you will make; I just know what choices you're gonna make of your own free will. I've simply watched the video of life.

When my wife views our little ice-cream shop video, she too will know what happened--and I have a funny feeling she ain't gonna be happy with me.

I think I'm with you now. And I agree with DBT's response (though DBT and I do not agree on everything).

It's about labelling, in some ways, or more precisely labelling preferences.

Ultimately, and I think you'll agree, every act comes from...well, let's not call it compulsion perhaps because that word may be used to mean some aspect of our psychology in particular.....let's just say that every act is forced, by the laws of physics or what have you. 'You' don't get to freely choose...anything, ultimately (and DBT is talking about what we might call ultimate or actual free will). Sure, you can change your mind, or better still let's say your mind can change, but there's no you at the controls of that. It just really really feels like it.

Some people (mostly compatibilists) want to use the term 'free will' for what are imo those sophisticated capacities for agency that we do have (generalising here) because...well I'm not sure why they do that. But in essence what they mean, I think, is that there can be degrees of free will and that we have some, or some type or version. I prefer, at least in intellectual discussions, to treat 'free' in free will like the term 'perpetual' in 'perpetual motion', of which there aren't degrees.

Why? Am I an inflexible and unpragmatic pedant?

Possibly.

But I like to think it's not that. Imo, compatibilist free will (ie compatibilists use of the term) hides more than it reveals. I believe that most humans are fooled by their brains into believing they have certain capacities that are in fact illusory, and compatibilism seems to me to sweep this under the fudge carpet somewhat (Dennett is the classic example imo) but more to the point there is imo a lot of conflation and inaccuracy in play. See: almost anything untermensche says on the topic.

The example I like to offer is this. Does god exist? Ok, if we strip away from the definition of god any sort of supernatural or other dubious features we can end up (as incredibly I think some may even do) essentially calling the universe god. Is that useful? I don't think so. I think it retains a word...for the sake of retaining a word. But if you met a person using that definition, I think you'd have to agree and concede that god exists.

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't see how the scope of "compulsion" allows for the relevancy of that. I'm thinking (speculating) that maybe if you came up with a brain-related example of compulsion that I might deny that it's an example at all.

(Don't hit me)

Imo it's dead simple. Just use 'being forced' or 'acting under the physical laws of the universe' instead of 'compulsion'.

Can you give me an example of anything which is not forced by what we might call the preceding events operating under the physical laws of the universe? I think you'd need to show me where something or someone can deliberately and freely interrupt that chain of causes. No one, as far as I know, has ever been able to give such an example.

 

[DBT]

The brain and its state, condition and role in decision making is essential to the issue of free will, essential to the question of whether we actually have something we can formally define as being 'free will' or not, or whether the term itself has any relevance beyond common usage, ie, the 'sun is setting'

I don't see how the scope of "compulsion" allows for the relevancy of that. I'm thinking (speculating) that maybe if you came up with a brain-related example of compulsion that I might deny that it's an example at all.

(Don't hit me)

I didn't say that the given definitions of free will are definitions that I accept. As I said, the term 'free will' is irrelevant in relation to understanding human behaviour, its mechanisms and drivers. It's just a term used in common language in reference to decisions made without external compulsion, 'there was no gun held at his head.....'

 

[DBT]

(though DBT and I do not agree on everything).

We don't?




* Sorry, humour, can't help myself.

 

[ruby sparks]

By the way, fast, I'd like to briefly add what I think is the most unique of our 'sophisticated capacities for agency'. Advance modelling. Our systems can run virtual (imaginary) simulations (backwards and forwards) in a way that allows us to 'escape the moment' in a way that I'm not sure any other system (including living, biological systems) can do. I do not think, for example, that any creature other than us can consciously plan what it is (or isn't) going to do next week. But in us, it seems, these virtual simulations 'just happen', albeit they can, yes, affect the decisions our systems make.

 

[ruby sparks]

(though DBT and I do not agree on everything).

We don't?




* Sorry, humour, can't help myself.

I think that even more than me you are disinclined against compatibilism. I think I'm against it, but perhaps in a softer way. iow, I think it's 'quite good' in some ways.

But in general, I'm with you. If a choice, or a change of decision, no matter how sophisticated, can't be described as being freely, consciously made, what's the point in calling it free will?

 

[ruby sparks]

Also, I'm not totally against the idea that there can usefully be described something akin to 'degrees of free will'. I just have my (what I think are good) reasons for not wanting to call it that. 'Degrees of freedom' is better, imo, for several reasons. It reminds us that we are 'just' machines, that there is no 'special sauce' in our brains. 'We do have free will' seems to me to carry a whiff of a comfort blanket.

 

[ruby sparks]

One more small thing, I used the words 'Dennett' and 'fudge' in the same sentence for a reason. I think he and others fall into the trap of considering consequences (of for example saying to people that they don't have free will) which imo is a separate (though fascinating) issue and should be treated as such. Not that anyone has brought it up here, I think, lately, but it does tend to be a common follow-on question.

 

[DBT]

It seems pointless to tell people they don't have ''free will'' when the term itself is of no use for our understanding the decision making process, human behaviour or its drivers. It's just a shallow term, a casual reference in every language, rarely used at that.

 

[ruby sparks]

.... rarely used at that.

Aha, so our disagreement surfaces already....

I would say that it is regularly and commonly used (or at least strongly implied) in arguably one of the key scenarios for human interaction, law courts (and in morality generally, including in interpersonal relationships). It underlies the concepts of guilt and personal responsibility.

Although it is being questioned by legal scholars:

"This chapter confronts the issue of free will in neurolaw, rejecting one of the leading views of the relationship between free will and legal responsibility on the ground that the current system of legal responsibility likely emerged from outdated views about the mind, mental states, and free will. It challenges the compatibilist approach to law (in which free will and causal determinism can coexist). The chapter argues that those who initially developed the criminal law endorsed or presupposed views about mind and free will that modern neuroscience will aid in revealing as false. It then argues for the relevance of false presuppositions embedded in the original development of the criminal law in judging whether to revise or maintain the current system. In doing so, the chapter shares the view that neuroscientific developments will change the way we think about criminal responsibility."

http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/vi...43095.001.0001/acprof-9780198743095-chapter-2

Though that gets us on to consequences.



Also how can it be pointless to tell people something that may (it seems) be true?

See also: there is (it seems) no god.

ps I'm not necessarily taking a very strong position on whether people should (in the normative sense) be told, though I do tend to favour it.

 

[untermensche]

It seems pointless to tell people they don't have ''free will'' when the term itself is of no use for our understanding the decision making process, human behaviour or its drivers. It's just a shallow term, a casual reference in every language, rarely used at that.

So you freely claim.

There is nothing the claim is bound to, no knowledge, no experience, no evidence.

The endless and repeated evidence is I can move my arm when and how I desire. Over and over and over.

So it must be a claim made completely free of any influence beyond the desire of one mind.

Why a mind would desire it is another matter. Human desires that are freely acted on can be very strange.

There is no evidence an evolved brain would desire such uselessness.

The endless claim that no distinction exists between a reflexive brain and an active mind is an error in thinking.

A bad choice made freely using an active mind.

 

[fast]

I recall a poster a few years back who repeatedly denied that there's nothing in an empty drawer. The misplaced logic was in treating nothing as if it was an actual something. To his mind, since there was no object that is referred to by the term, then it was false that there was nothing in an empty drawer.

What else is nothing if not the absence of something?

When we set out to discover whether we have free will, we need to understand that it's not something but rather the absence of something. Imagine a picture of a man, and next to this picture is another picture depicting a man behind a closed and locked cell. When comparing the two pictures, one picture can be thought of as confinement. The other (in comparative relation) depicts the absence of confinement.

When we observe someone acting because of compulsion, what we are not observing is someone acting of ones own free will. To observe someone acting of their own free will requires an observation that lacks compulsion. The man as depicted in the picture without a closed and locked cell has the ability to do as he pleases whereas the man depicted in the cell is compelled against his will. He wants to leave but is compelled to stay.

With that understanding of free will, let's turn to our children who we are taking to the ice cream shop. Your child wants vanilla flavored ice cream, just as my child does as well; you gave your child the option to choose between whatever flavor she wants. You did not compel her to choose vanilla. There was no pressure to choose vanilla. She freely chose vanilla.

My child wants vanilla flavored ice-cream, but I'm not allowing my child to have any ice-cream today because she refused to recite the "I love Trump pledge" that she's been taught to recite on demand.

The entire ordeal was videoed. I was there. You were there. We both know that your child was not compelled in her choice, and we both know I was a compelling force preventing my child from getting what she wanted.

My wife is about to watch the video. She does not know what choice your child made. It was never true that her choice was a necessary choice. It was contingent upon nothing involving compelling forces that made her act against what she wanted; that is of paramount importance. She could have chosen otherwise; our knowledge of the facts didn't cause the facts; the mechanics that went into her choice had no attached compelling forces.

If I'm clairvoyant, have a crystal ball, or am God himself, my knowledge of the truth does not and will not influence the mechanics of the choice that was or will be devoid of compelling forces. See, I'm privy to actual choices you will make; that doesn't mean you will be compelled in the future choices you will make; I just know what choices you're gonna make of your own free will. I've simply watched the video of life.

When my wife views our little ice-cream shop video, she too will know what happened--and I have a funny feeling she ain't gonna be happy with me.

I think I'm with you now. And I agree with DBT's response (though DBT and I do not agree on everything).

It's about labelling, in some ways, or more precisely labelling preferences.

Ultimately, and I think you'll agree, every act comes from...well, let's not call it compulsion perhaps because that word may be used to mean some aspect of our psychology in particular.....let's just say that every act is forced, by the laws of physics or what have you. 'You' don't get to freely choose...anything, ultimately (and DBT is talking about what we might call ultimate or actual free will). Sure, you can change your mind, or better still let's say your mind can change, but there's no you at the controls of that. It just really really feels like it.

Some people (mostly compatibilists) want to use the term 'free will' for what are imo those sophisticated capacities for agency that we do have (generalising here) because...well I'm not sure why they do that. But in essence what they mean, I think, is that there can be degrees of free will and that we have some, or some type or version. I prefer, at least in intellectual discussions, to treat 'free' in free will like the term 'perpetual' in 'perpetual motion', of which there aren't degrees.

Why? Am I an inflexible and unpragmatic pedant?

Possibly.

But I like to think it's not that. Imo, compatibilist free will (ie compatibilists use of the term) hides more than it reveals. I believe that most humans are fooled by their brains into believing they have certain capacities that are in fact illusory, and compatibilism seems to me to sweep this under the fudge carpet somewhat (Dennett is the classic example imo) but more to the point there is imo a lot of conflation and inaccuracy in play. See: almost anything untermensche says on the topic.

The example I like to offer is this. Does god exist? Ok, if we strip away from the definition of god any sort of supernatural or other dubious features we can end up (as incredibly I think some may even do) essentially calling the universe god. Is that useful? I don't think so. I think it retains a word...for the sake of retaining a word. But if you met a person using that definition, I think you'd have to agree and concede that god exists.

Limits. We are creatures with many limits. Focus on all we can do at our pleasure, we might, but bound by the constraints and restraints of the universe, we are. Alas, the laws of physics to which you speak. Be it laws of nature or science, I have no qualms in admitting being confined to operate within the smothering limits that life affords us. Image the majestic nature our deeds could shine before the world if we were not so tightly fitted to the limits we are prisoned to--and set out to exert our insatiable will.

Still, things are as they are, as only things can be, yet even with these limits, we can recognize and group and make perhaps subtle but important distinctions nonetheless.

As to word usage, I strongly object to allowing others to tinker with meaning. Think they are all they may, but incorrect usage and misusage (and not merely different usage) is abound. I find no more difficulty in defining the word God as I do the word unicorn. Existence is not a requirement to a word's meaning, and as far as defining words go, I have been forever hesitant to do so--except with "free will" and such few other terms. I believe the meaning of a word is a function of its collective usage, and as adamant I am as staying focused on lexical usage not being stipulative, I reject a failure to distinguish between reference and meaning to sway my perspective on meaning. As they ask, if you call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have," it's never any more or less because of what someone calls it ... and a rose by any other name smells just as sweet.