What is free will?

[Underseer]

AntiCitizenX brings up an interesting point. We seem to be spending a lot of time talking about free will lately, but can anyone really define free will?

What possible test can you use to distinguish between a thing that has free will and a thing that does not have free will?

 

[Togo]

Nah, he's just being disingenuous.

He's an eliminative materialist. That is, he believes that non-measureable states are not just not measureable, they literally don't exist. Hence his statements like this (Towards the end, 4.08)

If you can not tell me the empirical distinction between something that has free will and something that does not, then there simply is no distinction between those two states.

As such the problem isn't really free will at all, but the idea of anything not measureable whatsoever. Logic, for example. Theoretical mathematics. Whether someone has 'answered' the challenge. And so on.

If he really has never met anyone who is capable of meeting 'his' challenge, then he must have been extraordinarily selective in who he meets. Particularly since the challenge itself is a variation of the cognitive zombie thought experiment, which points out that there isn't any way to tell, based purely on observation and measurement, whether someone has free will or not. And the use of a time machine is a reference to the use of a time machine in free will thought experiments to identify whether the universe is determined or not, a necessary condition for some aspects of free will. So he knows enough about the philosophy to adopt an eliminative position and quote key arguments, but has never met anyone who can point out that he's not commenting on free will at all, but the existence of internal states? I find that hard to credit. Hence the disingenuous comment above.

But the real question raised by the video is not free will in particular, but whether it's reasonable to believe in anything you can't measure. So here's my challenge: Explain to me why it is reasonable to restrict human inquiry things that are measureable. And then I'll explain to you why the explanation you gave isn't measureable, and therefore doesn't exist. Fair?

 

[ryan]

He answered it, "the ability to choose between different possible courses of action without coercion".

If the decision-making process includes quantum mechanics, the decision-making process may not be coerced, giving it the freedom to different possible courses of action.

 

[DBT]

He answered it, "the ability to choose between different possible courses of action without coercion".

If the decision-making process includes quantum mechanics, the decision-making process may not be coerced, giving it the freedom to different possible courses of action.

A definition alone does not prove a proposition or make the case:

A definition or an ontological argument alone proves nothing.

1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

The common definition of free will is equally meaningless:

1)Free will is the ability to make conscious decisions.
2)Conscious decision making can be experienced.
3)Conscious decision making exists.
4) Free will exists.

There is no given reason to define or conflate Love with God. Love is love, nothing more and nothing less.

Just as there is no given reason to define conscious decision making as ''free will'' - conscious decision making requires nothing additional, it is a function of neural activity, nothing more and nothing less.

Being free from coercion is 'freedom from coercion' and not 'freedom of will' because will exists independently from coercion and has its own features and attributes, which are shaped and form by neural information processing.

The absence of coercion is no more an instance of 'free will' than is the addict a 'free man' because his handcuffs were removed when he was locked in a cell. He is still a prisoner regardless of being freed from his handcuffs, and when he is freed from his cell, he is still bound by his addiction, and if he manages to get help to free himself from his addiction, his will is still determined by brain information state, just like the rest of us.

 

[Underseer]

He answered it, "the ability to choose between different possible courses of action without coercion".

If the decision-making process includes quantum mechanics, the decision-making process may not be coerced, giving it the freedom to different possible courses of action.

By your definition, every piece of software ever written has free will.

Heck, any number of purely mechanical devices probably qualify as well.

- - - Updated - - -

Nah, he's just being disingenuous.

He's an eliminative materialist. That is, he believes that non-measureable states are not just not measureable, they literally don't exist. Hence his statements like this (Towards the end, 4.08)

If you can not tell me the empirical distinction between something that has free will and something that does not, then there simply is no distinction between those two states.

As such the problem isn't really free will at all, but the idea of anything not measureable whatsoever. Logic, for example. Theoretical mathematics. Whether someone has 'answered' the challenge. And so on.

If he really has never met anyone who is capable of meeting 'his' challenge, then he must have been extraordinarily selective in who he meets. Particularly since the challenge itself is a variation of the cognitive zombie thought experiment, which points out that there isn't any way to tell, based purely on observation and measurement, whether someone has free will or not. And the use of a time machine is a reference to the use of a time machine in free will thought experiments to identify whether the universe is determined or not, a necessary condition for some aspects of free will. So he knows enough about the philosophy to adopt an eliminative position and quote key arguments, but has never met anyone who can point out that he's not commenting on free will at all, but the existence of internal states? I find that hard to credit. Hence the disingenuous comment above.

But the real question raised by the video is not free will in particular, but whether it's reasonable to believe in anything you can't measure. So here's my challenge: Explain to me why it is reasonable to restrict human inquiry things that are measureable. And then I'll explain to you why the explanation you gave isn't measureable, and therefore doesn't exist. Fair?

That was a lot of words to not give your own answer.

 

[Togo]

That was a lot of words to not give your own answer.

To what? The OP? He says that he's defined a challenge to show that there is no measureable difference between someone who has free will and someone who does not. He's correct, he has.

If you don't accept the contraints of his challenge, such as by Ryan's post of using compatibalist rather than incompatibalist free will, then the challenge doesn't work. If you don't accept that a lack of measureable evidence demonstrates non-existance, then the challenge sort of works but doesn't show what he claims it does. But as long as you accept his definitions and assumptions, then his arguement works. As long as you accept a set of definitions and assumption, there are a great many arguements that work. That's why most arguements around free will deal with definitions and assumptions.

 

[Underseer]

That was a lot of words to not give your own answer.

To what? The OP? He says that he's defined a challenge to show that there is no measureable difference between someone who has free will and someone who does not. He's correct, he has.

If you don't accept the contraints of his challenge, such as by Ryan's post of using compatibalist rather than incompatibalist free will, then the challenge doesn't work. If you don't accept that a lack of measureable evidence demonstrates non-existance, then the challenge sort of works but doesn't show what he claims it does. But as long as you accept his definitions and assumptions, then his arguement works. As long as you accept a set of definitions and assumption, there are a great many arguements that work. That's why most arguements around free will deal with definitions and assumptions.

Yes, by Ryan's post, even the simplest piece of software (not to mention some mechanical devices) has free will.

Do you find that an acceptable definition of what people mean when they're talking about free will? Do you think most people would accept that definition?

 

[Togo]

To what? The OP? He says that he's defined a challenge to show that there is no measureable difference between someone who has free will and someone who does not. He's correct, he has.

If you don't accept the contraints of his challenge, such as by Ryan's post of using compatibalist rather than incompatibalist free will, then the challenge doesn't work. If you don't accept that a lack of measureable evidence demonstrates non-existance, then the challenge sort of works but doesn't show what he claims it does. But as long as you accept his definitions and assumptions, then his arguement works. As long as you accept a set of definitions and assumption, there are a great many arguements that work. That's why most arguements around free will deal with definitions and assumptions.

Yes, by Ryan's post, even the simplest piece of software (not to mention some mechanical devices) has free will.

Do you find that an acceptable definition of what people mean when they're talking about free will? Do you think most people would accept that definition?

Well, no, I don't personally. It's a standard compatibilist position and I'm not a fan of compatibilist free will.

Of course, your objection relies on decision making being otherwise an identical between software and people, and I don't think most people would accept that either. They'd probably protest that what we mean when we say a software application makes a decision, and what we mean when a person makes a decision, are two different things. It doesn't make much sense to 'coerce' a mechanism, so most people put in some sort of division between a simple mechanism, such as a door handle, and a complex person, such as a human being.

Whether any of that can be supported with rigorous definitions is another kettle of fish.

 

[Underseer]

Yes, by Ryan's post, even the simplest piece of software (not to mention some mechanical devices) has free will.

Do you find that an acceptable definition of what people mean when they're talking about free will? Do you think most people would accept that definition?

Well, no, I don't personally. It's a standard compatibilist position and I'm not a fan of compatibilist free will.

Of course, your objection relies on decision making being otherwise an identical between software and people, and I don't think most people would accept that either. They'd probably protest that what we mean when we say a software application makes a decision, and what we mean when a person makes a decision, are two different things. It doesn't make much sense to 'coerce' a mechanism, so most people put in some sort of division between a simple mechanism, such as a door handle, and a complex person, such as a human being.

Whether any of that can be supported with rigorous definitions is another kettle of fish.

Wait, are you serious?

What part of "making a decision" seems so confusing to you?

Any piece of software with any kind of logic branch (if-then-else, case-select, etc.) is making a decision. By your definition, either software has free will, or you haven't dealt with the challenge in the video.

 

[Togo]

Well, no, I don't personally. It's a standard compatibilist position and I'm not a fan of compatibilist free will.

Of course, your objection relies on decision making being otherwise an identical between software and people, and I don't think most people would accept that either. They'd probably protest that what we mean when we say a software application makes a decision, and what we mean when a person makes a decision, are two different things. It doesn't make much sense to 'coerce' a mechanism, so most people put in some sort of division between a simple mechanism, such as a door handle, and a complex person, such as a human being.

Whether any of that can be supported with rigorous definitions is another kettle of fish.

Wait, are you serious?

What part of "making a decision" seems so confusing to you?

Whether the process needs conscious agency, If it does then, clearly a doorknob doesn't make decisions.

Bear in mind also that you were specifically asking me questions about other people's opinions. Why are you trying to ascribe the answers to me?

 

[fromderinside]

Wait, are you serious?

What part of "making a decision" seems so confusing to you?

Whether the process needs conscious agency, If it does then, clearly a doorknob doesn't make decisions.

Bear in mind also that you were specifically asking me questions about other people's opinions. Why are you trying to ascribe the answers to me?

Boys, boys, boys. Determinism works differently in a closed system than it does in an open system because there are non (in)-determinable (from the closed systems's perspective) inputs from outside the system to keep it running. Free will in closed systems makes sense as does lack of free will in such a system just because explanations, or, mechanisms from the two perspectives are different and supportable based on energy availability. I just completed such a description to Togo on the simple will thread.

 

[Underseer]

Wait, are you serious?

What part of "making a decision" seems so confusing to you?

Whether the process needs conscious agency, If it does then, clearly a doorknob doesn't make decisions.

Bear in mind also that you were specifically asking me questions about other people's opinions. Why are you trying to ascribe the answers to me?

I still don't understand how you can argue that your definition applies to humans, but not to software.

Have you never learned to use a programming language before? Is there something basic I need to explain to you?

 

[ryan]

Yes, by Ryan's post, even the simplest piece of software (not to mention some mechanical devices) has free will.

Do you find that an acceptable definition of what people mean when they're talking about free will? Do you think most people would accept that definition?

Well, no, I don't personally. It's a standard compatibilist position and I'm not a fan of compatibilist free will.

Are you saying that I am taking a compatibilist position? If so, I really don't understand how my argument could be construed that way.

 

[ryan]

Whether the process needs conscious agency, If it does then, clearly a doorknob doesn't make decisions.

Bear in mind also that you were specifically asking me questions about other people's opinions. Why are you trying to ascribe the answers to me?

Boys, boys, boys. Determinism works differently in a closed system than it does in an open system because there are non (in)-determinable (from the closed systems's perspective) inputs from outside the system to keep it running. Free will in closed systems makes sense as does lack of free will in such a system just because explanations, or, mechanisms from the two perspectives are different and supportable based on energy availability. I just completed such a description to Togo on the simple will thread.

You seem to always be talking about "subjectively indeterminism", or put differently "relative indeterminism". But from what I have been reading, determinism is more about whether or not the universe is objectively determinate. If the universe ran only on classical mechanics, then the whole thing would be determined but not necessarily determinable from some point of reference. Through in QM, and we may actually have an objectively indeterminate, and of course indeterminable, universe.

 

[ryan]

edit above: throw in QM ...

 

[dx713]

Whether the process needs conscious agency, If it does then, clearly a doorknob doesn't make decisions.

Bear in mind also that you were specifically asking me questions about other people's opinions. Why are you trying to ascribe the answers to me?

I still don't understand how you can argue that your definition applies to humans, but not to software.

Have you never learned to use a programming language before? Is there something basic I need to explain to you?

Take a breath, and re-read his posts carefully.
It's not Togo's definition. He's trying to explain a point of view he doesn't agree with. You should cut him some slack, and commend him for trying to elevate the debate instead of being the standard "only my opinion counts" Internet guy.

Personally, but I don't claim to speak for Togo, or even other compatibilists, the difference is in self awareness.
I have free-will (of the compatibilist sense, cause I'm kind of a determinist) because I can reflect on my choices, in a way current software doesn't. Ot at least, I believe it doesn't, because it cannot prove it to me. Turing test is a very imperfect tool, but I've not come through a better way to test that yet.

 

[fromderinside]

I still don't understand how you can argue that your definition applies to humans, but not to software.

Have you never learned to use a programming language before? Is there something basic I need to explain to you?

Take a breath, and re-read his posts carefully.
It's not Togo's definition. He's trying to explain a point of view he doesn't agree with. You should cut him some slack, and commend him for trying to elevate the debate instead of being the standard "only my opinion counts" Internet guy.

Personally, but I don't claim to speak for Togo, or even other compatibilists, the difference is in self awareness.
I have free-will (of the compatibilist sense, cause I'm kind of a determinist) because I can reflect on my choices, in a way current software doesn't. Ot at least, I believe it doesn't, because it cannot prove it to me. Turing test is a very imperfect tool, but I've not come through a better way to test that yet.

Good start with that self awareness thing there. That doesn't get one to free will though since awareness is contingent on on of what one is aware, what of is aware of others about one and of what one's history lets one be aware. That last one is a real will killer.

 

[Juma]

I have free-will (of the compatibilist sense, cause I'm kind of a determinist) because I can reflect on my choices, in a way current software doesn't. Ot at least, I believe it doesn't, because it cannot prove it to me. Turing test is a very imperfect tool, but I've not come through a better way to test that yet.

The turing test has nothing to do with wether "current software" can reflect on its choices.

 

[DBT]

'Reflection' itself being a process governed by information exchange in neural architecture.

 

[dx713]

I have free-will (of the compatibilist sense, cause I'm kind of a determinist) because I can reflect on my choices, in a way current software doesn't. Ot at least, I believe it doesn't, because it cannot prove it to me. Turing test is a very imperfect tool, but I've not come through a better way to test that yet.

The turing test has nothing to do with wether "current software" can reflect on its choices.

True, but it's the only way you could convince me that it is.