What is the actual free will humans have?

[Speakpigeon]

And where did you provide a proper justification for it?

I thought I had? maybe I hadn't. In a way, I can't provide a justification FOR it because I don't think it actually exists. My justification against it is that it involves (or would involve if it existed) us being able to step outside the causal chain which operates under what we know of the laws of physics. The exception to this would be randomness, but that doesn't give free will.

That's not what I had in mind.

I wanted to know your justification for the idea that your definition would really define what most people usually think of as free will?

To illustrate, you say we can choose. I agree. But, we can't choose what we want to choose. It's a regress thing.

And I'm fine with that. My sense of free will seems something my body does and there's little I can do about that. But it's Ok. My sense of free will is nothing if not a part of me, so I qualified as the one in charge.

Unless you would rather say that if you arrive first running a one-hundred metres race, it's in fact not true that you won the race because what arrived first is in fact not you but instead what you have somehow the illusion that it is your body.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

We appear to be assisted in this partly-free capacity by the ability to forward-model (imagine, deliberate) alternative possible options, i.e. to step out of the moment (backwards and forwards) in a virtual way.

Yes, and this costly process allowing us, somehow, to entertain these alternative options wouldn't exist if free will was really just an illusion.

And this clearly shows there is a neuronal process involved in our sense of free will (although I also see no reason to assume that free will should limited to this explicit representation of alternative choices).
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

That's not what I had in mind.

I wanted to know your justification for the idea that your definition would really define what most people usually think of as free will?

Ah right. That is tricky, partly because as far as I know not enough research has been done to ask people. And I don't mean just amateur or professional philosophers or those interested in philosophy, who have given the matter a great deal of thought. I'd guess such people are in an overall minority.

I did present a graph from a study that Jerry Coyne cited which suggested that about 70-80% of respondents appeared to hold what the researchers called a 'Libertarian free will' belief or tendency.

There is also another study, which I could try and find if you like, which explored the subjects' beliefs more rigorously. the interesting thing about this study is that it showed confusion and variety, for example, that people were inclined to accept free will more readily for good deeds (eg 'he simply could not have done otherwise than jump in the sea to rescue that little girl') than for bad ones (eg 'that criminal could have done otherwise') which reinforces the suggestion that attitudes to free will are partly to do with an underlying urge for retribution.

Psychologist Paul Bloom has done studies which suggest that we are either natural-born dualists or become so relatively early in development, with all the implications for imagining little hommunculi just behind our eyes controlling us with free will.

Other than that......Well, Daniel Dennett is very popular, people read his books and go to his lectures, and when he describes the sort of free will that he believes (as I do) is an illusion (true, actual, ultimate and Libertarian free will) no one ever seems perplexed enough to ask him what on earth he's talking about. The literature on free will is copious, and what one repeatedly comes across these days is compatibilism, by and large (hugely popular among modern philosophers for some reason), all of it at pains to agree that the compatibilist free will they are talking about is not the traditional or commonly held 'folk psychology' believed-to-be one. It would be odd if all of them were in fact addressing something that made most readers furrow their brow at not recognising what they are talking about, what they are setting their compatibilism as an alternative to.

Finally, speaking personally, I know what sort of free will I feel I have, and it's the sort I reckon is an illusion.

And I'm fine with that. My sense of free will seems something my body does and there's little I can do about that.

Ok.

But it's Ok. My sense of free will is nothing if not a part of me, so I qualified as the one in charge.

Your 'sense' of free will. Ok. I would never argue there isn't that.

Unless you would rather say that if you arrive first running a one-hundred metres race, it's in fact not true that you won the race because what arrived first is in fact not you but instead what you have somehow the illusion that it is your body.
EB

No, that wouldn't be the illusion. The illusion would be about your supposed free will.

 

[ruby sparks]

We appear to be assisted in this partly-free capacity by the ability to forward-model (imagine, deliberate) alternative possible options, i.e. to step out of the moment (backwards and forwards) in a virtual way.

Yes, and this costly process allowing us, somehow, to entertain these alternative options wouldn't exist if free will was really just an illusion.

But those processes aren't free will. Ok, you can call them that if you wish. You can call them free Willy will. Anything. But at least understand why many won't. Because they're not completely free will. You can call them partially free will perhaps.

And this clearly shows there is a neuronal process involved in our sense of free will (although I also see no reason to assume that free will should limited to this explicit representation of alternative choices).
EB

Yes. In our 'sense of free will'. Nobody's saying we don't have that.

 

[ruby sparks]

Some discussion of studies into commonly-held, traditional or 'folk' beliefs about free will in here:

https://philpapers.org/archive/NADSFF.pdf

 

[ruby sparks]

Interesting article, subtitled, "The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will"

"The results suggest that the core of people’s concept of free will is a choice that fulfills one’s desires and is free from internal or external constraints."

"...what it means to choose to act is to form an intention in light of and because of relevant beliefs and desires, which thereby function as the reasons for which the agent chooses to act."

"...the relationship between peoples’ definition of free will and their beliefs about its implementation may be murky."

https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.e...=From_Uncaused_Will_to_Conscious_Choice_T.pdf

 

[ruby sparks]

Oh one more thing...about what are called folk psychological, common or traditional conceptions of free will. History, and especially legal history, is replete with notions of free will that either explicitly say or at least imply that criminals are assumed to have been able to freely and willingly chosen to have done otherwise in whatever circumstances pertained. They even put pigs on trial as far as I know, in medieval times.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_trial

 

[Treedbear]

but simply due to the state of the brain

Sure, but I don't have the necessary equipment to look into my own brain, let alone those of other people.

And humanity would just crash if it was suddenly required to use scientific criteria for everything we choose to do in life.
EB

That's a good point to consider. That's why I think when people speak of having done something by free will they mean they don't really know why they chose to do it. And if they examine why they did it and come up with a reason (logical or illogical) then they don't know how they came up with that reason. That introspection can go on for a while, but soon they'll have to admit they don't know why. That's where free will is seen to come in. So I'll take the definition you gave in the OP and modify it a bit:

The human ability to make choices intuitively, or beyond the limits of cognition.

And many of the reasons we make the choices we do are based on principles and habits that become esatblished after years of experience. They are automatic, so the choices were made long before. We consider them to be part of us. Part of the self that makes the decisions. So we no longer know the reasons why.

 

[fast]

There's three notions:

1) Your honor, I didn't want to do what I did. I feel I had no reasonable choice under the circumstances but to do what I did. Surely, you can see that I didn't do what I did of my own free will.

2) Your honor, it was an awful choice I had to make. Even though I was threatened, I ultimately did what I thought was right.

3) Your honor, what I did was caused, not just on the macroscopic scale, but on the microscopic scale as well. The actions, the intentions, the thinking, everything, boils down to atoms in motion which themselves are caused, so of course I did what I did, just as you must (not will but must) take the very singular path you must take. There is no free will when it's already written in the stone of physics.

I agree with the first notion, which carries with it a refined notion of free will.

 

[DBT]

but simply due to the state of the brain

Sure, but I don't have the necessary equipment to look into my own brain, let alone those of other people.

That's the point. Consciousness doesn't have the means or apparatus with which to examine its own production mechanism and its activity. That being the source of the illusion of free will, ie, that it is consciousness that holds the reins when, actually it doesn't. The illusion being exposed when the underlying mechanisms (modular brain) and their information processing, mental representation activity begins to fail.

And humanity would just crash if it was suddenly required to use scientific criteria for everything we choose to do in life.
EB

If we were talking about money and finance and economic collapse, that could well be a true statement...science? Nah, people prefer money and religion and sex and property, not necessarily in that order.

 

[ruby sparks]

That's a good point to consider. That's why I think when people speak of having done something by free will they mean they don't really know why they chose to do it. And if they examine why they did it and come up with a reason (logical or illogical) then they don't know how they came up with that reason. That introspection can go on for a while, but soon they'll have to admit they don't know why. That's where free will is seen to come in. So I'll take the definition you gave in the OP and modify it a bit:

The human ability to make choices intuitively, or beyond the limits of cognition.

And many of the reasons we make the choices we do are based on principles and habits that become esatblished after years of experience. They are automatic, so the choices were made long before. We consider them to be part of us. Part of the self that makes the decisions. So we no longer know the reasons why.

Yeah. That, if anything, is more or less the main interpretation I think we can take away from the research into what most people think about this, sunmmed up in the word 'murky'. Also intuitive. Slightly mysterious. Not fully understood. Assumed, because it strongly 'feels like'.

I don't think that the challenges to free will from neuroscience, psychology, genetics, philosophy and so on have made much of an impact on wider society, yet. Day to day, most people just carry on.

That said, change has been ongoing for many decades and it is starting to filter through, especially in the courts, in legal discussions, in the media (where mainstream neuroscience articles question our assumptions) and I think it is fair to say that belief in free will is, if anything, weakening slightly in many quarters, and is causing headaches, and a few worries. To some philosophers, the consequences of society losing a belief in free will seem worse than it losing a belief in god. To others, illusions of free will are argued to be useful.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Some discussion of studies into commonly-held, traditional or 'folk' beliefs about free will in here:

https://philpapers.org/archive/NADSFF.pdf

They did two studies, both broadly in line with my view and saying that a clear majority of people have a notion of free will which is compatible with determinism.

However, they see their studies as not conclusive, in particular because of the need to have a more representative sample of the world's population. And there are biases in terms of replies being influenced by unconscious moral and emotional considerations.

Personally, I would make the distinction between on the one hand the more basic notion of free will most people would inevitably come up with intuitively, if left on their own, and this is the one notion I'm interested in, and, on the other hand, the various culturally determined conceptual constructs most people eventually end up with, influenced to some extent either by religion, ideology, social conventions, philosophical theories, literature, education etc., and often influenced by several if not all of them.

Unfortunately, I think it has to be very difficult to study the former. I think that the views people express is to some extent inevitably under the influence of their cultural environment. Without that, I'm convinced a proper study would find conclusively that nearly all of us have a notion of free will compatible with a deterministic universe.

The problem I see is that what most people are discussing here is the culturally influenced concept of free will, not the intuitive one. Probably because they're no longer able to call on their intuition. All they are aware of is the cultural concept of free will.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

To others, illusions of free will are argued to be useful.

Our subjective experience of red is also an illusion since there's no redness as such in the physical world as described by science. All there is supposed to be are electromagnetic waves. Yet, redness sure seems a useful illusion. We can even say, and we're very nearly all certain of that, that it's an operationally effective illusion.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

And this clearly shows there is a neuronal process involved in our sense of free will (although I also see no reason to assume that free will should limited to this explicit representation of alternative choices).
EB

Yes. In our 'sense of free will'. Nobody's saying we don't have that.

If you accept we have a sense of free will, you should also accept that there is a clear distinction between free will as per our sense of free will and any culturally determined concept free will informed by things like religious views, ideologies, education etc.

Proving that the concept of free will advocated by the Catholic Church is wrong cannot have any bearing on the reality or otherwise of free will as per our sense of free will.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

That's a good point to consider. That's why I think when people speak of having done something by free will they mean they don't really know why they chose to do it. And if they examine why they did it and come up with a reason (logical or illogical) then they don't know how they came up with that reason. That introspection can go on for a while, but soon they'll have to admit they don't know why. That's where free will is seen to come in. So I'll take the definition you gave in the OP and modify it a bit:

The human ability to make choices intuitively, or beyond the limits of cognition.

And many of the reasons we make the choices we do are based on principles and habits that become esatblished after years of experience. They are automatic, so the choices were made long before. We consider them to be part of us. Part of the self that makes the decisions. So we no longer know the reasons why.

Yes, I broadly agree with that.

And I think it goes a bit further. We are also very limited in our knowledge of the world and even our immediate environment, so even when we do make a conscious choice, it can at best be only partially justified.

So I would characterised our situation as having incomplete data about just everything. And I think that our sense of free will can only reflect our situation in this respect.

This further suggests to me that natural determinism, even assuming it's real, is beyond what we as individuals could possibly know of the world (including scientists).

And then this would explain why our sense of free will could only ignore determinism altogether, as a possible factor to take into account.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Some discussion of studies into commonly-held, traditional or 'folk' beliefs about free will in here:

https://philpapers.org/archive/NADSFF.pdf

They did two studies, both broadly in line with my view and saying that a clear majority of people have a notion of free will which is compatible with determinism.

However, they see their studies as not conclusive, in particular because of the need to have a more representative sample of the world's population. And there are biases in terms of replies being influenced by unconscious moral and emotional considerations.

Personally, I would make the distinction between on the one hand the more basic notion of free will most people would inevitably come up with intuitively, if left on their own, and this is the one notion I'm interested in, and, on the other hand, the various culturally determined conceptual constructs most people eventually end up with, influenced to some extent either by religion, ideology, social conventions, philosophical theories, literature, education etc., and often influenced by several if not all of them.

Unfortunately, I think it has to be very difficult to study the former. I think that the views people express is to some extent inevitably under the influence of their cultural environment. Without that, I'm convinced a proper study would find conclusively that nearly all of us have a notion of free will compatible with a deterministic universe.

The problem I see is that what most people are discussing here is the culturally influenced concept of free will, not the intuitive one. Probably because they're no longer able to call on their intuition. All they are aware of is the cultural concept of free will.
EB

Hm. I agree with some of that.

First, while the researchers in the case of those two studies come to the conclusion that people are generally compatibilist-leaning, it's also the case that other researchers come to a different indeed opposite conclusion. Also, it's not clear that the compatibilist-leanings (which I accept are there) are the sort that compatibilist philosophers are talking about. Also, the compatibilism is applied unevenly (differently in 'bad' scenarios than in 'good'). All in all, I think the work 'murky', or 'confused' is applicable.

So unlike you, I would not even go near to saying I'm convinced a proper study would find conclusively that nearly all of us have a notion of free will compatible with a deterministic universe, in the sense that this would not just be one intuitive leaning amongst others.

On the cultural thing, point taken and I'm sure it's relevant. Just to note that the study Jerry Coyne linked to did try to compare cultures (USA and Japan and others) and found little variation, in that at least 70% in all were deemed Libertarian. And I do honestly think the history of human justice tallies with this, by and large. Less so in modern, developed legal jurisdictions perhaps, where things have moved away from a strong assumption of Libertarian free will.

That said, I do also thing culture is a factor, yes. One can even see this if looking at religions. The concept of free will is weaker/looser in Buddhist writings than in 'western/christian' ones for example (whether it is all that different in the day to day lives of the faithful is another matter) and I do think it is fair to say that the varieties of concepts about free will that are most.....'toxic'...the hardest...in the Libertarian sense...are to be found in the USA, and I once watched a very interesting video presentation, which I must look out for you, on the downsides of this.

 

[ruby sparks]

To others, illusions of free will are argued to be useful.

Our subjective experience of red is also an illusion since there's no redness as such in the physical world as described by science. All there is supposed to be are electromagnetic waves. Yet, redness sure seems a useful illusion. We can even say, and we're very nearly all certain of that, that it's an operationally effective illusion.
EB

Yes.

Though perhaps it is not so clear when it comes to other illusions or delusions. Belief in god can readily be said to have both plusses and minuses. Perhaps something similar can be said about belief in free will. My own opinion is that belief in free will is, on balance, more useful than not, especially if we widen our scope to consider usefulness to society, since I think that this is arguably the bigger arena in which belief in free will plays out. Obviously, it plays out as a manifestation of the beliefs of individuals.

 

[fromderinside]

I'm finding it difficult to stomach "Our subjective experience of red is also an illusion since there's no redness as such in the physical world as described by science".

Science treating pure spectral energy on humans reliably recovers a 'red' response and to put color in terms of photic energy. Yes there are exceptions. Those with little or no color experience react somewhat differently. However, humans have very nice systems for dealing with hue whether it is pure, Raleigh, or something else derived. Humans also have a very nice capability to divine shape even though some in Africa, for instance, have no experience with 'round'. So when placing some attribute in one''s repertoire it is safe to include the ability to properly categorize color in line with physical properties and combinations of properties. The latter is exemplified by proper mixing of primaries with sensed direct and reflected light. It seems a shame to take out color when one agrees that shape is fundamentally related to assignment of edges with perspective for instance. there is no frequency or sound or size if one persists in pointing to language representations when the most direct representation is 'yes this matches that' or 'yes there is (physical stimulus quality) present or absent.

The experiences are not illusions. They are correct assignment of learned quality with actual stimulus by the observer.

If one wants to say all perception is indirect therefore not a reproduction in the observer's' mind' of the sensed energy or energy condition, one would be correct. But that is a world away from being an illusion. An illusion is experiencing something that is not actually there like experiencing a pipe going through a window frame when the pipe is only osculating within a frame.

I hpe no one was disabused to conclude the brain reproduces photic energy in the brain. One produces tags appropriate to photic energy in the brain, but, one is not seeing an illusion. Rather one is providing accurate reporting of physical entity to others.

 

[untermensche]

Illusion is not the correct word.

Our experience of red is not an illusion. It is real.

It's just that the object is not red.

Only our experience of it is red.

But experiences are real. They are not illusions.

 

[Speakpigeon]

To others, illusions of free will are argued to be useful.

Our subjective experience of red is also an illusion since there's no redness as such in the physical world as described by science. All there is supposed to be are electromagnetic waves. Yet, redness sure seems a useful illusion. We can even say, and we're very nearly all certain of that, that it's an operationally effective illusion.
EB

Yes.

Though perhaps it is not so clear when it comes to other illusions or delusions. Belief in god can readily be said to have both plusses and minuses. Perhaps something similar can be said about belief in free will. My own opinion is that belief in free will is, on balance, more useful than not, especially if we widen our scope to consider usefulness to society, since I think that this is arguably the bigger arena in which belief in free will plays out. Obviously, it plays out as a manifestation of the beliefs of individuals.

I would make the distinction between a possible belief in God and an inevitable belief in free will, which I think comes out of what I think is properly a sense of free will, just as it seems to me that we have a sense of logic for example. And if we have a sense of something, it must be because it is useful and operationally effective, as is indeed our sense of logic. I don't think this could be said of simple beliefs, like a belief in God. Any belief may well serve some useful role for the person who entertains it, but a belief in God can't possibly be said to be operationally effective (except by believers themselves, obviously).
EB