Crazy Eddie
Veteran Member
You still haven't supported your insinuation that procreation in and of itself is a non-praiseworthy goal, hence you keep comparing it to things like genocide and theft. Procreation, however, is the act of deliberately creating new life; that act may be morally praiseworthy or it may be morally objectionable. It may even be normally neutral, with no inherent positive or negative beyond subsequent choices.From the premise that the deliberate perpetuation of one's own family, community and species is a goal to be praised, it does not logically follow that a strategy that accomplishes this is also a goal to be praised. There are any number of non-praiseworthy strategies that accomplish praiseworthy goals.
But like anything else, the morality of an act is not situational. One can balance competing moral imperatives and choose the lesser of two evils, yes, but those acts have an inherent value -- positive or negative -- all on their own.
Where, then, do you support the premise that procreation is morally objectionable?
The key word there is "probably." Probabilities don't factor into moral judgements, only choices.And attempting to preserve your family is a goal to be praised; making a baby who'll probably have a miserable life is a questionable application of that strategy.That still doesn't eliminate the need to evaluate individual actions within the context of that strategy. Attempting to get people to exercise more frequently is a morally beneficent strategy for public health; breaking into people's houses with a chainsaw and chasing them halfway across town is a questionable application of that strategy.
You can therefore question the morality of a parent whose child "probably" won't have a great life and your objection becomes moot with the words "Not if I have anything to say about it."
Of course it is. I'm telling you that oranges are fruit because they grow from flowers and have seeds; your counter example is "sunflowers are not fruit, therefore neither are apples."No. We've been through this already. A counterexample to an inference rule is not an implication of equivalence.
If it's up to individual judgement whether or not conditions are sufficiently adverse to reproduce or not, then it's a practical consideration, not a moral one. "How great is the risk of harm and how hard would we have to work to reduce that risk?" Some people are more/less capable of that than others, and some people are more/less capable of that than they think they are.And again, "not ideal" is a red herring. There's a continuum between ideal and terrible; to say you should not reproduce under terrible circumstances does not imply you should only reproduce when conditions are ideal.
We were discussing the practical utility of that particular reproductive strategy. The MORAL dimension depends on the choices of the parents in relation to their children and is a completely different issue. A billionaire may choose to create a child for the sole purpose of harvesting its organs for a fondu party, while a refugee in a war zone might choose to have a child with the intention of loving and nurturing that child as best she can.
Their respective conditions are not moral considerations, only their choices with respect to the new life they created.
Argument by assertion. Is drunk driving "immoral" or merely reckless and dangerous? Your own category error is applicable here, since quite alot of things human beings do have a high probability of harm but are not considered to be immoral. Contact sports -- MMA in particular -- being the most obvious example, wherein the objective of the sport is to DELIBERATELY harm another competitor to the point that he can no longer compete.Probability of harm coming to a victim is all it takes to make drunk driving immoral...
There are simply too many cases where "probability of harm" is not sufficient to judge an action to be immoral; I suggest it is not sufficient OR neccesary, and even this example -- where the probability of harm is zero but violation of personal autonomy is guaranteed -- indicates it is neither.
Apples and oranges: the comparison would only be valid if reproduction were actually a crime.I'm not comparing reproduction to crimes; I'm comparing your argument for reproduction to hypothetical arguments for crimes
Because I recognize that too many of the things a normal person does over the course of a lifetime WOULD be immoral if "probably harmful" was a genuine moral concern. These include things like drinking alcohol in public, fornication, watching pornography, eating trans fats, farting in public, driving over the speed limit, paying taxes to governments that are prone to start wars, voting for Republicans, etc. Any one of a million actions have a chance of leading to GREAT harm, depending on how you evaluate those probabilities.Sure I can. So can credoconsolans et al. So can most people. Why can't you?
You are attempting to get around this fact by setting the threshhold for "probability of harm" at some arbitrary/imagined standard that makes it moral or immoral, which would essentially reduce all such moral judgements to entirely subjective value judgements based on inherently imperfect information.
In other words you are confusing practical considerations of risk management with dimensions of moral reality. Just because something is impractical and dangerous doesn't make it immoral; and just because something is immoral does not make it impractical or dangerous.