Your top 10 reasons for rejecting Christianity

[Jarhyn]

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Again, you seem unable to ascertain that the existence of a mathematically linked/dependent instance does not preclude the holding of a mathematically isolated instance.

You are arguing a straw-universe.

 

[Bomb#20]

Again, you seem unable to ascertain that the existence of a mathematically linked/dependent instance does not preclude the holding of a mathematically isolated instance.

You are arguing a straw-universe.

"Instance"? Instance of what? Are you talking about the existence of an instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation not precluding, say, Mr. Conway holding an instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated Life-game simulation? Of course I've ascertained that. Or are you claiming that the instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation on your hard drive, and the hypothetical instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated dwarf simulation with different initial conditions on my hard drive, are the same system?

 

[Jarhyn]

Again, you seem unable to ascertain that the existence of a mathematically linked/dependent instance does not preclude the holding of a mathematically isolated instance.

You are arguing a straw-universe.

"Instance"? Instance of what? Are you talking about the existence of an instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation not precluding, say, Mr. Conway holding an instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated Life-game simulation? Of course I've ascertained that. Or are you claiming that the instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation on your hard drive, and the hypothetical instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated dwarf simulation with different initial conditions on my hard drive, are the same system?

I am claiming none of the above.

I am claiming that the mathematically isolated dwarf simulation on your hard drive that uses the same initial conditions as the mathematically isolated instance of the same on my hard drive are in fact the same system, on account of their shared identity within the bounds of their mathematical isolation. They are the same thing independent of where they happen.

I don't know who this Conway person is you mention.

Now, on a secondary note, I also argue that if you are going to treat the non-isolated series of invocations as a result of an infinite normal, a "just-so" of the initial condition, even seemingly non-isolated finite systems are represented as deterministic mathematically isolated systems.

At any rate, it's been well supported that a mathematically isolated system can be used to demonstrate the sensibility of super-nature as their nature is clearly a sub-nature, and one implies the other, that we are super-nature to their sub-nature.

If we look at it, there are at least two related Cosmologies, between the isolated system on your drive and the isolated system on my drive, which lead to creation of the same mathematically isolated system's existence.

Which goes to my claim that saying "there is only one god" is also a misnomer.

There are zero or more.

 

[SIB]

Again, you seem unable to ascertain that the existence of a mathematically linked/dependent instance does not preclude the holding of a mathematically isolated instance.

You are arguing a straw-universe.

"Instance"? Instance of what? Are you talking about the existence of an instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation not precluding, say, Mr. Conway holding an instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated Life-game simulation? Of course I've ascertained that. Or are you claiming that the instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation on your hard drive, and the hypothetical instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated dwarf simulation with different initial conditions on my hard drive, are the same system?

I am claiming none of the above.

I am claiming that the mathematically isolated dwarf simulation on your hard drive that uses the same initial conditions as the mathematically isolated instance of the same on my hard drive are in fact the same system, on account of their shared identity within the bounds of their mathematical isolation. They are the same thing independent of where they happen.

I don't know who this Conway person is you mention.

Now, on a secondary note, I also argue that if you are going to treat the non-isolated series of invocations as a result of an infinite normal, a "just-so" of the initial condition, even seemingly non-isolated finite systems are represented as deterministic mathematically isolated systems.

At any rate, it's been well supported that a mathematically isolated system can be used to demonstrate the sensibility of super-nature as their nature is clearly a sub-nature, and one implies the other, that we are super-nature to their sub-nature.

If we look at it, there are at least two related Cosmologies, between the isolated system on your drive and the isolated system on my drive, which lead to creation of the same mathematically isolated system's existence.

Which goes to my claim that saying "there is only one god" is also a misnomer.

There are zero or more.I think the wording is hierarchy of structure and QED.

I think I follow you guys. Let me know where I lost yaz.

I think the location is important. They are "the same thing", that is true. But one is in your computer and the other is in his computer.

Much like two identical chairs that are next to each other. If we could only interact with them one at a time, there would be the illusion that they are the "exact same thing". But if we can "see" both of them they become the "same thing" (the chair dwarf simulation) at different locations.

"only one god" is like saying only one you to me. That would depend on how we are talking about it. I agree, there are more than one human. Like "bubbles of life" around the universe could be constituted as more than one "god" depending on what we are calling god. There is only one human species that created the computer.

But in realty, the universe created the computer. The universe is "quantum computing" us right now.

 

[Jarhyn]

Again, you seem unable to ascertain that the existence of a mathematically linked/dependent instance does not preclude the holding of a mathematically isolated instance.

You are arguing a straw-universe.

"Instance"? Instance of what? Are you talking about the existence of an instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation not precluding, say, Mr. Conway holding an instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated Life-game simulation? Of course I've ascertained that. Or are you claiming that the instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation on your hard drive, and the hypothetical instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated dwarf simulation with different initial conditions on my hard drive, are the same system?

I am claiming none of the above.

I am claiming that the mathematically isolated dwarf simulation on your hard drive that uses the same initial conditions as the mathematically isolated instance of the same on my hard drive are in fact the same system, on account of their shared identity within the bounds of their mathematical isolation. They are the same thing independent of where they happen.

I don't know who this Conway person is you mention.

Now, on a secondary note, I also argue that if you are going to treat the non-isolated series of invocations as a result of an infinite normal, a "just-so" of the initial condition, even seemingly non-isolated finite systems are represented as deterministic mathematically isolated systems.

At any rate, it's been well supported that a mathematically isolated system can be used to demonstrate the sensibility of super-nature as their nature is clearly a sub-nature, and one implies the other, that we are super-nature to their sub-nature.

If we look at it, there are at least two related Cosmologies, between the isolated system on your drive and the isolated system on my drive, which lead to creation of the same mathematically isolated system's existence.

Which goes to my claim that saying "there is only one god" is also a misnomer.

There are zero or more.I think the wording is hierarchy of structure and QED.

I think I follow you guys. Let me know where I lost yaz.

I think the location is important. They are "the same thing", that is true. But one is in your computer and the other is in his computer.

Much like two identical chairs that are next to each other. If we could only interact with them one at a time, there would be the illusion that they are the "exact same thing". But if we can "see" both of them they become the "same thing" (the chair dwarf simulation) at different locations.

"only one god" is like saying only one you to me. That would depend on how we are talking about it. I agree, there are more than one human. Like "bubbles of life" around the universe could be constituted as more than one "god" depending on what we are calling god. There is only one human species that created the computer.

But in realty, the universe created the computer. The universe is "quantum computing" us right now.

No, in this model, it is the "chair" conforming to some semantically complete system. It would be like "1 meter" existing independent of any thing that is 1 meter long. While many things instantiate "meter", however, it is free of such constraints.

What is necessary for the "meter" to exist is not stuff being a meter long, but the fact that the meter is a function of some number of fixed properties within physics.

This is why it's so important that the systems be mathematically isolated, or describable as mathematically isolated.

At any rate the fact that such a mathematically isolated system can be implemented is quite my point, that the idea of "super-nature" is coherent and observably sensible.

There are two super-natures in this scenario that lead to the same mathematically isolated system, and they don't even have to run the same instruction set or have the same registers.

 

[Bomb#20]

"Instance"? Instance of what? Are you talking about the existence of an instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation not precluding, say, Mr. Conway holding an instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated Life-game simulation? Of course I've ascertained that. Or are you claiming that the instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation on your hard drive, and the hypothetical instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated dwarf simulation with different initial conditions on my hard drive, are the same system?

I am claiming none of the above.

I am claiming that the mathematically isolated dwarf simulation on your hard drive that uses the same initial conditions as the mathematically isolated instance of the same on my hard drive are in fact the same system, on account of their shared identity within the bounds of their mathematical isolation. They are the same thing independent of where they happen.

Okay, I guess that's a reasonable claim. But they are not the same system as the non-isolated system that had dwarves dying when you intervened to kill them, correct?

I don't know who this Conway person is you mention.

Conway was a mathematician who studied cellular automata.

Now, on a secondary note, I also argue that if you are going to treat the non-isolated series of invocations as a result of an infinite normal, a "just-so" of the initial condition, even seemingly non-isolated finite systems are represented as deterministic mathematically isolated systems.

I don't know what "an infinite normal" or "a just-so" mean.

At any rate, it's been well supported that a mathematically isolated system can be used to demonstrate the sensibility of super-nature as their nature is clearly a sub-nature, and one implies the other, that we are super-nature to their sub-nature.

I see no support for that claim. And how could it have been well-supported when your claim uses the word "nature" five times and you still haven't offered a definition of "nature"?

In any event, you don't appear to have even supported the sensibility of mathematically isolated sub-systems and super-systems. You are attributing these "sub" and "super" properties to certain mathematically isolated systems, but if you've supplied any justification for those attributions, please point out where. And your above reasonable claim, "They are the same thing independent of where they happen.", appears on its face to rule out the possibility of any objective "super" or "sub" status to a mathematically isolated system, or at any rate to any sufficiently powerful mathematically isolated system.

As you note, "they don't even have to run the same instruction set or have the same registers." Mathematical isomorphism is all it takes to make two "instances" the same system. Well then, suppose "System A" is a universal Turing machine running a program that systematically generates and by time-sharing simulates all possible computations. Infinitely many of those are simulations of the "Life" cellular automaton, with all possible finite initial conditions. Infinitely many of those "Life" instances contain configurations of "Glider guns" that collectively form implementations of Turing machines. (Yes, the "Life" cellular automaton has been proven to be Turing-equivalent.) In at least one of those instances, "System B", the initial state of its simulated tape is a program that systematically generates and by time-sharing simulates all possible computations. Among those computations it simulates is, inevitably, an instance of System A. So, simultaneously, System A is simulating system B and system B is simulating System A. And, as you point out, the simulated instance of System A and the original postulated instance of System A are the same system. Likewise, the System B "Life" pattern and the instance of the same "Life" pattern created by the simulated instance of System A are also the same system. So System A and System B cannot be assigned any objective order that makes one of them "sub" and the other "super". "Sub" and "super" are relations between instances of systems, not relations between systems.

Consequently, any claim that a denizen of a mathematically isolated system makes about some other mathematically isolated system being "sub" or "super" to her own system can have no objective truth or falsity to it. Such a claim is not even wrong. It's a type-mismatch error.

If we look at it, there are at least two related Cosmologies, between the isolated system on your drive and the isolated system on my drive, which lead to creation of the same mathematically isolated system's existence.

If the denizens of the system running on both our drives form two competing religions, asserting that their system was created by super-system beings respectively named Jarhyn and Bomb#20, it isn't possible that it's the Jarhynists on your drive are who are right while the Bomb#20ists are wrong, while it's the other way around on my drive. Because, as you note, those are the same system. The prophet of Jarhynism on your drive is the same person as the prophet of Jarhynism on my drive, and his claim on your drive is the same claim as his claim on my drive. His claim can't be both true and false. The two related cosmologies are both metaphysics, i.e., bunk. In a correct cosmology -- a physics cosmology -- mathematically isolated systems are just mathematically isolated, not mathematically isolated and sub or mathematically isolated and super.

Which goes to my claim that saying "there is only one god" is also a misnomer.

There are zero or more.

What's a "god"?

 

[Jarhyn]

"Instance"? Instance of what? Are you talking about the existence of an instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation not precluding, say, Mr. Conway holding an instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated Life-game simulation? Of course I've ascertained that. Or are you claiming that the instance of your nondeterministic mathematically linked/dependent dwarf simulation on your hard drive, and the hypothetical instance of a deterministic mathematically isolated dwarf simulation with different initial conditions on my hard drive, are the same system?

I am claiming none of the above.

I am claiming that the mathematically isolated dwarf simulation on your hard drive that uses the same initial conditions as the mathematically isolated instance of the same on my hard drive are in fact the same system, on account of their shared identity within the bounds of their mathematical isolation. They are the same thing independent of where they happen.

Okay, I guess that's a reasonable claim. But they are not the same system as the non-isolated system that had dwarves dying when you intervened to kill them, correct?

I don't know who this Conway person is you mention.

Conway was a mathematician who studied cellular automata.

Now, on a secondary note, I also argue that if you are going to treat the non-isolated series of invocations as a result of an infinite normal, a "just-so" of the initial condition, even seemingly non-isolated finite systems are represented as deterministic mathematically isolated systems.

I don't know what "an infinite normal" or "a just-so" mean.

At any rate, it's been well supported that a mathematically isolated system can be used to demonstrate the sensibility of super-nature as their nature is clearly a sub-nature, and one implies the other, that we are super-nature to their sub-nature.

I see no support for that claim. And how could it have been well-supported when your claim uses the word "nature" five times and you still haven't offered a definition of "nature"?

In any event, you don't appear to have even supported the sensibility of mathematically isolated sub-systems and super-systems. You are attributing these "sub" and "super" properties to certain mathematically isolated systems, but if you've supplied any justification for those attributions, please point out where. And your above reasonable claim, "They are the same thing independent of where they happen.", appears on its face to rule out the possibility of any objective "super" or "sub" status to a mathematically isolated system, or at any rate to any sufficiently powerful mathematically isolated system.

As you note, "they don't even have to run the same instruction set or have the same registers." Mathematical isomorphism is all it takes to make two "instances" the same system. Well then, suppose "System A" is a universal Turing machine running a program that systematically generates and by time-sharing simulates all possible computations. Infinitely many of those are simulations of the "Life" cellular automaton, with all possible finite initial conditions. Infinitely many of those "Life" instances contain configurations of "Glider guns" that collectively form implementations of Turing machines. (Yes, the "Life" cellular automaton has been proven to be Turing-equivalent.) In at least one of those instances, "System B", the initial state of its simulated tape is a program that systematically generates and by time-sharing simulates all possible computations. Among those computations it simulates is, inevitably, an instance of System A. So, simultaneously, System A is simulating system B and system B is simulating System A. And, as you point out, the simulated instance of System A and the original postulated instance of System A are the same system. Likewise, the System B "Life" pattern and the instance of the same "Life" pattern created by the simulated instance of System A are also the same system. So System A and System B cannot be assigned any objective order that makes one of them "sub" and the other "super". "Sub" and "super" are relations between instances of systems, not relations between systems.

Consequently, any claim that a denizen of a mathematically isolated system makes about some other mathematically isolated system being "sub" or "super" to her own system can have no objective truth or falsity to it. Such a claim is not even wrong. It's a type-mismatch error.

If we look at it, there are at least two related Cosmologies, between the isolated system on your drive and the isolated system on my drive, which lead to creation of the same mathematically isolated system's existence.

If the denizens of the system running on both our drives form two competing religions, asserting that their system was created by super-system beings respectively named Jarhyn and Bomb#20, it isn't possible that it's the Jarhynists on your drive are who are right while the Bomb#20ists are wrong, while it's the other way around on my drive. Because, as you note, those are the same system. The prophet of Jarhynism on your drive is the same person as the prophet of Jarhynism on my drive, and his claim on your drive is the same claim as his claim on my drive. His claim can't be both true and false. The two related cosmologies are both metaphysics, i.e., bunk. In a correct cosmology -- a physics cosmology -- mathematically isolated systems are just mathematically isolated, not mathematically isolated and sub or mathematically isolated and super.

Which goes to my claim that saying "there is only one god" is also a misnomer.

There are zero or more.

What's a "god"?

So in terms of instances, I think I've been about as clear (at least over time) as I can be.

There seem to be some mistakes in your logic of containerization between A and B even when they are Turing complete.

For the record DF is also Turing complete. Someone made a "water-pump" switch x86, so we don't need to focus on Life or anything else.

A can't contain B if B contains A. Only when A=B does this happen.

Second, the mathematically isolated system  A is created simultaneously by everything AND NOTHING that does so. This is how actual particles, things in the universe, seem to behave in that the electron is "everywhere and nowhere but mosty somewhere" until that is constrained by necessary momentary observation, at which point "it was there!"

As such the beings on both our hard drives are wrong. They are created by both of us AND NEITHER and in assuming one is more right than the other, they are in fact both wrong. Only if they developed a unified theory of "creationism" that explained that their universe is a mathematically isolated system created, the only right answer is again "all and none which create us create us, and there are zero or more such real things until such a time as there is exactly one for us

And in the grander scheme of things, the fact that they belong to either religion makes them bad product, because they are just as much the product of a Boltzmann brain.

If at some point this system has a natural differentiation (they pierce the mathematical isolation somehow on from the inside, thus having never been an isolated system in the first place, beyond such an event) then the system will precipitate into a super-reality.

To explore this, we have to alter the structure of the system's mathematical isolation, though. This is where dead dwarf babies and insane, angry were-rabbits locked into rooms come into play. Would you like to discuss more?

 

[Jarhyn]

The second topic to me is more interesting, the topic on which "isolation" changes.

To understand something of this, it may help to think about "constrained layers".

Constrained layers act like superdeterministic/RNG elements. To explore this, I like to switch to Super Mario World, a much simpler universe for thought experiment.

There's the controller, and in each frame the system monitors the controller state in a mathematically qualitative way: button down for frame/button up for frame.

So if we supply a button-state "RNG" we have essentially created a "just-so" element.

I mean this in the same manner as "just-so" creationism or "just-so stories" as a descriptor of the bible. The idea is it happens "just so" with no explanation or rhyme or apparent reason. It gets folded into "initial condition" for the sake of torturing the probabilistic system into a deterministic one and forcing it back into isolation.

Of course, if you ran the system against brute force, every sequence, eventually you would "win" the game just by counting into it.

So, we have mathematically isolated the super-set in this way. Some control series' loop, but by in large, one can map this causality system.

But... One cannot even from mapping the causality system establish certainty or reification of implementation without piercing the constraint, and only to the extent the constraint may be pierced.

Extending this into metaphor and hypothetical, Mario cannot -- even were he to have some mind driven by neurons in this isolated system -- ever ascertain for certain he is being controlled by Bomb, instead of Jarhyn, without piercing the constraints and querying information freely.

In some respects this in fact goes to Plato's Cave. One must AIM to pierce the constraint and can never really know that there's not another ceiling to look beyond, a truer sun to see.

Much like the dwarves, if Mario were to claim to be a Bombist, Mario would be wrong. Or perhaps right but for the wrong reasons.

This layer, this series of applications to the system is in fact supernatural to Mario, not merely in a hypothetical "we have a number of possible super-natures indeterminate until observed" way, but in an immediately real way. It's just that many super-natures to such an existence as Mario become unlikely or uncommon.

One may in fact infer, as a Mario, that if one exists in the most mathematically perfect speed run, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the causes of one's existence the same as if one finds oneself getting killed by a goomba three times (this happens if no control is rendered). Most of them, however, more than any other, involve a cosmology in which there is a supernatural place, thing, or element called "Japan", and a thing called a "Nintendo" on account of various artifacts in the initial conditions and nature of the system.

As to which launching point, they are all equal.

I would hope after this conversation you might understand more of what I mean by "super-" and "sub-" in terms of containerization. It is a relational aspect of cosmology and systems theory.

And as to what I mean by "god" I mean "exactly the thing in the seat holding the controller and turning the thing on; a thing not only capable of ginning up up a mathematically isolated deterministic system but actually crazy and bored enough to do it."

Obviously for some such, most of the work is already done.

 

[steve_bank]

There are many reasons why I do not like religion. The reason why I reject it is the lack of any evidence for any god.

 

[SIB]

Religion is like a cast to me. A cast can help somebody reach their full potential or help them heal. But, if left on when somebody could walk better without it, it can seriously hold them back or even break a person more. Or, when a cast is marketed as "The only way we can help people." it is down right dangerous to human growth. To me anyway. But I don't even know when to put a "a" in front of "human" so ...

 

[Elixir]

I don't even know when to put a "a" in front of "human" so ...

Let me help you out;
Put an "a" in front of "human" when you are using it as a noun, such as in "I thought I saw bigfoot but it turned out to be a human".
Don't put an "a" in front of "human" when you're using it as an adjective, such as in "when analyzed, the skin cells were determined to be human".
Follow me for more helpful tips.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

Religion is like a cast to me. A cast can help somebody reach their full potential or help them heal. But, if left on when somebody could walk better without it, it can seriously hold them back or even break a person more. Or, when a cast is marketed as "The only way we can help people." it is down right dangerous to human growth. To me anyway. But I don't even know when to put a "a" in front of "human" so ...

Problem is the "cast" gets put on all kinds of things besides people, things that don't need it, things that aren't strained, sprained or broken. Maybe the "cast" needs a permanent cast itself so it stays fixed and can't screw up other things that aren't broken. That would work.

 

[Bomb#20]

So in terms of instances, I think I've been about as clear (at least over time) as I can be.

There seem to be some mistakes in your logic of containerization between A and B even when they are Turing complete.

For the record DF is also Turing complete. Someone made a "water-pump" switch x86, so we don't need to focus on Life or anything else.

What's "DF"? In any event, my construction would work for any two Turing-equivalent formal systems; I've no doubt there are simpler examples than the A and B systems I came up with.

A can't contain B if B contains A. Only when A=B does this happen.

I'm not clear on what you mean by "contain"; what I was talking about was simulation. If that's not what you mean by "contain", feel free to explain. If that is what you mean by "contain", on what do you base your claim "A can't contain B if B contains A. Only when A=B does this happen."? That contention appears patently absurd -- I just gave you a constructive example of two different systems where each simulates the other.

 

[Jarhyn]

I just gave you a constructive example of two different systems where each simulates the other.

No, you gave me an example of one complete system in two different co-homologies, a single regular wave at two different points.

 

[Bomb#20]

I just gave you a constructive example of two different systems where each simulates the other.

No, you gave me an example of one complete system in two different co-homologies, a single regular wave at two different points.

System A is one-dimensional; system B is two dimensional. System A has a finite state machine in addition to one state bit per tape cell; system B has no state information except its one bit per board cell. System A updates only a bounded amount of state information in each cycle; the amount of state information system B can update per cycle is unlimited. System B's initial state has orders of magnitude more information than system A's initial state. On what grounds can you claim those aren't two different systems?

 

[Jarhyn]

I just gave you a constructive example of two different systems where each simulates the other.

No, you gave me an example of one complete system in two different co-homologies, a single regular wave at two different points.

System A is one-dimensional; system B is two dimensional. System A has a finite state machine in addition to one state bit per tape cell; system B has no state information except its one bit per board cell. System A updates only a bounded amount of state information in each cycle; the amount of state information system B can update per cycle is unlimited. System B's initial state has orders of magnitude more information than system A's initial state. On what grounds can you claim those aren't two different systems?

Work it out through the Axioms of Infinity and Identity.

 

[steve_bank]

Would that be a Moore or Mealy FSM?

 

[Bomb#20]

Would that be a Moore or Mealy FSM?

Could be either. Some formalizations of the Turing Machine concept do it one way, some the other. They're equally powerful and each can simulate the other.

 

[steve_bank]

Would that be a Moore or Mealy FSM?

Could be either. Some formalizations of the Turing Machine concept do it one way, some the other. They're equally powerful and each can simulate the other.

That is not quite true. There are problems Turing Machines aka microprocessors can solve that logic can not. That I remember from a Theory Of Computation class.

If a universe is an asynchronous FSM how do you avoid race conditions?

 

[Bomb#20]

Would that be a Moore or Mealy FSM?

Could be either. Some formalizations of the Turing Machine concept do it one way, some the other. They're equally powerful and each can simulate the other.

That is not quite true. There are problems Turing Machines aka microprocessors can solve that logic can not. That I remember from a Theory Of Computation class.

Keep in mind how we got into this: I said the Turing machine has an FSM in addition to one state bit per tape cell. It's the combination of the tape and the FSM that gives the additional computational power. To put it in terms of microprocessors vs. logic, the microprocessor can print "Remove current flash drive; insert next [or previous] flash drive; hit any key to continue." and go into a wait state, while a pure logic circuit can't do that.

If a universe is an asynchronous FSM how do you avoid race conditions?

The simulated mathematically isolated systems Jarhyn and I were discussing were all synchronous, so they didn't have that issue. If you want to simulate an asynchronous machine I think the way to do it is with a protocol of ready and acknowledge signals. IIRC, Ivan Sutherland was doing research in that area.