“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[steve_bank]

Well pood, these threads always go down the same path because the debate is based on abstractions and arbitrary definitions with no reference point to judge validity.

At best one mcan claim a valid logical argument, given a premise or definition the results follow. A logically consistent syllogism meaning no logical falci9es is just that, alone it proves nothing.

 

[DBT]

Well pood, these threads always go down the same path because the debate is based on abstractions and arbitrary definitions with no reference point to judge validity.

At best one mcan claim a valid logical argument, given a premise or definition the results follow. A logically consistent syllogism meaning no logical falci9es is just that, alone it proves nothing.

Compatbilists give a definition of determinism, with a definition of free will in relation to the terms and conditions of their definition of determinism. A definition that takes external necessitation/determinism into account as a restriction on freedom of will, but fail to account for inner necessitation/determinism which places as much a restriction on freedom of will as external necessitation/determinism.

So compatibilism fails to make a logical case for free will.

 

[steve_bank]

Exactly. Abstract definitions used as part of other abstract definitions. Metaphysics, systems of abstractions. Science ties abstractions to humongous physical units.

As I posted point to a situation that demonstrates free will or determinism. It becomes self referential.

I freely chose Pepsi over Coke therefore I exercised free will.

Given modern science any discussion of the topic has to include neuroscience.

AI is a first attempt to mimic human brains. In an AI it is not possible to localize where a decision is made. It is not deterministic.

 

[peacegirl]

We are not talking about many worlds or there rather than here, which is just another lame excuse for observed reality. All you are doing is trying desperately to give determinism a bad rap due to your dislike for the implications.

This is classic ad hominem. I will start reporting all your ad hom posts if you keep this up.

You and your damn ad homs. You are no saint Pood. You have done more to purposely hurt me in the last decade than I could ever do to you. Your threats don’t scare me. I still am trying to understand your apparent unwillingness to see why logical necessity, according to modal logic, does not mean anyone, given the same exact circumstances, could do otherwise, which is what this whole argument is centered on.

Do not do ad hominem again, or I will start reporting all your ad hom posts. There have literally been dozens of them.

Go for it if it gives you greater satisfaction.

And doing what gives me greater satisfaction — that is, doing what I want to do, free of coercion or restraint, including from external forces or the past — is … compatibilism.

No, that is not the definition used in this debate. It's a bait and switch that you're proposing. Free will is the ability to choose otherwise, not the freedom (no external constraint) to weigh options. We have this attribute, and free of coercion is only half of the definition. We have internal as well as external constraint based on conscious and unconscious factors. Free from coercion is a colloquial expression used by the general public. Appearances are often wrong, and it is wrong to think that there is no compulsion to choose what is preferable when the very act of contemplation proves this to be the case or we wouldn't contemplate, ponder, ruminate, reflect, or think over. What would be the point of this attribute if not to decide our preferences where there can only be one possible choice each moment in time? This is the reason free will is a realistic mirage.

So you are asking, what would be the point of us contemplating, pondering, ruminating, reflecting, or thinking things over to decide our preferences, if there can be only possible choice each moment in time?

What would be the point of mulling over options if there wasn’t a winner, so to speak. The whole point of contemplation is to try to determine which choice to pick otherwise there would be no point in making this determination.

If you mean by “one possible choice,” that some choices are mutually exclusive, that would be one thing; but that is not what you mean — you mean only one choice is possible to us, because we lack the will to freely choose.

That’s not what I mean at all. We lack the will to freely choose? What does that even mean? All of us are making choices all day everyday but they ate not free choices for the reasons given

And so, yes, I have asked DBT the same question, and it is for YOU and HIM to answer, and not me — how did we evolve the ability to contemplate, ponder, ruminate, reflect, and think things over about what we will choose, when in reality we have no choice at all?

Having a choice means having options, but this in no way means we can choose A or B equally (i.e. free will) when there is a compelling reason to choose A (not to shoot) over B (to shoot) rendering B an impossible choice under those circumstances. If will was free, there would be no compulsion to pick A over B. I’m trying to make this easy for you to understand but your modal logic has gotten in the way. You are sold on the idea that logical necessity somehow grants us free will because it’s possible that a different choice could be made (it’s not a rock rolling down an hill) under a new set of conditions. What malarkey! Free will, which means “could have done otherwise” does not exist, never did exist, and never will exist.

 

[Elixir]

my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

… absent the factors that compelled (“determined”) your choice of Coke, yeah. But such factors exist(ed) with or without your (or anyone else’s) awareness.

Yes, and crucially among those deterministic factors is me.

And “you” is composed of matter and energy behaving in conformance with known physics. One more or one less cup of coffee and maybe you choose differently.

To me the whole question lacks meaning. We experience making choices, so the experience is real. We never were in control, or even aware of all the determinative factors that influence our choices. That holds true regardless of how “true” free will or determinism is as observed from some nonexistent point of objectivity.

 

[DBT]

Decision making is real, we do make decisions....if, however, the world is deterministic, the decision we make in any given instance is inevitable.

If our decision not inevitable, the world is not deterministic and we live in probabilistic world, which is also a problem for compatibilism and free will

 

[peacegirl]

Exactly. Abstract definitions used as part of other abstract definitions. Metaphysics, systems of abstractions. Science ties abstractions to humongous physical units.

As I posted point to a situation that demonstrates free will or determinism. It becomes self referential.

I freely chose Pepsi over Coke therefore I exercised free will.

Given modern science any discussion of the topic has to include neuroscience.

AI is a first attempt to mimic human brains. In an AI it is not possible to localize where a decision is made. It is not deterministic.

Determinism is not a thing found in the brain. It is a product of the brain. That is why observation is more valuable in terms of getting to the truth rather than looking at the brain directly. There is some indication that choices are made by the brain before we are even aware of those choices on a conscious level. But our actions are performed consciously, so this does not exempt us of responsibility since we are the ones that give an action permission.

 

[peacegirl]

my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

… absent the factors that compelled (“determined”) your choice of Coke, yeah. But such factors exist(ed) with or without your (or anyone else’s) awareness.

Yes, and crucially among those deterministic factors is me.

And “you” is composed of matter and energy behaving in conformance with known physics. One more or one less cup of coffee and maybe you choose differently.

To me the whole question lacks meaning. We experience making choices, so the experience is real. We never were in control, or even aware of all the determinative factors that influence our choices. That holds true regardless of how “true” free will or determinism is as observed from some nonexistent point of objectivity.

Determinism (or no free will) cannot be observed objectively like observing matter because what we find preferable in any decision we make is subjective in nature. You are correct that we are not in control or even aware of all the determinative factors that influence our choices but they do influence us nevertheless which give us no free choice at all.

 

[Jarhyn]

No DBT, you still have no answer for the Paradox of the Oracle which is created by this view of yours:

The Oedipus Paradox: the Oracle of Delphi sees the future, and what the oracle sees shall come to pass.

I go to the Oracle of Delphi. The Oracle of Delphi says *oh hey, you're going to (do Oedipal things)*, and then I say "fuck that noise" and kill myself.

In doing so I have proven the Oracle wrong and created a paradox.

So either the Oracle telling me that takes away my power to kill myself, or the Oracle can't tell the future at all, or the Oracle can't tell me my future.

It seems like the one who actually has power here isn't the Oracle or determinism but the active thing that can process information and which makes decisions: not even fate is powerful enough to invalidate the strength of who I am in that situation, and that the inevitability is dependent on not having the information on the first place...

But because inevitability is *even if you know*, the whole concept doesn't seem to apply as it is clearly NOT if you already know (as then I would KMS).

It seems the outcomes of our actions are functions of *who we are in that moment*, before anything else.

 

[Swammerdami]

I don't follow the "determinism debate." I have trouble with big words like "contingent." For me the universe is either fully "deterministic" or it is not. Any middle-ground ("soft determinism"?) confused me. Let me ask simple yes/no questions.

For the sake of argument, let's ignore probabilistic interpretations of quantum physics. Let's ignore Penrose's theory that human consciousness is the result of unpredictable events in the microtubules of neurons. OTOH, if one's opposition to "hard determinism" depends specifically on quantum unpredictability, please say so explicitly.

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options....
If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

... The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise....

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. ... I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The choice is made by human brain, allegedly the most powerful machine in the universe. The result of the "thinking" in such a brain is much too difficult to compute. Especially since humans appear to have volition and might switch their choice at the last moment just to confound an on-looker who believes in determinism.

The execution of a computer program is not easily predictable. A gamma-ray might arrive "randomly" and invert a bit. But nothing is "random"; that gamma-ray is part of the universe and would be part of the input to any impossibly-perfect predictor.

So my Y/N question is: Granted that human action seems completely unpredictable, given exactly the same circumstances is it possible for the human to choose Coke in one instantiation of the universe and Pepsi in other?

After all, I want to say proving Fermat's Last Theorem, took using math around *inaccessible cardinalities*.

Nitpick: You've made this claim before, and I've objected before. It's an interesting controversy, but this seems to be expert opinion:

In the most naive sense Wiles proof does depend on existence of Grothendieck universes (and thus on existence of inaccessible cardinals). By this I mean if you took every reference in Wiles proof and read the first published proof of that fact you'd certainly end up somewhere in SGA where, due to Grothendieck's love of generalization, you'd find universes popping up.

However, this certainly doesn't mean the proof really uses universes. It's widely believed ... that in any practical situation you don't actually need universes. ... BCnrd [Brian Conrad, math Prof. at Stanford] was one of the mathematicians who proved the Modularity Theorem, which showed that all elliptic curves over Q are modular. This is a strengthening of Taylor and Wiles' result, which applied only to semi-stable elliptic curves, and the proof involved understanding and building on Taylor and Wiles' work. BCnrd is also famous for his attention to detail and for consulting underlying foundational sources; he is the author of a book dedicated to simplifying and correcting the presentation of Grothendieck duality in Hartshorne's book Residues and Duality.

As explained in the comments to Pete's answer, BCnrd says there's really no issue at all in Wiles's proof. All of the specific things that Wiles uses stay far away from any of the difficult issues where you might be worried about needing to invoke universes.

 

[DBT]

I don't follow the "determinism debate." I have trouble with big words like "contingent." For me the universe is either fully "deterministic" or it is not. Any middle-ground ("soft determinism"?) confused me. Let me ask simple yes/no questions.

For the sake of argument, let's ignore probabilistic interpretations of quantum physics. Let's ignore Penrose's theory that human consciousness is the result of unpredictable events in the microtubules of neurons. OTOH, if one's opposition to "hard determinism" depends specifically on quantum unpredictability, please say so explicitly.

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options....
If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

... The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise....

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. ... I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The choice is made by human brain, allegedly the most powerful machine in the universe. The result of the "thinking" in such a brain is much too difficult to compute. Especially since humans appear to have volition and might switch their choice at the last moment just to confound an on-looker who believes in determinism.

The execution of a computer program is not easily predictable. A gamma-ray might arrive "randomly" and invert a bit. But nothing is "random"; that gamma-ray is part of the universe and would be part of the input to any impossibly-perfect predictor.

So my Y/N question is: Granted that human action seems completely unpredictable, given exactly the same circumstances is it possible for the human to choose Coke in one instantiation of the universe and Pepsi in other?

After all, I want to say proving Fermat's Last Theorem, took using math around *inaccessible cardinalities*.

Nitpick: You've made this claim before, and I've objected before. It's an interesting controversy, but this seems to be expert opinion:

In the most naive sense Wiles proof does depend on existence of Grothendieck universes (and thus on existence of inaccessible cardinals). By this I mean if you took every reference in Wiles proof and read the first published proof of that fact you'd certainly end up somewhere in SGA where, due to Grothendieck's love of generalization, you'd find universes popping up.

However, this certainly doesn't mean the proof really uses universes. It's widely believed ... that in any practical situation you don't actually need universes. ... BCnrd [Brian Conrad, math Prof. at Stanford] was one of the mathematicians who proved the Modularity Theorem, which showed that all elliptic curves over Q are modular. This is a strengthening of Taylor and Wiles' result, which applied only to semi-stable elliptic curves, and the proof involved understanding and building on Taylor and Wiles' work. BCnrd is also famous for his attention to detail and for consulting underlying foundational sources; he is the author of a book dedicated to simplifying and correcting the presentation of Grothendieck duality in Hartshorne's book Residues and Duality.

As explained in the comments to Pete's answer, BCnrd says there's really no issue at all in Wiles's proof. All of the specific things that Wiles uses stay far away from any of the difficult issues where you might be worried about needing to invoke universes.

Given determinism, the distinction to be made lies between decision making and choice. If the decision that is made is fixed by antecedents - which is determinism - they may not be one and the same, where a decision is made but it's not a choice because an alternate action was never a possibility.

 

[pood]

I don't follow the "determinism debate." I have trouble with big words like "contingent."

“Contingent“ in this context simply means “could have been otherwise,” as distinct from “necessary,” which means “could not have been otherwise.” If you can imagine a world different from the one we live in without bringing about a logical contradiction, then the things that are different in the imagined world are contingent both in the imagined world and in this world. Since I can imagine a world in which I pick Pepsi instead of Coke without bringing about a logical contradiction, then the proposition “I picked Coke” was contingently true.

By contrast, I can imagine no world in which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married without bringing about a logical contradiction.

Some properties of this world are exceptionless regularities, like gravity. It appears to operate the same everywhere and at all times. Nevertheless, given that I can imagine a world without gravity, or in which gravity operates differently, and I can do so without bringing abut a logical contradiction, it follows that gravity is a contingent truth about the world.

Modal logic employs a “possible worlds” heuristic, which refers to logically possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which pigs fly, donkeys talk and the Greek gods were literally real. In modal logic these are characterized as possible non-actual worlds. The philosopher David K. Lewis maintained that all such worlds actually exist, but are actual only to their inhabitants. This is sometimes called the modal multiverse, to distinguish it from other multiverse concepts like the quantum multiverse.

For me the universe is either fully "deterministic" or it is not. Any middle-ground ("soft determinism"?) confused me. Let me ask simple yes/no questions.

For the sake of argument, let's ignore probabilistic interpretations of quantum physics. Let's ignore Penrose's theory that human consciousness is the result of unpredictable events in the microtubules of neurons. OTOH, if one's opposition to "hard determinism" depends specifically on quantum unpredictability, please say so explicitly.

No, absolutely not. Compatibiism has nothing to do with quantum indeterminism. I raised quantum indeterminism to counter peacegirl’s claim that the whole history of the world had to be exactly the way that it is. This claim would be false even if quantum indeterminacy did not exist, but because it does, and because the whole world is fundamentally quantum, it follows that plenty of events could easily have been different for no reason at all.

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options....
If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

... The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise....

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. ... I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The choice is made by human brain, allegedly the most powerful machine in the universe. The result of the "thinking" in such a brain is much too difficult to compute. Especially since humans appear to have volition and might switch their choice at the last moment just to confound an on-looker who believes in determinism.

The execution of a computer program is not easily predictable. A gamma-ray might arrive "randomly" and invert a bit. But nothing is "random"; that gamma-ray is part of the universe and would be part of the input to any impossibly-perfect predictor.

So my Y/N question is: Granted that human action seems completely unpredictable, given exactly the same circumstances is it possible for the human to choose Coke in one instantiation of the universe and Pepsi in other?

I’ve given the compatibilist response to this many times, though one should note there are subtly different flavors of compatibilism. My response is simply, given the exact same antecedent circumstances, if you could replay the tape of the world, I would always pick Coke. However, it simply does not logically follow from this that I have to pick Coke. See discussion above about contingency vs. necessity.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

First, what is the difference between “situationally not-possible” and “situationally impossible”?

If the universe is modally necessary, then something situationally (or contextually) not-possible is situationally (or contextually) impossible. But it is very easy for us to assert that it is possible that there would be nothing rather than something.

That being the case, the universe as modal necessity is not here established. Consequently, the universe is; the universe is actual, but it is not modally necessary. This perspective renders everything in and about the universe contingent. The context for determinism simpliciter is the universe, more specifically as a context which is utterly determinate, devoid of any indeterminateness that is ever relevant (more on relevant in a later response). For determinism, this universe as utterly determinate, devoid of any relevant indeterminateness is regarded as or functions as the initial condition, effectively the only context, the broadest context addressed, and the only relevant context (although it can also be addressed as constituted by sub-contexts which are as utterly determinate as the broadest context). It is as if the universe were necessary, even if it is not modally necessary.

But here's the thing: even if the universe is never demonstrated to be a modally necessary thing, we can take into account the conditional if the universe is not modally necessary and determinism simpliciter is true, and we can also take into account the conditional if the universe is modally necessary and determinism simpliciter is true, and then we can see whether that unavoidably affects the determinism simpliciter position at all. What we find is that there is no difference with regards to the universe or with regards to determinism. This shows that, if compatibilism is actually compatible with determinism simpliciter, then nothing about compatibilism depends on whether the determinism context is modally necessary or contingent, because nothing about that determinism is dependent upon whether its context is modally necessary or contingent. That being the case, nothing about the modal status of the universe determinism context is relevant to the hard/soft determinism distinction.

 

[peacegirl]

I don't follow the "determinism debate." I have trouble with big words like "contingent."

“Contingent“ in this context simply means “could have been otherwise,” as distinct from “necessary,” which means “could not have been otherwise.” If you can imagine a world different from the one we live in without bringing about a logical contradiction, then the things that are different in the imagined world are contingent both in the imagined world and in this world. Since I can imagine a world in which I pick Pepsi instead of Coke without bringing about a logical contradiction, then the proposition “I picked Coke” was contingently true.

By contrast, I can imagine no world in which triangles have four sides or bachelors are married without bringing about a logical contradiction.

Some properties of this world are exceptionless regularities, like gravity. It appears to operate the same everywhere and at all times. Nevertheless, given that I can imagine a world without gravity, or in which gravity operates differently, and I can do so without bringing abut a logical contradiction, it follows that gravity is a contingent truth about the world.

Modal logic employs a “possible worlds” heuristic, which refers to logically possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which pigs fly, donkeys talk and the Greek gods were literally real. In modal logic these are characterized as possible non-actual worlds. The philosopher David K. Lewis maintained that all such worlds actually exist, but are actual only to their inhabitants. This is sometimes called the modal multiverse, to distinguish it from other multiverse concepts like the quantum multiverse.

For me the universe is either fully "deterministic" or it is not. Any middle-ground ("soft determinism"?) confused me. Let me ask simple yes/no questions.

For the sake of argument, let's ignore probabilistic interpretations of quantum physics. Let's ignore Penrose's theory that human consciousness is the result of unpredictable events in the microtubules of neurons. OTOH, if one's opposition to "hard determinism" depends specifically on quantum unpredictability, please say so explicitly.

No, absolutely not. Compatibiism has nothing to do with quantum indeterminism. I raised quantum indeterminism to counter peacegirl’s claim that the whole history of the world had to be exactly the way that it is. This claim would be false even if quantum indeterminacy did not exist, but because it does, and because the whole world is fundamentally quantum, it follows that plenty of events could easily have been different for no reason at all.

Determinism doesn’t eliminate choices, it generates options, and brains are able to choose among those options....
If any other members would care to go down this rabbit hole, feel free.

If choice is defined as permitting someone to take any one of a number of possible actions in any given instance in time, that is not determinism. And if a compatibilist believes that, they are not a compatibilist, they are a Libertarian.

I’ve addressed this many times. You need not agree with what I say, but it would be nice if you would address the substance of it.

... The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise....

If I choose x — Coke, say, over Pepsi — I am acting on a string of precise antecedents that motivated my choice. ... I choose Coke because I want to, and not because I have to.

The choice is made by human brain, allegedly the most powerful machine in the universe. The result of the "thinking" in such a brain is much too difficult to compute. Especially since humans appear to have volition and might switch their choice at the last moment just to confound an on-looker who believes in determinism.

The execution of a computer program is not easily predictable. A gamma-ray might arrive "randomly" and invert a bit. But nothing is "random"; that gamma-ray is part of the universe and would be part of the input to any impossibly-perfect predictor.

So my Y/N question is: Granted that human action seems completely unpredictable, given exactly the same circumstances is it possible for the human to choose Coke in one instantiation of the universe and Pepsi in other?

I’ve given the compatibilist response to this many times, though one should note there are subtly different flavors of compatibilism. My response is simply, given the exact same antecedent circumstances, if you could replay the tape of the world, I would always pick Coke. However, it simply does not logically follow from this that I have to pick Coke. See discussion above about contingency vs. necessity.

Stop using this to prove free will. No determinist that I know of would say you could NOT choose otherwise in a different situation that would naturally elicit a different response. Show me where this applies to the situation that compels a reaction due to having no choice given the options. You seem to be sidestepping the main argument Pood!

 

[pood]

Although I think philosophy is profoundly important, as well as inextricably bound up with science, which is shot through with philosophical assumptions, some of it can be very silly. There are, for example, metaphysicians who take no note of modern physics in constructing their metaphysical models.

In that regard, I wonder whether there are any hard water determinists out there, in competition with soft water determinists.

The dispute here would be whether water is actually wet, or is wetness an illusion?

The hard water determinist stoutly maintains that wetness is an illusion, because his/her world view is entirely reductive and he/she argues that because molecules, atoms, etc. are not wet, therefore there can be no wetness! The soft water determinist simply opens a faucet and lets the water rush out and says, “See? It’s wet!”

The hard water determinist counters, “Nu-huh! Sure, it seems wet, but that’s an illusion. It can’t be wet because it’s constituent parts are dry!”

And indeed, there are those, including some scientists, who maintain that consciousness is an illusion, because neurons, synapses, etc., are not conscious. Or else, they maintain that there is no “hard problem of consciousness,” because qualia, self-awareness, etc., simply ARE, the firing of neurons, etc. These are called eliminativists, among them being the biochemist Larry Moran.

 

[pood]

When DBT repeatedly brings up “inner necessity” to claim we do not have compatibilist freedom, I simply ask again and again: What kind of “necessity” is he talking about?

It cannot be logical necessity, for reasons I have given. So what IS this necessity of which he speaks? I hold that it does not exist — that the only form of necessity is logical necessity.

But it is true, of course, that people use language in a loose and often slipshod manner, so we might say, for instance, that it is “necessary” to eat a big breakfast if you are doing to do a hard day’s work. But it’s not necessary at all; it’s just advisable.

 

[pood]

Earlier the Minkowski block world model was brought up, in which the future exists along with the past and the present. The model was derived from evidence: relativity theory. Given the relativity of simultaneity, and that every spacetime event has to be assigned four coordinates, three of space and one of time, it’s hard to see how the model could not be true, but then again, general relativity conflicts with quantum mechanics, so the jury is out.

However, if the future is already just as fixed as the past — a theme of the wonderful sci-fi movie Arrival — this still does not impugn compatibilist free will.

That’s because the block world was anticipated by Aristotle some 2,000 years ago, even though he knew nothing about relativity theory.

It’s called the Problem of Future Contingents. Aristotle worried that if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then the battle is inevitable and no one could do anything about it. Hence, he reasoned, we have no free will. The ancient Greek thinkers were big on fatalism and the so-called “idle” argument — it is idle to worry about what we do, because the future is fixed, and there is nothing we can do to avoid it or change it. In drama, this idea is most vividly depicted in Oedipus Rex by Sophocles.

Aristotle, wishing to preserve free will, argued that propositions only become true at the time the event they describe happens; thus the statement “today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle” actually has no truth value.

But there are all sorts of assumptions here that need to unpacked and clarified.

If, 100 years ago, someone uttered the sentence, “In 2024, Donald Trump — unfortunately — will be elected president,” who can doubt that he spoke truly, both of the event and the value judgment ascribed to it? He did speak truly; Aristotle was mistaken. Importantly, his solution to the Problem of Future Contingents was not needed to vindicate free will.

Again, modern modal logic shows why. Aristotle’s reasoning was:

If today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow the sea battle MUST (necessarily) occur. No one can prevent it.

The proper modal reconstruction is:

Necessarily (if today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow a sea battle will [but not MUST!] occur.

The necessity is a relative necessity, inhering not just in the consequent, but jointly in the antecedent and consequent together.

From this it follows that the sea battle may, or MAY NOT, occur, but whatever happens, the statement prior to the event will adjust its truth value to reflect reality. If there is a sea battle, then today it will be true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle; if there is NOT a sea battle, then today it will be true that tomorrow there will NOT be a sea battle.

The implicit mistake in the Problem of Future Contingents is to suppose that the truth of a statement today, somehow forces the event that the statement describes to occur tomorrow. But this gets the flow of truth-making exactly backward. It’s like my saying that watching the sun come up forces the sun to come up.

The Problem of Future Contingents also amounts to the (false) assumptions that the fixity of the future is the same as fatalism, and that to have free will, we ought to be able to somehow change the future.

But fixity is not fatalism, inevitability is not necessity, and free will requires us to change nothing, only to be able to make certain things within our purview be, what they actually are.

If the future is already fixed as in the block world model, then my future free acts will contribute to that fixity, just as my past free acts contributed to the fixity of the past, and my current free acts contribute to to the fixity of the present. As I freely type these words in the present, I am changing nothing; I am only helping to make things be, what they actually are.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

... part of the deterministic stream are humans determining choices.

The cited expression is not compatible with determinism. In order for any action to be "determining", it must be the case that there was some not-yet-determined matter for that action to determine and, hence, effect a determined condition out of a not-yet-determined condition. Determinism asserts that there never is a (human level) not-yet-determined condition to be determined by humans or by anything else for that matter.

One reason why determinism is not (necessarily) coercion-ism is because determine is (or can/should) always be appreciated as intended to convey more of a passive voice condition. It could be said that determinism is not concerned with how/why utter determinateness is. Per determinism, humans (and their actions) happen to be constituents of the utterly determinate context referred to as the universe.

 

[peacegirl]

Maybe Michael can help Pood see the light in regard to the truth of no free will which does not allow for free will without a complete contradiction. Free will is just an artifact of an ancient thought system that dishes out rewards and punishment along with the belief that there are superior people who should take the controls. This is the most dangerous thinking of all and has gotten us to where we are now. Don’t you think it’s time for a change in the approach toward a system of blame and punishment that is failing us? What is it going to take before we destroy ourselves and everything we hold dear?

 

[pood]

necessity.

Stop using this to prove free will. No determinist that I know of would say you could NOT choose otherwise in a different situation that would naturally elicit a different response. Show me where this applies to the situation that compels a reaction due to having no choice given the options. You seem to be sidestepping the main argument Pood!

You seem unable to comprehend what I write.