You are saying that I don't make decisions, because I am a deterministic system, and so therefore cannot make decisions.
Were I a determinist, I would say you do not make decisions only because there are no decisions to be made. You will do what you will do, but nothing that you have done, do, or will do is a decision. The words
decide,
choose,
select, and the like - in ordinary usage - refer to experiences as context. Specifically, those terms refer to the experience a person has of having the sense that there is physical and metaphysical (hence (meta)physical) unsettledness - indeterminateness - with regards to what the person will do given a situation in which the person senses that there are options/alternatives. When faced with a situation in which the person is thirsty and there are Pepsi and Coke available, the person has some sense of it being as yet undetermined as to whether the person will choose/select/decide to have Pepsi or Coke or even neither.
Determinism denies that it is ever as yet undetermined what the person will do; determinism denies the (meta)physical actuality of - but not the experience or sense of there being - human-level indeterminateness.
If, as per determinism, it is correct that there is no such actual indeterminateness as that which humans experience in being human, then there is nothing to decide. Compatibilists might counter something along the lines of: The compatibilist definition of
decide,
choose,
select, and the like is different from that above given description. The compatibilist definition is ... well, I do not recall actually seeing one, and I cannot at the moment think of a compatibilist definition that would work against the above described context description for those terms. And this is relevant inasmuch as the compatibilist as determinist agrees that there is no actual (meta)physical indeterminateness with regards to the human-level context. After all, if the compatibilist denies denying that indeterminateness, then how is it that the compatibilist is a determinist?
I have seen incompatibilist determinists say that the person MUST do what the person does, and I have even seen self-described incompatibilist determinists say that they DECIDE/CHOOSE/SELECT. But such semantic inconsistency is easily rectified. MUST gets replaced by WILL, and the indeterminateness-related terms get re-expressed simply by reference to the person doing something. For example, QUESTION: Does the person choose the Pepsi or the Coke? ANSWER: The person picks up (will pick up or did pick up, obviously depending on further context details) the Pepsi and drinks it. And the semantic inconsistency is erased/avoided. Of course, that leaves determinism as incoherent with regards to a rather basic experience of human being. And that just leads to further discussion.
As I said, I am not a determinist. I have tried to present the determinist perspective fairly and accurately. I think I have succeeded. But I leave that for determinists to challenge. I am not a determinist, but I also hold that determinism is possibly true. I am willing to regard compatibilist determinism as possibly true, but I just have not yet found a way to express that compatibilism in a way which is consistent with what I previously referred to as determinism
simpliciter. Also as noted previously, I see no reason for an incompatibilist determinist to disagree with the compatibilist determinist with regards to a person not being coerced/made to do what the person does, but that is just a reiteration of the incompatibilist determinist being able to substitute WILL for MUST without in any way affecting the determinism of the incompatibilist determinist. Being
free from (coercion or control, for instance) can be a necessary condition for being
free to, but being
free from is not a sufficient condition for being
free to. Indeterminateness is also a necessary condition for being
free to.